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ABSTRACT 
Kotilainen, Noora 
Visual Theaters of Suffering - Constituting the Western Spectator in the Age 
of the Humanitarian World Politics 
Visual images picturing suffering of others are in many ways forceful; they 
move their spectators emotionally and politically. Images of wars, crisis and 
suffering communicate humanity, the peril it is in, as well as the need to 
protect it and to alleviate suffering. Emotive images of bodily suffering affect 
the understanding of not only the immediate crisis they depict but of the 
surrounding world, the position of the spectators of the images, as well as the 
position of the spectated (suffering) others.  
This is a study into the position, significance, framings and utilization of 
images of atrocity, war and human suffering within the evolvement of the 
ideas of a shared human community and humanitarian discourse. The visual 
theaters of suffering are approached within a historical perspective from the 
times of the Enlightenment onwards, focusing particularly on the era of 
Western lead humanitarian world politics  of the recent decades. The thesis 
asks, how images of suffering presented within a humanitarian frame have 
historically been communicating apprehensions of a shared humanity whilst 
reflecting the political preconditions of their era.  And how images of distress 
and crisis in the more contemporary international political and media 
contexts are framed and used within the Western sphere, and how they are 
communicating the prevalent humanitarian ethos of their time. The 
dissertation focuses on visual practices that constitute namely the Western 
spectatorship and Western spectator of suffering, and thus the practices that 
through visual representations of suffering, war and conflict constitute, 
produce and reproduce conceptions of international politics, the West and 
the Rest and hierarchies of humanity.   
Humanitarianism, especially in the more contemporary political settings, 
is approached as an influential (unconscious) ideology. Emotive images of 
suffering are perceived as emotionally driven theatrical tragedy 
arrangements through which the ideological apparatus of humanitarianism 
addresses and invites its audiences to see the spectacles of global suffering in 
certain contextual, politically and ideologically constructed and governed 
ways.  
Firstly the history of visual humanitarian communication from the mid-
eighteenth century until 2000s is mapped out. Through the mapping out of 
the imagery, the positions and framing of images of human suffering within 
the evolvement of the humanity and humanitarianism discourses and 
changing notions of life seen as worthy of protection and rights are analyzed. 
Secondly, through four divergent, contemporary and empirically orientated 
cases, it is analyzed how various images of crisis, war and suffering/non-
suffering are arranged and utilized in the contemporary settings of Western 
humanitarian world politics. In the contemporary setting, images of conflict, 
war, natural catastrophes and refugeeness are discussed, and the differences 
of the representation of Western suffering vis-à-vis non-Western suffering 
are analyzed as a theater of proof of the conditional nature of humanity. 
Topical Western visual war branding efforts—strategic communication of the 
NATO Afghanistan operation—are analyzed from the point of view of the 
legitimizing narratives of contemporary Western war. Also the visual 
narratives of the Western enemies—Muammar Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein 
and Osama bin Laden—in the context of Western humanitarian international 
politics are scrutinized. And finally, the positions of social media images of 
contemporary war within international politics–namely the images of the 
Syrian 2013 Ghouta chemical assault—are analyzed. 
The thesis shows how visual humanitarian communication, the 
representational practices and arrangements of images of pain and crisis, 
have during history reflected, as well as constructed, the predominant 
thinking on humanity, the perils it faces and the available means to protect 
life from these perils. It is concluded that in addition to mediating distant 
atrocities and informing the spectators of the need of help, images of war and 
suffering are contemporarily often used in the branding of military 
operations and legitimation of interventionist actions, as well as utilized as 
strategic enablers in foreign political settings in times of crisis. Moreover, it 
is argued that the humanitarian imagery of today has become a central arena 
of communicating the world order, and further of indicating the status of the 
sufferers within the global hierarchy of humanity, and thus manifesting the 
globally conditional value of (human) life and the limited universality of 
humanity. 
The study includes 24 collage illustrations into which some of the key 
visual images discussed in the study are compiled.  
 
 
 
 
TIIVISTELMÄ 
Kuvat muiden kärsimyksestä vaikuttavat katsojiinsa monilla tunteisiin 
vetoavilla ja poliittisilla tavoilla. Kärsimyksen kuvat kertovat ihmisyydestä, 
sitä uhkaavista ilmiöistä sekä elämän suojelun ja kärsimyksen helpottamisen 
tarpeesta. Yksittäisten kriisimielikuvien muokkaamisen lisäksi kuvat 
vaikuttavat käsityksiin ympäröivästä maailmasta muovaten katsojiensa 
käsityksiä omasta ja muiden asemasta globaalissa järjestyksessä.  
Tämä tutkimus keskittyy sotien-, kriisien- ja kärsimyksen kuvien 
asemaan, käyttöön ja kehystyksiin ihmisyys-, ihmisoikeus- ja 
humanitaaristen diskurssien kehittymisen konteksteissa, eli tarkastelee 
ihmisyyden visuaalisia teattereja historiallisessa perspektiivissä. Tutkimus 
tarkastelee kärsimyksen kuvien asemaa laajenevan ja muuttuvan läntisen 
humanitaarisen diskurssin ja ihmisoikeusdiskurssin osana, ja kartoittaa sitä 
miten kuvien esityskäytännöt ovat heijastelleet sekä rakentaneet aikansa 
käsityksiä elämän suojelun tarpeesta ja oikeuksien arvoisesta elämästä. 
Tarkastelu alkaa valistusajalta 1700-luvun puolivälistä keskittyen 
nimenomaan viime vuosikymmenten, läntisen humanitaarisen 
maailmanpolitiikan aikakauden läntisiin kuvakäytäntöihin. Tutkimuksen 
keskiössä ovat kriisien kuvien esittämisen käytännöt viime vuosikymmenten 
kansainvälisen politiikan kontekstissa sekä se, miten kuvat muodostavat 
nimenomaan läntistä katsetta ja läntistä katsojaa, näin ollen heijastellen ja 
rakentaen kansainvälisen politiikan ja ihmisyyden hierarkioita. 
Humanitarismi, varsinkin lähivuosikymmenten kansainvälispoliittisissa 
yhteyksissä, käsitetään tutkimuksessa  alitajuisena ideologiana.  
Kärsimyksen kuvien esityskäytäntöjen nähdään muodostavan teatraalisen 
tragediamuodon, jonka kautta humanitaarinen ideologia puhuttelee ja 
kutsuu katsojiaan näkemään globaalit kärsimyksen spektaakkelit 
kontekstuaalisilla, ideologisesti ja poliittisesti rakentuneilla ja hallinnoiduilla  
tavoilla.  
Tutkimuksen ensimmäinen osa kartoittaa humanitaarisen kuvaston  
käyttöä valistusajalta 2000-luvulle saakka analysoiden kuvaston asemaa 
kehittyvän ja muuttuvan ihmisyys- ja humanitarismidiskurssin yhteyksissä. 
Toiseksi, neljän erilaisen, empiirisesti suuntautuneen 2000-luvun tapauksen 
valossa analysoidaan sodan, kriisien ja kärsimyksen kuvien asemaa ja 
käyttöä nykyisen läntisen humanitaarisen kansainvälisen politiikan 
yhteyksissä. Tutkimuksessa analysoidaan kuvia viimevuosien sodista, terrori-
iskuista, luonnonkatastrofeista, epidemioista ja pakolaisuudesta sekä 
käsitellään länsimaisten ja ei-länsimaisten ihmisten kärsimyksen kuvallisen 
esittämisen käytäntöjä ihmisyyden arvon todistamisen teatterina. 
Tarkastelun kohteena ovat myös läntisen nykysodan visuaaliset 
markkinointi- ja legitimointinarratiivit ja Nato-johtoisen Afganistanin 
operaation strategisen kommunikaation kuvat.  Viimeaikaisten lännen 
kansainvälispoliittisten vihollisten – Muammar Gaddafin, Saddam 
Husseinin ja Osama bin Ladenin – kiinniotto- ja rankaisukuvastoja 
käsitellään humanitaarisen maailmanpolitiikan kontekstissa. Ja viimeiseksi 
tarkastellaan nykysodista levinneiden sosiaalisen median kuvien asemaa 
kansainvälisessä politiikassa, Syyrian Ghoutassa elokuussa 2013 
tapahtuneiden kaasuiskujen kuvien käytön avulla.  
Väitöskirja osoittaa, miten humanitaarinen visuaalinen viestintä, 
kärsimyksen ja konfliktien kuvien esittämisen käytännöt ja asettelut ovat 
historian saatossa heijastelleet sekä muokanneet vallitsevia käsityksiä 
ihmisyydestä, arvokkaasta elämästä ja sen rajoista, elämän suojelun 
tarpeesta, ihmisyyttä uhkaavista vaaroista sekä niistä käytännöistä, joilla 
elämää voidaan suojella. Tutkimus osoittaa, että kriisitiedonvälityksen lisäksi  
kärsimyksen visuaalisia representaatioita käytetään nykytilanteessa laajasti 
muun muassa legitimoitaessa interventionistista kansainvälistä politiikkaa, 
markkinoitaessa  sotilasoperaatioita, ja niihin vedotaan usein kriisiaikojen 
poliittisessa retoriikassa. Tämän lisäksi tutkimus esittää, että kriisien ja 
kärsimyksen nykykuvastot ovat nykyisin keskeisiä läntisen 
maailmanjärjestyksen kommunikoinnissa.  Kuvien esityskäytännöt 
ilmentävät kuvien kohteina olevien kärsijöiden asemaa ihmisyyden 
globaalissa hierarkiassa havainnollistaen globaalisti epätasaisesti 
jakautunutta ihmisyyden arvoa. 
Tutkimus sisältää 24 kuvakollaasia, joihin tutkimuksessa käsitellyt 
keskeiset kuvat on koottu.  
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1 INTRODUCTION: INVESTIGATING THE 
POLITICAL THEATERS OF MEDIATED 
SUFFERING 
1.1 SPECTATING THE SUFFERING OF OTHERS 
Contemporary Western followers of ever more frantic paced media flows and 
consumers of foreign news have grown accustomed to seeing suffering bodies 
of distant individuals mediated for their awareness on daily bases. Although 
the majority of spectators of representations of suffering on average have 
never first-handedly witnessed mass-atrocity or all-embracing human 
suffering, nevertheless seeing the despair of others is an everyday experience, 
quintessentially constituting conceptions of the surrounding world. But why 
are followers of media and politics continuously placed as the spectators of 
distant, unknown suffering others? And what effects do images of atrocity 
and distress have on in particularly the Western apprehensions of humanity, 
the surrounding world —and of international politics?  
This a study into the position, significance, framings and utilization of 
images of atrocity, war and human suffering within the evolvement of the 
ideas of a shared human community and humanitarian discourse historically 
and particularly in the era of Western lead humanitarian world politics 1 of 
the recent decades.  
Visual images of suffering bodies are powerful; they are often read in an 
instant and work partly on subconscious, culturally driven levels, according 
to historically formed customs. Moreover images of suffering others stick 
with us—they haunt us. Visual representations of suffering bodies arouse 
strong emotions; fear, pity, compassion, will to help, indignation, sense of 
threat, sorrow, will to retaliate. Because of the very dramatic and 
connotative, emotionally charged nature and mode of communication, 
images of suffering obtain great power. Analytically assessing—or 
furthermore questioning—the motives of the presentation and framing of 
images depicting the most intimate and tragic moments of distant fellow 
humans might feel heretical, even heartless. Thus, in everyday settings the 
emotional and moral education embedded in the dramatic images, as well as 
the politically driven assemblage of images of suffering often tend to remain 
beyond critical assessment.  
                                                
1 By humanitarian word politics I refer to Western military interventionist politics, rationalized 
by the protection of human rights and safeguarding lives in distant corners of the world, has come to 
play an increasingly essential part in the legitimization of Western international political aspirations in 
the post-Cold War era. Humanitarian world politics remains as one of the key terms used and referred 
to through out this study. See: Aaltola, Mika: Western Spectacle of Governance and the Emergence 
of Humanitarian World Politics, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009; Barnett, Michael: The International 
Humanitarian Order. Routledge, Oxon&New York 2010.  
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Visual humanitarian arrangements enclose and address their spectators 
on daily basis in multimodal and often highly political manners. Images of 
crisis and suffering tell of the shared fate of all living creatures as vulnerable 
and precarious, thus they communicate humanity, the peril it is in and also 
the need to protect it and alleviate the suffering. These powerful images 
affect our understanding of not only the immediate crisis they depict but of 
the world surrounding us, our own position, as well as the position of (the 
suffering) others in it. The representational patterns of visualized suffering 
create global and political hierarchies. The arrangements of such images thus 
construct and direct our understanding on protectable life, human rights, 
their endorsement and downfall. (Mainstream) media heavily relies on 
dramatic crisis imagery at times of conflict in order to mediate faraway 
events into the awareness of distant spectating audiences. Visualized 
suffering provides and suggests routes to intervening in the situations 
inflicting suffering and is, thus, commonly used by humanitarian actors and 
organizations. Moreover images of violence and suffering are habitually 
utilized in political settings; namely at times of conflict and war and within 
international politics.  
The starting point of this study is the desire to gain deeper understanding 
of the position visual images depicting and mediating suffering have 
historically had on the apprehension of the shared universal humankind 
bound together by (bodily) vulnerability within the formation of the modern 
Western humanity/humanitarianism discourse. And in light of history, this 
study moreover sets to analyze the contemporary Western discourse of 
protection of humanity, human rights, humanitarian system and 
humanitarian politics—and ‘humanitarian war’—through visual 
representations.  
Throughout this study I repeatedly refer to the “West”, as well as the 
“Rest” — the “non-West”. This is because at the focus of this study are also 
the visual practices that constitute namely the Western spectator and the 
Western spectatorship of suffering, and thus the practices that through visual 
representations of suffering, war and conflict constitute, produce and 
reproduce conceptions of international politics, the West and the Rest and of 
hierarchies of humanity.   
The construction of ’our fellow feelings’ for the suffering others has been 
an interest of analytical consideration probably for as long as there has been 
human civilization. The conception of empathetic feelings towards one’s 
neighbor is at the heart of any religion. Cosmopolitan feelings and moral ties 
towards distant others and the others of the human kind have been 
considered at least from the time of antiquity. Also, solidarity and moral 
sentiments towards the suffering distant others have undeniably always been 
communicated through emotive visual representations. Such representations 
have been abundant throughout history: in religious bearings (the crucified 
body of Jesus Christ communicating mercy through suffering), in visual art 
and popular culture, as well as in more straight forwardly political 
18
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affiliations, such as official dissemination of information and propaganda, 
especially in times of conflict. An important modern culmination point in 
regards to visually mediated humanitarian communication is habitually 
dated to the times of the Enlightenment, when the preconditions of 
communication as well as a generalizing and popularizing apprehension of a 
shared humanity with rights became a center of attention in Western societal 
philosophy.2  
Over the past few decades, quite a lot of attention has been given to the 
analysis and critique of the ethics of representation and the (theatrical) 
display of humanitarian imagery. Within relevant research, the ways in 
which the suffering of the distant, usually non-Western others have been 
visually presented and mediated for Western spectators have been widely 
scrutinized. Most of the research literature in this field has been 
concentrating on the functions and ethics of visually representing the pain of 
others3; the uses of the images of suffering by (international) humanitarian 
organizations (NGOs)4 and the use of images of crisis and suffering in and by 
the media.5 Within this line of research, the effects of visual representations 
of distant suffering on cosmopolitan solidarity, on the role of images in the 
construction of global hierarchical relations, on the ethics of representation, 
as well as on the impact of divergent representational modes on 
humanitarian work and appeals have been discussed in a variety of scholarly 
                                                
2 Smith, Adam: The Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1759. (Filiquarian Publishing, LLC, 2007) Burke, 
Edmund: A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origins of the Sublime and Beautiful: And Other Pre-
Revolutionary Writings, Penguin Classics, New York, 1998; Voltaire, Candide, Penguin Classics, 
2001 (1759); Kant, Immanuel: Critique of Judgement. Hackett Publishing Company, Cambridge, 
1987 (1790.) See also: Sliwinski, Sharon: Human Rights in Camera, The University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 2011; Halttunen, Karen: Humanitarianism and the Pornography of Pain in Anglo-
American Culture. American Historical Review, Vol. 100, April, 1995, 303-334.;Orgad, Shani: Media 
representations and the Global Imagination. Polity, Cambridge, 2012; Neiman, Susan: Evil in 
Modern Thought. An Alternative History of Philosophy. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 
2002. 
3 Sontag, Susan: Regarding the Pain of Others. Farrar, Straus & Giroux, New York, 2003; Sontag, 
Susan: On Phtography. Penguin London, 1979 (1977); Scarry, Elaine: The Body In Pain. The 
making and unmaking of the world. Oxford university press, New York, 1985; Linfield, Susie: The 
Cruel Radiance. Photography and Political Violence. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2010; 
Dauphinee, Elizabeth:The Politics of the Body in Pain: Reading the Ethics of Imagery, Security 
Dialogue, Vol. 38, No. 1, 2007; Picturing Atrocity. Photography In Crisis. Batchen, Geoffrey, 
Gidley Mick et al. (Eds.) Reaction Books, London, 2012; Butler, Judith: Frames of War: When is life 
grievable? Verso, London, 2009 
4 Chouliaraki, Lillie: The Ironic Spectator. Solidarity in the age of Post-Humanitarianism. Polity, 
Cambridge, 2013; Cohen, Stanley: States of Denial, Knowing about atrocity and suffering, Polity, 
Cambridge, 2001.; Kennedy, Denis: Selling the Distant Other: Humanitarianism and Imagery- 
ethical dilemmas of Humanitarian Action. The journal of humanitarian assistance, 2009; Käpylä, 
Juha& Kennedy, Dennis: Cruel to Care? Investigating the Governance of Compassion in 
Humanitarian Imagery. International Theory, 6/2, 2014, 255-292. Malkki, Liisa: Speechless 
emissaries. Refugees, Humanitarianism and dehistoricization. Cultural Anthropology, 1996, 11/3, 
377-404; Humanitarian Photography. A History. Fehrenbach, Heide&Rodogno,Davide (Eds.), 
Cambridge University Press, New York, 2015.  
5 Moeller, Susan, D: Compassion Fatigue. How the Media Sell Disease, Famine, War and Death. 
Routledge, New York, 1999 ; Boltanski, Luc: Distant Suffering. Morality, Media and Politics. 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999. ; Chouliaraki, Lillie: The Spectatorship of Suffering. 
Sage, London, 2008. 34; Orgad, 2012.; Zelizer, Barbie: About to die. How news images move the 
Public.Oxford University Press, New York, 2010.; Campbell, David: Horrific Blindness. Images of 
Death in contemporary Media.Journal for Cultural Research, 8/1, 2004, 55-74. Disasters and the 
Media. Pantti, Mervi, Wahl-Jorgensen, Karin. & Cottle, Simon. Peter Lang, New York, 2012.  
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work. Also, the historical formation of the connection between visual 
humanitarian representations and humanitarian/human rights paradigms 
and humanitarian politics have been somewhat scrutinized in research.6 The 
political power and international workings behind the images of suffering 
presenting distant crisis and vulnerable others to Western spectators and 
policy makers has also been scrutinized.7 Perhaps most renownedly the 
international political power of atrocity images has been scrutinized in the 
context of the “Vietnam War syndrome”8 and the “CNN effect” theories,9 as 
well as more lately somewhat touched upon, for example, within the “Al 
Jazeera effect”10 debate. These analytical theories have debated whether the 
mediated revelatory images depicting the distress of (non-Western) others 
have imposed interventionist pressure or even forced their view upon 
(Western) foreign policy towards humanitarian crisis situations and conflicts 
in global crisis areas.   
Western military interventionist politics, rationalized by the protection of 
human rights and safeguarding lives in distant corners of the world, has 
come to play an increasingly essential part in the legitimization of Western 
international political aspirations in the post-Cold War era. In consequence 
of the recent developments, it may be argued, images revealing and 
visualizing the distress of distant others have feasibly become a more 
important and convenient political tool for Western international political 
actors. The historical and political development leading to the current 
situation, in which humanitarianism and international power politics have 
been amalgamated, has been an issue of growing academic interest. The 
implications of Western humanitarian world politics and military 
humanitarianism at the level of international politics as well as the effects of 
this development on organizational humanitarianism have been scrutinized 
                                                
6 Sliwinski, 2011; Orgad, 2012; Zelizer, Barbie: Remembering to forget. Holocaust Memory 
through the Camera’s Eye.  University of Chicago Press, 1998; Sontag, 2003; Butler, 2009; 
Campbell, David: Atrocity, Memory, Photography: imaging the concentration camps of Bosnia – 
the case of ITN versus Living Marxisim, Journal of Human Rights Vol. 1/ nr 1, 2002(1.),1-33 (A); 
Campbell, David: Atrocity, Memory, Photography: imaging the consentration camps of Bosnia – 
the case of ITN versus Living Marxisim, part 2. Journal of Human Rights, Vol 1, nr. 2, 2002 (2.), 143-
172(B); Cottle, Simon: Global Crisis Reporting. Journalism in the Global Age. Open University 
Press, Maidenhead, 2009.  
7 Hansen, Lene: How Images make World Politics: International icons and the case of Abu Ghraib. 
Review of Intrnational Studies.  41/2, 2015, 263-288; Saugmann Andersen, Rune: Remediating 
Security. A semiotic Framework for Analyzing how Video Speaks Security.  PhD Dissertation, 
Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, 2015.  
8Hallin, Daniel C: The Uncencored War: The Media and Vietnam. University of California Press, 
Berkeley, 1989 (1986); Perlmutter, David: Photojournalism and Foreign Policy. Icons of outrage in 
International Crisis. Praeger, London, 1998 ; Chomsky, Noam & Herman, Edward, S: 
Manufacturing Consent. The Political Economy of the Mass Media. Pantheon Books, New York, 2002 
(1988). 
9 Robinson, Piers: The CNN Effect. The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention, Routledge, 
London, 2002. ; Giboa, Eytan: The CNN Effect: The search for a Communications theory of 
International Relations. Political Communication, 22, 2005, 27-44.   
10 Seib, Philip: The Al Jazeera Effect: How the New Global Media Are Reshaping World Politics, 
Potomac Books, Washington DC, 2008; Seib, Philip: Real-time diplomacy: Politics and power in the 
Social media era. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012.  
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extensively in contemporary scholarly research.11 Nevertheless, relatively 
little attention has been given to the Western (governmental) political 
framing and representation of the suffering/non-suffering of humans within 
the contemporary visual humanitarian theatrical arrangements. Likewise the 
global political—even imperialistic—features embedded in Western media 
representations and presentational practices governing the depiction of the 
suffering of distant others, as well as the non-suffering of some others, has 
been relatively scarcely addressed in research literature.12  
Moral sentiments aroused by visual arrangements of human suffering, as 
well as by humanitarian visual communication and by global humanitarian 
politics, have been studied and approached from a multitude of perspectives 
and angles. But what interests me deeply is how images of suffering have 
historically been communicating a widening apprehension of a shared 
humanity whilst reflecting the political preconditions of their era, and how 
images of suffering, crisis and wars in the more contemporary 
international political context are framed and used within the Western 
sphere, and how they are communicating the prevalent humanitarian ethos 
of their time—and this has not been extensively touched upon in research.   
Therefore, this work firstly maps out the history of visual humanitarian 
communication from the times of the Enlightenment onwards, all the way to 
the contemporary times, by mapping out, analyzing and collecting some of 
the key events in Western visual history into collage illustrations. Through 
the mapping out of the imagery, the position and framings of images of 
human suffering within the evolvement of the notions of a shared humanity 
and life worthy of protection as well as within the evolvement of the 
humanitarian discourse are analyzed. Secondly, through four divergent, 
contemporary and empirically orientated cases, which I shall outline shortly, 
I shall analyze how various images of crisis, war and suffering communicate 
the topical ethos of humanitarian politics, and how images of suffering/non-
suffering are used and utilized in the contemporary settings of Western 
humanitarian world politics.  
I see humanitarianism, especially in the more contemporary political 
settings, as an influential (unconscious) ideology, and I perceive emotive 
                                                
11 Aaltola, 2009; Douzinas, Costas: Human rights and the Empire. Political Philosophy of 
Cosmopolitanism. Routledge-Cavendish, New York, 2007; Humanitarianism in Question. 
Politics, Power, Ethics. Barnett, Michael& Weiss, Thomas, G. (Eds.) Cornell University Press. 
Ithaca, 2008. Barnett, 2010; Belloni, Roberto: The Trouble with Humanitarianism. Review of 
international Studies. 2007. vol.33, 451-474; Chandler, David: The Road to Military 
Humanitarianism: How the Human Rights NGO’s shaped a New Humanitarian Agenda. Human 
Rights Quarterly 2001/23, 678-700, 683- 85. Chandler, David: From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond.  
Human Rights and International Intervention. Pluto Books, London, 2006 (2002); Fassin, Didier: 
Humanitarian Reason. A Moral History of the Present. University of California, Berkeley, 2012; 
Duffield, Mark: Development, Security and Unending war. Governing the World of Peoples, Polity, 
2007, Cambridge ; Fox, Fiona: New Humanitarinism: Does it Provide a Moral Banner for the 21st 
Century?, Disasters, 25/4,2001¸275-289; Rieff, David: a Bed for the night. Humanitarianism in 
Crisis. Simon and Shuster, New York, 2003. Barnett, Michael: Empire of Humanity. A History of 
Humanitarinism. Cornell University Press,  Ithaca, 2011.  
12 Butler, 2009; Kennedy&Käpylä, 2014; Cottle, Simon: Global Crisis Reporting: Journalism in 
the Global Age, Open University Press, Berkshire, 2009 
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images of suffering as an emotionally driven theatrical tragedy arrangement 
through which the ideological apparatus of humanitarianism addresses and 
invites its audiences to see the spectacles of global suffering in certain 
contextual, politically and ideologically constructed and governed ways. 
Analyzing the aspects of visual representations of human distress, 
exemplified through the metaphor of visual humanitarian theater, is at the 
heart of my inquiry into visual humanitarian communication throughout this 
study.13 Therefore, by following Judith Butler, I endeavor “to learn to see the 
frame that blinds us to what we see.”14 In other words, I seek to 
deconstruct—through contextual analyses of different types of politically 
constructed and utilized humanitarian imageries—what kind of messages the 
arrangements of the images of human suffering/non-suffering tell of the 
humanitarian politics of their time.  
In the contemporary setting (chapters 4-7 of this study) images of conflict, 
war, natural catastrophes and refugeeness are discussed, and the differences 
of the representation of Western suffering vis-à-vis non-Western suffering 
are analyzed. Topical Western visual war branding efforts—strategic 
communication of the NATO Afghanistan operation—are analyzed from the 
point of view of the legitimizing narratives of contemporary Western war. 
Also the visual narratives of the Western enemies—Muammar Gaddafi, 
Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden—in the context of Western 
humanitarian international politics are scrutinized. And finally, the positions 
of social media images of contemporary war within international politics–
namely the images of the Syrian 2013 Ghouta chemical assault—are analyzed.  
The study includes numerous collage-illustrations—in chapters 2, 4, 5, 6 
and 7—into which some of the key images discussed are complied. The 
illustrations provide the reader a view into the material of the study—the 
imagery and visual arrangements discussed and analyzed in the course of the 
study—and, moreover, they aim at giving a more comprehensive and 
accumulative visual perspective into the visual arrangements of images of 
suffering in historical settings and particularly within the Western media in 
recent years. Collage as a visual art form strives to create a new whole, by 
assembling different visual material together. Likewise, the illustrations in 
this study seek to visualize more than just the sum of the individual images 
collaged together. Thus, the collage-illustrations do not only aim at 
sententiously bringing together images discussed in the study, but moreover 
seek to show the segmented, collage-like and cumulative nature of images of 
suffering.15  
In this introductory chapter I shall outline the framework of the study and 
define the concepts used in the course of the study. I shall describe the 
                                                
13 As the metaphor of theatricality follows this study throughout on a theoretical and conceptual level, I 
will get back to the theatricality of mediated suffering in more depth in the chapter three of this study.  
14 Butler, 2009, 100.  
15 Rancière, Jaques: The Emancipated Spectator. Verso, London, 2011, 25-30 ; I will get back to this 
later in the chapter 1.6. See Also, Särmä, Saara: Junk Feminism and Nuclear Wannabes. Collaging 
Parodies of Iran and North Korea. Academic dissertation, University of Tampere, 2014.  
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position and significance images of suffering in the formation of the 
humanity discourse. The politics of humanitarianism and spectatorship of 
suffering images are discussed. I shall furthermore explicate how visual 
representations are read and analyzed in their representational contexts. And 
finally I shall describe the outline and the structure of the study in more 
detail.  
1.2 SPECTATORSHIP OF SUFFERING AND 
COMPREHENSION OF A SHARED HUMANITY IN 
NEED OF PROTECTION 
Susan Sontag has noted that seeing suffering bodies of distant, foreign 
others mediated for our awareness is an essentially modern experience.16 The 
conception, that by witnessing mediated representations that tell of the pain 
of others a compassionate relation between the sufferers and spectators is 
created, lies at the core of modern humanitarian thinking. Sharon Sliwinski 
and Karen Halttunen argue that, as the Western Enlightenment thinking in 
the mid-eighteenth century centered on pondering upon humanity and the 
shared human community in need of protection from pain and disaster, 
concurrently visuality in humanitarian context became central. Ever since, 
the spectatorship of suffering—the visual mediation of distant pain, seeing 
the suffering of others, and sentimental spectatorial sympathy—has 
remained central to the humanitarian discourse, and has evolved hand in 
hand with the development of (Western) humanitarian notions.17   
Today Westerners spectators continuously encounter the corporal 
suffering of distant fellow humans in emotion-arousing media 
representations. During the past months I have spectated starving and 
bleeding Syrians from newspaper images, and witnessed mutilated bodies of 
strangers in televised news of several foreign conflicts and catastrophes.  
While reading the online news on Western ‘humanitarian’ military 
interventions in the Middle East, I have encountered terrifying images of 
victims of war and terror. Distressed bodies of distant strangers—drowned 
refugee children on European beaches and victims of terror attacks in 
France, Kenya, Turkey and Iraq—have permeated my view while browsing 
the social media, whether I wanted it or not. Furthermore, visual appeals of 
humanitarian organizations daily catch our eye in various conjunctions: in 
the communication of the relief organizations, in the TV charity shows, even 
when drawing money from the cash machine we encounter needy faces of the 
global less fortunate. Especially today—during the age of ever more frantic 
media environment and the increasingly visible standing of humanitarianism 
also in political settings—seeing the suffering of others is a growingly vital 
part of the Western public life. Through viewing images of crisis and 
                                                
16 Sontag, 2004, 16.  
17 Sliwinski, 2011, 17-56; Halttunen, 1995, See also: Orgad, 2012. 
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suffering we encounter the turbulent world surrounding us, get informed, 
undergo sentiments, produce judgments, react to the pains and atrocities 
experienced by others and are sometimes even moved into action in order to 
alleviate the suffering of unknown distant others.  
The predominant view is that the pain of others is often more tangible for 
the distant spectators, when witnessed through visual representations 
showing the suffering of others in a bodily manner, than when encountered 
through mere words. An image of a body in pain cannot be easily 
disregarded, since a vulnerable body can be seen to represent that which is 
shared by all living creatures: something we all have, and something we all 
may lose. It is commonly thought that witnessing the suffering and bodily 
precariousness of others awakens us to see the value of human life and the 
relevance of humanitarianism, and that realizing the pain of others facilitates 
the apperception of a shared human existence. On one side of the coin, there 
is suffering and, on the other, humanitarianism. The epiphany of humanity 
is, thus, predominantly negative and often emerges from witnessing pain and 
despair of others.18  
This emphasis on corporal, visualized vulnerability is at the heart of our 
understanding of humanitarianism. Seeing visualized representations of 
suffering others constitutes the way solidary bonds between us (the 
spectators) and the others in despair are formed.19 Thus, images depicting 
another individual’s pain aimed at creating such bonds may be called 
humanitarian images.20 In order to stimulate the moral sentiments of 
distant onlookers, visual representations of the corporal pain of others are—
and have been for centuries—constantly mediated for the awareness of 
spectators by a multitude of actors and methods. Actors trying to inform and 
morally educate the distant spectators of the pain and distress of others—the 
pioneers of human rights struggles, humanitarians, religious agents, artists, 
journalists and political quarters—have all done this in varying ways 
throughout the course of history.21 Furthermore, today images vividly 
exhibiting the suffering of distant others play an increasingly important role 
in world politics: they are commonly referred to in political rhetoric and 
habitually used in political proclamations as explicating and legitimating 
political actions aimed at suffering individuals and turmoil areas. 
                                                
18 Smith, 2007 (1759), 9-11; Sliwinski, 2011, 1-15; Linfield, 2010, 34; Sontag, 2003; Butler, 2009, 
1-32; Butler, Judith: Precarious life. Powers of Mourning and Violence. Verso, London, 2004; 
Scarry, 1985.  
19 Halttunen, 1995, 303-334; Chouliaraki, 2013, 26-27; Scarry, 1985;  Linfield, 2010, 39-40. 
20 Humanitarian image and visual humanitarian communication are terms I shall use throughout the 
study, when pointing to images mediated/framed with a humanitarian intent or to images pointing out 
despair, pain, human rights violations or the need of help. What makes an image of despair 
humanitarian is the mode of its framing, addressing and contextualization. When an image is mediated 
and presented, in order to convoy a message of not only pain but also of its alleviation, I considerer it 
to be a humanitarian image. Humanitarian images do not necessarily depict suffering; they might even 
show how the need of help has been fulfilled.  
21 Sliwinski, 2011.  
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One of the major starting points of this study is the centrality of visualized 
pain—and spectatorship of images telling of the pain of others—for the 
humanitarian discourse, its historical evolvement and status today.  
1.3 THE POLITICS OF HUMANITARIANISM AND 
HUMANITARIAN WORLD POLITICS 
In everyday thinking humanitarianism is often understood as an aspiration 
and practice of neutrally and altruistically attending to the needs of those in 
despair and pain, as a practice of doing good. But the practices of helping 
those in need—particularly in the global context—are inseparably linked with 
power and often they can be seen to operate on highly hierarchical bases. 
Instead of an altruistic aspiration to help and do good, humanitarianism can 
be seen as an influential system of political power relations and global 
hierarchies.22 The practices of global humanitarianism and human rights 
aspirations have fluxed according to surrounding political, societal and 
cultural atmosphere.  Western humanitarianly framed intentions and actions 
towards the rest of the world have a centuries-long history, particularly 
exemplified by the colonial system. The institutionalization of 
humanitarianism and the safeguarding of human rights have further 
accelerated especially after the Second World War.23  
The concept of power, in a study concerning politics, humanitarianism, 
global hierarchies and international relations is central. In the study of 
international politics, as Barnett and Duvall suggest, power should 
understand through a lens of multiple conceptions, as compulsory, 
institutional, structural, and productive. In this study, I from time to time 
point to someone or something as having power overs something/someone, 
as well as to institutions as powerful or using their power. And thus point to 
power as a compulsory and institutional resource.24 On the other hand power 
in this study is also understood as discursive power in the Foucaultian sense. 
Michel Foucault saw power differently from the liberal theories, in which 
power has been traditionally understood as a resource, influence or an ability 
to get others to do things. For Foucault power is not a thing, but a relation: 
power is everywhere. Power operates not only as a property of state power or 
at the hands of the sovereign or the patriarch, but it is exercised at all levels 
of social relations, and is present at every level of social body. Thus power is 
                                                
22Barnett, 2010; Douzinas, 2007; Duffield, 2007, Hyvän tekeminen ja valta, Johansson, 
Frank (Ed.): Gaudeamus, Helsinki, 2013.  
23 See for example: Barnett, 2011.  
It is worth noting here, that throughout this study I use terms and expressions such as, “civilize”, “full-
fledged humans”, “subhuman”, “evil”, “adolescent”, “immature” etc. as I refer i.a. to hierarchical roles 
of the Westerners and the non-Westerners. I usually do not mark these terms with quotation marks, 
since I think that it is clear that I am not claiming the true nature of these characterizations, but using 
them as rather metaphoric sense and restore to their usage since they stem from the stereotypic 
Western thinking dividing the global “us” and “them”.  
24Barnett, Michael & Duvall, Raymond: Power in international Relations. International 
Organization, 59/1, 39-75, 2005. 
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not only repressive, but also productive; it does things.25 Therefore, in this 
study power is understood as multifaceted phenomena, and I seek to pay 
attention to power in its different forms.  
As the visual constitution and reproduction of the West is at the focus of 
this study, also the political and cultural differentiation or even opposition—
the West and the Rest—is one of the major starting points of this study. I am 
well aware of the distinctions and hierarchical positioning, cultural meanings 
and political ramifications of using the terms West and the Rest–or non-
West, us and them, bring about and cause.26 But, since this historical and 
political division of power is very much alive and determining of how the 
world is apprehended (especially in international political settings), I find 
resorting to the use of the term West in a study concerning international 
relations and global hierarchies regardless relevant. 27 
By West I do not only refer to the geographical northern entity comprising 
of Europe and North America. By referring to West I point to the historically 
and culturally formed distinction and demarcation of the Occident (West) 
vis-à-vis the Orient (the East or non-West).  Historically the distinction of the 
West and the Rest has been commonly traced to the Antique—Greek and 
Rome—and the differentiation has formed along the lines of ‘civilized’ 
Western world/’non-civilized’ Eastern ‘barbarians’, and is often strongly built 
on stereotypical representations of the other. This distinction is often still 
today traceable and very much alive in cultural conceptions, political notions 
– and representational practices of images of suffering others. Moreover, the 
West in the contemporary international political setting often refers to 
political orientation and military power, as well as the identity associated 
with “Western values”, democracy, humanism, human right, development 
and liberalism. Thus, by West I rather point to the culturally, politically and 
historically produced entity—or the idea of—the West. And understand the 
West thus primarily as a historically and politically formed concept, 
community of identity, elusive and ever changing notion, which is over and 
over again constituted through cultural and political practices.28  
                                                
25 See for example: Foucault, Michel: Society Must be Defended, Lectures at the Collage de France 
1975-76, Bertani, Mauro& Fontana, Alessandro (Eds.), Picador, New York, 1997; The Foucault 
Reader. Rabinow, Paul (ed.) Penguin Books, London, (1984) 1991. 
26 As a Finn by nationality, a spectator and an analyzer of encircling representations of suffering of 
others, and as a scholar, the composer of this study, I myself can be defined as a Westerner. Therefore, 
I recognize my self as a part of the “West”, and I cannot to certain degree escape the Western gaze and 
my own culture bound position as a spectator of these representations. Thus I also from time to time 
refer to the West as “us”, whilst, on the other hand, I refer to the non-West as “them” or the “other”. 
27 Ibid.  
28As the West can be seen as a community of identity, by the West, I—in the contemporary setting—for 
the most part point to the political entity of North America, Europe, Australia, and other nations, 
regimes and communities that identify themselves as being Western.  On the concept, definition, 
formation, politics and history of the West, see for instance: Hall, Stuart: The West and the Rest. 
Discourse and Power. In Formations of Modernity. Gieben, Bram & Hall Stuart (Eds. ) Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 1992; Gress, David, From Plato to NATO: The Idea of the West and its Opponents, Free 
Press, New York, 1998; Enduring Western Civilization: The Construction of the Concept of 
Western Civilization and its ‘Others’. Federici, Silvia (Ed.), Preger, Westport, 1995; Mikander, 
Pia: Westerners and Others In Finnish School textbooks. University of Helsinki, Institute of 
Behavioral sciences, 2016.  
26
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The contemporary humanitarian system29 poignantly exemplifies global 
power relations, as it typically gravitates from the global north, i.e. Western 
countries, towards the global south, the Non-West. As Costas Douzinas 
points out, global humanitarianism is based on a sentimental narration in 
which the roles of the arrangement are habitually fixed according to the 
global (again, not meaning only geographical, but rather cultural and 
political) hierarchy and conventions embedded in the workings of the global 
humanitarian apparatus. Thus the roles are most commonly fixed into two 
opposites: the potent Westerners helpers, and the weak helped, habitually 
non-Westerner sufferers.30 This is not only a contemporary arrangement, but 
also in the colonial times the ‘civilizing’ endeavors gravitated from the 
Western sphere towards the non-Western world.31 Because of this, dominant 
representational practices of humanitarian images are practically invariably 
based on globally hierarchical mediation arrangements: the corporal pain of 
non-Western individuals is predominantly presented to mainly Western 
audiences, who gaze at the suffering of the precarious others from distance 
and from the relative comfort of safe societies and homes.32 Thus, the 
representational practices of humanitarian imagery forcefully create global 
and political hierarchies, which for a significant part determine how the 
Western spectators perceive (and have perceived) their own status and the 
status of the others in the global world. Due to the hierarchal power relations 
embedded in the global humanitarian machinery and the representation 
practices of images of suffering within the humanitarian political frame, 
humanitarian images often wound up presenting the world as divided into 
diverse strata of humanity: helpers and the helped, us and them, the ‘full 
humans’ and the ones struggling to gain access to the protection (of their 
rights), the spectators and the spectated.  This is why particularly the visual 
constitution of the (contemporary) Western spectator is also at the focus of 
the inquiry of this study.  
In recent decades the number of humanitarian aid organizations has 
mushroomed enormously especially after the end of the Cold War era, and 
the societal standing and visibility of organizational humanitarianism 
particularly in the public life of the Western sphere have concurrently 
                                                
29 By the ’humanitarian system’ it is predominantly pointed to the humanitarian non-governmental 
organizations, and the international committee of Red Cross –system and The United Nations (UN). As 
the UN Organization Unicef defines it: The international humanitarian system is not a formal 
structure. It includes a wide range of agencies and organizations as well as various mechanisms and 
processes which together aim to support and protect all those affected by an emergency. 
But moreover, within the humanitarian system, I place the ample field of state humanitarianism and 
developmental aid.  And in some terms furthermore, in the more contemporary setting, I see the more 
politicized field of humanitarianism, exemplified in the recent decades also by Western humanitarian 
political actions, also military involvement in crisis zones legitimized by humanitarian rationale, 
belonging to the system. I see the humanitarian system moreover also as a form of structural 
(bio)power and governance, since it is, firstly highly globally hierarchical, and secondly predominantly 
(from the Western point of view) aims at intervening into the lives of the global others.  See for 
example: Barnett, 2010; Douzinas, 2007; Duffield, 2007.  
30 Douzinas, 2007, 52-89.  
31 See for example: Barnett, 2011.  
32 Douzinas, 2007, 84-89.  
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increased.33 Moreover, over the past decades, humanitarianism has risen 
from an activist endeavor at the margins of international politics into a 
prominent status in world political settings. Organizational humanitarianism 
and downright political, interest-based humanitarianly framed 
interventionist state aspirations have increasingly merged. Today, 
safeguarding human rights and humanitarian objectives serves as one of the 
most prominent manifestations of Western international political agenda 
and of the international community.34 Furthermore, the humanitarian frame 
has also risen into a prominent role in Western interventionist world politics, 
and contemporarily humanitarian objectives and rhetoric play a central role 
also in (Western) military engagements and even wars.35 I refer to these 
contemporary Western world political aspirations and the logic of 
international politics as humanitarian world politics.  
As the relation between emotive images and humane emotions is close, 
and the status of the images of human suffering and despair is central to 
humanitarian communication, reading and analyzing visual representations 
presented in the (political) context of humanitarianism unveils the practices 
and ethos of humanitarianism. But how do I free the messages of the images 
                                                
33 The amplified visibility and prominence of humanitarian organizations, in the western public life, is 
due to the increase in the number of humanitarian organizations. Concurrently divergent 
humanitarian through causes and appeals have gained more visibility. But moreover because of the 
renewed marketing strategies of humanitarian  NGO’s - celebrity humanitarianism concerts and other 
entertainment based action. Contemporarily one may make a donation to a humanitarian organization 
while drawing money from the cash machine, parting at a concert or by adopting a ”god child” from a 
Third World country.   Barnett, 2011; Barnett& Weiss, 2008; Chouliaraki, 2013; Kennedy, 
2009; Yrjölä, Riina: The Global Politics of Celebrity Humanitarianism. Academic Dissertation, 
Jyväskylä Studies in Education, psychology and social research, 498, 2014.  
34 The term or phrase ’international community’ is often used within international relations. It at its 
simplest refers to a somewhat inclusive group of governments and peoples of the world (such as the 
General Assembly of the United Nations), and is particularly in contexts such as human rights, when a 
somewhat mutual consensus on such issues is highlighted.  But very often the term has been seen as 
actually referring to the leading Western powers and their strategic global interests. (See for example:  
Chomsky, Noam: The Crimes of the ‘Intcom’. Foreign Policy, September 2002.) The history of 
international community also links to the emergence of global humanitarianism, Western colonialism 
as well as international law. Koskennimeni sees that the international law – aiming at ’civilizing’ the 
world, and thus for a large part revolving around Western liberal ideas of civilization and 
humanitarianism– has occupied as a major function in the formation of the ’international community’. 
See: Koskenniemi, Martti: The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. The Rise and Fall of International Law 
1870-1960. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001. Barnett sees that in colonial times (1800-
1945) West defined the values of the international community in terms of the ideology of humanity and 
Christian religion. During the era, liberal and religiously inspired humanitarians set out to nurture new 
kinds of compassion and accepted new responsibilities towards the distant suffering others, by 
civilizing the objects of the help (individuals as well as states and areas) in order to alleviate their 
suffering. Barnett sees that the major humanitarian watershed, i.e. the founding of the Red Cross and 
the ICRC movement as well as the Geneva Conventions, is also founded on and reflect the Eurocentric 
ideas of international community and are inspired by the expanding Christian fellowship as means of 
rescuing the fallen. (Barnett 2011, 30);  See also: Feher, Michel: Powerless by design: the age of the 
International Community. Duke University Press, Durham, 2000.  
35 Aaltola, 2009;  Belloni,2007 ;Barnett, 2011; Chandler, 2006; Douzinas, 2007; Fassin, 2012.  
Moreover, in addition to the amplified visibility of humanitarian benevolence also the western 
humanitarian turn in international politics, as well as the militarization of humanitarianism within the 
recent years, have worked to amplify prominence and visibility of humanitarianism in the everyday 
lives of western citizens. See for example: Douzinas, 2007, 79.  
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from the “constraints of the situation at hand”36 or how do I endeavor to “see 
the frame that blinds us to what we see”?37 This is what I shall discuss next. 
1.4 READING THE INTENDED ADDRESSING OF THE 
HUMANITARIAN IMAGES 
First of all, in this study I perceive and handle the pictures presented within 
the humanitarian frame as visual representations: as interpretations and 
readings of reality. Visual representations do more than just show ‘reality’: 
they reflect the values, attitudes and political, social paradigms and 
discourses of the time and place, as well as the frames of their presentation 
and reading. Furthermore visual representations also participate in the 
construction of their objects. When analyzing the messages of images, 
pictures are read just as texts are read and spoken words are interpreted, 
although, there are differences between reading text—symbolic letters and 
textual word—and reading images, which consist of objects and visual signs. 
A child can name and narrate images far before being able to read text; 
natural signifiers, such as ’a building’ or ’a human’ can be detected in visual 
images in an instant. Thus, even a child without the skill to read texts can 
read an image and see the details in it. But this does not mean, that a young 
child with no perception of the surrounding culture could read an image in 
all its richness. Reading the multi-layered messages in images acquires 
cultural awareness and a multimodal approach. 38  
My aim is to deconstruct and decode the messages of the images and, 
thus, to interpret the meanings of the images. At the first level of the reading 
I identify and observe details and other visibly apparent subject matter— or 
what Erwin Panofsky calls the natural subjects. Thus I pay attention to the 
objects in the images: the background, material surroundings, housing, the 
people and their gestures, how they are dressed, how they act and what they 
look like. Also up to a certain level I take into account other dimensions of 
the photograph; the composition, framing and, for instance, the color, when I 
see this is of relevance. When looking at pictures at the second level—which 
Panofsky calls iconographical analysis—the ‘conventional meaning’ of the 
picture is read: an image depicting an airplane hitting a tower in a city is 
recognized as a picture of the 9/11 World Trade Centre attacks and a veiled 
woman showing her inked fingertip in front of a crowd is recognized as an 
Afghan woman who has voted.39 
                                                
36 The whole quote: ”Learning Depends upon freeing the message from the constraints of the situation 
at hand.” Barthes, Roland: Camera Lucida. Vintage Books, London, 2000 (1980.) 
37 Butler, 2009, 100.  
38 Basics of the workings of visual representations and of reading visual images, see, for example: 
Visual Culture: a Reader, Evans, Jessica& Hall, Stuart (eds.), Sage, London, 1999; Rose, Gillian: 
Visual Methodologies: An introduction to researching with visual Material. Sage, London, 2012.  
39 Panofsky, Erwin: Iconography and Iconology: An Introduction to the Study of Renaissance Art. 
In Panofsky, Erwin: Meaning in the Visual Arts: Papers in and on Art History. Doubleday Anchor 
Books, New York, 1955, 26-54. 
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But for understanding the images and their messages, the significations 
and meanings to be read in their time, place and context, this is not enough. 
Going beyond this, quite an apparent, although culturally alert, visual level is, 
according to Panofsky, called iconological interpretation. Iconological 
reading attempts to analyze the significance of the subject matter within the 
culture that has produced it. At this level questions such as ‘why is this event 
pictured in this way?’ and ‘what meanings does an image contain in its 
historical/ cultural/political contexts?’ are asked. Thus through iconological 
interpretation a deeper, cultural level of an image is unveiled and the 
historical meanings, cultural connotations and attitudes present in the 
image, characteristic of their era of presentation, are taken into account and 
analyzed.40  
Iconological interpretation is thus concerned with the intrinsic meanings 
of the image; the underlying principles that reveal the basic attitudes of the 
frame of its presentation, that is, the period in time, or an ideological, 
cultural or religious point of view, the spirit of an era or of a group, a world 
view, a zeitgeist.41 On an iconological level, for example, an image of a voting 
Muslim woman, dressed in a traditional burka showing her ink stained 
finger, when published and circulated by the Afghan NATO-led International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2011 and targeted to address 
predominantly Western audiences can be seen to communicate the 
effectiveness and the women’s rights orientation of the Western military 
presence in Afghanistan. In this context the image may be read to depict a 
liberated Afghan woman using her deserved political rights, and the message 
of the image may be seen to communicate the emancipation of Afghan 
women by humanitarian-militarized Western help, and thus to prop up the 
international Afghan military operation and its legitimation. Thus, reading 
the contextual meaning of the image also requires knowledge and 
understanding of the cultural codes and overall (political, historical) 
situation in which it is produced, /presented and interpreted.42 
However, what is furthermore relevant is that all pictures may be signified 
and read in multitudes of manners. Depending on the presenter, the place of 
presentation, and other contextual framings—such as naming, captions, 
accompanying texts, positioning, layout etc.—as well the gaze43 of the 
spectators, the very same image placed in a different settings may signify 
completely opposite things.44 The image of a voting Afghan woman discussed 
                                                
40 Ibid.  
41 Panofsky, Erwin: Studies in Iconology, New York, 1939, 3–31; Burke, Peter: Eyewitnessing. 
Uses of Images as Historical Evidence. Reaction Books, London, 2001, 34–37. 
42 Ibid.  
43 Gaze is a term used by Jacques Lacan, and concerns the different viewpoints or different 
culturally varying ways in which different groups look at things. It can be perceived that there 
are different gazes: a “tourist gaze”, a “male gaze”, a “western gaze” or a “colonial gaze”. By 
this it is meant, for example, that, from the viewpoint of the scientifically educated Western 
secular woman things perhaps look different than from the viewpoint of an African male peasant. 
Lacan, Jacques: Seminar Eleven: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. W.W. 
Norton and Co., New York, 1978. 
44 Barthes, Roland: Image Music, Text. Fontana Press, London, 1977, 17, 30.  
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earlier may in another context signify—and be targeted and intended to 
mediate—a story of a woman out of her rightful place violating tradition and 
religion and behaving in a manner unbefitting a traditional Muslim woman. 
This could be the reading of the image of the Muslim woman who has casted 
her vote, for example, within the communication of the Taliban, targeted to 
address domestic, mostly religiously conservative populations of 
Afghanistan. Thus, reading images in their contextual dispositions—taking 
into account the presenter, the (intended) audience, the time of presentation 
and positioning—reveals different, ambivalent meanings and messages that 
may be loaded onto a single image.  
Therefore—although phrases such as ’an image tells more than thousand 
words’ are commonly reiterated—it is noteworthy to bear in mind that 
images are endlessly ambivalent  —and moreover silent. As especially images 
of suffering, war and bodily human distress and destruction are frequently 
referred to as powerful, influential and even politically potent, nevertheless 
visual images in them selves are mute, as Roland Barthes reminds us.45 Even 
the most horrific of images cannot solely form an argument. Photographs do 
not have a narrative coherence; and thus they cannot activate us, tell stories 
of politics or make us understand the suffering of others by themselves. As 
Sontag explains it: if images are to move us politically, it is only because they 
are presented within the context of relevant political consciousness.46 And 
even if photographs of crisis and suffering often constitute a focal setting for 
informing and baring witness to tragic far-away events and act as an arena 
for contemplating the suffering of others, as Sontag further reminds us, they 
cannot solely create a moral position or act as instruments of political 
standpoints as such. But, if there is an “appropriate context of feeling and 
attitude,” dramatic images may move us in forcefully political ways. Thus, 
what is relevant for reading emotive images of pain, distress and discomfort 
within the humanitarian discursive frame is that “while a photograph cannot 
create a moral position” they may—and often do—work to “reinforce an 
existing one.”47  
The context of presentation, the naming, captions and the overall 
positioning frame48 the image. The context loads and adds cultural, historical 
and ideological meanings into silent images.49 Thus images of wars, 
catastrophes and pain presented within the humanitarian frame may address 
their viewers in multitudes of ways, but, when carefully analyzed in their 
contexts, they can be seen to invite particular readings and ways of looking. 
Images of pain and distress presented within the humanitarian frame are 
habitually arranged in organized, purpose-oriented and somewhat 
conventionally fixed ways, which invites the spectators to see them in 
                                                
45 Barthes, 1977, 15-31.  
46Sontag, 1977,17; see also Butler, 2009, 67.  
47 Sontag, 1977, 17; Sontag, 2003, 80-84.  
48See: Goffman, Erwin: Frame analysis: an essay on the Organization of Experience. Harper&Row, 
London, 1974.  
49 Barthes, 1977, 25-27, 39; Butler, 2009, 63-65.  
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particular ways. Thus, images within a discourse are habitually framed and 
intended to welcome certain readings—and emotive reactions. I see that 
humanitarian images, presented within the Western humanitarian discursive 
settings and frame are predominantly read according to the principles and 
norms of the predominant humanitarian thinking descriptive of the era. 
Thus, at the core of my approach to the investigation and interpretation of 
the messages and meanings of images and the ways in which they address 
their spectators is the need to take into account their multifariously 
contextual character.  
Nevertheless, I must underline that in this study I am not interested in 
how individual spectators encounter, read, or feel when facing or how they 
react to these images. Not everybody reacts in the same way when facing 
horrors others experience, even if they would be embraced and enclosed by a 
culture that highlights the centrality of human rights, or by an international 
political system, which revolves around humanitarian ethos and legitimation. 
As said, images are ambivalent and may articulate even contradictory 
significations, depending on the context, thus also their reception is always 
contextual and ambivalent. What an image or a collection of images and their 
accompanying texts in their representational contexts in the end articulate to 
individual spectators, rather depends on the spectator, than what she looks 
at.50 Claiming to investigate or trying to find out individual reactions—or 
even average reactions and sentiments—at face of such images would be an 
impossible task with the tools available. Therefore, I do not aim at finding 
out how an individual spectator receives, reacts to or reads an image. 
Researching reception apart from being tricky, is not what interests me, nor 
would it even serve the purpose in finding out what I have set out to 
investigate. Rather I am interested in how the images are intended to address 
their (intended) audiences in their discursive, historical, political and 
ideological contextual settings of presentation. As Quentin Skinner argues, 
identifying the intention of a text is equivalent to the knowledge of the 
meaning of the texts. Thus, I see that what is essential in deconstructing the 
messages of images and identifying their contextual meanings, is aiming to 
interpret the identifiable intention of the image in its presentational context, 
and the reading suggested by the humanitarian discursive frame.51  Reading 
the images in their contextual settings and identifying their intended 
messages and meanings are at the core of my method throughout this work.  
                                                
50 See for example: Barthes, 1977, 46-47.  
51 On the relevance and the process of identifying the intentions (of the writer) in interpreting the 
meanings of texts, see: Skinner, Quentin: Motives, intentions and interpretation of texts. New 
Literary History, 1971, 3/2, 393-408, 404.  See also Barthes, 1977, 32-51.  
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1.5  INTERPRETING THE AMBIVALENT, REFERENTIAL, 
INVISIBLE AND FLOWING IMAGES 
What is endlessly intriguing in analyzing images is precisely their ambivalent 
and ambiguous nature. As visual images are emotive and powerful, yet mute 
and ambivalent in their function, they are—more so than textual accounts—
inclined to be contextually signified and addressing their audiences as well as 
read(able) in multitudes of ways.  The strong emotive quality of images of 
pain and despair is vital for their functionality and for their central position 
within humanitarianism. Humanitarianism and humanitarian politics are 
essentially fuelled by emotional politics. The powerful utilization of emotions 
is perhaps most evident when it comes to the presentation of visual images of 
wars, crises and suffering in political contexts. Compassion towards the 
distant other is the principal emotion deployed within humanitarian politics, 
but images of pain moreover arouse multitudes of other feelings, such as a 
sense of urgency, a will to act and to intervene, but also sorrow, shame, guilt, 
indignation, anger and outrage, even a will to retaliate. The functioning of the 
humanitarian discourse and system is dependent on the powerful emotions 
brought on by the imagery of pain and distress.52  
Images moreover contain more connotative, culturally and historically 
structured content than written text or spoken words. Thus their reading and 
signification often works on a partly subliminal level and for large parts their 
interpretation banks on naturalized, even stereotypical ways of thinking. As 
well, visual arrangements often reveal even unintended, culturally driven 
messages, which habitually tell more off the presenter than of the objects of 
the images or of the events they portray. This content—cultural residue—is 
often revealing of the attitudes, cultural codes and subconscious ways of 
thinking of the actor presenting the images as well as of the intended 
audience. As humanitarian images most often depict distant individuals in 
foreign settings, they often rely on rather stereotypical forms of presenting 
and picturing ‘the others’ formed according to cultural attitudes and customs. 
Thus visual arrangements often reveal aspects of rigid ways of understanding 
the world, as well as hidden political aspirations, which would not be easily 
articulated aloud in verbal and textual accounts but, nevertheless, frequently 
surface in visual communication.53 This sort of knowledge is extremely 
intriguing for a researcher interested in politics, power and ideological 
constellations. Therefore, while reading the images I also bring forth and 
analyze these traits of unintended or latent information, which reveals 
cultural/political dispositions of the presenter/arranger or the images.   
Furthermore, production and circulation of photographs is often 
conditioned by a set of social codes and norms, which restricts and limits not 
only the reading of images but also their presentation. Images are habitually 
                                                
52 See: Käpylä &Kennedy, 2014, 255-292 ;  Nussbaum, Martha: Upheavals of Thought: The 
intelligence of Emotions. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2001, 354-400. 
53 Burke, 2001, 124–128; Barthes, 2000, 111–121. 
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taken of certain events and in certain ways, and pictures of certain instances 
are presented in particular ways, and, moreover, images are habitually read 
in rather rigid ways.54  Interestingly, emotive and often dramatic images of 
pain and crisis often point back in time, they refer to historical horrors and 
events and are thus often read through—and sometimes even intentionally 
framed so that they encourage a reaction—in historically and culturally 
formed, conventionally accustomed ways. Arrangements of photos of atrocity 
are often formed according to collective ways of remembering the past.  The 
historical conventional and customary ways of presentation not only form the 
arrangements and ways of presenting images of crisis and suffering but also 
commonly intend to direct the reactions of the spectators and to frame 
contemporary atrocities and political events in particular, often historically 
familiar ways. For example, the reiterated references to the iconized 
Holocaust images can be identified as such a famous, iconic imagery, often 
used in the context of topical suffering images, which are then often 
conventionally arranged to model Holocaust imagery and, therefore, also 
reacted to in similar ways. Thus photographs, especially images of pain and 
atrocity, have socially and historically ‘preferred meanings’ and entail 
collective culturally and politically formed ways of reading and perceiving.55 
Therefore, while reading images, the conventional, much used ways of 
presenting must be identified, detected, and taken into account in analyzing 
and interpreting the messages, significations and contextual meanings of 
images.  
In addition to the perhaps unintended cultural traces embedded in the 
images, also what is not pictured in images—what is left out of them, framed 
invisible and what is not seen as appropriate to picture in visual 
representations—is central in investigating the political arrangements of 
images. What is not seen, or is scarcely seen, is as relevant as what is seen, or 
overtly in sight.  The unseen, sometimes even the hidden aspects bring forth 
the limits of showing, seeing, imagining, and understanding. The unseen 
creates narratives, just as the pictured does. What is framed out of the images 
makes the viewer simultaneously both focus and ignore, to imagine and 
confine, to be compassionate and evasive. What is pictured and what is not 
pictured is politically and culturally governed, and these arrangements of 
seeable/non-seeable create the frames in which we encounter the pain of 
others, humanitarianism and Western international political aspirations and 
actions.56 Therefore, in the course of this study I will, in addition to analyzing 
what is pictured and how it is pictured, also take into account and analyze the 
                                                
54 Shapiro, Michael: The Politics of representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, 
and Policy Analysis. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1988. 128, 149-150; Kennedy&Käpylä, 
2014, 260-262.   
55 Zelizer, 1998;  Käpylä&Kennedy, 2014, 255-292; Campbell, 2002, (B).  
56 On the politics of invisibility see for example Butler, 2009. 63-100;  Sontag, 2003; Caspers, 
Monica& Moore, Lisa: Missing Bodies. The Politics of Visibility.  New York University Press, New 
York, 2009. Identifying what is perhaps missing from images describing an event or a phenomena also 
requires culturally, politically and historically alert mind, and moreover knowledge of the time, place 
and other significant settings.  
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‘blind spots’ of relevant imagery and observe the un-pictured. By observing 
what is framed out of the realm of visual representability, in the context of 
the humanitarian representational frame, I intend to find out about the 
frames and limits of picturing and to draw into open the visual(lized) 
boundaries of humanity.  
Furthermore, what is particularly important to keep in mind when 
analyzing images of crisis and their meanings—especially within the frantic 
mediation tempo of the topical social media era—is that images constantly 
move, circulate and flow from one context into another, gathering new 
positionings, significations, messages and meanings along the way. (Global) 
flows of images—shifts from one context to another, from the local level to 
the international, even global level, from the social media to the mainstream 
media, from organizational settings to high-level political proclamations, 
from news connections into internet memes, and so on and so forth—
constantly construct new meanings and produce different significations of 
the images in their uses and reuses. The messages of flowing (mute) images 
cannot be frozen, as the significations of images constantly flux and 
alternate. Thus, I see that the process of meaning creation happens in the 
diverse realms of the political constantly producing new perceptions of the 
world we live in, affecting political decision-making, offering a variety of 
ways in which they can be used within the frame of humanitarian 
international politics. I will pay attention to the flows of images in the course 
of this study, and also seek to develop further the idea of flowing images and 
the analysis of the nature of humanitarian image flows in the contemporary 
setting.57  
Additionally, as indicated, in this study I am particularly interested in the 
‘Western gaze,’ or in how humanitarian images are arranged by their 
presenters, and how they are intended to be perceived by their intended 
Western audiences.  But I must add that as an analyzer of the images (and as 
the person who has chosen the material of the study), as an academic 
scholar, a Finn—i.e. as a citizen of a nation that generally identifies with the 
Western political realm—and as a private person with her own political and 
moral points of view and preferences, I recognize that my own culture-bound 
and political position as a spectator, and as an analyzer of the images. Thus, 
when analyzing the images I seek to assess the objects of my analysis on a 
number of levels. Firstly, I use the hermeneutic approach, through which I 
seek to understand what messages the images are seeking to deliberately 
convey in their contexts of presentation. Secondly, I employ an analytically 
and politically alert gaze through which the contextual political meanings of 
the images may be revealed. Thirdly, I take a culturally critical view through 
                                                
57 Particularly in the Chapter 7 I shall pay attention to the contemporary image flows in the context of 
visual social media mediation of images of war.  
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which I seek to go beyond the naturalized cultural readings of the images and 
to question and critically assess their political and discursive meanings.58   
1.6  THE STRUCTURE AND OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
As said, in addition to the contextual and flowing qualities of humanitarian 
images, in the contemporary settings, images of pain, war and distress often 
work on highly referential bases and frequently point to history.59 I became 
aware of this first hand in the course of my study into the contemporary 
status of humanitarian images. I first started my investigation into the 
contemporary arrangements of humanitarian images from the Afghan War 
imagery in 2010-2011 (chapter 5 of this study).60 Whilst conducting this 
study a question arose in between the lines repeatedly: how have the 
presentational practices and modes of utilization of humanitarian images 
altered and evolved within the recent years and what has changed? I soon 
understood that in order to gain a fuller understanding of the contemporary 
status of images in humanitarian settings, the images of crisis and suffering 
must be reflected against a wider historical frame. As these aspects have not 
been comprehensively dealt with in one work before (as noted above), I felt it 
was necessary to map out the visual history of humanitarianism. 
Thus, before investigating the uses of images of atrocity, pain and crisis in 
recent years and contemporary settings, I shall give an overview of the 
history of the relations of visual images of pain, of their representation and 
mediation practices, and of the evolvement of the ideas of a shared humanity 
and of the changes in the concepts of humanitarianism over the past 250 
years in chapter 2, “A History of Humanitarianism and Visual Images of 
Pain.”  
I start the mapping out of the history of mediated visual representations 
of suffering, of the ideas of a shared human kind, and of the need to protect 
humans from peril from the times of the Enlightenment, in the mid-
eighteenth century. I start following the visual trail of (global) 
humanitarianism from the representations of human suffering produced of 
the 1755 Lisbon earthquake. From this event onwards—which has been seen 
as a turning point in the international mediation of humanitarian visual 
representations61—I continue to map out and introduce the role of visual 
representations in widening the scope of the humanity in need of protection 
                                                
58 But this said, I must underline, that I do not claim strict objectivity–which in my view is not even 
possible. As I act as the analyzer of the images, the conclusions made are mine, they arise from my 
theoretical dispositions, my choices of material, my arrangement of text and they cannot to a certain 
degree refrain to reflect me as an actor and a writer of this study.  
59 Campbell, 2002(A and B); Käpylä&Kennedy; Zelizer, 1998.  
60 An earlier version of chapter 5 was published by the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in 
August 2011. See: Kotilainen, Noora: Humanitarian soldiers, colonialized Others and Invisible 
Enemies. Visual Strategic Communication Narratives of the Afghan War. The Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs Working Paper  72.  
61 Sliwinski, 2011; Orgad. ; See also Neiman, 2002.  
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through divergent images, which I see as iconic62 within the evolution of the 
humanitarian/human rights paradigm. I shall, for instance, stop to 
contemplate the position of images in the abolition fight, the role of early war 
photography in widening the scope of protectable life, and the uses and 
significations of suffering images in colonial surroundings. Further, I shall 
analyze the uses of revelatory brutal war images within the early twentieth 
century pacifistic movement and introduce the position of the Holocaust 
images within the institutionalizing system of the protection of humanity and 
the role of the Vietnam War images in creating anti-war sentiments as well as 
the fluxing visual representational practices of organizational 
humanitarianism. Furthermore, I shall discuss the 1990s CNN effect thesis of 
the increased influence of mediated images of suffering on foreign policy and 
the visual practices of representing the end of the century Western war at the 
Persian Gulf (1990) as well as the role of images in the wars in Yugoslavia.  
As said, in addition to mapping out the historical status of visual images 
within the evolution of the ideas of humanity and humanitarianism, the 
second chapter gives a historical backdrop to the later analysis of the more 
contemporary images of pain within the changing discourse and practices of 
global humanitarian politics. The historical overview of the images is 
presented before the more comprehensive introduction of the theoretical and 
methodological choices of this study in chapter 3, because many of the 
theoretical choices of the work, as well as central questions dealt with later in 
the course of this study, for a large part arise from the historical 
arrangements, patterns, traditions and modes of utilizing images of suffering 
over the past centuries and decades within the humanitarian frame. 
Furthermore, the second chapter predominantly draws from relevant 
research on the issue and is, thus, less empirically orientated than the 
following chapters 4-7.  
As indicated, after the tour of the history of humanitarianism and visual 
images of human precariousness and distress, in chapter 3, I shall elaborate 
on my theoretical and methodical approach to the subject, largely grounded 
in the questions and patterns that arise from the historical uses of suffering 
images within the humanitarian frame. In chapter 3 “The Arrangement and 
Spectatorship of the Humanitarian Tragedy Theater” I shall explain how 
humanitarianism contemporarily functions within the Western sphere as an 
influential unconscious ideology, addressing its viewer-subjects through 
emotive visual representations of pain. In addition, I shall introduce more 
broadly the arrangement and operation of global humanitarian theatrical 
                                                
62 By iconic is often meant that such images are much used and circulated, familiar to many and well 
known, even famous. These sorts of images are often displayed in cover illustrations and news 
contexts. They circulate fast in different mediums and gather multitudes of different utilizations in 
various contexts.  They are reproduced across a wide range of media, in relation to different genres and 
topics. Such images are thus widely known, as well as remembered and frequently referred to. See 
Perlmutter, David: Photojournalism and foreign policy. Icons of outrage in international crisis. 
Praeger, Westport, 1998, 11-20; Hariman, Robert & Lucaites, John, Louis: No Caption Needed.  
Iconic Phtographs, Public Culture and Liberal Democracy. University of Chicago Press, 2007, 27  
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arrangements that I see as taking the form of a theatrical tragedy play, 
which addresses and invites the spectators of the play to see the images and 
their arrangements in multitudes of politically constructed ways. I shall as 
well open up the way the images and image types dealt with in the 
subsequent chapters have been selected as thick images, descriptive of their 
time and context.  
Chapters 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 include illustrations that compile some of the 
discussed key images into new images, collages.63 The function of these 
illustrations is firstly to give the reader a concise view into the material 
discussed, and moreover to illustrate the arrangements of the images and 
indicate their narrative nature. The illustrations of the history chapter 2 
(illustrations 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4) visually narrate the historical evolution of 
the ideas of humanity from the mid-eighteenth century until the 1990s, and 
thus aim to give an outline of the imagery used in humanitarian settings 
during this time period. Moreover, also the chapters that deal more with the 
contemporary visual (media) representations include several collage 
illustrations. Particularly while spectating current crisis and enfolding 
events, we habitually face a rather sporadic and coincidental view into the 
suffering of this world. Thus the aim of the illustrations included in the 
chapters 4—7 is also to provide a more comprehensive and accumulative 
visual perspective into the imagery and visual arrangements discussed and 
analyzed.  
Therefore, in addition to merely compiling the imagery discussed, the aim 
of the collages is also to bring together perhaps a more revealing viewpoint 
into how the images of war and pain are utilized and framed in the 
contemporary setting. Therefore the illustrations, like visual collages aim to 
do, create a new whole, by assembling different visual material together. 
They show the sporadic nature of images of suffering as encountered by their 
spectators, but also concurrently visualize the segmented, collage-like, 
historically and thematically cumulative nature of images of suffering.64 Thus 
the illustrations are more than just illustrations in the conventional meaning 
of the word. They are a part of the study, in the sense that the images 
displayed are selected from the visual material of the study, and further, 
because they illustrate the nature and representational practices of the 
discussed theaters of suffering through a visual form.  In practice the collage-
illustrations were compiled so, that I explained the cases at hand and my 
study on them to my friend, graphic designer Karoliina Isoviita, and 
pinpointed the key thick images discussed in the study, which I saw relevant 
to be included in the collages. After this, Karoliina used her artistic freedom 
and skill in assemblage of the images, after which we discussed the collages, 
and when required together further worked up the collages. Thus, the 
collage-illustrations are not “my art”, but rather artistic works created by 
                                                
63 Also, by following the links provided in the bibliography, the reader may go and see more relevant 
visual material on the internet. 
64 Rancière, 2011, 25-30. See Also, Särmä, 2014.  
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Karoliina, which are guided by my scientific work. They aim at bringing 
together the material of the study, and providing a cumulative view into the 
historical and contemporary uses of images of suffering and atrocity and 
representational practices.  
Chapters 4-7 may be perceived as contemporary acts at the humanitarian 
tragedy theater of suffering. They exemplify how images of suffering, 
precariousness and the pain of others in contemporary settings are presented 
for (Western) spectators in various divergent humanitarian conjunctions. 
Each of these acts shed light on different aspects and sides of humanitarian 
visual communication and contemporary humanitarian politics.  
Chapter 4 “Emotional Theaters of Proof: Humanity’s Conditionality in 
Humanitarian Images” is the first empirical chapter dealing with the 
contemporary role of images within humanitarian world politics. The main 
questions of this chapter arouse during the analytical process: Why are 
Western media representations abundant with images of distant, non-
Western suffering bodies, but vulnerable Western bodies are scarcely seen? 
How differently non-Western suffering is presented, and how the 
presentation of images of Western suffering is politically and culturally 
governed and controlled vis-à-vis the images of non-Western bodily 
suffering? Why is this and what kind ramifications do these predominant 
representational practices have on the Western notions of humanity and its 
value and on the practices of protecting humanity from its perils, and? That 
is, how do images of suffering constitute the Western spectator and how do 
the predominant representational practices thus influence the Western 
interventionist political acts humanitarianly legitimized and targeted towards 
crisis areas in the global south? 
Following Bruno Latour’s notion, I depict the visual representational 
practices, openly presenting the corporal pain of others—and effectively 
hiding the pain of some others—as a theater of proof in which the conditions 
of being included in humanity and being worthy of such humanity are 
globally and politically negotiated.65 In this fourth chapter divergent visual 
media representations of non-Western suffering, circulating in the Western 
publicity, are juxtaposed with the presentation and governance patterns of 
Western suffering and Western-inflicted suffering. Through this examination 
of crisis, war and suffering images I analyze not only the representational 
patterns of images of suffering but also the ethos of conventional Western 
global humanitarianism and the predominant Western apprehension of life 
worthy of protection and rights constituted by the representational practices 
of images of suffering, crisis, terrorist violence, sickness and refugeeness.  
In chapter 5 “Humanitarian soldiers, Colonialized Others and Invisible 
Enemies,” I examine how the NATO-led International Security Assistance 
Force (from here on the ISAF) functioning in Afghanistan has presented its 
actions in its strategic communication imagery uploaded on the social 
                                                
65 Latour, Bruno: The Pasteurization of France, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1988, 85–86. 
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media photo-sharing platform Flickr.66 The chapter investigates what kind of 
means, messages and narratives the Western military strategic 
communications machinery used in its self-presentation in the time period of 
2008-2011. I see that these images are foremost presented in order to 
convince and address the domestic, mainly Western publics, of the 
desirability of the Afghan-ISAF operation. This chapter analyzes how the 
“Afghan war of images”—the fight to win over the minds and hearts of 
Western populations—was fought on the visual arena and how the Western-
dominated operation presented itself to predominantly Western audiences. 
In addition to opening up the intended messages of the images presented 
by ISAF, chapter 5 also brings to the fore any unintended narratives 
embedded in the images. Thus, by analyzing visual materials, the chapter 
goes beyond the official justifications that are tailored to explain and 
legitimize the war in Afghanistan. Through analyzing the strategic 
communication images, currently dominant discourses and ways of 
perceiving ourselves, the “others” and the world emerge. I examine what 
these images tell us about the politics, values, morals, and attitudes of their 
time and about the world order they are presented within. The visual 
narratives embedded in the images create a picture of how “we Westerners” 
want to see ourselves as moral agents and international actors. Through 
unravelling and deconstructing the visual narratives of today’s war I shall 
bring to light a clearer picture of the resources, messages and narratives used 
to address the Western viewers, in order to see the conflicts of today in 
certain ways. 
In Chapter 6 “Picturing the Inhuman Evil Enemies: The Dark Side of the 
Humanitarian Narrative” I set out to analyze the visual construction and 
arrangement of evil in the contemporary Western humanitarian frame.67 In 
recent years, visually striking imagery describing the enemies of the 
contemporary Western order have extensively circulated in the Western 
political publicity and media.  The threat to the Western way of life, to the 
international order, human rights, and to the humane ethos held sacred by 
the West has often taken a visual human form. Primarily Muammar 
Gaddafi, Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein have served as such highly 
visual contemporary enemy characters. Each of these leader figures have, all 
in their own turn, served as the embodiments of evil opposed to Western 
good. These men and the regimes/organizations they represent have been 
the targets of military operations of Western and Western-minded coalitions 
during the times of the War on Terror and humanitarian war.  In addition to 
mapping out the visual arrangements of contemporary Western evil, I shall 
                                                
66 An earlier version of this study was publishes as a working paper by the Finnish Institute of 
internationals affairs, August 2011. See: Kotilainen, Noora: Humanitarian soldiers, Colonialized 
Others and Invisible enemies. Visual Strategic Communication Narratives of the Afghan War. The 
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Working Paper 72, August 2011.  
67 An earlier (Finnish language) version of this chapter was published in Journal Kosmopolis. 
Kotilainen, Noora: Muammar Gaddafin, Saddam Husseinin ja Osama bin 
Ladenin vihollisspektaakkelit humanitaarisen maailmanpolitiikan kuvastimina. Kosmopolis 2-
3/2012, 29-53. 
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in this chapter engage with the very core of topical Western humanitarian 
world politics and with the contemporary Western political self-identity built 
upon the notion of the West as a global, moral humanitarian savior.  
The final empirically orientated chapter 7 “A Social Media Effect? Syrian 
Chemical Attack Images in Mainstream Media and International Politics” 
investigates the contemporarily articulated ‘social media effect’ by analyzing 
the flows of contextual significations and different utilizations of the social 
media originating images produced of the August 21st 2013 chemical 
weapons attack in Damascus, Syria. Firstly, the chapter introduces the 
historically constructed causality claim of “the more we see, the more we 
react” on the political power of atrocity images. After this I analyze the image 
flows in the social media era by investigating the meanings the images 
gathered while flowing from the local social media level to the global level, as 
well as the signification process of the images within mainstream media’s 
journalistic remediation. I investigate how the images were used by the 
(Western) mainstream media, how they were named and framed in their new 
contexts. I trace how some images and stories came to at the time signify and 
define the situation in Syria for Western spectators.  Further, by making a 
brief detour by presenting the uses and significations the images gathered 
from the Russian mainstream media, I juxtapose Western representational 
practices with Russian ones and unveil the prevalent contextual and 
ideological framings of social media images in mainstream media’s 
journalistic remediation.  
Secondly, I observe how the images telling of the suffering of the Syrian 
people operated in the international political debate on the situation of Syria. 
I examine how the images were referred to and used in political 
argumentation and in the rhetoric rationalizing and legitimating the Western 
response to the situation–namely the planned targeted military operation 
against the Syrian leader al-Assad. Through the case of the Damascus 
chemical weapons incident I also draw attention to the novelty that the uses 
of amateur images and visual social media mediation potentially bring to the 
conventional practices of representing distant suffering. The analysis of the 
Syrian case deconstructs and enables the drawing of conclusions on the 
global (Western) uses of social media and amateur images of crisis and 
suffering.  
Chapter 8 “Conclusions: The Necessity of Non-Western Hamartia for 
the Humanitarian Hierarchy” concludes the study and reiterates the research 
results by combining the preceding analysis of the divergent realms of 
visuality, world politics and humanity. Also further questions and possible 
new directions and roadmaps for future investigation are briefly outlined.  
 
 
 
 
41
A History of Humanitarianism and Visual Images of Pain 
 42 
2 A HISTORY OF HUMANITARIANISM AND 
VISUAL IMAGES OF PAIN 
2.1  INTRODUCTION: FOLLOWING THE VISUAL TRAIL 
OF CALAMITY  
This chapter engages with the historical evolution, settings and stages of 
visually mediated suffering from the times of the Enlightenment to 
contemporary era.  The chapter follows the visual trail of humanitarianism 
and protection of human lives through visual representations of bodily pain 
and despair. By following the history of mediating images depicting the pain 
of others, I map out the evolution of efforts at building up solidary bonds 
between humans created by images of pain and conflict.  
What led me to investigate these particular visual episodes discussed in 
this chapter is the fact that many of these episodes are recurrently taken up 
when contemporary images of crisis, war, pain and humanitarianism are 
discussed.  These historical stopovers have been designated as watersheds or 
kind of visual nodal points in the evolution of the thinking on humanity and 
its protection. Some past events shine more brightly, because someone has 
already shed light on them. That is, also previous scholarly work on these 
instances directed my attention to these particular cases, and thus I have 
largely followed the visual trail opened up before me. This also means that 
the episodes could have been selected differently, that they by no means all-
encompassingly represent ‘all there is to say’ on the matter. Rather, the 
function of this chapter is to give a historical perspective into analyzing the 
contemporary relations of visual images, humanitarianism and recognition of 
humanity, and to provide a background for analyzing the uses of images of 
suffering, wars and crises in contemporary settings. In the course of writing 
the later chapters 4 to 7–to which this chapter also works as a backdrop–it 
became evident that the reoccurring surfacing of these episodes and nodal 
points in the history of humanitarian visual communication points towards 
conventional and established (perhaps canonized) ways of seeing the history 
of atrocity and its picturing, but moreover proves the significance of these 
imageries for the contemporary public imagination on the topic. Thus I 
apprehend the imageries discussed in the historical chapter 2 also as thick, in 
multitudes of ways; I argue that they describe the ethos and spirit of their 
time in emblematic ways, and by scrutinizing them in their contextual 
settings, many things on the discursive settings enfolding them maybe 
extracted.  
I shall start this journey from the Enlightenment era and its altered 
thinking on humanity, empathy, and regard for the pain of the others, which 
has been pinpointed as a watershed in the history of wide-ranging emotive 
visual communication on such matters. I have chosen the 1755 Lisbon 
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earthquake, which has been marked as the first mass media event related to a 
distant catastrophe and seen as having greatly influenced the emerging 
discourse of a shared humanity in need of protection, as the starting point. 68 
I then continue by tracing the relations between witnessing mediated 
visualized suffering, humanitarian emotions, as well as the apprehension of 
humanity and the developments in the ideas on the protection of humanity at 
the time of the emergence of the revolutionary ideas of the rights of the man 
in the late eighteenth century.  
From this groundwork of modern Western humanitarian ideas, the need 
to protect humanity and the status of visual images within the humanitarian 
paradigm, I move forward in time and take a look at the uses of visual 
representations of suffering at the age of imperial humanitarianism, 
following the categorization of “humanitarian ages” by Michael Barnett. 69 I 
shall introduce the emerging abolition fight and the visual strategies used by 
the abolitionists in widening the boundaries of apprehending humanity in 
need of rights and protection. After this I shall exhibit Fransisco Goya´s 
drawings Distasters of War as early anti-war images aiming at addressing 
their viewers in a humanitarian mode. After this I shall introduce the horrific 
scenery of the battlefield of Solferino (1859), which led Henri Dunant to 
sketch what has become a constitution for the modern ideas of universal 
humanitarianism and obligation to (neutrally) help those in despair. From 
the 1840s onwards photography has been used to depict suffering inflected 
by war.  I make a short inquiry into the first war photos of the US-Mexican 
war, Crimean and US Civil War, as well as investigate the mode in which the 
late nineteenth century photographic representations of suffering in the 
colonies addressed their Western viewers. After this I shall outline the uses of 
images of pain in various locations of the First World War and take a look at 
the presentation of atrocity images in pacifistic settings.  
From here I shall take a leap into the era of neo-humanitarianism70 and 
the post-World War setting and move on to the late 1940s to open up the 
effect Holocaust images had on the ideas of universal humanity, 
institutionalization of human rights and understanding of the need to protect 
humanity in peril. After this, I shall walk through the post Second World War 
evolution of humanitarianism and the position of images in mediating 
distant suffering from the post-World War era onwards all the way to the end 
of the Cold War. I shall trail the uses, presentational practices and 
significations of images describing distant suffering within the latter 
twentieth century organizational humanitarianism and also introduce the 
uses and effects of the Vietnam War images in the television era. 
                                                
68See: Sliwinski, 2011, 35-47; Halttunen, 1995;  Neiman, 2002, 238-250; Orgad, 2012, 57-63.  
69Barnett introduces his typology of humanitarian ages-imperial humanitarianism, neo-
humanitarianism, and liberal humanitarianism- in Empire of Humanity. A History of 
Humanitarianism. See: Barnett, 2011. 
70 Barnett, 2011.  
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Finally, I shall present the more contemporary setting of the age of liberal 
humanitarianism71 characterized by altered, expanded and politicized 
humanitarian sector and engage with the visual presentational practices of 
distant suffering and need for help within this frame. Further, I shall open up 
the CNN effect thesis of the 1990s, examine the visual presentation of the 
Gulf War and analyze the more contemporary effects of politicized 
humanitarianism and Western interventionist international politics on visual 
representations of wars and crises.  
 So, let me start from the history, without which the present day remains 
incomprehensible. 
2.2  VISUAL IMAGES OF PAIN AND THE 
ENLIGHTENMENT EMERGENCE OF THE IDEA OF 
UNIVERSAL HUMANITY   
In his 1759 book The Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith depicts 
compassion for the suffering of others as one of the “original passions of 
human nature.”72 Compassion towards the suffering other is undoubtedly as 
old as human culture. Nevertheless, the emergence of the idea of a universal 
humanity, as a shared fragile condition of all humans who need to be 
safeguarded by humans themselves, is commonly dated back to the times of 
the Enlightenment. The idea that our compassionate reactions towards the 
pain of others are aroused by visual records of pain, which allow us to 
imagine a shared universal fate as a human kind, has been enduring ever 
since the times of the Enlightenment and is, still today, at the core of 
humanitarian communication. 73  
2.2.1 REPRESENTATIONS OF LISBON EARTHQUAKE STIMULATING 
A SENSE OF A SHARED HUMANITY  
It is remarkable, that Adam Smith wrote his seminal work on empathy 
towards the suffering others in the aftermath of the 1755 disastrous Lisbon 
earthquake. On the 1st of November 1755 Lisbon, an important power and 
trade center in the world of the era and, at the time, the fourth biggest city in 
Europe, was horrifically destructed by an earthquake and ensuing tsunami 
and fires. The destruction of a Western center and an emblem of European 
colonial power devastated the minds of both intellectuals as well as the wider 
                                                
71 Ibid.  
72 Smith, Adam: The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Filiquarian Publishing, LLC, (1758) 2007, 9.  
73 Sliwinski, 2011, 35-47; Orgad, 2012, 57-63; Burke, 1998; Smith, 1759 (2007); Voltaire, 1759 
(2001); Kant,. 1790(1987); Picturing Atrocity, 2012; Zelizer, 1998; Arendt, Hannah: On 
Revolution, Penguin books, New York, 1990 (1963) Scarry, 1985 ; Neiman, 2002; Butler, 2004; 
Butler, 2009; Linfield, 2010; Halttunen, 1995.   
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public of the era and gave rise to ideas of a shared humanity through (visual) 
testimony of the suffering of distant others.74 
News of the earthquake spread rapidly for the era and provoked 
previously unseen reactions. Compassionate reactions were unprecedentedly 
wide-spread and charitable. Material help flowed to Lisbon from all main 
European powers. The aftereffects of the quake were reportedly felt from the 
coast of Africa all the way to the farthest north.75 Perhaps partly because the 
trembles were felt by almost everyone in such a wide area, also the story of 
the Lisbon distress gave rise to exceptional curiosity and reached an audience 
of unparalleled size. The public was hungry for news on the sublime 
catastrophe.  The pain and distress of the inhabitants of Lisbon were 
mediated around the then acknowledged ‘civilized world’ (i.e. Europe and the 
New World) in unprecedented speed and intensity. 76  
European public at the time was often illiterate, and means of mediated 
communication differed greatly from our era. At the time religious 
representations, such as broadside psalms printed on broadside and sang in 
churches, were a popular way of mediating information of distant 
catastrophes, famines and wars to the often illiterate congregations. A 
Finnish priest Abraham Achrenius, affected by the devastation and 
witnessing its aftereffects as the surface of the River Aura rose by the force of 
the quake taking place thousands of kilometers away, wrote a broadside song 
in 1756 informing his congregate of the Lisbon catastrophe.  He describes the 
earthquake as disastrous and tragic, but links the timing of the quake (All 
Saints' Day) and other signals related to it with a prophetic frame, explaining 
the disaster as a warning and a sign of godly punishment.  Achrenius—as 
many of his contemporaries—saw the devastation as a prognostication for the 
people who had distanced themselves from God.77 Although a compassionate 
reaction was generally called upon toward the suffering of the Lisboans, at 
the same time popular religious representations resorted to the idea of 
providence and often stressed the catastrophe as a sign of godly anger and a 
warning to Europeans for their sinful way of life.78   
The Lisbon devastation was also a much-reflected theme in non-religious 
Enlightenment literature. The seismic shift that destroyed the city of Lisbon 
can be also recognized as a watershed marking an end to the earlier 
prevalently religious worldview. Voltaire wrote about the catastrophe in 
                                                
74 Sliwinski, 2011, 35-47; Neiman, 2002, 238-250.  
75 Sliwinski, 2011; Orgad, 2012, 57-58.  
76 Sliwinski, 2011,35-43.  
77Achrenius, Abraham: Sijtä hirmuisesta ja surkiasta maanjäristyxestä.  Lisabonin 
maanjäristyxen ajanmerkeist caxi wastudest syyscuusa lisättyä Wirttä wuonna 1976.Turku,1756.  
”Sijtä hirmuisesta ja surkiasta maanjäristyxestä, Lisabonin suuresa pääcaupungisa Portugalin 
waldacunnasa: josa, maanjäristyxen, walkian, ja weden cautta, nijn äkistä caupungi huckuis, että 
cuudenes osas hetkee, muurit ja tornit maahan langeisit, ja wijsi kymmendä tuhatta ihmistä, sangen 
surkiasti cuoletettin [etc]. Wijmeis pyhäin miesten päiwänä eli 1. p. marras cuusa 1755. Ynnä muitten 
ajan merckein cansa, cuin samoina aicoina tapahduit monesa waldacunnasa [etc]. Sen syndisen 
mailman waroituxexi, ja herätyxen ylös kehoituxexi, cocon pandu, ja cahdexasa wirresä präntijn 
annettu wuonna 1756.” 
78 For more on the religious responses see: Sliwinski, 2011, 39-44; Orgad 2012, 58-63.  
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Candide (1759), and quite the opposite to the view from the religious 
quarters of the era, saw the devastation as a sign of a forfeit and of the non-
existence of divine providence. This idea, pointing to the secularization of the 
conception of the humanity, can be seen to be at the core of the 
Enlightenment’s rethinking of compassion, the human kind, and of secular 
moral obligation of humans towards the suffering others. Moreover, Voltaire 
in his Poem on the Lisbon disaster: An enquiry into to the maxim whatever 
is, is right, stresses the innocence of the victims of the disaster and 
emphasizes the meaninglessness of their suffering, in polarity to the religious 
thought of providence. He writes:  
“What crime what sin had those young hearts conceived / That lie, 
bleeding and torn, on mother’s breast / Did fallen Lisbon deeper 
drink of vise / Than London Paris, or sun light Madrid?  
Tranquil spectators of yours brothers’ wrek / unmoved by this 
repellent dance of death / Who calmly seek the reason of such storms 
/ Let them but lash your own security / Your tears will mingle freely 
with the flood.   
Are you so certain of the great eternal cause / That knows all things 
and for itself creates / Could not have replaced us in this dreary clime 
/ Without Volcanoes seething ‘neath our feet?” 79 
 
In his poem he contrasts the suffering of the undeserving victims with the 
merry and carefree state of the distant spectators and, thus, points to the 
unfair relationship between the victims and the spectators. Voltaire’s poem 
can be seen to evoke sensations of guilt in the spectator and, therefore, invite 
the reader to imagine himself in the setting of horror and pain.80 Voltaire’s 
writings on the catastrophe mark a shift away from divine judgment and 
towards the notions of individual, of undeniable human worth stemming 
from witnessing violations of humanity´s integrity; they stress a need for 
moral sentiments and reactions towards the suffering of others and invite the 
readers to experience emotions of compassion.  
 
Visualized Bodily Pain, Compassion, and the Pain Induced Ideas of 
Humanity 
Although the event precedes the era of daily newspapers, a rich culture of 
secular print communication thrived at the time. Pamphlets and visual 
eyewitness accounts of the destruction were printed, sold and circulated 
widely. The representations of the devastation were not only textual but 
countless visual images of the destruction of Lisbon and of the pain of the 
                                                
79 As quoted in Orgad, 2012, 60-62.  
80 Sliwinski,2011, 44; Orgad, 2012, 61-62.  
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victims were produced and circulated in the publicity of the era; several of 
which have also survived the centuries. In addition to fine art and paintings, 
engravings and woodcuts picturing topical events were at the time popular 
and sold at markets and beerhouses. These images were affordable even to 
the working class and they also reached the often illiterate masses and 
infused the imagination of diverse segments of societies. As the accounts of 
the event, including visual images describing the horrors of the victims, were 
extensively circulated, Sharon Sliwinski has described the Lisbon disaster as 
first calamity mediated on a mass scale: the first modern mass media event 
to a distant catastrophe.81  (Artistic representations of the Lisbon earthquake 
see Illustration 2.1, at the end of this subchapter) 82 
In the case of Lisbon the images—or seeing and visually witnessing the 
suffering of others—held a central position. The significance of the 
visualization of the suffering of others was, reputedly, for the first time so 
essential to the mediation of a distant crises.83 In The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, as said written in the aftermath of the Lisbon disaster (1759), 
Adam Smith writes about the constitution of our fellow-feeling for the 
suffering other:  
How Selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some 
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, 
and render their happiness necessary to him, tough he derives 
nothing from except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or 
compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when 
we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner.84  
 
Smith here points to seeing, or conceiving in a lively manner, as a starting 
point of developing a compassionate relationship between the spectators and 
the distant sufferers. He continues that we can only conceive what the other 
goes through by placing ourselves in the situation of the sufferer by the force 
of our imagination.  With the help of imagination evoking representations 
and through the impressions of our own senses we may, according to Smith, 
place ourselves in the situation of the sufferer and, thus, conceive of 
ourselves as enduring the same torments. “We enter as it were into his body, 
and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form 
some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker 
                                                
81 Sliwinski, 2011, 36-38. 
82 Included in the illustration 2.1 is a Czech broadsheet, entitled "The true story of the disastrous 
earthquake in Lisbon…". It was published in 1755 in Prague, but is incorrectly dated 1750. Actually this 
artistic illustration bears no resemblance to the city of Lisbon. A timely and relatively accurate written 
report on the disaster, was however, attached. See: Historical Depictions of the 1755 Lisbon 
Earthquake, Nisee, University of California:  http://nisee.berkeley.edu/lisbon/  
The other artistic representation of the Lisbon catastrophe included in the illustration is a 1755 copper 
engraving the events by an unknown artist.  The original is in Museu da Cidade, Lisbon.  
83 Sliwinski, 2011, 35; Orgad, 2012, 58-63; see also Halttunen, 1995. 
84 Smith, (1759), 2007, 9. 
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in degree, is not altogether unlike them”. Smith continues: “That this is the 
source of our fellow-feeling for the misery of others, that it is by changing 
places in fancy with the sufferer, that we either to conceive or to be affected 
by what he feels”. 85 
Smith points to the centrality of bodily and visual dimensions in evoking 
our imagination, and, later, many others as well have seen a visual record of a 
body in pain crucial to forming a solidary bond between the pain-stricken 
and the spectators gazing from distance. Also many other Enlightenment 
thinkers, for instance David Hume and John Locke, saw a link between 
seeing and empathy toward the suffering of others, and emphasized the 
primalty of vision for sympathy. Thus the birth of “spectatorial sympathy” 
has been located in the Enlightenment   era.86  A fragile body can be seen as 
something that bounds all living creatures together, and thus the ability to 
imagine the pain of another living creature often stems from a bodily 
encounter. All humans have experienced pain and discomfort, and therefore 
we can all imagine a violation of our bodily integrity and relate to corporal 
suffering of others. An injured body points out for us—in the most realistic 
way possible—what may happen to us all: a body is what we all have and may 
lose, and thus it is the utmost thing shared by all living creatures.87  This 
emphasis on perceivable bodily pain, visually demonstrated and mediated for 
the awareness of distant spectators, is still today at the core of the 
humanitarian communication. It serves as a focal component in (media) 
representations of distant crises, and thus it is central in constitution of 
imagining ourselves and the “others“ in this world, and it is thus also pivotal 
to foreign politics and international relations.  
Smith explains that the base of compassion is situated in the ability to 
imagine and reflect on the distress seen in the bodies of others and in our 
own bodies by the help of imagination. He states that: “in looking at the sores 
and ulcers which are exposed by beggars in the streets, they (the spectators) 
are apt to feel an itching or uneasy sensation in the correspondent part of 
their own bodies”.88 Like Locke, also Smith remarks that this observation is 
so obvious, commonplace and mundane that not much proof is needed to 
back the claim. Whilst the claim might seem arbitrary, our ability to detect 
the pain of another by his/her bodily expressions has today also been proven 
by brain research. Recent findings show that visually witnessing the pain of 
others actually affects the spectators at a bodily, corporal level. Modern 
studies have demonstrated that when encountering visually detectable bodily 
pain in another person, areas in the spectator’s brain—mirror neurons, the 
mirroring system and mirroring mechanisms—activate, which enables us not 
                                                
85 Smith, (1759) 2007, 9-11.  
86 Halttunen, 1995, 304-308.  
87 See: Halttunen, 1995; Chouliaraki, 2013, 26; Scarry, 1985; Linfield, 2010, 39-40; Butler, 
2009, 1-5; Butler, 2004, 19-23. 
88 Smith, (1759) 2007, 10-11.  
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only to react to the pain of others but also to stimulate the body state of 
others in our own bodies.89 Just like Smith argued three hundred years ago. 
Further reflecting on the nascent tradition of humanitarianism and its 
impact on contemporary thinking, for example, also Judith Butler writes 
about bodily precariousness as a shared condition of all (human) life. 
Recognition of life and the similarity of all living beings through an 
encounter with a body (in pain) is a central part of constituting social 
obligations towards others. Becoming aware of the precariousness of all lives 
is to recognize the social dimension of sustaining life—one’s life is always in 
some sense in the hands of others. Precisely because all living creatures 
(humans as well as other animals) are precarious—vulnerable in a bodily 
manner and may suffer pain and die—it becomes necessary to care for these 
beings so that they could live.  And thus, often only under conditions in 
which the loss of life would matter, the value of life appears. The shared 
nature of our being as bodily precarious creatures extends our obligation to 
the others like us, who might even be unknown, distant and remain 
anonymous to us.90 Perceivable bodies in pain and precariousness thereby 
are fundamental to the ideas of not only a shared humanity but to 
humanitarianism, the aspiration to uphold and save the lives of others.  
As Shani Orgad and Sliwinski remark, the focus of the popular visual 
representations of the Lisbon disaster was neither to picture the event in 
realistic terms nor to work as an accurate portrayal of the destruction but 
rather to vividly represent large-scale destruction of human lives in general 
terms. Illustrations concentrating on the massive scale and horrific nature of 
the pain and suffering of the victims were to mediate a sensation of horror, to 
elicit fascination and a sense of pity in their spectators and, therefore, to 
visually invoke an idea of a shared humanity. The emphasized bodily 
suffering of individuals in the images of the Lisbon quake seems to suggest a 
reading that this kind of destruction could well be experienced by any of the 
spectators, by any human. By their concentration on the corporal suffering of 
individuals and the agonizing destruction caused by the violent event, the 
images underline the universality of the experience of pain, and they stress 
the collective experience of suffering as a shared human condition. Thus, 
they create an experience of a shared fate of all humans—with bodily fragility 
and vulnerability—and, by doing so, they lead the spectator to imagine a 
universal human community, which is bound together both by pain and in 
compassion for the suffering of our own kind.91 Thus, seeing the pain of 
others—in the ways it was encountered through the popular representations 
of the Lisbon catastrophe—does not only give the spectators the ability to 
                                                
89 See for example: Saarela, Hlushchuk& et al.: The Compassionate Brain: Humans detect intensity 
of Pain from another’s Face. Cerebral Cortex January 2007,17: 230—237; Damasio, Antonio: Self 
comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain. Vintage, New York, 2012.  
90 Butler, 2009, 1-15. From this, as Butler adds, does not necessarily follow, that we want to or will 
protect all vulnerable life. On the contrary. She points out, that apprehending lives as precarious is not 
necessarily s followed by the decision to protect them. See also Butler, 2004.  
91 Sliwinski, 2011, 30; Orgad, 2012, 59.  
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identify with the agony of the sufferers and to actually feel their pain in their 
own bodies but, moreover, it gives the opportunity to imagine a larger entity 
of humanity bound together by collective moral bonds. (For popular 
representations of the Lisbon catastrophe see illustration 2.1.)   
The Enlightenment representations of the Lisbon tragedy can be seen to 
create a space for a secular idea of singular humanity in the minds and eyes 
of distant spectators. The circulation of emotion evoking representations of 
the distant event created a community of mediated suffering between the 
sufferers and the audiences. By these representations, it can be argued, an 
idea of a shared human community, early notions of humanitarian 
obligations towards distant suffering others, and, moreover, ideas of 
universal human rights were created in the imagination of the distant 
witnesses of the calamity. To borrow a phrase from Hannah Arendt, the 
secular worldview partly launched by the Lisbon disaster unveiled the shared 
and vulnerable condition of all humans; “the abstract nakedness of being 
nothing but human”.92 As the disaster gave birth to the ideas of human rights 
and individual humanity of all people, it also made clear that in a secular 
worldview and in the absence of god, nothing—but we ourselves—safeguards 
us from violations of our bodily integrity and from the defilement of these 
rights.  
What is remarkable and perhaps unprecedented in the representational 
style of the Lisbon disaster is, that the representations of the 
contemporaries—visual as well as, for example, poems and other textual 
representations—seem to be focused on the experience of the audience faced 
with the records telling of the suffering others. In addition to being the first 
disaster comprehensively mediated on this scale, the destruction of Lisbon 
might have been the first mass disaster in the reporting of which the 
emotions the accounts evoked in us —the distant witnesses of the event—
were accentuated. Although a compassionate reaction was generally called 
upon, nevertheless the victims of the disaster—the suffering objects in the 
images—were often quite blatantly blamed for their sinful way of life and, 
thus, often seen, to a certain extent, to be deserving the “punishment from 
above”. Therefore the suffering objects were partly presented as being 
different from the safe and happy onlookers; presented as others.93  
Thus the Lisbon disaster can also be seen as the first global humanitarian 
event belonging to the register of politics of pity.  Hannah Arendt 
differentiates between compassion and pity by outlining that, on the one 
hand, within the register of compassion action is carried out in the presence 
of the suffering, who are nearby and within the reach of our natural gaze, 
without being accompanied by representations that aim at generality. Pity, 
on the other hand, is felt when the spectator is a happy person, not 
immediately concerned, touched and faced with the suffering of the other, 
but gazing from distance and through mediated, represented knowledge. 
                                                
92 Arendt, Hannah: The Origins of Totalitarianism, Schocken Books, New York, 2004, 383.  
93 Orgad, 2012, 60. See also Halttunen, 1995, 309.  
50
 51 
Thus, in the case of pity, action cannot be taken immediately, but only 
indirectly, and the suffering has to be communicated and represented —
mediated—into our knowledge. The essentiality of representation and 
generalization that inevitably occurs, when moving from the local setting to 
the global level, adds further political and hierarchical dimensions to the 
arrangement between the sufferer and the spectator.94  
Thus, Lisbon also signifies a turn from the register of compassion towards 
the politics of pity, and it further shows the way to the forthcoming global 
representational practices and arrangement of humanitarianism and 
humanitarian images. The emotions these (visual) representations aroused 
in their spectators, gazing from distance and safety, became the moral of the 
humanitarian story, and the theatrical setting of mediated suffering came to 
emerge. Thus, the style of representation, the eminent standing of iconic, 
thick visual material, as well as the arrangement of roles, and the hierarchical 
relationship between the humanitarian spectators and the suffering objects 
in the representations of the Lisbon disaster, to a large extent, resemble the 
ways in which images of distant suffering address us today in humanitarian 
communication and exemplify how the roles of the humanitarian play are 
assembled also in the contemporary humanitarian communication, or the 
“humanitarian theater”.95 Thus, I argue that the foundations of the ever since 
prevalent representational practices of mediating distant suffering were 
created in the face of the ruins of the city of Lisbon. The Lisbon catastrophe, 
its mediation, the reactions and the discussion it stirred can be seen as a 
starting point of modern thinking on humanity, of humanitarianism and 
(visual) humanitarian communication.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
94 Arendt, 1990 (1963), 85-89.  
95 Orgad, 2012, 60; Halttunen, 2015; see also Chouliaraki, 2013, 27-32, & Boltanski, 2000. I will 
get back to the themes of humanitarian narrative, roles and humanitarian theatricality in more detail 
later in the course of this chapter, and especially in chapter 3. The idea of the theatricality of 
humanitarian visual communication is one that will permeate the whole study.  
51
A History of Humanitarianism and Visual Images of Pain 
 ???
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
????????????
 
 
 
 
52
 53 
2.2.2 THE REVOLUTIONARY RIGHTS OF MEN  
When looking at the Enlightenment discourse on humanity—partly 
generated by the Lisbon disaster—it becomes clear that the starting point for 
the ideas of a common humanity and human rights is in the recognition of 
the other as a human. And in the recognition of the rights of men as rights of 
the other, who has been denied these rights. Thus, vulnerability, suffering 
and destruction of human lives are central to generating the notions of 
protection of humans from these perils. And just as the destruction of Lisbon 
gave rise to the apprehension of the precariousness of life, we often still today 
know and recognize human worth and human rights only by witnessing their 
downfall.  
The ways in which the representations sprouting from the Lisbon disaster 
presented the catastrophe and addressed their audiences allowing the 
imagining of a common humanity worthy of protection, which gave a push to 
an extensive reformulation of the ideas and imagination on humankind with 
rights. A couple of decades later, the power of aristocracy and monarchy was 
radically challenged both in the New World and in Europe. What was only 
sketched out a few decades earlier by philosophers, was at the end of the 
century politically asserted in the radically novel declarations of 
independence and the “Rights of men”, in the United States and France.  
Thomas Jefferson formulated the “Rights of men” in 1776 Declaration of 
Independence: We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men were 
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness. In 1789 the French proclaimed in the article 1. of the Declaration 
of the Rights of man and citizen, drafted by the marquis Lafayette, that Men 
are born and remain free and equal in rights. In contrast to the US 
declaration, the French declaration does not mention church, king or nobility 
but referrers to natural, inalienable and sacred right of man.96  
These ideas, jubilantly declared and printed on the ceremonious sheets, 
did not come out of the blue, but they had their base on the over-all 
rethinking of humanity and its protection by Enlightenment thinkers. 
Although often at the time, politics in reality did not even try to hold the 
declared rights in honor—as the revolution in France ended in terror and 
bloodshed, and later the French constitutions and declarations were very 
differently formulated—the declarations gave a push to reimagining 
humanity and paved the way for what could be imagined for the future. As 
the declarations of that time were all but all-inclusive—and openly 
disregarded the rights of the insane, children, some religious minorities, 
slaves, incarcerated, racialized groups, and of course women—they, just as 
the previous formulations of a shared humanity evoked by the Lisbon 
catastrophe, set the stage for the future of human rights and protection of 
humans. As Lynn Hunt acknowledges, to declare is to publically and 
                                                
96 Hunt, Lynn: Invention of human rights. A History. Norton, New York, 2007. See Hunt for the 
entire declarations.  
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formally state the condition of things; it is a public act of telling how things 
are, or perhaps even more how they should be. Thus, the early declarations of 
human rights paved the way to widening the scope of what can be imagined 
and apprehended as life worthy of protection.97   Thus, the emerging human 
rights ideas and the care for the pain of others opened new spaces for the 
further evolvement of ideas of humanity, humanitarianism, caring for the 
pain of others and for attempts at alleviating it.  
 
2.3  PICTURING ATROCITY IN THE AGE OF IMPERIAL 
HUMANITARIANISM 
As noted above, the emerging discourse of humanity and the ideas of the 
protection of humanity stem from Enlightenment thinking, and the birth of 
(global) humanitarian communication can be located in the representations 
inspired by the Lisbon disaster. But typically the starting point of modern, 
organized humanitarianism is located at the turn of the eighteenth century 
and the emergence of the abolition movement in Britain. The new century 
brought out to the open new forms of compassion for the suffering distant 
others. Following the typification of Michael Barnett on the ages of 
humanitarianism, the time period from about 1800 to 1945 may be called the 
age of imperial humanitarianism.98 
Barnett apprehends humanitarianism and its evolvement as driven by 
three major forces: the force of destruction, the force of production and the 
force of compassion. Barnett argues, that in this time period destruction was 
brought upon people by the forces of great power wars and colonialism, and 
commercial production relied on the subordination of the colonies.  As these 
forces destroyed local sense of community, compassion drawing from the 
ideas of Western-based ‘civilization’ encouraged individuals to imagine new 
more universal and global obligations to other humans. The colonializing 
West defined the values of the international community in terms of the 
ideology of humanity and Christian religion. During the era, liberal and 
religiously inspired humanitarians set out to nurture new kinds of 
compassion and accepted new responsibilities towards the distant suffering 
others, by civilizing the objects of the help (individuals as well as states and 
areas) in order to alleviate their suffering. Barnett sees that the major 
humanitarian watershed, i.e. the founding of the Red Cross and the ICRC 
movement as well as the Geneva Conventions, is also founded on and reflect 
the Eurocentric ideas of international community and are inspired by the 
expanding Christian fellowship as means of rescuing the fallen.99  
                                                
97 Hunt, 2007, 113-116.  
98 Barnett, 2011 
99 Barnett, 2011, 30, 49-94. On how international law influenced this development, see also 
Koskenniemi, 2001.  
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In the age of imperial humanitarianism relief activity was still mostly a 
private matter. But for instance, in the abolition fight the antislavery activists 
tried to get countries to engage in the fight for humanity and in the 
alleviation of suffering. Nevertheless, it was only after the First World War 
that governments and state actors more widely adopted new kinds of 
responsibilities in order to care for the vulnerable and became involved in 
humanitarian action, creating international humanitarian organizations such 
as the High Commissioner of Refugees. 100 
During the era of imperial humanitarianism both the means of mediating 
information and producing images took major leaps ahead. At the start of 
this era the sole means of visually communicating and mediating suffering 
into the awareness of distant spectators were paintings, drawings and 
engravings. Whereas, at the end of the era, mechanical means of reproducing 
and mediating visual images—along with the emergence of photography in 
the 1830s—had already changed the outlook of Western publics on the 
suffering of distant others in spectacular ways. In the following paragraphs I 
shall engage with the evolvement of humanitarian ideas and the position of 
images of suffering and pain in this historical process.  
2.3.1 REPRESENTING AND SPECTATING THE SUFFERING OF 
SLAVES  
In the eighteenth century world order, freedom of humans, as we now know 
it, was rare.  As a matter of fact slavery was ubiquitous, and it has been 
roughly estimated that three quarters of all people alive were under some 
form enslavement. The rising living standards of the populations of the 
Western colonial powers and the globalizing Western world order were 
dependent on the enslavement and forced work of others. Majority of African 
slaves were working in Africa ensuring the colonial power and wealth, and 
African slaves were shipped shackled and chained to the New World by 
millions.  On top of this, African slaves were also shipped to many parts of 
the Arab world. Likewise, the Ottoman Empire enslaved other peoples, and 
Russian serfs—majority of the population—were exploited and owned by 
their masters. Millions of farm workers in India and in other parts of Asia 
lived in outright slavery. At the time the ideas of liberation of all humans 
from the shackles of forced labor and slavery seemed far-fetched and 
unattainable. In the eighteenth century most citizens of Western colonial 
empire found the idea of ending slavery not only unimaginable in terms of 
the economic system but also if not undesirable then realistically 
unachievable and perhaps even utopic.  Nevertheless, in the late 1780s 
London—the capital of a colonial empire—the ideas of freedom of men and 
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abolition of slavery were forming and gathering public resonance in 
unforeseen rapidity.101   
Thus, for a good reason, the start of the history of humanitarianism is 
often located at the birth of the British antislavery movement emerging in the 
1780s. Adam Hochschild dates the early abolition movement in Britain as the 
first time in history, when a large number of people became outraged over 
someone else’s rights—and, moreover, over the rights of people of another 
color, distant people of another continent.102 Therefore, the abolition 
movement is remarkable in the evolvement of human rights thinking and in 
widening the scope of who can be understood as belonging to humanity and, 
moreover, to humanity in need of protection and rights. The emerging 
humanity and human rights thinking of the era, marked by an unprecedented 
willingness to see all humans as capable of reason and, thus, born with some 
natural rights, played a major role in the anti-slavery movement.103 In 
addition to the broadening secular thinking on humanity stemming from 
Enlightenment ideas, new religious doctrines created novel possibilities for 
seeing even distant others as belonging to humanity. Evangelical protestant 
religious sects, abundant among the abolitionists, particularly Quakers, saw 
all humans as God’s children and, therefore, preached that they should be 
treated with equal respect and decency. Among the religious thinking 
dominant amongst abolitionists, slavery and treatment of slaves was seen as 
inhumane and as barrier to the spiritual awakening of the slaves. Indeed, 
many antislavery leaders of the time were not so much against the system of 
colonialism or even slavery as such but against the terrible treatment of 
slaves and the lack of Christian instruction provided to the slaves, which they 
also saw as obstacle to the conversion and thus salvation of the slaves 104 
Thus, rather than an anti-colonial mindset, it was evangelical religious 
thinking, emphasizing conversion and salvation of all humans, that played a 
central role in the abolition movement.  
Nevertheless, widening of the scope of who could be perceived as a human 
entitled to rights was central to the birth of abolitionist movement. As Judith 
Butler writes, lives must be apprehended as lives before they can be regarded 
as injured or lost grieved and mourned over, and demanded to be 
protected.105 Or in the words of Arendt, one must be judged human in order 
to enjoy the benefits associated with the title. 106 Thus, in order to persuade 
the publics to turn against slavery and to pressure policy makers to abolish 
the slave trade, the strategy of the abolitionists was not only to show the 
inhumanity of the slave trade, but to demonstrate the humanity of the slaves 
by depicting them as belonging to the family of humans and worthy of rights.  
                                                
101 Hochschild, Adam: Bury the Chains, Prophets and rebels in the fight to fee an empire´s slaves. 
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102 Hochschild, 2005, 5; see also Barnett, 2011, 57-64.  
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Various strategies emphasizing the humanness of the slaves and arousing 
sensations of sameness with the slaves among the Western publics were used 
in order to include the distant people of different color and continent into the 
rank of humanity.107  
 
The Visual Strategy of the Abolitionist 
The early antislavery movement engaged in various, often also visual, tactics 
to encourage the Britons to see the slaves as humans and, thus, to sympathize 
with their suffering. Pamphlets vividly describing the cruel practices and 
brutal consequences of the slave trade in detail were among them. The minds 
of the British publics were also tempted to turn against slavery by putting a 
human face on the slaves; tours of former slaves telling their stories of 
enslavement and emancipation were arranged. Also travelling displays 
showcasing the brutality of the slave trade and its practices were organized. 
These displays presented material objects associated with the inhuman 
business: weapons of discipline, whips, thumbscrews and shackles. These 
demonstrations aimed at arousing the imagination of the audience. The 
theatrical arrangements confronted the spectators with a question: what 
would it feel like to lose one’s freedom. Showcasing the slave trade 
practices—presenting the freed slaves along with the equipment of 
discipline—was used in order to get the spectators to recognize the fact that 
the inhuman practices were used to sustain the lifestyle of the British public. 
Thus unveiling the nature of slavery was articulating to the publics: the sugar 
and tea you are enjoying are coming from the colonies and are produced by 
slave labor; you are all part of this and, thus, also guilty of these inhuman 
practices. Therefore, at the heart of the Abolitionists strategy was to arouse 
emotions of guilt and shame in the audiences.108 Furthermore, what is 
remarkable in the tactics of the abolitionists is that they often centered on 
visuality and explicitly focused on showing the bodily, corporal features of 
the suffering induced by slavery. As a vulnerable body is shared condition of 
all living creatures, sensations of sameness were effectively aroused in the 
spectators through visual encounters with suffering others, and the 
imagination of a shared human condition was stimulated by visually 
presenting bodily vulnerability. As an example of this strategy is a medallion 
used in a British Anti-Slavery campaign in 1787, picturing a shackled slave in 
a kneeling posture, with an accompanying text ”Am I not a Man and a 
Brother?” (See illustration 2.2 109)  
Another vivid example of this theatrical style of abolitionist publicity is 
demonstrated by a historic speech of an antislavery activist, member of the 
parliament, William Wilberforce delivered on April 2, 1792 at the British 
parliament. Wilberforce’s speech centered not only on reasoned arguments 
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against slavery, as the previous appeals for the abolition of slave trade had 
tended to do, but focused on emotional appeal and strived to arouse 
benevolent sentiments in the audience. As Sliwinski argues, Wilberforce's 
strategy was to get the members of the parliament to squirm in their seats 
and to experience the emotions of shame and guilt over the prevalent and 
legal brutal treatment of slaves. For this he used narratives of extreme 
humane suffering. Among other vivid descriptions of the brutality of slavery, 
he told a story of a single slave girl, 15 years of age, being cruelly beaten on a 
slave ship, placed on display, hanged upside down from her leg and left dying 
by the captain of the ship. In his presentation Wilberforce centered on the 
physical suffering of the “innocent” child, on the cruelness of the captain and 
the slave trade system and, thus, placed the members of the parliament in a 
position of baring witness to the suffering of the girl and to the suffering 
induced by slave trade. Wilberforce's performance was followed by a heated 
debate, and the parliamentary session lasted the whole night, after which an 
act of “gradual abolition” of slavery was passed. After the parliamentary 
session Wilberforce’s story of the brutally murdered slave girl spread out side 
of the walls of the parliament, made the news, was transformed into popular 
representations and caused a public uproar.110  
After a week from the hearing, a hand colored print, illustrating the event 
of the beating and murder of the young girl was produced and rapidly 
circulated from hand to hand among Londoners. The print is captioned: “The 
abolition of slave trade. Or the inhumanity of Dealers of human flesh 
exemplified in Capt'n Kimbler's treatment of a young Negro girl of 15 for her 
virgin modesty.”  The image shows a young naked girl, hanged on a rope 
from her angle, held up by a sailor. The young girl is exposed to the gaze of 
the captain placed on the forefront of the image.  Several other slaves are 
presented as looking at the event in the background of the image, and sailors, 
who are pictured as turned away from the scene of torture, are also placed in 
the background. The captain is pictured as smiling and looking content—or 
even cruel—, as the sailor holding the girl by the rope is titled as saying: 
“Damn me if I Iike it. I have a good mind to let go.”  As the girl is pictured 
naked, her breasts and buttocks revealed for gazes of the spectators. She is 
pictured as trying to cover her face, a sign pointing to her modesty. What is 
emblematic and typical of the representations of this type is that the girl at 
the center of the image remains anonymous—as she also did in the 
parliamentary hearing—and thus she, in her bare corporality becomes a 
nameless symbol of the victims of the inhuman trade. 111 (For the image see 
illustration 2.2 112)  
The picture of the anonymous slave girl’s murder, the mode in which it 
presents the event and its textual framing is, according to Sliwinski, 
descriptive of the nature of the abolitionist's rhetorical and visual strategy. 
                                                
110 Sliwinski, 2011, 2.  
111 Sliwinski, 2011, 2-4.  
112 Isaak Cruikshank “The abolition of the slave trade” 1792, image is included in the Illustration 2.2 
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Also the rhetorical strategy of Wilberforce, added with the popular visual 
representations depicting slavery inspired by his speech, contains features 
fundamental to (visual) humanitarian communication for years to come.113 
Ever since the abolition, these features—the nameless sufferer, pain-stricken 
and in need of saving, the curious and outraged spectators witnessing the 
pain of distant others, the mode of addressing the audience by 
representations arousing guilt and shame, and the stress on the physical 
suffering demonstrated by visual representations of corporal pain—have 
remained as central and lasting for humanitarian communication. Moreover, 
the theatrical mode of representation is again immanent in the visual 
strategy of abolitionist. As the victims are visually presented to the spectating 
audiences as weak, unable to help themselves and suffering, and the 
emotions of the spectators aroused in the face of the suffering of others is 
given a central role in the arrangement. 114 Overall, the religiously driven 
abolition movement and its civilizing and evangelizing motives in the fight to 
end slavery, enlighten the nature of humanitarianism of the colonial era, but 
these motives also underline its central functions and modes of 
representation that have lasted as primary modes of representing distant 
suffering for future decades.  
With unprecedented speed, the ideas of the abolition of slavery—an avant-
garde, nearly utopian idea of the 1780s—resonated with large segments of the 
British public, and the abolition movement spread widely with enormous 
scale. Law soon incorporated an idea that had been unimaginable just a few 
decades earlier, as the Slave Trade Act (An Act for the Abolition of the Slave 
Trade) was passed by the British parliament in 1807. The act restricted slave 
trade in the British Empire and encouraged pressuring other European 
nations to end slave trade, but it did not end slavery as such.  Finally, the 
Slavery Abolition Act passed in 1833 abolished slavery in the whole of British 
Empire. From Britain the fight quickly spread to other colonial powers, and 
the spirit of anti-slavery saw no deceleration.115  
2.3.2 PRELUDE TO PHTOGRAPHY OF ATROCITY: GOYA AND THE 
SPECTATORSHIP OF WAR HORROR  
As Sliwinski notes, the history of the struggle for human rights and the 
evolution of the protection of humanity can be perceived as a story of 
courageous campaigners and pioneers telling stories of atrocious events to 
fascinated and outraged spectators.116 The stories and images of the 
suffering of other humans, mediated by the avant-garde humanitarians of 
their times have been widening the scope of what can be perceived as life 
worth of mourning over and demanded to be protected. In the early 
                                                
113 Sliwinski, 2011, 2-4.  
114 See: Orgad, 2012, 60; Halttunen, 2015; see also Chouliaraki, 2013, 27-32, & Boltanski,  2000. 
115 See:  Hochschild, 2005.  
116 Sliwinski, 2011, 4.  
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twentieth century, in addition to slaves, also the pain of soldiers and other 
victims of war became to be mourned over, and their pain was presented in 
images shown in order to arouse humanitarian sentiments in distant 
spectators.  
Fransisco Goya (1746-1828)—a well-known and an influential artist of his 
era and a court painter of the Spanish monarchy—stands out as a striking 
example of a visual avant-garde revealer of war induced suffering. After 
baring witness to the war between Spain and Napoleon's France (1808 -
1814), Goya produced—whilst officially working as an artist of the crown—a 
series of 82 etchings illustrating cruelty and human suffering induced by the 
war: the Disasters of War (or as the artist himself entitled the collection, 
Fatal consequences of Spain's bloody war with Bonaparte, and other 
emphatic caprices). At the time when paintings and artistic visual 
representations of war tended to center on the heroic features of war, Goya 
extraordinarily pictured the horrific nature, suffering and universal madness 
of war.  
Goya produced the plates between 1810 and 1820 in response to the 
conflict, but the critical views of the artist close to power were kept to himself 
at the time, and the drawings were publicized only posthumously.  The style 
of the prints is raw and detailed; after the tour of images the spectator feels 
utterly dispirited in the face of such inhumanity, cruelty and pointlessness of 
war. The images focus, unlike most war art of the time, not on the heroic 
nature of fight but on the pain of individuals caught in the middle of the 
bloody carnage. Cruelty and physical pain in their bareness are at the 
forefront of the images.  Goya did not explain why he made the images; but 
he accompanied each image with dire captions.117 Perhaps one of the most 
famous images of the series’ (Plate number 39) pictures three naked, 
disfigured, mutilated bodies and body parts hanging on a tree; a headless 
torso on one branch, a head in another, one man tangled at the root, another 
tied to the trunk. The text blatantly says: “Heroic Feat. With dead men”. Plate 
12 pictures an armless vomiting man about to fall into a pile of dead bodies 
and is laconically titled: “This is what you were born for”. Image 26 titled: 
“One can't look”, pictures a man kneeling down to a prayer, a mother trying 
to shelter her children, a man covering his face and women begging for 
mercy, all being pointed at with rifles. Plate 33, titled “What more can be 
done”, pictures two men holding third man by his legs, while a fourth man 
uses a sword on the genitalia of the man.118 The onslaught of barbarity, 
torture, rape and atrocities of Disasters of War is endless. (See illustration 
2.2. 119 )   
                                                
117 Sliwinski, 2011, 48-54.; See also Sontag, 2003, 39-42.;  Goya's Disasters of War: The truth 
about War laid bare. BBC, July 17, 2014. 
118 All of the plates can be seen online, for instance here:  
http://www.richardharrisartcollection.com/portfolio-view/francisco-goya-2/ 
119 Included in the illustration: Goya, Francisco, Disasters of War, Plate 39  “Heroic Feat. With dead 
men “& Plate 12  “This is what you were born for “.  
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The way in which Goya’s pictures war, accompanied by his punitive 
captions, leave few questions to be asked; it’s hard to see them as anything 
other than a visual protest against violence and war. The viewpoint of the 
images is often arranged so that they show the events from an onlooker’s 
perspective and thus places the spectators as the witnesses of these horrors. 
The focus is on the perception of the horrors, not the horrors themselves, 
underlining a feeling of having been there at the spot. These images do more 
than show, they bear witness; they claim, things like this happened, and thus 
invite the spectator to actively imagine the horrors taking place, and thus also 
to think of and imagine—not only inhumanity—but humanity. Moreover, the 
images do not much differentiate between the suffering and the perpetrators 
of the violence; it is often hard to tell who—a French or a Spaniard—is 
inflicting the suffering. It seems that taking sides did not matter to Goya. His 
images were making a global condemnation: war to him was a universal 
lunacy, inglorious for all partakers.120  
If Goya's images point to the perils of humanity, they also point to the 
universality of vulnerable humanity and the need to protect it in line with the 
ideas of Enlightenment thinkers. The images do not solely point out the 
madness of war but also stipulate empathy for its victims, soldiers and 
civilians alike. Again the theatrical mode of addressing is present: the 
emotions of the spectators are at a central position in the arrangement of 
images. The Disasters of War images were published decades after the artist’s 
death in 1863, since publishing the set of prints denouncing violence and 
abuse of power in such a way was deemed impossible during the rule of 
Ferdinand VII. These images seem more like the modern, realistic 
photographic images poignantly criticizing and describing the madness of 
war, a prelude of the years to come, than the standard war art of his time. 
The images of the Disasters of war are graphic snapshots of war before the 
invention of photography. 121 
2.3.3 DUNANT GAZING AT THE DESTRUCTION OF SOLFERINO: THE 
STARTING SHOTS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED PROTECTION OF 
HUMANITY  
The start of modern, organized humanitarian movement is regularly 
pinpointed to Henry Dunant's humanitarian reaction provoked by witnessing 
the suffering caused by the bloody battle of Solferino, June 1859. When 
arriving at the battlefield of Solferino at nightfall, Dunant, a young Swiss 
businessman, had never seen a battlefield before. In his book Memory of 
                                                
120 Sliwinski, 2011, 48-54; Sontag, 2003, 39-42; Goya's Disasters of War: The truth about 
War laid bare.;  How Disaster of War made Goya a Modern artist, February13. 2012, 
Phaidon. 
121 Ibid. See also: Griffits, Antohony, Wilson-Bareau, Juliet & Willet, John: Disasters of War: 
Callot Goya Dix .University of California Press, Berkeley, 1998.  
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Solferino Dunant writes about his impressions of the following night after 
the actual fighting was over:  
Bodies of men and horses covered the battlefield; corpses strewn over 
roads, ditches, ravines, thickets and fields… The poor wounded men 
were pale as ghosts and exhausted. Heart-rending voices kept calling 
for help. Who could describe the agonies of that fearful night.122 
 
Dunant was deeply shocked by the aftermath of the enormous battle, which 
left 6000 dead and 30 000 wounded men on the battlefield.  
When he returned to Geneva he wrote Memory of Solferino. Seeing and 
witnessing the destruction by his own eyes—and trying to attend to the 
enormous suffering of the wounded men left without medical care—led him 
to think about the need to alleviate the pain of soldiers on all sides of the 
battlefront. Dunant dedicates a larger part of his book to descriptions of the 
horrors he encountered at the scene of Solferino, and by poignant deceptions 
of human suffering he invites the reader to imagine the horrors of war. After 
enveloping the reader in blood and carnage, only at the end of his book, he 
makes a plea for the international recognition of a need to universally 
alleviate the pain caused by war.123 Although Dunant’s testimony of the 
carnage did not include visual images, visual testimony of the suffering is at 
the heart of his plea for humanity and its protection. His description of the 
horrors has led to numerous artistic representations of the scenery he 
described in the book, which have helped the distant audiences to imagine 
not only the horrific downfall of humanity in the midst of war but also 
aroused the will and determination to help the victims of war in countless 
generations to follow. (See illustration 2.2124)  
Dunant's eye-opening and persuasive testimony of the destruction of war 
resonated with the philanthropists of Geneva and Europe. Soon a committee 
promoting humanitarian ideas of war and advocating the sending of 
volunteer medical personnel to battlefields—wearing a Red Cross emblem of 
neutrality—was formed. In August 1864 a diplomatic conference met and the 
first Geneva Convention for the “Amelioration of the Conditions of the 
Wounded in Armies in the Field” was formulated. As Loius Appia—a 
founding member of the committee—put it: “To make war more humane, if 
that is not a contradiction in terms, is our mission… once we have voiced our 
undistinguished rejection of war, we must take it as it is, unite our efforts to 
alleviate suffering”. For the first time in history nations agreed to sign a 
treaty that exceeded the boundaries of national governments to respect a 
                                                
122 Dunant, Henry: Memory of Solferino, 1862. Cited in Humanity in War. Frontline 
photography since 1860, ICRC (Caroline Moorehead), Geneva, 2009, 8.  
123Humanity in War. 2009, 8-9; Rosén, Gunnar: Sata sodan ja rauhan vuotta. Suomen 
Punainen Risti 1877-1977. Suomen Punainen Risti, Helsinki, 2002, 25-27.  
124 Included in the collage illustration 2.2. is a painting by Charles Édouard Armand-Dumaresq, 
picturing Dunant administrating aid at the Solferino Battlefield.  
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code of conduct in war. As a result the International Committee of the Red 
Cross and the Red Cross movement were born in 1864.125 Still today the 
founding principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, universality, 
independence, voluntary service and unity of the Red Cross live on in the 
minds of the public when humanitarianism is mentioned.  
Again we see here, in the history of the international Red Cross movement 
and in the history of the Geneva Convention aiming at creating the laws of 
war, how they emerged as a reaction to visually and intensively witnessing 
the pain of others giving rise to a demand to do something to alleviate the 
pain caused by war. Dunant's awakening in the face of enormous suffering 
again indicates the inseparable communion between seeing suffering and 
humanitarian reactions: on the one side of the coin there is pain, on the other 
relief. Humanitarianism is given birth to by baring witness to pain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
125 Humanity in War, 2009, 8-9; Rosén, 2002, 27- 38. 
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2.3.4 EMERGING DOCUMENTARY PHTOGRAPHY REPRESENTING 
THE PAIN OF OTHERS  
Artistic visual illustrations have historically had an important role in the 
formation of the understanding of the world beyond our gaze, as well as our 
perspectives on history and memory. War-art, combat art and paintings of 
catastrophes and war are still even today widespread modes of articulating 
the spirit and pain inflicted by war for distant spectators126, but after the 
invention of photography in 1830’s (there are numerous dates marking the 
invention) photographic images quickly came to occupy predominantly the 
visual mediation of suffering and war from crisis zones. As Susan Sontag 
remarks, since the invention of photography, photography has kept company 
with death.127  
Early on the novel medium of photography was perceived as the Pencil of 
Nature; as a technical and scientific apparatus, a wonder of natural sciences, 
offering an objective and uncompromising representation of the real. 
Although the camera's ability to record reality “as it is” was emphasized, 
photographs never were objective records of reality. Photographs have 
always had a point of view. Whilst they are copies of an actual moment of 
reality, photos have been, from the very start, framed gazes and 
tendentiously produced points of view, interpretations of reality. The primary 
difference of photography, in contrast to verbal accounts and artistic 
manmade visual representations of wars, crises and events of suffering, is the 
underlying notion that the photographer, as well as the camera, had to be at 
the location of the dramatic event in order to produce images and record the 
unfolding events. The reality behind photographic images and the eye-
witness quality of photography adds an aura of truth and proof value to 
photographs, especially when taken of dramatic events and human 
suffering.128 Therefore, baring witness to horrors of war and the suffering of 
distant others through a photographic image—a record of the real—brings 
the visual encounter between the safe spectators and the distant suffering 
others to another level. As Roland Barthes acknowledges, looking at a 
photograph is always looking at something that no longer exists. 
Photographic images record stalled moments of the past, and thus they 
collect and replicate something already lost. As light is what makes the 
photographic image possible, it always also depends on dark; the shadow. 
The complex relationship of lived life, death and photography is inseparable, 
at the same time elusive and dire.129 This feature of photography makes the 
spectatorship of bodily suffering (always pointing to the shared vulnerability 
of living creatures) even more complex and compelling.  
                                                
126 Still today war-artists record contemporary wars, although photography is today perceived as the 
primary route to seeing war and suffering in a global setting.  An artist in Afghanistan: ‘To tell 
the story, you’ve got to take risks’, The Guardian, 19 October, 2014.  
127 Sontag, 2003, 21.  
128 Barthes, Roland: Camera Lucida. Vintage Books, London, 2000 (1980), 76-77.  
129 Barthes, (1980) 2000, 96; Sontag, 2003, 22-23.   
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Developments in the technical means of photography, as well as progress 
in the field of mediating and reproducing visual images, have defined and 
altered the uses and effectiveness of visual images throughout the history. 
The innovation of the portable Kodak dry plate camera in the late 1880s as 
well as the introduction of the truly portable Leica camera using cinema film 
in the 1920s both revolutionized picture taking, just as digital and mobile 
technology has done lately. Although Kodak cameras democratized the use of 
the medium and made it accessible for larger publics, it was only when the 
camera was liberated from the constrains of the tripod it became truly 
movable and portable, and equipped with a range finder and lenses suitable 
for both close up and distant range shooting—that photographs came to lead 
the way of picturing and mediating horrors of wars and combat in a mass 
scale. Therefore, as Sontag argues, it took some time before photos were able 
not only just to record but to actively produce narratives.130 Later on, with 
developments in photography, artistic, man-made images have lost their 
leading role as mediators of horror, suffering, and wars as well as of heroism. 
But along the way, so has deteriorated the belief in the objectiveness of 
photographs.  
In the following chapter I shall introduce early photography depicting and 
communicating war and battlefield sceneries to distant Western spectators 
from the 1840s onwards. After this I shall present early photographic 
representations of distant suffering from the colonies from the late 1880s 
onwards and open up how these initial photographic representations of 
distant suffering others formed the conventions of visual humanitarian 
communication.  
 
The Early War and Crisis Photography 
Only about a decade after its birth, photography was for the first time used to 
record war. Daguerreotypes of the US-Mexican War (1846-48) have survived 
and give the contemporary spectator a view into a war that took place more 
than a century and a half ago. As photography equipment at the time was too 
slow to record action, war images of the time had to be taken of still 
moments, stationary objects; capturing battle and action scenes or the 
moving reality of war were made possible only decades later. These early war 
images predominantly focus on scenes where a war took place; landscapes 
and military camps and also habitually pictured soldiers and officers in 
portraits and depicted troops posing for the camera. But among the images 
there are also photographs pointing to the human peril of war: images of war 
graves and burial places of US soldiers and images of operations in military 
hospitals.131  
The Crimean War (1853-56) has been regarded as the first war that was 
somewhat systematically documented by the means of photography. The war 
                                                
130 Sontag, 2003, 21.   
131 See: Sandweiss, Martha: Eyewitness to War: Prints & Daguerreotypes of the Mexican War, 
1846-1848, Smithsonian, 1989.   
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is known most famously through images taken by Roger Fenton. Fenton 
spent March-June 1855 in Crimea as an official photographer, employed by 
the British military, to record the war and the British war campaign. Just like 
the photos of the US-Mexican war, Fenton's camera was unable to capture 
the bloody reality of war in the sense we now understand war photography, 
due to technical restrictions of photography of the era. His images offer a 
view into the war through portrays of soldiers and officers, pictures of life in 
the military camps, as well as local workers and camp followers. His 
photographs were published, e.g. in Illustrated London News. Casualties of 
war, the dead and injured are not among his choice of photos, probably 
partly due to his position as a military photographer hired to promote the 
war for the spectating domestic audiences.  But Fenton's most famous 
photograph, The Valley of the Shadow of Death (April 1855), picturing a dirt 
road in Sevastopol Crimea scattered with cannonballs, mediates a strong 
sense of horror. Although the image does not show any wounded of dead, as 
Sontag phrases its, it is a portrait of death without the dead. The photo is a 
poignant scene of war, an image which most likely would not communicate 
the same story if it was not a photograph. While Fenton and his work were 
quite quickly forgotten by his contemporaries, this image has been later 
identified as the first iconic image of war.132  (Included in the illustration 2.2, 
Roger Fenton’s The valley of the shadow of death, 1845.) 
The visual coverage American Civil War (1861 to 1865) was the first 
attempt to document a conflict in its entirety by the means of photography. 
Matthew Brady and Alexander Gardner, Brady’s employee, are amongst the 
most known photographers to chronicle the war. The most notable difference 
in the Civil War photos, in comparison to the photos from the Crimean War, 
is their relentless portrayal of death. With his employees Brady, named the 
father of photojournalism, took thousands of images of the war: portraits, 
battlefield scenes prior battle, aftermaths of battles, as well as images of the 
camp life and routines of war. More so than the images of the Crimean War, 
the Civil War photos brought the bloody and harsh reality of war before the 
distant spectating publics. Photographs displayed in the 1862 exhibition the 
Dead of the Antietam assembled by Brady deeply shocked the contemporary 
American public. Images, in the exhibition, showing the battlefield without 
the dead being removed from the scene, were the first brutal war photos 
distributed to a mass audience. Images of the bloated bodies of the fallen 
men, entangled corpses scattered around the battlefield and left to decay 
astonished the spectators. In a review of the exhibition that was published in 
the New York Times in October 1862 it was said: “Mr. Brady has done 
something to bring home to us the terrible reality of and earnestness of war. 
If he has not brought bodies and laid them in our door-yards and along the 
streets, he has done something very like it…”. For the first time photographs 
of war challenged the public's long nurtured belief that death at the 
                                                
132 Sontag, 2003, 43-46.  
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battlefield was glorious and heroic; these images had the capacity to shock 
and unravel the minds of the spectators in a visually novel way. Thus it can 
be said that the images of the Dead of the Antietam addressed their viewers 
not only in a revelatory manner, but they also pointed to the horrors and 
suffering induced by war in a corporal and emotive mode, and thus the 
images potentially aroused compassionate reactions and novel 
understandings of lives in need of protection in the viewers. 133 (Included in 
the illustration 2.2: Gardner, Alexander:  “Confederate dead on the 
Hagerstown Road, Antietam Battlefield, September 1862” from the series  
“The Dead of the Antietam”, 1862)   
The photos were sold at the exhibition, published in books, made into 
wood engravings and published in, e.g., Harpers Weekly. Numerous articles 
on the exhibition were published in the press. The images of the horrors of 
war were also circulated in stereo cards (cardboard pictures looked at 
through a binocular viewer to produce stereo view from two nearly identical 
photographic prints that produce an illusion of a three-dimensional image), 
which was a popular novelty collected by the publics of the time. However, 
the exhibition could only reach a limited audience; newspapers were still 
read at low incidence among the publics and stereo cards were expensive. 
Therefore photographic images did not yet suffice to reach ample audiences 
at the time of the Civil War, and the power of photographs in shaping the 
public’s view of the war still remained quite limited. 134  
Early war photography was inhibited by several the technical factors, 
means of mediation, circulation, as well as of production. Thus photography 
of the time was barely able to record the reality of war as eye-witnessed and 
experienced at the battlefront. In addition, the mediation techniques, at the 
time, were unsophisticated, and the means of reproducing photographic 
images in the press were still rather inadequate. Moreover the public’s access 
to the images in large scale often remained limited.135 Nevertheless, the 
invention of photography and the widening use of this novel apparatus to 
record war and crisis gave a new and more powerful method to mediating the 
events of faraway places and the suffering of others to audiences too far to 
witness the events with their bare eyes, which also enabled the spectators to 
engage with the suffering of others in radically altered ways. The early photos 
of war paved the road for more comprehensive war and crisis photography to 
come.136  
                                                
133 Moeller, Susan: Shooting War: Photography and the American Experience of Combat, Basic 
Books, New York, 1989, 23-25; The Death of Antietam.  Jones, Terry, L. September 24th, 2012, New 
York Times. Sontag, 2013, 46-48.  
134 Moeller, 1989, 23-25. 
135 Ibid. 
136 In addition to this, the example of early war photography exposes how, on the one hand, 
developments in camera equipment and in the technology of visual mediation and, on the other hand, 
varying policies of restrictions and censorship have been the key parameters of visually mediating 
events of war from the very start. Even today, in the era of rapidly flowing and hard to confine social 
media images, attempts to circulate images revealing war inflicted suffering, efforts to restrict the 
circulation of visual images that might jeopardize the popularity of a war, and the production of images 
that promote and legitimize warfare are all still central to mediating contemporary warfare. This is one 
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Imagining Suffering in the Colonies 
In the early years of photography, in addition to war photos, distant suffering 
was presented to Western viewers in photographs depicting human suffering, 
such as famines, in the colonies. The introduction of a portable Kodak 
camera in 1888 expanded the use of photography as a tool of documentation 
also to nonprofessional photographers.  Now also missionary humanitarians 
and investigative journalists travelled armed with Kodak cameras and were 
able to mediate what they saw in the colonies into the awareness of distant 
spectators by the means of photography. New camera technology, along with 
the advances in printing techniques allowing mass production of original 
photographs in periodicals and newspapers in the early 1890s, enabled wider 
use and circulation of photographic illustrations in the media.137 
Early photos depicting human suffering, famines and epidemics in the 
colonies—i.e. in Africa and India—were predominantly shot and circulated by 
missionaries and humanitarians of the colonial era and published in Western 
papers from the 1880s onwards. Presenting images of atrocious events and 
human suffering in faraway corners of the world, along with haunting 
narratives of misery, the humanitarians aimed at engaging the Western 
spectators in empathetic action on behalf of their fellow humans around the 
world and to care for the faraway vulnerable lives, regardless of their 
different color, race, or religion.138  Although the suffering of the indigenous 
people of the colonialized areas was brought before the Western spectators 
predominantly for humanitarian purposes—for arousing benevolent 
sentiments— the representations carried with them a strong colonializing—
religious, evangelizing, civilizing and patronizing—emphasis.  (See 
illustration 2.2 139) 
The predominant mode of picturing distant suffering is in these images 
corporal and passive. Naked bodies of the nameless sufferers were often 
placed and arranged in front of the camera by the photographer, in order to 
show the suffering in the most vividly naked way possible. Skeleton-like, 
brown, weak bodies—sometimes even supported by ropes and other devises 
to make them stand up in the absence of any physical strength—were on 
display for Western eyes to indulge in. The missionary aid, alleviation of 
suffering and civilizing endeavors provided by Western the humanitarians 
was often underlined in the narratives produced by images and 
accompanying texts. The predominant mode of representation was as well 
                                                                                                                                     
of the central features of this study, to which I will come back to in several occasions in the course of 
the study.  
137 Curtis, Heather: Depicting Distant Suffering: Evangelicals and the Politics of Pictorial 
Humanitarianism in the Age of American Empire, Material Religion 8/2, pp. 154–183, 2012, 157-159.  
138 Curtis, 2012, 157-159; see also Imagining Famine Project: http://www.imaging-
famine.org/index.htm; Sliwinski, 2011, 73.  
139 Included in the Illustration 2.2, is an image showing skeleton-like victims of famine, that can be 
seen as a thick image picturing the suffering in the colonies, typical for the representational practice of 
the era. A famine in Madras, 1876. Sean Sexton collection. See: Imagining Famine Project: 
http://www.imaging-famine.org/historical/02.html 
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pointing to the underdeveloped surroundings of the indigenous people; and 
the incapability of the locals of taking care of themselves is highlighted by 
style of the images. Added with the representational style of bare life140—
physical, corporal suffering, often depicted in the bodies of nameless 
crowds—the powerlessness and otherness of the distant colonialized people 
is further highlighted. Therefore, the main mode of addressing the audience 
of these images is done through a colonial mindset, stressing Western 
dominance over the inferior people of the distant colonialized crisis zones.141   
Michael Barnett argues that Western colonialism and the emergence of 
global humanitarianism are inseparable. In the era, the European empires’ 
colonial exploitation of Africa and India forced the powerful to contemplate 
their relationship with the local populations of the colonies. The emergence 
of the humanity discourse in the late eighteenth century and the widening 
scope of humanity did not stop at the early abolition movement but 
broadened into a discourse on the overall relationship of the powerful 
Westerners and the weak, subjugated and governed peoples of the colonies. 
The superiority of the powerful—Western, Christian, white and wealthy—was 
often seen within the colonial mindset as creating a duty to help and civilize 
the ruled, undeveloped, uncivilized, savage and weak pagans. Nineteenth 
century Western colonialism included an ideology of trusteeship, defined by 
the themes of civilization and conversion. Many missionary humanitarians of 
the era— just like the religiously driven abolition activists—were not against 
colonialism as such but against its extreme consequences, its exploitative and 
cruel features. Yet, the colonial powers justified their conquest of new areas 
and peoples in terms of civilizing mission. The French had their La mission 
Civilisatrice, the British the white man's burden, and the United States the 
manifest destiny. The paternalistic ideologies, accompanied by the then-
contemporary racist theories based on the notion of inferiority of non-white 
races, formed new kinds of hierarchies of humanity and were very much part 
of the colonial humanitarian project. The belief in the Western cultural, 
racial and religious superiority convinced the imperialistically driven 
humanitarians to think that developing, civilizing and governing—even 
forcefully—the underdeveloped areas and taking care of the local people, not 
quite seen as full-fledged humans, was an act of doing good in the long run. 
The immediate consequences of the developmental and civilizing projects—
the lost lives and destroyed communities—were seen as sacrifices for the 
bigger plan of civilizing and converting these people and developing these 
distant areas toward a more Western system.142  
The roots of modern global humanitarianism and humanitarian 
photographic imagery can thus be traced back to the civilizing religious 
conversion projects of the colonial era. Just like the abolition activists, who 
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often were driven by evangelist religious motives, the missionary 
humanitarians saw colonialism as an endeavor to civilize and develop the 
backward populations of the colonialized areas. Imperialism and colonial 
submission of the distant people did not, for the religious humanitarians of 
the era, contradict humanitarian efforts in alleviating suffering of the 
colonialized, but rather the other way around: humanitarianism of the era 
cannot be separated from the imperial economic interventionist and 
expansive logic of colonialism. The colonial and imperialistic efforts of the 
industrializing Western countries were commonly seen as endeavors of 
transforming the non-Western colonialized societies into ‘wealthier, happier 
and more stable’ societies. Christianity, conversion, colonial commerce and 
civilizing were seen as the route to progress. At the time, humanitarians 
acting in the colonies were most often acting without direct economic ties to 
states and were usually financed by parishes at home. Although they 
functioned without governmental financial support, they nevertheless relied 
on the colonial powers for security and legal sanctuary and shared the 
attitudes and outlooks of the colonial powers. Missionaries aimed at 
introducing modern Western institutions, such as schools and health clinics 
in the colonies, emphasized the importance of hygiene, preached the 
importance of discipline, self-control, sobriety and hard work that were 
central to Christian protestant ideology. Thus, they also aided the colonial 
administrators in taming and domesticating the locals into Western customs, 
values and tastes, making them supposedly easier to govern and rule.143 Thus 
humanitarianism of the era was very much a part of the colonial apparatus of 
Western power.  The intersections of power, violence and humanitarianism 
were central to modern imperialistic world order. The history of modern 
humanitarianism is, thus, tightly tied not only to religious civilizing 
endeavors of the missionary humanitarians but also with imperialism and 
the belief that Western style governance and the capitalistic mode of 
production offer a route to modernity, development and better life for the 
colonialized. Defenders of the empire and of humanity of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries widely believed that importing the capitalistic imperial 
economic system—forcefully or not—was an act of improving the lives of the 
“less developed” peoples; imperialism was often seen as a fundamentally 
humanitarian enterprise, and humanitarianism can thus be seen to stem 
from a colonialist foundation.144  
The intertwining of the colonial commercial governance and 
humanitarian, religiously colored ideology is prevalently present in the 
photographic imageries of distant suffering presented by the missionary 
humanitarians in the late nineteenth century. The self-assumed duty of the 
sovereign religious Western people to intervene in the suffering, by civilizing 
the distant underdeveloped peoples of the colonies, was articulated in the 
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images of corporal and nameless suffering and passive bare life145. As the 
suffering objects of the images seem utterly unable to help themselves, the 
presentation of the visual corporal suffering was not only to arouse the will to 
help and sentiments of empathy and benevolence in the spectators but also 
feelings of superiority and the duty to govern and intervene. The patronizing 
colonial-humanitarian ideology is distinctly visible in the early humanitarian 
photographic representations of the colonies. (See illustration 2.2.) From the 
very start of humanitarian (international/global) communication, relying on 
photographic representations, a hierarchical—and theatrical—practice of 
picturing the objects of humanitarian aid, predominantly in a corporal mode 
and as weak, passive, nameless, inferior others, is present. This mode of 
representation can be seen to reflect the dominant Western outlooks and 
mindsets of the era. Although the distant suffering others were presented as 
humans in need of help, they were not presented as being human in the same 
sense as the spectators of the images, the Western potential intervening, 
civilizing helpers. In the visual humanitarian representational practices of 
the colonial era the hierarchical role divisions of the Western helper and the 
non-Western weak helped are imminent. 146  
 
The Handless Children of the Congo Free State 
The story of King Leopold's rule over the Congo Free State is an extreme 
example of the atrocious consortium of humanitarianly rationalized civilizing 
endeavor, forced financial progress and systematical terror, murder and 
slavery in the colonies. But the story as well exemplifies the then novel power 
embedded in the use of photographic images of suffering in unveiling distant 
human rights violations, and moreover the story sheds light on the early 
formation of visual representational practices of global humanitarianism. 
King Leopold II, the monarch of Belgium, seized colonial power over the area 
of Congo in the 1880s. Leopold's rule over the area was rhetorically framed 
and rationalized as a civilizing economic development project, and his 
interest in the area was at the time widely believed to be humanitarian in the 
West. In reality, Leopold's interest was financial by exploiting Congo's 
natural resources—namely rubber—of the area by resorting to wide spread 
terror, violence and forced labor.147  The use of photographic images in the 
fight to unveil the horrific nature, the human rights violations and atrocities 
produced by King Leopold's cruel colonial enterprise also serve as a 
watershed in the humanitarian use of atrocity photographs; one that shaped 
visual humanitarian communication for decades to come. 
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The story of the atrocities in Leopold's Congo Free State began to unfold 
for the Western audiences in the 1890s. American George Williams travelled 
to Congo in order to investigate what he believed to be a benevolently 
governed African society but found out a reality quite the opposite. After 
witnessing the widespread and arbitrary cruelty of the Belgian colonial rulers 
toward the natives, he wrote a public accusation Open letter to King Leopold 
II of Belgium. Condemning the atrocities and offering a detailed testimony of 
the atrocities, Williams claimed in the letter that Leopold was “waging unjust 
and cruel war against the natives.” After its publication in the New York 
Herald in 1890, the testimony aroused wide spread outrage and became 
vastly circulated and reprinted throughout America and Europe. Following 
the outrage, an investigative report of the situation in the Congo Free State, 
assembled by the British government, came out in 1903. The report, 
including several horrific photographic images, paints an appalling picture of 
the oppression in the Congo Free State system. 148 Probably for the first time 
in history, this report used photographs of pain as forensic evidence of 
atrocities and human rights violations. For instance, the report visually 
describes the cruel doctrines of the local police Force Publique, and 
particularly it describes the type of mutilation that became an icon of 
Leopold's colonial rule: the cutting off of hands. The Belgian officials of the 
regime demanded proof from the Force Publique of native killings, which 
was routinely offered in the form of delivering the cut-off right hand of the 
victims. Cutting off of hands became a form of terror. Among the 
photographs used in documenting the mutilations were images of maimed 
children, such as the much-circulated story and photo of a young boy by the 
name of Mola Ekilite. This images pictures the young Mola149 and an even 
younger girl named Yoka, both mutilated by colonial authorities. The 
children are pictured staring at the camera, their mutilated, cut-off hands 
appearing as a stark contrast to the white clothes they are wearing, are at the 
center of the image, drawing the attention of the spectator to the painful 
bodily marks of the cruel colonial regime. 150 (The image of Mola Ekilite and 
Yoka is included in the illustration 2.2. The image is taken about 1905)   
Photography was also used in documenting other instances of such 
cruelty in Congo. Among these photographic representations are the images 
of a British missionary Alice Harris, who photographed the atrocities 
happening in Congo with her Kodak camera. In 1904 a Congolese man called 
Nasala came to Harris, telling her of an attack by the officials of the Anglo-
Belgian India Rubber Company. He showed her the severed limbs of his wife 
and daughter that the offenders had left behind. Appalled by the story Harris 
made Nasala pose for her camera looking at the small limbs of his dead 
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daughter, Boali. As soon as Harris´s husband saw the photograph, he 
understood the strong power they possessed in mediating the story of the 
suffering of the Congolese midst the cruel colonial system to the Western 
publics and arousing strong moral outrage even in the most skeptical viewer. 
Sliwinski argues, that the strong emotional appeal of the images also shifted 
the focus from immediate outrage and action to the level of relationship 
between the photographs and the growing public spectating them; between 
the pictures and the safe Western spectators witnessing the visualized 
atrocities of unknown faraway individuals. Thus, the images were seen as an 
effective tool in arousing widespread public condemnation of violence and 
violations of human rights. 151 (Included in the Illustration 2.2, the image of 
Nasala, taken by Alice Harris in 1904.)  
Visual representations of the suffering of the Congolese became an 
important tool in the fight against the Congo Free State´s cruel regime, much 
used by missionary organizations such as the British Congo Reform 
Association (RCA). RCA´s strategy was to disseminate information of the 
Congo Free State through publications and public meetings–also 
photographs were central in this strategy. RCA collected and published 
evidence of the atrocities happening in the Congo and, building on the 
evidence, claimed that Leopold´s regime was “criminal” and suppressed the 
Congolese people, who RCA saw possessed some inalienable rights as 
members of the human family. Early conceptions of “crimes against 
humanity” and safe guarding of human rights beyond the boundaries of 
nationality and citizenship surfaced in the discourse on the Congo Free State 
atrocious crimes. Photographs of suffering were used in multitudes of ways 
in the campaign to unveil the cruel nature of the regime for the Western 
publics. The brutal images were published in journals and books as well as 
presented to the publics in the form of lantern slide show lectures.152 
First, before the revelations of the atrocities committed by Leopold's 
regime, lantern slide shows delivered by evangelist missionaries typically 
presented the colonial rule and Christian conversion as civilizing acts aimed 
at saving the savage colonialized people. But once Leopold's crimes were 
unveiled, and the RCA campaigns were launched, the lantern shows featuring 
atrocity images came to be used as an effective and dramatic tool for awaking 
the “Christian consciousness” of the Western spectators. The lantern shows 
featured atrocious images, producing scripted horror narratives, and were 
presented along with melodramatic evangelical appeals. The visual shows 
were aimed at persuading the audiences to see the cruelness and inhumanity 
of the regime and to elicit a strong emotional response in the spectators 
guiding them to realize the humanity and the need of protection of the 
Congolese. The photographing missionary Alice Harris and her husband 
John were among the missionaries delivering these popular visual horror 
shows. Although the aim of the shows was to arouse benevolent emotions in 
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their audiences, to gain recognition for the crimes and to make a plea to stop 
the cruelty, the phantasmagoric shows have been criticized for 
misrecognition and for transforming particular cases of individual suffering 
into “standardized objects” and “thematic events” (as Sliwinski describers 
them) creating a distorting standard for picturing the distant other in need. 
Moreover, the shows were in a central place in the process of building the 
modern hierarchical relationship between the Western spectators and the 
colonial objects of the images, as they created a strong difference between the 
superior onlooker and the inferior looked-upon racially different other. The 
concept of the other—in this context referring to primitive races and exotic 
savages—was largely created by the use of photographic technology. Sliwinski 
argues that the visual language and the discursive framings of the visual 
shows, furthermore, transformed the moral relationship of “I and Thou” into 
a relationship on “I and Them,” which transforms the other into “it”.153 
Therefore, although these images and visual representations of the atrocities 
were predominantly used in order to arouse the benevolent emotions of the 
spectators (just like the missionaries’ images of famines) and to reveal 
information on the cruelness of the colonial rule, through their 
representational mode these images reproduced certain features that reveal 
the deep buried colonial attitudes and that, moreover, play a major role in 
constructing the visual imaginary of the far away (racially different) distant 
others.154  
As a conclusion it can be said that the atrocity imagery of the lantern 
shows, as well as the early famine photos of missionary humanitarians, 
unveil prevalent attitudes and mindsets of their era, but moreover these 
imageries set a pattern for representing distant suffering, the need to help 
and the need to intervene for years to follow. The iconic representations of 
missionary humanitarians, displaying barely living, skeleton-like, starved 
bare life, and the practice of presenting the objects of aid as very divergent 
from and as somewhat less human than the average Western spectator have 
significantly influenced the Western gaze on the less fortunate of this world 
over the centuries and are still somewhat prevalent today, as we shall see 
later. I claim that still today calls for human rights often (perhaps partly 
unconsciously) borrow form these representations dating back to the 
colonial, patronizing mindset. In contemporary calls for the respect of 
human rights and for the alleviation of distant suffering the use of atrocity 
photography and demands for Western intervention are still inherent, as also 
is the reliance on transcendental notions of dignity and the duty of 
Westerners to act upon the plight of the distant others. Moreover, the 
representational style and composition of the images point out the theatrical 
visual addressing, as well as the hierarchical arrangement embedded in the 
humanitarian imagery. The hierarchical roles of the humanitarian mediators 
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of the images, as compared to the amazed and dazed distant spectators and 
the suffering looked-upon objects of the images, are solidified.155 
2.3.5 IMAGINING SUFFERING AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY: 
FIRST WORLD WAR CENSORSHIP AND PACIFISTIC SHOCK 
THERAPY OF WAR IMAGES 
The new century brought about a new kind of modern worldwide war—the 
First World War (1914-1918). Propaganda and atrocity stories, telling of the 
brutality of the opponent and thus motivating the fight, served a central 
position in the war on both sides of the front. Stories of the bloodthirsty 
Huns circulated in the publicity of Britain and the USA. In the propaganda 
campaigns of the allied the Germans were told to massacre nuns, nurses, and 
infants and to boil human fat and bones into lubricants and glycerin in 
“corpse factories.” Often these stories did not hold water and were later 
proved to be misleading and exaggerated. The atrocity stories thus produced 
an aura of fakery and skepticism midst the Western publics.156 In addition to 
straightforward propaganda or conscious dissemination of false or 
misleading information, journalistic presentations during the First World 
War were tightly censored, especially in the case of photographs of war. 
Susan Moeller argues that due to the advances in technology, photographs at 
the time of the First World War already had “storytelling ability,” but because 
of the very ability feared by the military and warring states, the publication of 
war photos was suppressed by strict censorship.157  
During the war censorship was strictly applied to visual representations of 
war in Germany, as well as in Britain and United States. The main articulated 
objective of press censorship of all of the Western warring states was the 
acknowledgement of the importance of withholding critical information 
about military movements from enemy forces. The other objective was to 
keep up the will to fight and the morale of the home fronts. Especially images 
showing the horrors of war and the causalities among one’s own troops were 
seen as lowering morale by unveiling the unprecedentedly violent face of 
modern warfare, the hopelessness of the trench war, the use of poison gas 
and the massive amounts of victims.158  The reportage of the war was strongly 
constrained by the governments and the militaries: publishers, editors, 
writers and photographers were placed under strict rule of not publishing 
“unpatriotic” stories. In the US a system of bonds was introduced. Bonds 
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were paid by newspapers to the military in order to get their journalist a right 
to work in the field. If the journalist did not obey the rules of “patriotic 
reporting”, the money invested was not refunded by the military. 
Arrangements like this held back critical reporting. In addition, restricting 
journalists' access to information enforced the censorship line, and the press 
was predominantly dependent on the official military bulletins as well as 
photographs produced by the military.159 Journalists were encouraged to do 
their “patriotic war duty” by reporting on the war along the lines of military 
rules and viewpoints. Self-censorship also played a part in the First World 
War reportage, and for the most part there was no fight against the spirit of 
control. Thus it can be said, that war journalists at the time were successfully 
prevented from informing the public of the reality of war by three forces: the 
governments, the military as well as the proprietors of media houses 
themselves. 160   
Military rules and restrictions of not giving information on the 
movements of the troops and events at the front, which could jeopardize the 
war effort by revealing information to the enemy, led to imprecise captioning 
of photographs. In publishing photographs of the war usually no information 
of the place, event, date, situation, or of the identity or the military position 
of the individuals in the images, or the identity of the photographer was 
allowed to accompany the published images. Often war images did not pass 
the censors hands, even if the information about the photographer was not 
mentioned in the caption. Therefore, the First World War photos for the 
most part remained plain images, with no narrative storytelling ability. 
Captions of released images often referenced patriotic phrasing backing the 
official military spirit, such as “Our Heroes at the Front.” Relatively few 
images of the American war dead were shown in publicity during the war, 
and images depicting the reality of the trench war remained predominantly 
unseen by the American public. However, images showing wounded and 
dead enemy soldiers were published along with atrocity stories demonizing 
and building hate toward the enemy. By visually showing the destroyed 
adversaries, it was believed, the enemy would appear as defeatable, and thus 
such images were seen to motivate fighting. Nevertheless, combat images 
and images of the bloody reality of the fighting were usually not released.161 
Censorship efforts were effective in hiding the bloody reality of war from the 
home front public, and for instance one of the bloodiest battles in military 
history—like Somme 1916, where 600 000 allied soldiers died—at the time 
went largely unreported. 162 Referring to the control of the visibility of the 
war and its unprecedentedly bloody and devastating nature, Susan Moeller 
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writes:” the photographs that best represent the real conflict were denied any 
exposure until after the war. And it is those unpublished photographs that 
best recall the horrors of the first “great war”.”163 Dramatic visualizations of 
the war were not exposed to the gaze of the home front before its end. 
Predominantly the publics learned about the high casualty toll and the 
horrific nature the new war—the trench warfare and the agony of soldiers 
caused by the use of poison gas—only after the war.  
This is not to say, that people at the time did not know anything about of 
the atrocities of the war. Soldiers returning from the war and other firsthand 
eyewitnesses had always challenged the governmental and military efforts to 
hide the bloody side of war. But during the First World War governmental 
efforts to keep the bloody reality out of sight were significant, and perhaps 
emblematic of modern day visual mediation of war. A belief in the idea that 
seeing the pain of others would create empathetic ties between the sufferer 
and the spectator—springing already from Enlightenment discourses—can be 
detected in the efforts to censor the bloody images of war. As seeing the pain 
of others has been seen to create solidary bonds between the safe spectators 
and the pain-stricken objects of the images, it can thus be seen to lead to 
disillusionment with the nature of war and to produce a drop in the morale of 
the home fronts. And hence, hand in hand with the evolving technology of 
visual mediation, militaries have gone to new lengths to govern the imagery 
of war. As Sontag points out, at the turn of the century many people were 
convinced that if the horrors war imposes on people were made visible in way 
vivid enough (through photographic accounts on a corporal and visual level), 
people would be outraged by the insanity of war and would turn against it. 
Therefore, as militaries have tried to control the visibility of war, actors 
opposing war and the military mindset have seen a potential in presenting 
images unveiling the brutality and insanity of war as a weapon of shock 
therapy, possessing the power of pushing people towards anti-war 
sentiments and pacifism.164  
An anti-war photo pamphlet Krieg Dem Kriege! by a German pacifist 
Ernst Friedrich (published in 1924, six years after the war), displaying 
horrific war images, is an example of the pacifist approach aiming at 
unveiling the reality of war that militaries and warring governments attempt 
to hide.165 Friedrich’s album exhibits almost 200 hundred photographs—
mostly deemed un-publishable by the government censors. The images were 
drawn from German military and medical archives and compiled by 
Friedrich in a clear attempt to force the spectators to confront the reality of 
war and to shock and scare the spectators into realizing the horrifying nature 
of war. Friedrich shows horrific images of mass graves, wrecked buildings 
and demolished infrastructure, forests cut down by fire fights, soldiers killed 
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by poison gas and grotesque images of front line prostitutes used by the 
military and of children starved by warfare. He juxtaposes such images of the 
horror of war with propagandist photos of war: an image of enthusiastic 
merry soldiers leaving to fight is on the next page met with an image of the 
entangled corpses of young men lying stiff in piles, entitled “Field of honor”. 
But even midst the overwhelming carnage of war, shown vividly by the 
images selected by Friedrich, a chapter of the book called “Face of War” 
stands out. Close up images of disfigured soldiers with severe facial wounds 
and the apparent horrifying physical agony makes the spectator gazing, from 
behind a gap of hundred years, sick to his/her stomach, revolted and fearful. 
But in addition to this, Friedrich’s visual pamphlet does more. It addresses 
the viewer in a forcefully political manner.  (For the cover of the original 1924 
edition of Krieg Dem Kriege!, see illustration 2.2.) 
 Krieg dem Kriege! does not only rely on the narrative power of 
photographic images, but the messages of the images are enforced by sharp 
political criticism and a textual manifesto. At the very start of the book, 
Friedrich calls “all human beings in all lands” to learn about the causes of 
war, the prevention of war, and about the way to wage “a war against war”. 
His message is one of peace and love, of the universality of all humans, of 
non-violent ideology and opposition to organized military violence. He 
identifies role of money in society and the capital class as the cause of all 
wars, calls for a general strike, and begs his audience to acknowledge its 
position as mere pawns used in the game of the powerful and the capitalist 
class. He also points to the responsibility of every man and woman to oppose 
war, which encompasses everything from bringing up of children to the 
refusal to do military service and to the obligation of citizens to fight against 
capitalism. The pacifistic perspective is underlined throughout the book by 
Friedrich’s style of writing accompanying the photos. The texts point a finger 
at the ones responsible for the horror and pain and at “military lies”. 
Friedrich lashes the military ideology and makes a mockery of warmongers 
by his laconic and ironic phrasing. He places patriotic phrases besides images 
of decaying corpses, producing a collage that mocks the common myths 
reiterated in patriotic representations and in the rhetoric of the military. By 
this visual collaging he points out how the prevalent society and its settings 
and institutions—from children’s toys to schooling, from the church to other 
powerful public institutions—prepare the minds of citizens by the means of 
socialization to violent warring and military ideology. Along with the horrific 
images describing what war does to humans and individuals he points out 
how business is allied with the state and the military, together producing the 
mentality of modern warfare, which ultimately destroys everything.166  
Freidrich’s critique draws from socialist thinking. He identifies the victims of 
war as members of the proletariat, abandons the nationalistic and patriotic 
ethos of the military and replaces it with internationalist thinking embedded 
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in Marxist thought. Thus, throughout the pamphlet he speaks of the 
universality of humanity and points to the emancipation from war inflicted 
suffering by the means of not only pacifistic but socialist thinking. By visually 
showing the horrors that the militaristic project steered by a capitalist logic 
do to human beings, he indicates a way to oppose violence and to strive 
towards the protection of humanity through pacifistic socialist method.  
Expectedly the authorities did not condone the publication of the photos 
and Friedrich’s phrasings; bookstores were raided and military and veteran 
organizations denounced the publication of the images. Nevertheless, the 
book circulated at an unprecedented speed, 10 editions in German were 
published before 1930 and the book was translated from the original four 
languages—German, French, English and Dutch into several others.167 
Friedrich’s declaration against war intensively circulated midst intellectuals, 
left-wing writers, and artists of the time. He was very influential in the 
pacifistic peace movement, and his ideas gave rise to numerous anti-war 
leagues, believing firmly that the book and its visual strategy of anti-
militarism would make a difference. Friedrich’s book and his manifesto had 
such a massive influence, partly because before the publication of the book 
people had—due to strict censorship—rarely seen photographs of the war. 
When reading Krieg dem Kriege! one cannot help but think of Goya´s 
Disasters of War . Both projects centering on the visual exposure of horrors 
of war also share a universalist ethos; they aim at revealing the agony of the 
people—of individuals—and point to the need to protect humans from 
organized violence of states and militaries. Friedrich was not alone in his 
time either, but critical contemporaries of Friedrich also produced paintings 
and drawings of the war and published critical anti-war poems describing the 
horrors of the war. Political artists such as Otto Dix, and Georg Grosz 
pictured the horrors of war through strong realism and terrific scenery and 
John Heartfield’s satirical Dadaistic photomontages ridiculed the military 
mind-set. The influence of such artists can be detected in Friedrich’s work.168 
But at the time, the utilization of realistic photographic war images as 
documentary pieces of evidence, combined with anti-war ideology in the style 
in which Friedrich did it in War Against War! was unprecedented. As 
Friedrich was probably influenced by the avant-garde artists of his time, the 
critical circles were touched by his montage of war imagery and humanistic 
ideas, stressing the need for collective organization against war. And his non-
violent fight against militarism still lives on; among other things in the 
insignia he designed to represent the fight against military violence—two 
hands breaking a rifle—is still used by many pacifistic groups around the 
world. 169  
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This take on the horrific images unveiling the nature of war was not, and 
is not, only manifested in the work of Ernst Friedrich. But the idea on the 
power of shocking images in arousing empathy and even anti-war sentiments 
seems to be at the core of the widespread use of atrocity and war imagery 
aimed at informing the public of the mindlessness of war. In the early 
twentieth century many shared Friedrich’s belief in the emancipating and 
pacifistic manner of using atrocity images.170 In this spirit, Virginia Woolf 
describes, in her 1938 essay Three Guineas, an encounter with images 
depicting the death and horror of the inhabitants of the Spanish Basque city 
of Guernica after it’s bombing. Looking at the news photographs of mutilated 
bodies of what perhaps used to be a family, Woolf wonders whether the 
image contains bodies of human beings or slaughtered pigs. By looking at the 
images it was hard to tell. Shocked by the scenery of war-induced suffering 
she attested that one can only have one reaction to such images: to oppose 
the madness war.171  The belief in the potency of photographs of pain in 
evoking a disapproval and mobilizing a cry against violence moreover 
highlights the role of the spectator as an active (political) actor, with a 
possibility of acting in behalf of the suffering others, and even combatting 
war.  
2.3.6 THE FLOWING AMBIVALENCE OF ATROCITY IMAGES  
The belief and hope in the power of atrocious images in shocking the public 
into turning against violence and war was strong in some circles at the start 
of the century, and visually unveiling the horrors of modern warfare was 
widely believed to be effective in communicating the humanity and need of 
protection of the sufferers depicted. Nevertheless, one must bear in mind 
that the ways in which images of atrocity work and are utilized—what images 
tell to their spectators and how they address their viewers—is far more 
complex than the belief in the visual shock therapy of atrocity images gives 
reason to think. Photographs of pain and horror, as Sontag puts it, may give 
rise to opposing responses: a call for peace (as it was hoped) or a cry for 
revenge. Alternatively, they may just simply, as Sontag phrases, create a 
bemused awareness that terrible things happen.172 As an image of death may 
arouse a cry for peace in one and bring about sensations of desperate sadness 
and horror in another, the very same photograph may spell retaliation, incite 
more violence, or even arouse emotions of fulfillment and justice being 
served for the other. This phenomenon becomes lucid especially in times of 
war, conflict and division. In a situation of war, on the one hand, a picture of 
a fallen soldier may be an icon of grief and sacrifice —or an image of a 
destroyed enemy facing a just end. In an extreme situation images conveying 
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horror, moral decay, terror and disgust may, on the other hand, be objects 
symbolizing glory, supremacy or even enjoyment for some.  
This phenomenon is vividly demonstrated by an example of the photos of 
racial lynchings in America and by a photo exhibition and book called 
Without Sanctuary. The Without Sanctuary project, displaying violent 
images of the racial lynching’s of twentieth and twenty-first century America, 
came out in 2000 and provoked awareness of the recent bloody history of the 
United States.173 The project graphically informed the public of the atrocities 
caused by racism in the not so distant past, by shedding light to nearly 5000 
visually recorded lynching’s from 1889 to 1968. The images collected in the 
exhibition and book are brutal: The bodies of the victims are mutilated, 
burned, shown hanging from trees, disfigured.  At the time of the launching 
of the project, the images produced horror and shock in their spectators. The 
message was one of anti-racism, but, as David Campbell acknowledges, this 
had not always been the case. At the time when the photos were taken, these 
very same images often conveyed for their producers and circulators a 
completely different story. Lynchings at the time were communal events, 
social rituals attended by vast number of local people, creating often a festive 
atmosphere. The killings were often openly advertised in advance in local 
papers and witnessed not only by the usually white male perpetrators but 
spectated by local bystanders, women and children. Kodak’s clicked in the 
crowd as the killings were taking place. More importantly, the crowds of on-
lookers, as well as the perpetrators, are in plain sight in many of the images 
that have survived into our era, and the on-lookers in the images seem to be 
clearly aware of the presence of the camera. The spectating crowds, visible in 
the visual records of the atrocious performances, can thus be seen as 
participants in the violent acts.  As they, for the most part, accepted the acts 
of violence and, thus, made them possible, by supporting and taking part in 
the continuation of the brutal acts. 174 (Included in the illustration 2.2. is 
lynching image 27 from Without Sanctuary book. This photo picturing a 
lynched body hanging from a tree was taken in August 1930 in Marion 
Indiana.)  
In addition to the visible perpetrators and crowds, these images include 
other significant and—to a contemporary viewer—somewhat peculiar 
features. Visually they share features with typical hunting images, as they 
show the killers and the bodies of their lynched human victims in the same 
manner as the bodies of prey animals are often shown in photographs: with 
the proud killers showing off their prey. As these images now send shivers 
down the spine of an average contemporary spectator, one must bear in 
mind, that these photographs were popular at the time; they were not hidden 
and kept in shoe boxes under beds, but they were openly presented, kept as a 
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mementoes of the incident, sent as postcards and collected.175 The popularity 
of the images was grounded in their function as “icons of white supremacy” 
at the time. They “dramatized the racial and gendered cleavages of a social 
order in which blacks were terrorized, white women were vulnerable and 
white men were on the top, invulnerable and free”.176 These images were 
trophies and mementoes for the perpetrators, telling of glorious acts worth 
recording, showing off and remembering.    
By 2000s, the time of the introduction of Without sanctuary, the visual 
icons of white supremacy were generally seen in a totally reverse way from 
the original meanings they conveyed to the perpetrators of the acts. If the 
images for most spectators signified horrendous acts and were commonly 
seen as appalling and outrageous in 2000s, they had signified horror to many 
of their contemporaries as well. For African American communities—as well 
as for Jews, Native Americans, Hispanics and other minorities who were 
among the victims of the social ritualistic killings—the photos also, at the 
time of their production, represented completely different things than to the 
perpetrators; violent racism, repressed societal position, personal grief, fear, 
threat intimidation, inequality. But then again, for a majority of the then 
contemporary people living in the areas where the lynching’s took place, the 
images showing bodies of the victims of violent murders were merely records 
of the prevalent societal system, in which killing members of some minorities 
was seen somewhat commonplace, perhaps not liked, perhaps felt ashamed 
about, but quietly approved of. And as Sontag put it, for the majority they 
probably just showed that things like this happen.  
What the example of lynching photographs poignantly shows, is how the 
messages of images—the things images articulate and do to their spectators, 
what they are and what they tell—depends on who looks at them and in what 
context. The message of an image depends not only on its visual composition, 
or on what it pictures and how bluntly. Even an image picturing the most 
horrendous suffering imaginable for one may be honorable, even pleasurable 
when gazed by another. The messages and meanings of images cannot be 
stalled or frozen, but their significations fluctuate constantly as they move 
and circulate from one context (time, place, position, culture) to another. 
Thus, images flow; they alter according to the spectator, perspective, time 
and context. Moreover, images are read and interpreted. An act of 
interpretation in the case of photographs is much more ambivalent, 
contextual and tied to prevalent cultural, political and historical conventions 
than interpreting texts and words tends to be. 177  Thus the same image may 
do and articulate different things, according to the context of their 
presentation and spectator and the individual interpretation. As was 
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discussed in the chapter 1, images themselves can be seen as mute; they 
cannot articulate for themselves, but their meanings are added to them by 
framing, captioning and by the surrounding mindsets. That is, this is a 
matter of framing and presentation; a matter that comes lucid also when 
thinking about the different uses and framings of the lynching images 
through time.178 Therefore images of horror, violence and war can address 
their viewers in multitudes of ways, according to context and, thus, be 
interpreted, utilized and understood in a variety of fluctuating manners, 
which cannot be confined or ultimately defined. This complex singularity of 
photography and photos as messages is very relevant when looking at and 
analyzing images of suffering and atrocity; and one that I shall come back to 
repeatedly in the course of this study.  
2.4  IMAGES OF PAIN IN THE AGE OF NEO-
HUMANITARIANISM 
Michael Barnett dates the age of Neo-humanitarianism as starting from the 
end of the Second World War (1945) and spanning all the way up to the end 
of the Cold War (approximately 1989). From the end of the World War ?? 
onwards, decolonization and Cold War—the forces of destruction of the time 
period—opened up a new space for new kinds of compassions. The end of the 
Second World War, and particularly the pain and horrors induced by the 
war—namely the horrors of the Nazi Holocaust largely revealed to the 
Western world at the end of the war—lead to new international endeavors to 
protect the fragile humanity from violence and human rights violations. The 
founding of the new international organ, the United Nations (UN), in 1945 
and the UN Declaration of Universal Human Rights (1948) marked a new era 
in the apprehension of universal humanity and institutionalization of human 
rights. In this time period the world, as Barnett phrases it, “got serious about 
humanitarianism”. States became more involved in the organization and 
delivery of aid and relief, non-governmental organizations (NGO) expanded 
and the architecture of aid became more global and organized around 
principles of humanity. In addition to benevolent and altruistic motives, this 
development had to do with the idea of safeguarding the political, strategic 
and economic interests of particularly the Western states through 
humanitarianism and development. As the speeding decolonization created 
institutional vacuums in the Third World, the superpowers, as well as non-
governmental organizations and international organizations promising to 
bring welfare, progress and modernity to the backward populations, quickly 
occupied space; the humanitarian sector expanded, and state and NGO 
humanitarianism intertwined. In the politically and ideologically divided 
global settings of the Cold War, humanitarianism was often harnessed to 
advance superpower interests. New forms of global governance and 
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ideologies, proclaiming that the global rich and the powerful have obligations 
to teach the “global minors,” changed the colonial tones of voices of the 
former era into developmentalism. This change, however, predominantly left 
the patronizing structures of global humanitarianism untouched. As 
institutional humanitarianism remained West-centered, the discourses of 
humanity and impartiality were capitalized in order to claim a universal 
jurisdiction. According to Barnett, the era became, on the one hand, a 
struggle between claims of neutrality and impartiality and, on the other 
hand, moved towards a growing dependence of humanitarian action on 
states and international organizations. The era ended with deep 
dissatisfaction with humanitarian action that had come to be accused—from 
inside as well as from outside—of both of neutral cowardice as well as active, 
non-neutral participation in wars.179  
In this chapter I shall tackle the developments of the era in the discourse 
of humanity and its protection, map out the uses and presentational practices 
of the images of suffering and war in the twentieth-century milieu, and 
introduce some significant watersheds in the uses of images of distant 
suffering and war in the era. I shall start with the images of the liberated Nazi 
camps and take a look at the imageries by humanitarians depicting distant 
suffering in the non-Western world, and I shall also analyze the role of 
photographs of the Vietnam War in international political settings.  
2.4.1 PICTURING THE NAZI DEATH CAMPS: FROM THE GROUND 
ZERO OF HUMANITY TO THE DECLARATION OF UNIVERSAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS  
By the time of the Second World War (1939-1945) photography had 
technically evolved into a stage in which cameras were portable and fast 
enough to record combat situations. The means of visual transmission 
techniques had improved with the advancements in the Wirephoto 
technology by the mid-1930s. Regardless of the technical preconditions 
available for global mediation of photographic images, the problem with the 
storytelling ability of photos in news production was their then prevalently 
perceived inferior status as a mode of communication. Photographers were at 
the time still commonly perceived as “newspaper illustrators” rather than 
photojournalism. Images were commonly seen as an adjunct to textual 
journalistic reports, and ‘real’ journalist intervention was seen as necessary 
for them to make sense.  Images were fillers and story illustrations but not a 
principle way of reporting on the news. Moreover, at the time images were 
often used in news reporting and media without proper accreditations; they 
were commonly published without info on the date or place of their taking, or 
of accurate info on the people and the situations depicted. Without detailed 
referential information the use of photographs in news created ambiguity, 
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and photographs commonly remained symbolic markers rather than 
conveyed detailed and plausible news value.180  
Iconic images telling visual stories of the suffering and brutality of the 
Second World War are nevertheless numerous. And due to changes in the 
mediation techniques and press conventions the censorship conditions were 
not as strictly applied and the flows of images were not as easily controllable 
as they were in the previous worldwide war. Even though the Second World 
War produced many iconic images depicting human suffering—utilized and 
referred to also in the context of humanitarian ideas, humanity and need to 
protect it from violence—I shall not deal with the various visual mediation 
practices of the war in more depth. Rather, in the following paragraph I shall 
focus on the mediation of images that were produced at the very end of the 
war: the visual representational practices and the relevance of the Holocaust 
images, in the context of humanitarian ideas, to the enlargement of human 
rights thinking and institutionalization of universal human rights. 
The very end of the Second World War produced atrocity images surely 
most famous in the Western cultural sphere: photos of the Nazi camps 
liberated by the Allied forces, later known as Holocaust images. At the time 
when the disastrous war beyond comparison was still raging, rumors and 
anecdotal information of the Final solution and the Nazi camps system was 
circulating in the publicity of the Western allies as well as Soviet union, but a 
wide spread understanding of the Nazi extermination camp system remained 
rather unknown until the very end of the war. The story of the perhaps most 
massive and visually iconic atrocity performed by humans began to be 
revealed to the surrounding world once the Allied troops began to conquer 
the central European territory earlier occupied by the Nazi Germany. 
Although almost all have now seen these images, perhaps the understanding 
of these hideous crimes still today exceeds the full scope of apprehension.   
Although now the spring 1945 is most often think of when imagining the 
liberated Nazi camps, the Soviet troops first reached the Majdanek 
extermination camp in Poland in July 1944. During the summer prior to the 
end of the war Soviet forces also reached the Belzek, Treblinka and Sobibór 
camps, which had already been abandoned by the Nazis in 1943 (the efficient 
death apparatus of the camps made itself redundant as the majority of the 
Jews in the area were already killed by the time). In January 1945 the Soviets 
reached the Auschwitz camp in Poland. Several months later, in April the 
American forces reached the Buchenwald camp in Germany. More than 20 
000 inmates were liberated. The liberation of several other camps followed 
in the spring of 1945:  Dora-Mittelbau, Flossenbürg, Dachau by the US, 
Sachsenhausen and Ravensbrück by the Soviets and Bergen-Belsen by the 
British all in April, and later in may Mauthausen  by the American and 
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Stutthof by the Soviets. Although the Majdanek camp was liberated already 
in the summer of 1944, the enormous death toll and incomprehensible 
amount of suffering induced by the Nazi rule began to be revealed to the 
wider spectating Western world in a large scale and in an unprecedented 
visual manner almost a year later, when the Western troops entered the 
death camps in April 1945.  
 
Early Representations of the Nazi Camps 
By the time the Soviet forces first reached the Majdanek camp, it had been 
for the most part emptied by the Germans, and the Soviet troops were met 
only by about 700 survivors. The fleeing Nazis attempted to destroy the 
evidence of mass murder, but the gas chambers and other infrastructure of 
the camp were left standing. The Soviet authorities and media published 
stories and photographs of the firstly encountered camp, and Western 
journalist were also invited to tour the camp. During the summer and fall of 
1944 textual accounts of the horrors of the camps were published also in the 
Western press. The conditions of the camp and the horrors met by the 
reporters—the systematic organization of destruction of human lives and the 
scope of the horror transcending imaginary—challenged the conventional 
methods of reporting. The horror met in the camp was so unbelievable, that 
the early eyewitnesses had to combat disbelief in order to make the world 
believe what the reporters witnessing the camps first hand had seen. 
Something more than words was needed; and thus visual representations 
were widely used in order to help the public believe the unbelievable. Images 
of the gas chambers, cans of the Zyklon B gas used in murdering the inmates, 
hanging ropes, piles of shoes and other personal belongings of the victims, 
photographs of the barrels filled with the ashes of the burned victims sold as 
fertilizers and images of the ghastly facilities of the camps were shown in 
Western press already in 1944. What evidence remained of the carnage was 
documented by photography and the story of the brutality of the German rule 
was told through images in the Soviet Union and in the Western media.181  
Despite of the horror stories of the death camps breaking already in 1944, 
the atrocities reported from Majdanek failed to attract significant public 
notice in the West. During 1944 in the Western publicity, the camps were for 
the most part treated in the press and encountered by the readers as isolated 
incidents, and the exposed camps were not framed as a system representing 
Nazi regimes terror at large. One factor contributing to the scant attention 
has been seen to be the public’s disbelief in the scope of the destruction and 
the uncertainty about the facts. Western press was somewhat skeptical of the 
truth-value of the Soviet presentation and reporting of the event, and thus 
the stories were often treated as needing additional confirmation. The stories 
were met with suspicion because of the general suspicion of Soviet 
propaganda. The horrors were referred to as “Alleged killings of 1.5 million” 
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and sometimes paralleled with the fabricated First World War atrocity stories 
of German corpse factories.182 Because of the scant attention the revelation of 
the Majdanek horrors received in the West, in retrospect, one cannot avoid 
thinking about the significance of Soviet troops as the liberators of the 
camps. The wartime race between the Western powers and the Soviet Union 
to reach Berlin became exacerbated after the D-Day in June 1944. Political 
overtones and wartime rivalry between the allied surely played a part in the 
weak Western reporting and response to the Holocaust story.  
Moreover, one significant factor in the meager early attention on the story 
of the Nazi death camps may be attributed to the nature of the photographic 
representations used in reporting. As the camps liberated during the summer 
of 1944 were predominantly emptied and partly destroyed before the 
liberators reached them, the images of dead bodies and piles of corpses—
which compose the foremost visual mode of representing the Nazi 
determination camps in contemporary imaginary—remained unseen.183 The 
invisibility of blunt bodily suffering—visual witnessing of the suffering or 
dead corporal individuals and bodies, which has been seen as the 
predominant mode of arousing both outrage and empathy in the distant 
spectators—most probably played a part in the weak response to the 
reporting. In any case, the reporting of the death camps of 1944 did not 
create an influential spectacle in the West and has been said to have had little 
effect on public opinion. There were ones who readily believed in the Nazi 
atrocity, but the ones in doubt were not convinced. Perhaps the Western 
public was not yet willing to believe the full scale of German atrocities.  
In addition, the Soviets did not for some reason issue press releases from 
the other camps liberated after Majdanek, i.e. from Belzec, Sobibor or 
Treblinka. Only after the liberation of the camps on the Western front by 
Western forces in April 1945, the liberation of Auschwitz—that took place 
already in January—was made public more widely also in and by the Soviet 
Union. Therefore, most of the images iconized in the Western publicity and 
imagination are from the Buchenwald, Dachau and Bergen-Belsen camps, 
liberated by Western troops in April.184 As the Western troops reached the 
first death camps in April 1945, the story of the brutality of the Nazi of the 
camp system and the scope of the systematic carnage very quickly spread 
around the Western world. This time images of Nazi brutality and 
inhumanity of the systematic destruction of human lives surely constructed a 
powerful, wide-spread, influential and lasting visual spectacle.  
 
The Visual Horror Story Breaks 
The scale of the death camps began to unveil for Western publics only as 
journalists and photojournalists accompanying the Western forces reported 
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the events of the liberation and the conditions at the camps. Shock and 
disbelief along with the difficulties of mediating the scale of the horrors 
impacted on the early eyewitnesses. The eye-witnessing journalists 
commonly phrased their frustration in their inability to mediate what they 
experienced and witnessed at the camps. As reporter Edward Murrow stated 
after visiting the liberated Buchenwald camp phrased it: “ I have reported 
what I saw and heard. But only part of it. For the most of it, I have no 
words”.185 Some reporters complained about the general inadequacy of the 
news language in mediating the atrocity story, which challenged language 
appropriateness claiming that printing the actual story of the camps would 
compose a “story of obscenity and filth that would be unprintable.” 
Moreover, after the long war, it was said, the public was tiered of propaganda 
and no longer believed the written word. Therefore the utilization of “factual 
photographs”—visual mediation strongly relying on atrocity images and 
witnessing through the eyes—became the primary mode of trying to explain 
the situation and making the distant spectators believe—and at least partly 
apprehend—what the eyewitnesses saw.186 In this spirit, General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, after witnessing a scene in the Ohrdurf camp on April 12th 
ordered American units in the area to visit the camps and see the destruction 
with their own eyes. He also issued a call to the press back home to report on 
the camps. Eisenhower, perhaps abreast of the lingering disbelief and 
inability to report the scale of horrors, has been recorded as saying: “Let 
them see this.”187 Seeing and visually witnessing the suffering and horror 
became the primary modes of encountering the Holocaust.  
As Western reporters rolled into the camps, countless photographers 
produced images of the same scenes: the scenes now widely recognized as 
signifying the ground zero of humanity. What the world saw was a 
devastating cavalcade of suffering bodies: skeletal bodies of the survivors, 
dirty and barely alive men, women and children stuffed into barracks and 
staring empty-eyed from behind barbed wire, courtyards, train cars and mass 
graves filled with tangled piles of dead bodies, gas chambers, cremation 
ovens and the infrastructure of industrial mass murder, and eyewitnesses 
looking at the bodies of the victims.  “BELIVE IT!” cried out the headline of a 
photographic article by Lee Miller from the death camps of Buchenwald and 
Dachau.188 Doubt and disbelief about the scale of the atrocity and nature of 
the camp system were very much what the reports tried to diffuse. As this 
was the case already with Majdanek, it continued to be the major concern in 
picturing the subsequently liberated camps. Making the spectators bear 
witness to the unimaginable scope of terror and suffering was at the forefront 
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in the practice of visual reporting. Trying to make the unimaginable 
imaginable to the distant spectators was the goal.  The act of witnessing—the 
feelings and reactions of the spectator aroused by seeing the images—was the 
focus of these visual representations. The representational style of the images 
again places the spectators and their moral feelings as the main characters of 
the story in a theatrical way. The intention was thus to invoke certain 
emotions, and moreover political assessments, judgments in the audience. 
Moreover, the photographs were framed as proof of the atrocities committed 
by the Nazis, and thus the images acted as tools of confirmation. Barbie 
Zelizer argues that the circulation of these images played a central role in the 
legitimation of photography as the primary tool for bearing witness to distant 
horrors. In the mid-1940s, probably driven by the force of the Holocaust 
imagery, visual photographic evidence came to outweigh all other forms of 
testimony in regards to distant suffering. 189  
The predominant use of the images depicting the scope of the killing, the 
systematic manner and the planned nature of the carnage and the amount of 
suffering were used to make it seeable and, thus, more comprehensible. But 
the at the time still prevalent nebulous system of photojournalism—the lack 
of proper credits, precise information on the time and place of the taking of 
the images, as well as generalized captioning—all pointed to a generic 
representation and understanding of the atrocity, rather than to specific acts 
of violence taking place in a specific time and place.190  Thus most influential 
atrocity images known were often published without proper information on 
the time, place, the photographer or the individuals depict in the images, 
and, thus, they were not firmly tied to textual representations. Zelizer claims, 
that often the more horrific the image, the less it was specified. Therefore, 
she argues that the photographs of the camps were primarily presented in a 
way that they often turned into symbols of horror and of the downfall of 
human rights per se, instead of being evidence of the particular events they 
were depicting.191 (For Lee Millers and Margaret Bourke-White’s iconic 
photos of the camps, see illustration 2.3. 192) 
 
Visual Symbols of the Fall of Humanity 
The symbolic capacity of the camp images has taken new forms and depths as 
the images have travelled through time; what they have come to depict is not 
only war, death and the suffering of humans midst war, not only the camps 
or even the evils of the Nazi regime, but the modern downfall of humanity: 
systematic genocide, organized destruction of people driven by an ideology of 
hate; the Holocaust. Sliwinski argues that contemporaries looking at the 
images bore witness to something horrific, but did not at the time, just yet, 
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know what they had seen—not in the manner in which these images are now 
typically gazed upon. The perception of the revelation at the time escaped full 
consciousness of the spectators.193 Susan Sontag has described her first 
encounter with the images as a young girl in a way that perhaps is 
emblematic of encountering these images. She writes: “When I looked at 
those photographs, something broke. Some limit had been reached, and not 
only that of horror; I felt irrevocably grieved, wounded, but part of my 
feelings started to tighten; something went dead; something is still crying.” 
So strong was the sensation the images created, that she describes the visual 
encounter as dividing her conception of time into two: a time before seeing 
the images and the time after the images. Nevertheless, Sontag recalls that 
upon encountering them, in the 1940s at the age of twelve, she did not fully 
understand what the images were about.194 At first, the horrors of the camps 
were predominately treated as records of life under the Nazi rule.  Jews or 
Jewishness—or gays, gypsies, or the handicapped—or the fact that the 
majority of the victims were Jews, were rarely mentioned in the original 
captions of the images. As a matter of fact the term Holocaust, as something 
distinct from war in general, only surfaced as a widely used phrase in public 
discourse only in the 1960s. In the 1940s Nurnberg trials terms such as “war 
crimes” and “crimes against humanity” were used. The trial of the Nazi 
criminal Adolf Eichman—the architect of the of the Final solution—held in 
Jerusalem in 1961, brought up the terms “crimes against the Jewish people”, 
and the term Holocaust, as something distinct from the whole of the Second 
World War, began to be used in the publicity of the West. 195  
The images of the Nazi death camps, showing victims stripped of 
humanity—living, breathing people reduced into mere matter—, showed for 
Hannah Arendt how humans were “brought down to the lowest common 
denominator of organic life itself, plunged into the darkest and deepest abyss 
of primal equality” by the Holocaust.196 The fact that the victims in the 
images are shown as bodily creatures tied together only in pain and 
vulnerability, represented for Arendt life stripped of dignity—bare life—that 
has nothing else to cling to but life at its barest, and that shows “the abstract 
nakedness of being nothing but human”.197 For Arendt, the Holocaust 
represents an attempt to annihilate the very concept of human.198  The 
picturing of Holocaust, focusing on representations of destroyed human 
bodies, raised awareness of the fundamental and shared feature of humanity: 
the vulnerable and precarious body, the very being and persistence—or 
annihilation—of which depends upon the surrounding social conditions and 
institutions.199 The epiphany of becoming aware of humanity and realizing 
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the need to protect it (from humans themselves) was, once again, located at 
the heart of the visually and bodily presented ruins of life. Photography 
provided a kind of forensic evidence—indisputable proof of the fall of 
humanity—that was mobilized in arousing the outrage of publics spectating 
at distance. In the phrase “Never again”, introduced after the Holocaust, the 
outrage of the spectators was cemented into the language of human rights 
and future protection of humanity from such a destiny.200 Therefore, the 
ground zero of humanity of Holocaust is often pinpointed as the locus where 
the international institutionalization of universal human rights was 
conceived.  
In April 1945, simultaneously with the revelations of the Nazi camps, 
representatives of 50 nations and numerous non-governmental organizations 
met in San Francisco in order to form a new international body, the United 
Nations. World War II—leaving 60 million dead, the majority of them 
civilians and approximately 6 million of them Jews, killed just because they 
were Jews—was unprecedented in its barbarity. Already before the end of the 
war, the urgent need for a new international body was realized especially by 
the allied nations, the US, Britain and the Soviet Union. As the basic 
structures of the UN—the Security Council, the General Assembly and the 
Secretariat—were set up in the founding conference, the meeting also 
established the Hague International Court of Justice.51 The participating 
countries signed the United Nations Charter on June 16th 1945.201 The 
horrific images of the liberated Nazi camps, circulating in the Western 
publicity at the very time of the founding conference of the UN, have often 
been indicated as having had an impact on the formation of the agenda of the 
UN.202  
Yet, despite the knowledge of the atrocities of the war, including the novel 
revelations made by the visual record of the Nazi camps—the diplomats 
meeting in San Francisco had to be pushed and propped to include human 
rights on their agenda. Strong pressure by minority, labor, religious and 
human rights groups, as well as by some Asian and Latin American states, 
finally changed the minds of the leaders of Britain, the Soviet Union and the 
United States, and they agreed to put human rights in the United Nations 
Charter. Still the Charter of 1945 puts more stress on international security 
issues and devotes only few lines to the protection of humanity and human 
rights, stating only: ”Universal respect for, and observance of, human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion”. But the founding meeting did set up the Human 
Rights Commission, which as its first task drafted a bill of human rights that 
would later constitute the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.203  
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In December 1948, the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights was 
announced, and the goal of a 150-year struggle for international institutional 
recognition of human rights was finally reached.204 The preamble of the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights relies strongly on the atrocities of war as its 
starting point, by stating:  
 Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in 
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and 
the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of 
speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been 
proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people.205  
 
The declaration went further in defining human life worthy of protection 
than its predecessors; a quality that can probably be attributed to the then 
recently set new benchmark of inhumanity. Article 1 states: “All human 
beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of 
brotherhood”.206 Whereas the declarations of the eighteenth-century talked 
about individual rights, equality before law, freedom of speech and 
protection of private property, the 1948 declaration mentions dignity and 
rights inherent to all individual human beings and treats them as inalienable 
qualities of each person.207 The declaration prohibits slavery, advocates 
universal and equal suffrage, calls for freedom of movement, for a right to 
nationality, right to marry, right to social security, to work and to equal pay 
and life sustaining wage, for a right to rest and leisure, and for a right to 
education. However, the UN declaration calling for the universal rights for all 
humans in reality rather expressed a set of moral obligations for the world 
community, but it did not set up any mechanisms for enforcing them. In the 
system of the Cold War the set of rights often fell victim to both domestic and 
international politics, but nevertheless the 1948 declaration, rather than 
marking a culmination of the rights of the man, initiated a process of 
enlargement of and deepening regard for human rights in international 
political settings.208 
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2.4.2 THE POLITICS OF MAKING PAIN VISIBLE— AND INVISIBLE  
The Holocaust images are repeatedly marked as sites of bearing witness to 
something that is impossible to witness. They were, and perhaps still are, too 
traumatic to sink in and, thus, not fully comprehensible.209 Their significance 
has shifted in time, and they still actively flow from one context to another, 
continuously gathering new meanings along the way. They are referred to in 
new settings, juxtaposed with more contemporary images of atrocity, used in 
art, discussed in visual culture studies, circulated by the media, and 
commonly referred to in political speech in times of crises. Through their 
extensive circulation at the time of their revelation, as well as in the decades 
following the Second World War, the Holocaust has been established as the 
modern ground zero of humanity. The horrific images describing and 
unveiling the impeccable horrors under a violent totalitarian system have 
been solidified as the iconic visual representations of both the ultimate fall of 
humanity as well as of the symbolic warning signs of the human rights driven 
“never again” paradigm. Thus, they have also been also used in legitimating 
military interventions. They have been framed and established as iconic 
images, which have been and are continuously referred to in the face of 
contemporary atrocities the backdrop against which we often gaze at all the 
subsequent atrocities. 210  
Referring to the Holocaust and stating that contemporary images and 
sites of violence resemble these iconized atrocities has been a strong political 
statement used in multitudes of ways and contexts. Textual references to and 
visual juxtaposition of the most famous death camp images with 
contemporary images of violent events is prevailing. This has been the case 
with, for instance, the mass killings of Cambodia, Rwanda and Yugoslavia, 
and more recently for example with the war in Syria.211 The reiterated 
references to the Holocaust images does not solely function as an attempt to 
understand, explain and frame the contemporary events, but as Zelizer 
argues, the subsequent overuse of the Holocaust photos may diminish the 
need to see more contemporary instances of brutality. Our helplessness when 
confronted with the more contemporary atrocities may, thereby, be derived 
from our recognition that we already know what they look like; that we have 
already seen them. Holocaust images have become a memory bank of an 
iconic atrocity against which everything is weighed out. For example, images 
of the Bosnian War were commonly juxtaposed with Holocaust imagery, and, 
thus, the war was referred to as a “reoccurrence” of what happened in the 
1940s. The images of camps in Bosnia were pointed to by for example saying: 
“surely these images belong to another time”. Zelizer argues that the 
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continuous reproduction and references to the Holocaust images constructs a 
remembrance practice that rather encourages the spectators to “forget” 
contemporary atrocities, as nothing can succeed the pain and horror of the 
Holocaust. The surrounding, spectating world often remains paralyzed in the 
face of the horrors taking place now. The earlier atrocities may be 
remembered so as to forget the contemporary ones.212  
What is further interesting in regard to the central standing and 
iconization of the Holocaust images is their contextual political 
appropriateness in the Western sphere and utilization both right after the 
World War as well as later.213 The uses of Holocaust imagery thus also tell a 
poignant story of politics of representability of human suffering. For example 
the weak Western reaction to the Majdanek story breaking in 1944, tell of the 
position of politics in the breaking of atrocity stories, of the politics of 
selectiveness in publicizing, framing and signifying atrocity images- 
especially in times of war. As mentioned earlier, General Eisenhower, when 
witnessing the horrors of the extermination camps, was recorded saying that 
the images should be seen by the Western publics as well as by US soldiers. 
He also added that, if US soldiers had formerly possibly been uncertain about 
what they were fighting for in Europe, the visual testimony of the camps 
surely made them aware of what they were fighting against.214 This phrase 
gives away a significant factor in the framing of atrocity images: images of 
suffering can and often are politically utilized in order to indicate the enemy 
and point to its evil nature, by showing destruction induced by the enemy in 
the bodies of the victims. Images of pain can thereby, in addition to 
functioning as representations making war waging more difficult (as was for 
example in the attempt of the usage of the First World War photos by Ernst 
Friedrich), also make waging war easier. The control over, governance and 
regulation of images showing the suffering induced by friendly forces is a 
standard procedure in warfare, as is also the framing and presentation of 
images of the physical pain brought about by the enemy on especially civilian 
populations. This feature is central to visual wartime censorship and 
propaganda. Regardless of the spectacularly horrific nature of the Holocaust 
images, traits of this thinking are also detectable in the framing and 
representation of the Nazi camp atrocity images.  
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As the iconized photos of the Holocaust still contemporarily seem to 
determine the ways in which contemporary atrocities are seen, made sense of 
and understood, they can also be seen to have blocked the Western view on 
other atrocities taking place in conjuncture with them and made other 
brutalities invisible. For example, images telling of the suffering experienced 
by the civilian populations of the German city of Dresden—bombed by the 
Allied forces in February 1945, estimates of the death toll vary from 25 000 
to several hundreds of thousands—have not been extensively publically 
circulated, seen, mourned over, or iconized as signifying unimaginable 
human suffering or generalized madness of war. The suffering of these 
people has neither been remembered as an ultimate sacrifice, nor have the 
perpetrators of these acts (The British and the US) been framed as the 
embodiments of evil. Nor have the images of the victims of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki nuclear bombs—dropped by the US in August 1945, killing at least 
over 120 000 people in an instant—been circulated with an equivalent 
intensity as have the Holocaust images in the Western publicity.  It seems 
that the amount of human suffering experienced by the victims has little to 
do with the iconization of some images as representing the ground zero of 
humanity. Rather, it seems that what determines the iconization, 
representability and the extent of circulation and processes of signification of 
atrocity images, besides the atrocities themselves is political context and 
political as well as cultural appropriateness.  
The ones possessing power over representational practices have the 
power to determine whose suffering is visualized, made visible and 
significant, and thus they have power over who’s suffering matters. In the 
context of warfare the power to govern the representational practices usually 
belongs to the ones who win the war. And especially in the context of war 
photos, the process of making the suffering of some visible, and thus 
significant, is also a process of making the suffering of some others invisible, 
and thus less significant and less reacted to.215 Hereby, the history of 
visualizing the pain of others is also a history that reveals the political frames 
in which the pain of others becomes representable, and moreover a history 
that unveils who are recognized as humans in need and worthy of protection 
at different times. This comes apparent for instance in the context of the 
American racial lynching images dealt with earlier. As Sontag points out, it is 
often so—and especially after the Nazi death camp images produced a novel 
representational practice in the field of visual atrocity photography—that, if 
there is no photographic evidence of suffering, there is (in the minds of the 
spectators) no atrocity. If no images of an event of violence are made public, 
circulated, named, and framed accordingly—so as to produce a narrative of 
suffering, human rights violations and the carnages tend to remain unseen, 
and thus unreacted to. Whose suffering we see and how we see it, as well as 
whose suffering remains unseen to us, are subject to political governance and 
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power, and also substantially a matter of politics of (the institutionalization 
of protection) humanity.216 The Holocaust images and their connection to the 
advancement of the institutionalization of human rights and the evolvement 
of the humanity paradigm unveil this connection in an illuminating way. 
Conventions, institutions, norms and practices craft living people into 
recognizable subjects and, then again, leave some living creatures outside 
recognition and (human) status. As Hannah Arendt puts it, one must be 
judged as a human, before being able to become recognized as a human in 
need of protection and rights.217  In this manner, one must also be pictured as 
a human, in need of protection and rights, before one can be included into 
the realm of humanness.   
Therefore, by looking at the modes of representation and the framing 
practices of atrocity images mediating the pain of distant others, it also 
becomes apparent whose lives are perceived as worthy of being met with 
grief, outrage or cries for protection. Thus, the frames of what is recognized 
as grievable and non-grievable life become visible. Still today not all life at all 
times is perceived as worthy of protection, nor even always grieved when 
lost: Death sentence is still a common practice, killing another human in war 
is legal and quite generally seen as somewhat acceptable, and mass scale 
industrial killing of non-human animals for food is a normal everyday 
practice. As bodily vulnerability is a shared condition of all living creatures—
not only of humans but of all animals—visual presentations of vulnerable life 
is in a pivotal position in the recognition process of (protectable) life itself.218 
I shall develop these themes in more length for instance in Chapter 4 of this 
study.  
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2.4.3 HUMANITARIANISM AND HUMANITARIAN ICONOGRAPHY IN 
THE COLD WAR ERA  
What comes to your mind when you think of an iconic representation of 
human suffering in the Cold War era? Do you think of images of the starving 
crowds of naked African children, with bloated stomachs, flies in their eyes, 
staring into the distance in apathy and bare corporal existence? Or do you 
reflect on the image of a small Vietnamese girl, running naked and screaming 
as napalm burns her flesh? Both of these imageries arguably iconize 
something focal in the not so distant history, which is hard to vocalize but 
nevertheless painfully central for the Western understanding of the world of 
yesterday. These two types of images both address their viewers in somewhat 
different modes, but nevertheless they could be called thick imageries, iconic 
of the visual representation of suffering in the late twentieth century.   
It is widely recognized that humanitarianism—its organizational settings, 
status within Western politics, and thus also the styles, uses and modes of 
representation of humanitarian visual representations—has gone through 
significant changes in late twentieth century, and especially towards the turn 
of the century. Humanitarian aid and development work, as well as the 
overall ethos governing global humanitarianism, have dramatically 
transformed within the later decades of the previous century. Neutral and a-
political humanitarian orientation—based on the ethos of impartiality and 
neutrality of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) —in the 
later part of the twentieth century gave way to new, more selective and 
politically committed humanitarian objectives. This trait is represented by 
organizations such as the Mèdecins Sans Frontières (MSF) founded in 
1971.219 These developments have also left their mark on the visual 
representational practices of distant suffering. This chapter deals with the 
alterations and nature of humanitarian representations of human suffering 
in the Cold War era. 
In the pages that follow my aim is to map out the historical changes of 
humanitarianism in the Cold War era; to analyze the changes in 
humanitarian iconography, and its modes of addressing its audience, and to 
combine and cross-examine these with the overall changes in Western 
humanitarianism and with the expansion and alterations of the 
humanitarian frame. I shall start with the representational practices in 
humanitarian images and messages in predominantly organizational settings 
during the latter twentieth century.  I shall trace the kinds of solidary bonds 
different modes of visual addressing create between the spectators of 
humanitarian images and the objects of the humanitarian action and help, 
i.e. the sufferers in the images. I shall also examine the images, the ways in 
which the Vietnam War was presented to Western spectators, and open up 
the influential and much debated Vietnam War syndrome paradigm on the 
foreign policy influence of images of suffering. In addition, I shall also 
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explore and consider the political power of images of suffering in the contexts 
of technological novelties of visual mediation, of foreign policy and war, as 
well as ponder on the sentimental effects of images of suffering in 
international political settings.  
 
Era of Non-interference Humanitarianism and Iconography of 
Vulnerability as Bare Life 
In her book The Ironic Spectator, Lillie Chouliaraki maps out the 
representational practices of humanitarian images and messages during the 
late twentieth and early twenty-first century (predominantly in the context of 
communication of humanitarian NGOs). She traces the kinds of solidary 
bonds different modes of visual addressing create between the spectators of 
humanitarian images and the objects of the humanitarian action and help. 
She tracks the diverse forms of solidarity different representational practices 
of distant suffering create. Chouliaraki describes the iconic twentieth-century 
representations of distant (non-Western) atrocities—such as the 
representations of the Biafra famine (and war) around the turn of 1960s and 
‘70s and the dominant aesthetic framings of the 1980s Ethiopian famines—as 
belonging to the register of vulnerability as bare life. Perhaps the most 
piercing and thought-provoking, iconic humanitarian images of the later 
twentieth century belong to this iconographical mode. These images most 
typically present extreme and acute suffering, such as sickness and 
starvation, through visually detectably non-Western (naked) bodies, mostly 
through African, and often children’s, bodies. In these photorealist 
representations, the suffering objects in need of our help are typically 
presented in a state of weak existence, extreme bodily suffering and nameless 
passivity. Often the objects of these images are represented as masses of 
suffering crowds and pictured in nearly voyeuristic style, often naked and 
reduced to mere bodily creatures. In these representations belonging to the 
“register of bare life”, the sufferers are typically presented as not interacting 
with the camera, but are pictured passively and calmly giving themselves up 
for observation in the barest physical condition for the spectators of the 
images. These weary, skeleton-like figures are typically presented without 
names, histories, or without political context explaining the situation causing 
their suffering and condition.220  (See illustration 2.3.221) 
This representational mode strongly resembles the ways in which 
suffering in the colonies was pictured in the late nineteenth-century images 
of religious humanitarians, discussed earlier. In the age of imperial 
humanitarianism and within the Western imperialistic mindset, the ruling or 
saving of these ‘helpless adolescent’ non-Western subjects was seen as the 
imperialistic responsibility of their European/Western rulers. The ways in 
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which the early colonial representations address their viewers can be seen as 
a preamble to the prevalent visual humanitarian communication style of the 
twentieth century. That is, the predominant type of representing distant 
suffering, lasting far into the twenty-first century, was given birth by the 
colonial mindset. Hence, and because of the visual and political mode of 
addressing the images entail, Chouliaraki calls the solidarity created by the 
practice of presenting distant suffering, through addressing ‘vulnerability as 
bare life,’ as “the solidarity of neo-colonialism”. Moreover, these images, 
concentrating on the passive bodies of the victims, show distant suffering—
such as famine—not as politically created situations, i.e. not as situations 
ultimately created by a system of unequal distribution of resources or other 
situations produced by complex (global) political structures, but as a medical 
condition that can be remedied by relieving the symptoms, such as 
malnutrition.  That is, the centrality of the passive, bare biological bodily 
suffering de-politicizes the suffering of the inhabitants of the “less-
developed” non-Western world, and thus the images provoke a focus on 
immediate corporal relief and lead to solidarity, which aims at saving lives 
rather than at changing the conditions, which induced the suffering in the 
first place.222 Thus, this mode of representation exemplifies the dominant 
ethos of humanitarianism still predominant in the post-World War era, up 
until the mid-1980s, which mostly centered on non-governmental, neutrally 
framed help, based on the principles of non-interference, and practiced by 
organizations such as the Red Cross.223  
Moreover, this representational practice creates the starkest of contrasts 
between the spectators and the objects of the images. It maximizes the 
distance between the relatively happy, safe and well-fed spectator, gazing 
from the safety of an orderly society, and the weak, barely living (majorly) 
non-Western creatures, presented through their bodily feeble condition, 
pictured in nakedness, hunger and namelessness. Stanley Cohen finds that 
these kinds of representations produce sentiments of indignation, shame and 
guilt in their spectators (just as did the colonial representations of the late 
nineteenth century, as did the visual appeals of the abolitionists). They make 
the spectators feel bad, miserable and guilty; and thus Cohen claims, rather 
than being capable of producing compassionate reactions, they risk 
undermining them.224  It has been argued widely in research that this mode 
of addressing does not mobilize the spectator’s will to help in an effective 
way, but rather passivizes and even leads to a “I have seen this before”-
syndrome or to compassion fatigue225.226 Cohen argues that the risk of 
becoming indifferent or not taking action, when continuously facing this sort 
of images, is not necessarily because of exhaustion but because of the 
physiological moral distance they create. He argues that such images might 
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leave the spectator feeling utter hopelessness and shock, and thus they risk 
creating a specific form of denial:  the inability to even think about what was 
encountered via the image, because of the impenetrable horror conveyed by 
the images remains so completely remote from the sphere of experience of 
the spectator that it actually leaves us passive. The repetition of the hopeless 
and fatalistic imagery—accompanied by exhausting facts on millions of 
suffering children, dying of curable conditions such as diarrhea and hunger—
further removes the well-fed and secure spectators away from the depicted 
suffering. The iconography of bare life, thus, actually tells us that nothing 
really can be done about the persistent problem of global inequality and that 
these people and their lives are beyond the scope of our help.227 Portrayal of 
the sufferers through such “negative aesthetics” works to remove them from 
the order of “our humanity” and places the suffering objects of the images as 
subhumans, utterly different from the ‘full-fledged’ Western humans gazing 
at the images.228  Thus again, the fixed role division of the humanitarian 
story—well-off Western spectators and the weak and passive non-Western 
sufferers—as well as a theatrical mode of addressing centralizing on the 
emotions of the spectators prevails in the arrangement and addressing of the 
images presented within the register of vulnerability as bare life.  
From the mid-1980s onwards this mode of visual representation has 
gathered vocal critique.  Such mode of representation was seen not only as 
inefficient but also unethical, and the iconography of bare life thus started to 
become less frequent in humanitarian representations. Researchers of the 
field, as well as organizations and the Western mainstream media, started to 
highlight the need to represent people with dignity and respect, and the need 
to change the predominant representational style of distant suffering became 
vocalized widely.  As the ethics of representation has been analyzed, 
organizations practicing humanitarianism, as well as media houses, have 
sketched various best practices on representing situations of pain and 
suffering increasingly since the late 1980s. Conventions on the uses of images 
and messages in describing the Third World have been formulated, and 
“codes of taste and decency” compiled.229 The critique of the inefficacy and 
ethical dilemmas of the iconography of bare life have changed the 
predominant style of humanitarian images, although this does not mean that 
images entailing iconographical elements belonging to the visual register of 
bare life, producing the solidarity of neo-colonialism, would have been 
swiped off the representational register. Nevertheless, more lately this style 
of addressing is generally applied less frequently, and used with more caution 
and consideration, at least in organizational settings. 230 
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Visual addressing of vunerability and bare life, possessing long historical 
roots, was still the predominant mode of representing distant suffering by 
humanitarian organizations a couple of decades ago. In addition, as the 
iconography of bare life has also been the predominant mode of addressing 
used in media representations illustrating distant, namely non-Western 
crises, I argue that images of bare life are still most familiar to all individuals 
now above 30 years-of-age living in Western societies.  These images can still 
be seen to constitute one of the most influential and iconic modes of 
representing distant misfortune in the imaginary of Western publics. When 
growing up in Finland in the 1980s, my mother used to refer to the starving 
children of Biafra when trying to get us children to finish our meals, by 
saying that “some children don’t even have anything to eat, and you dare not 
to clean your plate.” And she was not the only Western parent resorting to 
this argument. I claim, that because of the shocking nature and wide public 
repetition of such atrocity images, presentations of this sort have forcefully 
formed the imagination of Africa and other non-Western, less-developed 
global areas for generations of Western inhabitants, and they still influence 
the ways in which we tend to see not only the others but also our position in 
the global world.  
What is noteworthy in the critique of the iconography of bare life is that it 
took place concurrently with a more general shift in the attitudes towards 
humanitarian aid and a wider self-examination within the discourse 
humanitarianism. The horrors of the Biafran famine and the Nigerian Civil 
War (1967-1970) can be seen as a watershed in this respect. The 
disappointment and frustrations experienced by a group of French doctors 
working for the ICRC in Biafra inflated a heated debate on the desirability 
and acceptability of the “silence rule”, neutrality, non-condemnation and no-
comment and non-interference policy of the Red Cross, as well as the 
tradition of “neutral and impartial” humanitarianism in broader terms. After 
witnessing the Nigerian army butchering unarmed and wounded men, 
women and children, along with Red Cross workers, the French doctors 
decided not to keep their vow of silence anymore. These “Biafris”, had lost 
their faith in the functionality and morality of the Red Cross principles and 
modus operandi, and thus revolted against the ICRC’s neutral stance on 
Biafra. The Biafris publically accused the Nigerian government of genocide 
and pleaded for its international condemnation.231  
The frustration and disappointment of field workers with the non-partial 
humanitarian logic ultimately formed a new approach to humanitarian work 
and ethos. The Biafris, with other like-minded groups, started compiling a 
manifesto for new humanitarianism. Mèdecins Sans Frontières (MSF), 
founded by Bernard Kouchner and Xavier Emmanuelli in 1971, has been 
regarded as the beacon of the new humanitarian proceedings and principles. 
MSF combined the professional medical ethic with cosmopolitan 
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universalism and human rights. MSF can also be seen to represent a then 
contemporary version of a French ideology, la mission civilatrice, dating 
back to colonial times, which justified foreign intervention in order to 
improve human welfare.  The MSF ideology resonated with many in the 
radical and politically turbulent years of the late 1960s and early ‘70s.  
Among the participants of the movement and defendants of its ideology were 
both left- and right-wing anti-colonialists and humanitarians, who imagined 
that the new approach would bring progress to “backward populations.”232 
The changes in the organizational field and in the ethos of humanitarian 
work have been seen as having paved the way for the growing overall 
politicization of humanitarianism, in which the previous universality and 
neutral aspirations of humanitarianism have been seen both as naïve and 
dysfunctional.  The critique of the representational practices of iconography 
of bare life and the critique of the a-political framing of the victims, 
therefore, merges with the concurrent overall critique of the ethos and 
practice of non-interventionist, “old-style” humanitarianism and with the 
growing perception of its inability to alleviate distant suffering. This 
development can be seen to have ultimately led to the birth of state military 
humanitarianism and, further, to what I call Western humanitarian world 
politics, themes that I shall open up in more detail later in this chapter.233   
2.4.4 IMAGES OF ATROCITY IN THE TELEVISION ERA: VIETNAM 
WAR SYNDROME OR MANUFACTURING CONSENT? 
As identified above, in the post-World War era, visual representations of 
organizational humanitarianism and humanitarian aid industry presented 
suffering individuals predominantly in a visual setting of bare life, as 
consequently did a multitude of media representations.  The a-political 
ethos—based on the colonial history, global power relations as well as on the 
non-interference tradition of humanitarianism dominating the era—resulted 
in humanitarian emergencies being predominantly met with ‘compassion as 
neo-colonialism.’ But concurrently there also existed other remarkable and 
historically emblematic visual representations describing human fragility 
and suffering, which seemingly do not fit this depoliticizing representational 
frame.  
The Vietnam War (1955-1975), from the 1960s onwards, was widely 
witnessed through televised images of atrocity, massively circulated in the 
Western publicity. At the turn of the 1960s and ‘70s stunning images of the 
Vietnam War, namely images depicting atrocities, war crimes, and suffering 
the warfare inflicted on Vietnamese civilians, gained immense visibility and 
attention in the Western publicity. These images stirred up heated political 
debate and were central in the anti-war movement. Haunting images, such as 
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Eddie Adam’s image “General Loan executing a Vietcong Suspect” (1968) 
picturing a South Vietnamese General shooting a alleged Vietcong terrorist in 
the head on a point-blank range and describing the events of the Tet 
Offensive in the streets of Saigon, have been iconized as one of the most 
powerful representations influencing the public image of the war. Also Ron 
Haeberle’s images of the My Lai Massacre (1968) inflicted by American 
soldiers and Nick Ut’s picture of napalm-burned child victims of an 
“Accidental Napalm Attack” (1972) perpetrated by South Vietnamese forces 
have been iconized as politically powerful atrocity images in the Western 
sphere.  Still today these images are often referred to when the political 
power and influence of mediatized war images on public war sentiments and 
political decision-making are discussed. (Included in the illustration 2.3 is 
material from an anti-war poster “And Babies?” made of Ron Haerberle’s 
photographs of the My Lai massacre, 1968, and the iconic Nick Ut’s photo 
“Accidental Napalm attack” from 1972.)  
The visual style of these images is photorealistic and the scenery offered 
by them of the war is horrific. These images concentrate on the physical 
(mass) destruction of the individuals caught in the midst of war and picture 
the devastating human toll of the war waged by a Western power.  But they 
also often point directly to illegal use of force—even to war crimes —of 
American/allied soldiers. For instance, the images of the My Lai massacre 
(secretly) shot by an army photographer Haeberle—which also played a part 
in the trial in which American soldiers were accused of and sentenced for 
crimes of war—blatantly show stunning images of unarmed villagers about to 
die as well as picture Vietnamese civilians, among whom are also babies and 
small children, killed by American soldiers and heaped into piles of 
unidentifiably tangled human bodies. Moreover, in all of the three 
emblematic iconic images mentioned above, the perpetrators of the violence 
are to some extent present in the images or strongly referred to. In their 
common contextual uses in the media, the style of addressing of the 
representations is formed so that the images intend to unveil features of the 
war that were perhaps unknown or hidden from the eyes of the distant 
Western spectators before. Thus their mode of representation is revelatory, 
and they produce active political narratives of war as well. 234  
Vietnam was the first war predominantly encountered in the living rooms 
of Western citizens through private TV sets. Vietnam is often nominated as 
an “uncensored war”, from which images allegedly flowed into the sight of 
the Western viewers without notable control from the state. The recurrently 
and massively circulated images, unveiling the brutal nature of American war 
and the atrocious price it puts on distant individuals, have frequently been 
hailed as having produced significant change in the public impressions of the 
war, causing public vigilance and outrage. Furthermore, it has become 
customary to claim that images of the Vietnam War not only negatively 
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influenced public perception of the war but worked to undermine the war 
effort, and, consequently, pressured political decision makers, ultimately 
leading to American withdrawal from the war, thus causing the so called 
Vietnam War syndrome.235   
In his memoirs (1978) President Richard Nixon voiced his impression of 
the role of media during the Vietnam War and stated his frustration 
particularly with the media’s use of atrocious images:  
More than ever before, television showed the terrible human 
suffering and sacrifice of war. Whatever the intention behind such 
relentless and literal reporting of the war, the result was a serious 
demoralization of the home front, raising the question whether 
America would ever again be able to fight enemy abroad with unity 
and strength of purpose at home. 236  
 
Arguments regarding the Vietnam War syndrome are often heard from the 
direction of the American state and military, and they stress how the 
centrality of visual war reporting and the increased power of media in the 
television era affect the public opinion and home front sentiments. This 
theory about the Vietnam War syndrome refers to media’s ability to destroy 
public morale and support for war, and claims that the media can pressure or 
even force political decision-makers into action. Often in everyday 
understanding and public discussion the Vietnam War is still commonly 
reminisced as a war during which governmental visual censorship was weak, 
and the media was in opposition to the official US policy of the war. It is still 
often reiterated that the revelatory imagery of the atrocities of war forcefully 
affected the public sentiments and attitudes towards the war. The myth of the 
Vietnam War syndrome still lives on. In reality, the relations between the 
publication of the images by the media, political power and public sentiments 
created by the revelatory images are far more complicated and ambivalent 
than this theory suggests. 237  
For example Daniel Hallin has concluded that the position of the media in 
opposition to the elite consensus on the war and the effect of the images 
mediated through a novel mediation platform have been highly exaggerated, 
or are even false. He has pointed out that the presentation of the crude 
images of war in the US media actually followed an established elite view of 
the war, rather than led it. Through detailed analysis of the changing 
historical trajectory of the war in the US, Hallin shows that, in contrast to the 
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commonly reiterated belief, critical reporting of the war actually intensified 
only after the political elite of the US became to be—at the turn of the 1960s 
and ‘70s—divided into the Doves and the Hawks. The pro-war Hawks 
believed that the war had to be won at any price, whilst the Doves had 
become disenchanted with the war and believed that the price of victory in 
Vietnam was not worth paying for.  The turning point in this respect has been 
dated more specifically back to the May Lai massacre and the Tet offensive of 
1968. It has been noted that especially the unfortunate Tet offensive led into 
a situation in which a number of Western spectators of the war felt that the 
US war effort had lost its credibility. In addition, Noam Chomsky and 
Edward Herman argue in Manufacturing Consent (1988), that by 1970 US 
had already won the war in Vietnam in terms of its major objectives, and thus 
critical public opinion was not a significant threat to the aims of the political 
elite anymore. This is to say that the images surfaced in the media, because a 
sufficient number of the national elite was already war weary and 
disappointed with the war, or even opposed the continuation of it. In other 
words, the war weariness and disappointment of the elites came first, and the 
presentation of the images seconded this change in the political atmosphere. 
Thus, Hallin argues that the presentation of the images—or the novel visual 
mediation techniques—did not change the dominant public (or elite) 
sentiments towards the war, but rather trailed it. 238  
Likewise, Chomsky and Herman shoot down the thesis on the political 
power of the Vietnam War images. They see that (American mainstream) 
media, in the case of Vietnam reportage but also in wider terms, functions 
under the political and economic elite and at the discretion of the ruling 
classes and groups, and thus remains prominently a disseminator of the 
“official agenda.”239 This line of thought on the nature and functions of 
(Western) media has been supported by a number of critical scholars, 
analyzing the relations of the mass media and the state in the twenty-first 
century as well as in the post-Cold War milieu. It has been, quite the contrary 
to the thesis on the Vietnam War images, found that, especially in times of 
war, national media tends to support the official agenda and elite views, often 
even succumbing to cheerleading and displays of patriotism, rather than 
opposing the official line. The position of the media as a part of the 
ideological machinery and institutional structures of the dominant cultural 
and political sphere, within which it operates, has also been theorized and 
analyzed by many.240 For example, Stuart Hall writes about the tendency of 
mass media to align itself with the dominant consensual political culture, and 
about the inclination of those who disaffiliate or challenge the status quo 
routinely to be marginalized by the media. He argues that the 
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institutionalized ethos of news media is often the source of hidden (national) 
consensus, rather than an institution providing revelatory anti-government 
information or revolutionary viewpoints challenging elite views or the 
political status quo. Furthermore, newsworthiness—what is seen as 
important and newsworthy—and, moreover, how news and news 
photographs are framed, presented, and signified remain highly political 
matters, and journalists often succumb to the ideological considerations of 
the elite. The selection and determination of news photographs describing 
war, furthermore, are a matter of political and cultural signification and 
framing. Generally, the mainstream media can be seen as functioning as a 
part of the ideological machinery of a given cultural and political sphere; and 
thus media representations reveal and reflect the dominant political and 
ideological ethos prominent in the given time, place, cultural and political 
surroundings. 241 These issues, i.e. the political and ideological nature of 
news media (and particularly mainstream media or mass media), the ways in 
which crises and wars are (visually) framed and presented in mass media, are 
issues, which I shall also develop later in more length and one that remains 
at the heart of this study.  
In regards to the Vietnam reporting, it has been shown, by a multitude of 
research projects, that media previously tended to reiterate the government 
line but, towards the turn of the decade, swung toward the anti-war 
movement.242 Thus, it may be said that visual media representations of the 
Vietnam war were more likely to appear in the mainstream media, because 
the critique towards the war had already become so wide-spread—and 
commonly accepted—in the early 1970s that critical viewpoints—also in the 
form of brutal imagery—had become culturally representable and politically 
newsworthy.  Moreover, in line with what Hall argues on the biased position 
of news media, elite consensus, and position of critical perspectives, 
Chomsky and Herman argue that, in the case of visual Vietnam reportage, 
regardless of the massive media bombardment of brutal images, the 
reportage did not actually have a significant effect on the popularity of the 
war before the turn of the decade. At least the reportage was not leaning 
toward the direction it has later been claimed to have been by the Vietnam 
war syndrome discourse, but rather in the opposite direction: still in the late 
1960s a vast number of American media spectators actually reported that 
they had become more supportive of the war than before due to the television 
coverage.243 Quite similarly Vicky Goldberg describes the response to the 
publication of the My Lai massacre images. Even though the images of the 
carnage of up to 500 civilians in the village of My Lai and the war crimes 
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committed by American soldiers appeared continuously in the media, 
according to a poll up to half of the of American public refused to believe that 
the massacre was real or inflicted by their countrymen. The New York Times 
at the time, possibly quite correctly, reported, that the spectator reactions to 
the My Lai story apparently paralleled the way people felt about the war in 
wider terms. If the spectator was anti-war, she probably saw the images as 
evidence of a massacre and of the way in which the war was ripping apart not 
only Vietnam but also the United States. If seen by a pro-war spectator, the 
images probably told about a legitimate US response to enemy atrocities.244  
Therefore, still at the end of the 1960s, encountering brutal imagery of 
Vietnam War crimes and atrocities generally did not effectively change the 
US public opinion on the war. Consequently, although the anti-war 
movement forcefully utilized the graphic photos of atrocity in its 
campaigning, concurrently the pro-war section of the society did not see 
them as conveying anything out of the ordinary. Thus, the media reportage of 
the war actually came to represent a larger division in the US society. 
Therefore, following Sontag, it can be said, also in relation to the Vietnam 
War images, that images, as a powerful means of conveying information on 
human rights violations and revealing massive suffering they may be, cannot 
independently produce an outcome. They cannot provide a moral position, 
unless a political and moral atmosphere sufficiently backing their message 
already exists.245  
Additionally, Chomsky and Herman claim that the soldiers returning 
from the war actually brought back a more disillusioning picture of the 
brutality of the war than the media reportage: What was shown by the 
pictures circulating in the media was, thus, already for a large part known by 
many at the home front. Moreover, they argue that regardless of the fact that 
brutal images were indeed shown on TV already in the 1960s from day to day 
and night to night, yet they still were not sufficient enough to stir up 
significant protests before the change of approach ensued in the highest of 
political domain. Thus, it appears that spectating war images was generally 
common in the late 1960s that seeing the brutality of war became business as 
usual—just like seeing images of the starving Africans.246 Chomsky and 
Herman go on arguing that, especially in the year prior to the swing in the 
elite attitudes, American media actually went on observing and discussing 
atrocities of the war quite blatantly, not considering them as raising moral 
issues, and thus, in fact, they did not treat them as atrocities at all but rather 
as achievements of the war effort.247 Moreover, the presentational practices 
of the Vietnam War images in the Western media actually, for the most part, 
concentrated on the emotions of the Western spectators, and these practices 
did neither present foremost the suffering of the Vietnamese civilians per se 
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as being problematic, nor did they present war as such as immoral, but 
rather they concentrated on the failed war effort of the US.248  Therefore, 
similarly as in the case of the bare life imagery, Vietnamese victims of 
violence, in their physical conditions, were framed as not belonging to the 
same register of humanity as the Western spectators. As African famine 
victims were presented as a-political victims of a medical condition and, thus, 
met as subhumans naturally belonging to the register of continuous 
suffering, the Vietnamese (civilian) victims were seen as less human and as 
somewhat justified victims, and sometimes—especially in the earlier 
representations and the media’s mode of addressing—they were framed even 
as the enemy, as inhuman characters deserving their fate and suffering249.  
 
The Power of Visual Framing 
As the two somewhat concurrent powerful and historically emblematic types 
of picturing distant suffering of the era—the bare life representations of, for 
instance, African famine and the images depicting the suffering of 
Vietnamese civilians midst Western warfare—may firstly seem very 
divergent, there are, as a matter of fact, some noteworthy similarities in their 
representational style. They both place the victims of the suffering—in their 
own distinct ways—into a separate sphere of humanity from that of the 
spectators. They both distance the suffering and actually concentrate on the 
feelings of the spectator facing the images more so than they actually center 
on the suffering of the individuals/groups/areas presented in the images. But 
these two image types are also arranged and presented significantly 
differently. Although the images of the African famine victims almost totally 
a-politicize the suffering and suggest that the way to engage with the victims 
is to alleviate their hunger by allotting some money to an organization, they 
do not, on the average, point into the direction of a wider political change as 
a possibility by their visual and contextual arrangement. In contrast, the 
Vietnam images address their viewers in more outright political manners. At 
least in the later 1970s milieu, media framings of the images seem to suggest 
to their spectators—foremost to the American public—that the spectators, as 
citizens of a democratic state, can have an effect on the suffering, and that 
their impact comes not foremost through giving money to an organization 
but through legitimization or de-legitimization of the war effort by 
democratic means or by protest. The framing the atrocity images are granted 
in the Vietnam War syndrome discourse suggests that the public has the 
power to change the course of war, by either supporting it or by resisting it. 
Thus, the spectator is given a role of a political actor, who may alleviate or 
even stop the suffering of distant individuals by taking a political stand. Not 
claiming that this really was the case, the mode of addressing and the 
arrangement of the Vietnam images—probably created somewhat in 
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retrospect—functions in a very different mode compared with the largely 
organizational images of suffering of African bare life. This has, as we have 
seen previously in the chapter when dealing with images in pacifistic 
arrangements and settings, been the case also earlier in history. A belief in 
the potency of brutal images of human suffering, affecting the public opinion 
on war/atrocity/human rights violation, thus seems to be historically formed 
and quite deeply engrained in the Western sphere.250  
The juxtaposition of the bare life imagery and the medialized images of 
the Vietnam War suggest that several different modes of representing distant 
suffering or different modes of visual addressing—created by different 
contextual framings, rather than divergent iconographical styles—exist 
concurrently. Images presented of wars and crises in which Western the 
spectators—as members of Western political and cultural sphere—are 
participants and active agents in (on an openly political or, furthermore, 
military level) seem to be presented differently and address their viewers in 
different modes than images presented in a ‘purely humanitarian’ setting. 
Here, the concurrently existing, segmented and collage-like nature of 
humanitarian images becomes clearly visible.251 These different co-existing 
modes of representation, framings, and signification, and the divergent ways 
in which the imagery in its contextual setting invite their spectators to see 
them, is what I am eager to open up more in the following pages of this study, 
which concentrate on the more contemporary imagery.  
Albeit the myth of the political power of the Vietnam images has been 
effectively discredited in academic research, the Vietnam War syndrome and 
the idea of the potency of suffering images in affecting (foreign) political 
processes seems to be cemented in the public consciousness as well as in the 
mindset of governmental and military actors. The myth of the Vietnam War 
as an uncensored war, and the belief in the brutal war image’s negative effect 
on the Western countries’ ability to wage war and to “fight the enemy abroad 
with unity and strength,”252 has affected the ways in which war reportage 
and, especially, visual images of war are, still today, governed and controlled 
both governmentally, culturally and by media.253 Further, it is also often 
stated that what Pentagon—and probably the Western policy-makers in 
larger terms—learned from Vietnam was that the ability to control (visual) 
media narratives of war is essential for the success of military operations. 
The British war in the Falkland Islands (1982) has been considered a test site 
of the new Western constraints on media coverage following the lessons from 
Vietnam. The governance and control resources—such as the pool system for 
war journalism—were further developed later and applied during the US 
operations in Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989-1990). Furthermore, 
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military control of Western war narratives and sceneries have been said to 
have been used to successfully polish to new heights during the Gulf War in 
1990-1991. Western war has, ever since Vietnam, been, and continuous to be, 
predominantly fought in the hearts and minds of Western media 
spectators.254 This is why the Vietnam War reportage and the belief in the 
Vietnam War syndrome can be seen as a significant watershed in modern 
mediation and control of visual images of crises and wars that has had a 
lasting impact, particularly in crises in which the Western powers play an 
interventionist part. I shall explore these themes in more length in the 
following paragraph dealing with the uses and presentation of images of war 
and pain in the age of liberal humanitarianism. 
2.5  IMAGES OF PAIN AND WAR IN THE AGE OF 
LIBERAL HUMANITARIANISM  
The era after the end of the binary system of the Cold War has meant 
significant and foundational changes both in humanitarianism and the 
system of world order. In Empire of Humanity Barnett calls the era starting 
from the end of the Cold War (1989) up until this day as the age of liberal 
humanitarianism. After the Cold War (Western) states became increasingly 
committed to saving “failed states,” in order to create liberal peace, security, 
and development. Barnett argues, that towards the end of the century and 
increasingly after 9/11, saving and securitizing states and areas in turmoil 
became a human security issue, far too important for the Western powers to 
leave to the humanitarian NGOs to handle. During the era domestic 
conditions, such as poverty and despotism in fragile (non-Western) states 
possibly fostering future terrorism, came to define the orientation of 
international actions of Western states. The regime of interference led to 
interventionist military-humanitarian operations and Western wars 
legitimized by humanitarian rhetoric.255 This new humanitarianized Western 
political environment has had major consequences for organizational 
humanitarianism. 
On the other hand, concurrent changes and alterations within the 
humanitarian organizational setting—namely the shift from immediate 
lifesaving aid to developmental emphasis—can be seen to have had an 
enormous effect on the recent Western take on global politics and 
international crisis. The interplay of changes between organizational 
humanitarianism and the humanitarization of Western global politics makes 
these two dimensions inseparable and manifoldly entangled. As a result, 
warring states, relying on humanitarian, security and securitizing discourse, 
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and humanitarian organizations, banking on development ideology, have 
begun to co-opt and co-operate increasingly in multitude of ways in global 
crisis zones. Consequently, some outright political, interest-oriented 
governmental acts and organizational humanitarianism have merged and 
become ever harder to tell apart.256 
Consequently, the neutrality of humanitarian relief organizations—and 
moreover also the neutral spirit of humanitarianism at large—have become 
increasingly questioned. As governmental actors and military personnel, 
acting in crisis zones under the guise of humanitarianism, have become 
difficult to tell apart from actors of humanitarian relief organization. 
Subsequently, humanitarian space has decreased, and humanitarian 
workers have been placed increasingly under suspicion by the locals, and 
they have even come increasingly under violent attacks.257 However, as a 
consequence of the humanitarization of Western international politics, 
humanitarian NGOs have not only been increasingly engaged in development 
efforts but, moreover, in political activities: currently humanitarians are 
commonly included in colloquies of high level international politics, even 
influencing resolutions of war. Humanitarians have also begun to be involved 
in post-conflict resolutions and peace building; they commonly address 
human rights issues, causes of poverty, gender equality and so on.258 As 
concurrently—increasingly towards the end of the century—the number of 
humanitarian organizations has mushroomed significantly, the visibility and 
economic significance of humanitarianism has increased, and the weight of 
the humanitarian point of view in political settings has further asserted 
itself.259  
It can be argued that during the post-Cold War era humanitarianism, as 
we thought we knew it, has withered away and become multifariously 
entangled with outright political, strategic international objectives of state 
actors. During the era of liberal humanitarianism, the system of 
humanitarian Western politics began, for a significant part, to use 
humanitarian organizations as tools in advancing their strategic objectives in 
global politics. As Colin Powell, former US Secretary of State, has been 
quoted saying in 2001, humanitarianism and humanitarian organizations 
have become a “force multiplier” in Western warfare.260 Furthermore, 
humanitarianism and humanitarian rhetoric have expanded from its 
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organizational aid setting into a prominent key term within the Western 
political sphere and has become a focal component in Western international 
political aspirations. Humanitarian reasoning and objectives, as well as the 
emphasis on human rights and protection of human lives, have, from the late 
twentieth century onwards, increasingly come to determine not only what is 
meant by the “international community” but also risen to a central status 
within Western power political reasoning, action and political branding. 
Military humanitarianism261 and interventionist Western politics have 
increasingly been carried out under the (rhetorical) cover of 
humanitarianism, humanitarian action and protection of humanity since the 
early 1990s.262 Humanitarianism has quite recently grown from activist 
endeavor acting in the margins of the Western societies into a significant 
paradigm outlining and defining Western public life at large. 
As the overall settings, functions and ethos of humanitarianism have 
altered significantly, likewise the humanitarian iconography—i.e. the uses 
and styles of representation of humanitarian imagery—have in the latter part 
of the twentieth century been substantially revised and altered. Furthermore, 
the dramatic evolvement in the technical means of visual mediation—TV, 
real-time live reportage from crisis zones and more lately using cell phones, 
digital cameras, new media and social media as means of mediation—have 
meant continuous and considerable shifts in the mediation of distant crises. 
Technological change has influenced the representational styles and 
iconography of images of war and pain and has significantly altered the ways 
in which humanitarian imagery has been presented to Western spectators. 
What have the recent alterations of global humanitarianism meant in more 
detail for humanitarian communication and visual representations depicting 
distant suffering and war during the last decades of the twentieth century? 
What do the various styles of visual representations of distant suffering tell of 
their era and its political ethos? This is what I shall outline in the following 
paragraphs.  
2.5.1 UPDATING HUMANITARIAN IMAGES AND MESSAGES   
From the mid 1980s onwards both the neutral and a-political ethos of 
humanitarianism, its concentration on immediate help without changing the 
settings producing inequality and suffering, were increasingly placed under 
doubt and criticism. And, as mentioned, consequently, the iconography of 
bare life, creating the compassion of neocolonialism, gave way to new visual 
representational practice. The turn of the century meant substantial 
commentary on the predominant uses of visual representations in 
humanitarian setting. Negative appeals, resorting to photorealistic images 
predominantly picturing helplessness and physical suffering, were seen not 
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only as inefficient in arousing empathy—and thus in the context of NGO 
humanitarianism ineffective in collecting donor money—but were also 
increasingly seen as unethical, inappropriate and even fallacious modes of 
picturing Third World and its populations.263  
The criticism stemmed not only from the academic tack, but also from the 
practitioners of the humanitarian field. At the end of the 1980s, it was stated 
by European humanitarians that the images and messages projected of the 
Third World by media and NGOs themselves were undermining the work of 
development organizations and endangering the solidarity and co-operation 
between the non-Western perceivers of help and the largely Western 
humanitarians.264 Concurrently, Western media consumers were reported 
stating increasingly that they want to be protected from images of horror in 
the media. The statement “I don’t want to see these photos while eating my 
breakfast,” can be seen as an emblem of indifference, but it is also often 
connected to the sensitivity to such images emerging at the time. This led to 
medias guidelines of representing images of death and suffering.265 As a 
consequence of the critique, the iconography of bare life has lately been 
replaced predominantly with a more positive visual representational style, 
one that has been designed to activate sentiments of hope, by focusing on the 
similarities and stressing interaction between the distant individuals in the 
images and their spectators.266 
A significant shift in this respect can be traced to the 1989 Code of 
conduct on images and messages relating to the Third World, which was 
adopted by European NGOs functioning in relief and development fields 
(The General Assembly of European NGO’s, CONCORD) to guide and 
regulate communication narratives used in education, public relations and 
fundraising. The recommendation was to avoid catastrophic images that 
lead to “clear conscience rather that a consideration of root causes.” In other 
words, the code suggested giving up the bare life representations that create 
what Chouliaraki calls solidarity as neo-colonialism.267 Further, the code 
takes up the need to present distant people as human beings with dignity, 
and it stresses the need to provide the reader with a consideration of and 
information on the social, cultural and economic environment and cultural 
identity of Third World countries. The code asserts that the voice of the 
people should be heard and consulted, and their ability to take responsibility 
on the issues concerning development should be underlined. The 
recommendation goes on and states that generalizations should be avoided, 
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the obstacles to development should be clearly indicated, and the 
interdependence and mutual responsibility of (under)development 
emphasized. Also causes of poverty, those natural but also those political and 
historical (such as colonialism or power struggles and vested interests) 
should be made apparent and exposed in humanitarian communication. The 
code further adds that the messages of the NGOs (and beyond) should avoid 
all forms of discrimination—racial, sexual cultural, religious as well as socio-
economic—and denounce all forms of oppression and injustice. The 
predominant role of women as passive, voiceless victims in messages 
describing the global south is acknowledged and denounced, by stressing the 
need for a “positive change” in picturing Third World women. 268   
Such new types of visual representation and humanitarian addressing 
began to be utilized predominantly in the communication of humanitarian 
organizations form the late 1980s onwards. But the re-figurations that the 
code reflects also had a broader effect: they raised more wide-ranging 
awareness of the problems of picturing the other and, thus, also shifted the 
focus of other representations—such as media images—describing the Third 
World in the era. Consequently also media houses have drafted their own 
best practices, and moulded their conduct on displaying crisis imagery.269 As 
the CONCORD 1989 code is just one of the documents remodeling the mode 
of representation in the era, it vividly illustrates and reflects some of the 
central changes taking place also in the wider setting of the humanitarian 
field during the era of birth of the CONCORD code, and beyond. 
 The shift, away from the catastrophic images and starkly othered and 
passive distant sufferers toward empowered characters with a say in the way 
they are presented, is emblematic of the era in respect of visually depicting 
suffering, but also in larger terms in regards to humanitarianism. The 1989 
code denounces the formerly predominant a-political nature of 
humanitarianism and dismisses the past tendency of de-politicizing 
representation. The code further pinpoints the colonial past as the one 
creating Third World problems and acknowledges that the interests of 
Western countries in the global south should be recognized. Thus, a move 
away from representations that picture suffering as a medical, rather than a 
political phenomenon is called upon in the code. Furthermore, in the 
reformulation of the code, immediate aid and relief as forces of remedy are 
dismissed, and an emphasis on development takes a central stage as a 
suitable humanitarian action and narrative. The stress on development here 
is interweaved with a wider topical shift in humanitarianism away from relief 
and towards a strong stress on changing the prevalent societal, political, and 
economic circumstances creating suffering, with the help of externally 
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imported and governed developmental aid.270 As saving lives under 
immediate threat, patching up wounds and feeding the hungry was not seen 
as enough anymore in the age of the liberal humanitarian discourse and 
project, also the narratives describing the need of help needed to change. 
Furthermore, a strong emphasis on human rights issues—including gender 
issues and the wider posing of questions on discrimination—and human 
security, formerly not seen as central in the predominantly relief-oriented 
humanitarianism, is visible in the reconfiguration of the CONCORD code.271 
The reformulation of the governing rules of humanitarian messages and 
visual images, thus, tells a telling tale of the changing ethos of 
humanitarianism at the brink of the age of liberal humanitarianism, as it sets 
out new guidelines for altered visuality of humanitarianism for a new era to 
come.  
 
Positive Appeals, Vulnerability as Tender-Heartedness and Target 
Orientated Communication 
The 1989 Code of conduct on humanitarian images and messages set out to 
change the ways in which distant suffering and need of help were visualized, 
by dealing with questions on the inefficacy of distancing visual 
representations as well as by raising questions on the ethical problems 
embedded in picturing the pain-stricken others through “catastrophic 
images.” Historically the dissimilarity and distance produced by images of 
distant pain has been a dominant issue—and both an ethical as well as a 
practical dilemma—ever since the times of the Enlightenment. As has been 
discussed visual humanitarian communication has for centuries relied on 
displaying images of corporal suffering as a mode of producing emotions of 
empathy and identification, and thus aspired to awaken the sensation of 
belonging to the same universal community of humanity with the sufferers in 
the spectators. But quite paradoxically, the communication practice relying 
on catastrophic images has often created a sense of horror and suffering 
belonging to another world, afar from the everyday experiences of the safe 
spectators, rather than being able to connect the potential helpers with the 
pain of others. Therefore, the effort of bridging the moral gap, through 
humanitarian visual representations centered on severe bodily expressed 
pain, has often resulted in widening the disparity between the spectators and 
the pain-stricken.272  
At the end of the century, at the brink of the new stage of 
humanitarianism, the attempt was to bridge this gap by a novel visual 
strategy. In consequence of the critique of the ethical issues of imagery and 
the changes suggested in order to measure up with the new challenges and 
the altered surroundings and ethos of humanitarianism, a new 
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representational practice began to take more space within humanitarian 
communication appeals. A major change in the novel visual representational 
style was that it dismissed the practice of showing the sufferers as passive 
victims. Within the new practice of humanitarian visuality the aim was to 
present the objects of aid in a personalized manner, with names and stories, 
with agency and dignity. Within the new representational mode, the visual 
style of the images is like that of their predecessors, i.e. photorealistic, but 
the subjects in the images are not nameless, passive or on the verge of dying, 
and the atmosphere is not one of paralyzing hopelessness. Images used 
within this visual regime are rather hopeful, picturing even happy and 
smiling individuals in realistic surroundings. Typically such images depict, 
for example children attending school. The images take as their subjects the 
local inhabitants of crisis zones, but they picture them as attending to their 
daily choirs, working and interacting. These representations even commonly 
portray people in fragile settings actively trying to better their situation and 
developing their societies by demanding a better quality of life, as well as 
their own rights. As the attempt is to display circumstances creating 
inequality, distress and suffering following a novel logic, the root causes of 
suffering are not predominantly presented via injured, suffering and battered 
bodies any more. 273 (Pictured in the illustration 2.4. are 2 emblematic, thick 
images representing the mode of addressing in positive appeals . 274)  
In comparison to the former bare life representations banking on 
catastrophic images and a negative style of addressing, Stanley Cohen and 
Lillie Chouliaraki call the novel types of appeals “positive appeals.”  As 
important as the novel type of representing the objects of help is, also the 
way in which the representations of the new regime invite their spectators to 
see the distant individuals in need is significant. The aim of such addressing 
is to bring the distant people closer to the spectators and to make the 
spectators feel and recognize that they belong to the same register of 
humanity with the distant people in need of their help. As the shock-effect of 
corporal suffering was replaced by a call for personal identification with 
those in need by Westerners living in abundant welfare, skeleton-like bare 
life characters dying of diarrhea could not function as the objects of the 
images anymore. In order to create benevolence and will to help the visual 
addressing style of the images was switched to hopeful sceneries, centering 
on similarities and focusing on visualizations evoking warm-hearted 
sensations in the spectators. The mode of addressing in the appeals 
characteristic of the age of liberal humanitarianism is one that Chouliaraki 
terms positive appeals and iconography of vulnerability as tender-
heartedness and spectacles of self-determination and hope. Such 
representations stress the similarity between us and them, the spectators 
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and the spectated, focusing on the universally shared features of all humans 
(beyond vulnerability and the ability to suffer).  Within this representational 
practice the victims of pain and atrocity needed to be portrayed as familiar, 
ordinary people (form the perspective of the spectator).275 
As the novel mode of addressing is inviting the spectators to see the 
distant sufferers as similar to ‘us’, the addressing of the appeals, furthermore, 
strives to make a claim that the misfortune pictured could also encounter 
oneself, or people like ‘us’. The positive appeals ask the spectator to imagine 
herself as a person who may come under threat in a setting that may seem 
genuinely possible in the lifeworlds of the spectators; they call their audience 
to imagine themselves as the undeserving victims of maladies, such as 
sickness, rape or illegitimate prosecution, and thus invite the spectators to 
engage with the suffering through identification. Concurrently, the Western 
inhabitants and spectators have been invited to intimately and directly 
participate in the lives of personified distant people in need, through novel 
participatory, benevolent and development-spirited campaigns, such as 
adopting an African child whose schooling to sponsor or buying a goat for a 
Bangladeshi family in order sustainably support their well-being. Thus, the 
shift in focus has also been from victim-orientated to target-orientated 
appeals and addressing. Even more so than before, the feelings aroused by 
the representations are again—just like formerly, during the history of visual 
humanitarian communication—principally centering on the Westerners as 
the spectators, on the feelings of identification and sameness of the 
spectators at face with such images, rather than centering on the objects of 
help. Thus also here, the theatrical arrangement of humanitarian images is 
again clearly detectable.276  
But, although the novel, more positively assembled representations aim at 
more complex, ethical and authentic representation of the vulnerable others, 
the spectacles of hope and self-determination have also attracted vocal 
critique, for example, for being inefficient in both arousing the will to help 
and in bridging the gap between the spectators in abundance of welfare and 
the suffering others. Firstly, presenting the suffering inhabitants of the less 
developed world through empowering sceneries of self-determination and 
sunny hopefulness may make the spectators feel similarity and identification 
with the distant individuals, but the hope-filled sceneries may potentially 
misrecognize the surrounding reality of the global misfortunate and obscure 
the differences in surroundings and possibilities between the spectators and 
the distant others. In reality, populations living in wealthy northern/Western 
states with developed, steady and relatively lawful institutions have a vastly 
different level of self-determination, possibilities and means to help 
themselves compared to the populations living in fragile, disorderly and less 
wealthy settings.277  Additionally, images of smiling children and empowered 
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women may lead to another kind of misleading illusion, which is countering 
the aim of the representations. Overtly positive representations of the 
everyday life of distant others may give the impression that “they are just like 
us” up to the point in which the spectators see no reason in helping the 
seemingly perfectly well-off smiling children of the Third World depicted in 
the images. Furthermore, stressing the agency and self-determination of the 
distant strangers potentially produces an illusion of ‘no help needed,’ since 
the overtly positive and empowering picturing suggests that the objects of the 
images are perfectly capable of helping themselves. These representations 
risk arousing the question: Why should we help, if everything is already 
taken care of and “they” are just like “us”?278 Additionally, and perhaps more 
importantly, the stress on development and human rights, and the practice of 
picturing the distant needy strangers “just like us” risks assimilating the 
distant others under our norm. At the time of the liberal humanitarianism 
this practice exemplifies larger global structural power relations prevalent in 
the humanitarian practices beyond organization-based humanitarianism. 279 
2.5.2 ICONOGRAPHY OF SOLIDARITY AS DEVELOPMENT AND 
EMERGING STATE INTERVENTIONIST HUMANITARIANISM  
The communicative practice of positive appeals and tender-hearted 
representations, revolving around the universal similarity of humans, the 
ethos of development and human rights, reflects a substantial shift in the 
humanitarian project and its ethos—also in larger terms than within the NGO 
humanitarianism. The emphasis of humanitarianism on development, and 
further on human rights and human security issues, reproduced in 
humanitarian communication and imagery—also reflects the substantial 
changes the (Western lead) humanitarian discourse and paradigm have gone 
through from the mid-1980s onwards. Starting from the disillusionment of 
the Biafris and the founding of MSF in the early 1970s, the disaffection 
within the inefficient and a-political humanitarian practice of non-
intervention has been prevailing. Incrementally the frustration with neutral 
help, the sense of powerlessness in the face of the suffering of others, and the 
critique of a-political aid orientation led to a generalized practice of going 
beyond immediate aid. In the later 1980s this trend resulted in an expanding 
orientation toward progress and enhanced human security via humanitarian-
development projects, and further it led to an emphasis on human rights as 
providing improved living conditions for the vulnerable others.280 
Concurrently, after the shift in the global balance of power after the fall of 
the Soviet regime and the collapse of the Cold War binary system and at the 
turn of the century, Western states adopted human security, development, 
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and the policy of securitizing crisis areas as their predominant international 
political interests. This has meant increasing use of humanitarian rhetoric in 
the international political tool box of Western countries and general framing 
of Western international politics as humanitarian, human rights, human 
security and development centered. Moreover, the rise of humanitarianism 
from the political margins into a focal component of Western international 
politics and into an expression of the shared values of the “international 
community” has also led to a system, in which the Western states have 
increasingly defined their interests in the global setting under the guise of 
development, human rights and humanitarianism. This trend has manifested 
itself in the use of humanitarianism as a source of rhetorical legitimization of 
foreign political actions and development projects driven by political interest 
but explained by universal moral imperatives. The interventionist 
humanitarian spirit of Western international political agenda has also led to 
different procedures of managing and containing threats, such as terrorism, 
within crisis areas by “humanitarian methods” and, furthermore, to 
humanitarianly framed military operations, wars and occupations, such as 
the Kosovo campaign 1999.281  
The altered core interest and novel definitions of policy, both in 
organizational humanitarian settings as well as in the Western world political 
surroundings, are manifoldly entangled, concurrent and in many ways 
complementary. Thus, the late twentieth century changes in picturing the 
perceivers of others’ need of help through themes of universal similarity also 
produces other significant outcomes, which are strongly tied to the 
concurrent politicized human rights orientation, developmentalist ethos and 
the interventionist spirit of emerging state humanitarianism. Picturing and 
perceiving the distant, vulnerable Non-Western others as “just like us” in 
Western representations makes interventions into the living conditions—and 
societal, cultural and political structures—of the Third World inhabitants 
seem valid and results in seeing the assimilation of the distant people into 
Western world politics through “our norms” as practical and right. As 
humanitarian visuals circulating in the Western publicity have turned into 
portraying distant others as “just like us”, the Western spectating audiences 
have perhaps grown accustomed to feeling that molding the surroundings of 
the depicted non-Westernenrs so that they become equivalent to Western 
(societal, cultural, political) structures is acceptable, in extreme cases even by 
forced military intervention. Therefore, the visual “spectacles of hope and 
self-determination” exemplify the power relations of developmentalism and 
produce solidarity as development, as Chouliaraki terms it.282 But, 
furthermore, these representations also epitomize and reflect the growingly 
aggressive interventionist humanitarian outlook adopted by Western states 
as a strategy of securitizing “fragile states” and governing global crisis areas.  
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Therefore essentially, by attempting to empower the distant sufferers with 
positive performativity, the development-driven positive appeals, by claiming 
the objects of the images as the same as the majorly Western spectators, end 
up disempowering the sufferers by substituting their right to define their own 
norms etc. with the Western norms of human rights, political structures, of 
correct conduct and good governance and perceptions of good life and 
preferable society. Furthermore, the logic of universalism and empathy-
induced sameness, in this mode of humanitarian communication, subjugate 
the distant others to a Western political project of securitization, legitimized 
by development-based state humanitarianism, and expose the distant others 
even to wars fought in the name of humanitarianism forcefully helping 
distant others. As the positive appeals centering on development, agency, 
human rights and similarity between the Western spectators/actors and 
majorly non-Western objects of help/actions, produce benevolent sentiments 
in the spectators, paradoxically, at the same time, the interventionist moral 
feelings operate as instruments of Western power over the rest of the world. 
In other words, the interventionist ethos of the emerging Western lead 
humanitarian world politics is blatantly visible in the iconography of 
solidarity as development, and concurrently construct the ways in which the 
Western spectator apprehends world politics, themselves and the “others” of 
the world.  
In the same era, during which the governing idea of organizational NGO 
humanitarianism shifted from relief to development, the number of 
organizations in the broadening humanitarian field has grown significantly, 
and the economic value of humanitarian aid and the money moving in the 
field has substantially increased.  The amount of money allocated especially 
to emergency relief aid, as well as to development aid, has steadily increased 
from the late 1970s onwards, but really skyrocketed from the early 1990s 
onwards.  Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss show the humanitarian aid 
business growing from $2 billion in 1990 to $6 billion ten years later, 
followed by another tripling to $18 billion by 2008. Especially NGO and 
private money flows have increased, but at the same time also government 
money allocated to development aid and peacekeeping has substantially 
grown. James Fearon explains the rise by the somewhat late response of 
major donor countries to the increased need of aid, created by the spread of 
civil war from the late 1970s onwards, but also by the winding down of the 
Cold War. As the Cold War system shifted, the attention of major Western 
powers, their voting publics, and the media was increasingly turned towards 
global high-profile civil wars, which were increasingly met with 
international—often Western-lead—humanitarian interventions.283   
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The growth of humanitarian organizations and industry, as well as the 
heightened status of humanitarianism in international relations in the late 
twentieth century, also reflects and corresponds to the rise of new 
communication technologies, visualization of Western societies and the 
upsurge in advertising in the humanitarian field.  This has meant increasing 
visibility for humanitarianism and humanitarian imagery in the Western 
public life. Humanitarian imagery has caught the eyes of the Western public 
via a growing number of appeals inviting potential donors through new 
modes of appeals, distributed via technological applications, divergent 
campaigning styles and intensifying humanitarian addressing from diverse 
directions. Over the past decades humanitarianism has increasingly 
penetrated the life of Western citizens in a number of new ways, from public 
charity concerts, celebrity appeals, popular television programs revolving 
around the issues of helping the distant individuals in need to an atmosphere 
supporting humanitarianism, addressing Western citizens in divergent and 
often interventionist modes.284  
Furthermore, the increased visibility of humanitarianism within the 
Western public sphere has been topped by the upsurge of humanitarian 
issues and reasoning within intergovernmental political settings. As the 
prominence of humanitarian issues in high-level politics has substantially 
grown, humanitarianism in Western political rhetoric and the legitimation of 
international issues have become more customary over the recent decades.285 
This rhetorical turn has, furthermore, strengthened the presence of 
humanitarianism also at the level of everyday life and experiences of Western 
citizens. This broad humanitarization of the public and political life in the 
West, I argue, has led to a situation in which the humanitarian framing of 
international politics and approach to the surrounding world has 
progressively come to determinate how we, the Western citizens, see not only 
the humanitarian modus operandi of helping the distant others in need and 
despair. Moreover, I argue that, during the era, humanitarianism—broadly 
understood—has become an influential (unconscious) ideology, central to 
Western public and political life, significantly impacting our apprehension of 
the global world of peoples surrounding us and our own status in this 
world.286 
2.5.3 VISUAL MEDIATION OF POST-COLD WAR MILITARY 
CONFLICTS  
Spectacles banking on soft, benevolent images aiming at sensations of 
similarity and universality became the new endorsed mode of representing 
                                                
284 See for example: Kennedy, Denis: Selling the Distant Other: Humanitarianism and Imagery- 
ethical dilemmas of Humanitarian Action. The journal of humanitarian assistance, 2009. ; 
Chouliaraki, 2013, 5-6 ; Yrjölä, 2014.  
285 See for example: Aaltola, 2009.  
286 I shall open this line of thought more broadly in the following chapter 3.  
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the distant others within organizational humanitarianism at the turn of the 
century, and the tendency was to avoid using catastrophic images of human 
suffering. But again, like earlier in history, this proves not to be the whole 
picture defining the representational practices or the use of iconography of 
distant suffering within the wider frame of humanitarianism and the 
apprehension of vulnerable humanity of the era. Therefore, in this section I 
shall engage with other influential and emblematic visual representation of 
distant suffering and need of help, entailing a humanitarian mode of 
addressing, circulating in the Western publicity during the era.  By this I aim 
at further opening up the relations between visual images and humanitarian 
evolvement at the turn of the century and beyond.  
Despite the codes of conduct and governing rules on humanitarian 
imagery in organizational settings, we also encounter human suffering and 
need of help through visual representations presented by other than 
humanitarian organizations. Political turmoil, violence and war at the turn of 
the century have been iconized in the Western imaginary through widely 
circulated media images of human suffering, pictured substantially by 
shocking images of corporal pain. Images of Somali fighters dragging a US 
soldier through the streets of Mogadishu (1993) became emblematic of the 
US war effort in Somalia.287 Also images of mutilated bodies of Tutsis, who 
perished in the mass killings of the Rwandan civil war (1990-1994), floating 
in rivers, lying tangled in piles and mutilated by machete strokes, permeated 
the eyes of Western media spectators in the early 1990s. The pain and 
destruction of the Yugoslav wars (1991-2001) was mediated and cemented 
into our awareness via images of mass graves, cities destroyed by siege and 
sniper fire, as well as via images of skeleton-like concentration camp 
inmates.288  No matter how forcefully the images of violence, inequality and 
suffering are encouraged and recommended to be pictured in a more ethical 
and polished manner, emergencies, wars and immediate situations of brute 
violence inevitably break the code of ethics—and mediatized crisis and war 
brings back the haunting images of corpses. Such images picturing brutal 
violations of bodily human integrity and humanity became to be, in this era, 
more political than perhaps ever before, as the horrors pictured were 
frequently referred to when rationalizing and justifying the Western military 
interventions in the situations causing these horrors. (See Illustration 2.4 
289) 
As stated above, this significant point of ethical alteration in the ever 
more politicized international humanitarianism can denote the era of the 
                                                
287 The images that became widely circulated, debated and influential– and iconized –were shot by a 
Canadian war journalist Paul Watson. He won the Pulitzer prize in 1994 with the images.  
288 For example images of the sieged Sarajevo, people living midst the destruction of war and running 
to avoid sniper fire, and photos of Ron Haviv of the inmates of the Trnopolje camp in Bosnia (1992) 
and brutalities of the war became widespresd in western publicity. See some of the iconic the images 
for example here: http://time.com/3787440/bosnia/ 
289 Included in the illustration 2.3 Paul Watson’s image from Somalia 1992  and Ron Haviv’s image 
from Bosnia in Bijeljina 1992, in which ”Arkans’s Tigers” paramilitary troop soldier have killed and 
kick local civilians.  
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new world order, emerging from the end of the Cold War. During the wars in 
the Former Yugoslavia the new humanitarian paradigm of the West was 
materialized, which can be seen in how the principles of “right to criticism” 
and “right of intervention” were extensively deployed. This is when 
attempting to help “those who are striving against oppression” in “their 
struggle for dignity and basic human rights” became an essential part of the 
Western political humanitarian discourse.290 Concurrently with the emerging 
interventionism, television and satellite technology increasingly enabled real-
time mediation straight from crisis zones. The visual mediation of crises and 
altered foreign policy dynamics of the turn of the century have been often 
referred to and defined by the concept of the CNN effect. The CNN effect can 
be described as a popular thesis, which suggests that witnessing foreign 
conflicts by means of real-time, live reportage from crisis areas can 
powerfully affect public opinion, create sentimental outrage in the distant 
spectators and, thus, bolster public condemnation of atrocities. The often 
reiterated idea of the CNN effect theory has been that (global) international 
televised news coverage from crisis zones—and especially crude images of 
suffering inflicted by wars and political violence—would not only influence 
public opinion, but, further, pressure political leaders to react more promptly 
and forcefully to war crimes, atrocities and human rights violations, often by 
(military) interventionist means.291 Novel visual mediation technology, 
changes in global power structures and alterations in humanitarian ideals 
combined to create the new kind of perception, and answer, to distant wars 
and crises.  
Whilst a major factor in the CNN effect was the growingly fast-paced and 
wide circulation of brutal and shocking images of distant wars and crises 
among (Western) audiences, also a very different mode of presenting military 
conflicts thrived concurrently. The Gulf War (1990-1991) has been 
commonly termed—referring to its visual presentation, mediation and 
perception—a war in which visual material reaching the eyes of Western 
spectators was heavily controlled by the military and the images of war were 
largely sanitized bloodless. The “brave new war” of Westerners, fought above 
Iraq was pictured unprecedentedly: shot by the nose cameras of “smart 
bombs” and presented through Western superior technological force, 
appeared like a computer game; unreal and distant from the reality on the 
ground. As a result of the novel representational practice and effective 
control and governance of war imagery, relatively few human casualties were 
seen, and the war was made to look like it did not yield human sacrifices or 
cause suffering.  
There is a stark difference in the visual presentation of Gulf war, waged by 
the Western super power, the USA, when it is contrasted with the brutal 
                                                
290 Chandler, 2001, 685. (quote from George Foulkes speech, 17.4.1998) 
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images that were circulated and presented of the wars by others during the 
same era, (in these the Western powers sometimes played an interventionist 
part, but one which they were not seen as starting the wars per se). This, 
again, shows how different modes of picturing war, the need of help and 
suffering of distant strangers thrive concurrently, and illustrates the 
segmented and collage-like nature of humanitarian imagery as encountered 
by (media) spectators. Moreover, the visual framing of the Gulf war as a 
bloodless, technological and relatively nonviolent, surgical operation—in 
terms of visible human suffering—is remarkable, and it can be seen to have 
significant ramifications for the future visual representation of Western wars. 
It is also emblematic of how the Western powers, the USA in front, came to 
govern and control the image flows from its war zones in a way that fit the 
humanitarian political atmosphere and reasoning at the brink of the new 
century. Thus, the First Gulf War reflects the character of Western 
humanitarian international politics to come. In the following paragraphs I 
shall explicate these themes in more detail.  
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2.5.4 WITNESSING SUFFERING LIVE: THE CNN EFFECT AND THE 
EMERGING WESTERN INTERVENTIONIST WORLD POLITICS 
Despite the predominant shift by humanitarian organizations towards 
benevolent images in the 1990s, when looked at through media images of 
wars and crises the era appears perhaps surprisingly violent. Western media 
audiences began to be increasingly bombarded with real-time live coverage 
from crisis and war zones, accompanied by striking imagery of enfolding, 
often violent events. The CNN effect theory that emerged in the post-Cold 
War era was inspired by the novel news mediation through satellite 
technology. Especially CNN, an independent US News Corporation founded 
in 1980, was the first news agency strongly relying on live reportage straight 
from global crisis areas and was, thus, often hailed as an emblem of change 
in crisis reporting and power. 292  
There are numerous different interpretations on how the CCN effect 
actually functions. Some of the readings strongly highlight the causal effect 
that images of suffering, mediated by the novel resources, with more speed, 
density and mass, have on foreign policy actions and international 
(humanitarian) interventions. For example Feist (2001) writes: ”the CCN 
effect is a theory that compelling television images, such as images of a 
humanitarian crises, cause US policy makers to intervene in a situation when 
such an intervention might otherwise not be in the US national interest”. 
Similar, yet more moderate conclusions were made by, among others, Seib 
(2002), who explained that CNN effect illustrates “[t]he dynamic tension that 
exists between real-time television news and policymaking, with the news 
having an upper hand in terms of influence”.293 These readings suggest that 
mediation of crisis news and images has the power to forcefully affect foreign 
policy, even to force it by addressing the media audiences and furthermore 
Western policy makers in a humanitarian and interventionist mode.  
Western journalistic real-time live reportage from topical global crisis 
zones—and especially the heightened use of mediation of graphic images of 
human suffering—was seen as a means of waking up the (Western) public to 
the atrocious events in distant areas and, thus, pressuring political decision-
makers into interventionist actions in often distant corners of the world. The 
new kind of crisis mediation and the journalists involved in it have even been 
virtually accused of the emergence of Western humanitarian interventionist 
political approach to various foreign crises in the 1990s. The former British 
foreign secretary Douglas Hurd blamed the foreign correspondents in the 
Bosnian crisis for advocating military intervention, calling them the founding 
members of the  “something must be done school”, as he saw the journalists 
as partly constituting the system of intervention.294 The former UN Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has been quoted as saying that the CNN acts 
                                                
292 Robinson, 2002; Giboa, 2005, 27-44 
293 Cited in Gilboa, 2005, 29.  
294 Cited in Giboa, Eytan: Global Communication and Foreign Policy, Journal of Communication, 
52/4, 2002, pp.731-747, 734. 
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as the “sixteenth member of the Security Council” due to the effect its crisis 
reportage had on international decision-making.295 It seems that the 
concurrent novelties of the post-Cold War era—visual real-time mediation 
and powerful emergence of the political concept of Western humanitarian 
intervention—intermingled, and that the concurrent novelties produced the 
idea of the CNN effect. Because of the historical simultaneousness and the 
intermingling of the two novelties, it was commonly suggested—and perhaps 
hoped—that novel revelatory mediation of crude images of suffering (and 
their empathetic power) and the emerging Western humanitarianly 
legitimized  practices in international relations would consequently work 
together to make the world a better, more secure, less violent place.296  
Other scholars have seen the CNN effect in more moderate or even critical 
terms and have viewed media’s role in foreign relations more as a strategic 
enabler of (Western) political involvement and intervention.297 Even as the 
“CNN myth” seems to still live on in public notions, the belief in the potency 
of mediatized images of suffering to form or direct—even to force—foreign 
policy has also been widely questioned and criticized, and the causal logic at 
the core of the claim has been effectively disputed by research. Pierce 
Robinson, in his influential 2002 book The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, 
Foreign Policy and Intervention, studies the role of media reportage in the 
“humanitarian” interventions of Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Rwanda. 
He differentiates between strong and weak effects of the media reportage on 
political actions and makes the claim that, if the policy of the political actor 
(most often the US) is certain, reportage does not make much difference. 
However, he asserts that media reportage showing humanitarian distress 
may have an effect in cases in which the policy (geopolitical interests and will 
to act) is uncertain.298 For example, in relation to the US intervention in 
Somalia, in the early 1990s called operation Restore Hope, he concluded 
that:  
If, however, the media played any significant role at all vis-à-vis the 
policy process it was an enabler and then a builder of support. Policy 
makers, aware of the prior sympathy toward the suffering in 
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Somalia among journalist and the public, could act confidently in the 
knowledge that an intervention could easily be sold to the public.299  
 
Therefore, in this view, media reportage of humanitarian suffering can be 
rather seen as an enabler of interventionist policy, or even a strategic political 
tool; a powerful source of legitimation, rather than a force pressuring and 
forcing policy makers to act against their will or interests. Many other 
researchers on the issue more or less agree with this view.300 
Therefore it could be said, in contradiction to the CNN effect thesis, that 
political interests and strategic evaluations have been far more likely driving 
forces behind international military interventions in atrocious crisis 
situations than the amount of horrific images, or the new technological 
means of mediation. In line with what Sontag has argued on the power of 
images, it seems that images may give a push to action and strengthen 
political reactions only, if there is enough cultural, ideological and political 
resonance to prop their messages, and, above all, if there is enough political 
power, and geopolitical and economic interests to reinforce their account. 301 
 
Picturing Suffering in the Yugoslav Wars 
Images of the Yugoslav Wars serve as examples of the political utilization of 
suffering images in the age of the CNN effect and within the emerging 
Western political interventionist humanitarian spirit and future military 
operations. British Independent Television News (ITN) published images of 
the Serb Trnopolje camp on the 6th of August 1992. The television report 
identified the camps as Bosnian Serb authorities’ tools of ethnic cleansing, 
and showed images revealing the suffering of Bosnian Muslims at the camps. 
Widespread public outrage followed. Images of weary, starving men pictured 
behind barbed wire made the front pages of Western papers. Especially an 
extremely thin man, with his ribs sticking out—a Bosnian prisoner named 
Fickret Alic—was featured at the fore in many of the widely circulated 
images. For the Western spectators Alic came to symbolize the atrocities 
inflicted by the Serbs and horrors of the Yugoslav Wars.302 A day from the 
publication of the ITN report images of the camps filled the front covers. The 
headlines cried out: “Belsen -92’: Horror of the new Holocaust”303, “Must it 
go on? The Balkans: Muslim prisoners at a Serbian detention camp.”304 and 
“The proof: Behind Barbed Wire, the brutal truth about suffering in 
Bosnia.”305 All of these papers displayed the same image of the inmates, with 
                                                
299 Ibid. 62-63 
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303 The cover of The Daily Mirror, August 7th 1992.  Included in the Illustration 2.4.  
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Alic on the front. (Included in the illustration 2.4, the cover of the Daily 
Mirror, August 7th 1992 picturing the inmates at the Trnopolje camp.) 
These images were, in their media use and their political contexts, framed 
to resemble the horrors of the Nazi-style concentration camps and the 
Holocaust. In the imagination of the Western spectators, the images of 
skeleton-like inmates of a concentration camp, presented as suffering behind 
barbed wire fences, effectively recalled the memory of the Holocaust—the 
ground zero point of modern humanity. The “never again” argument, 
referring to the Holocaust, was central in the framing of the images and 
pointed to the need of intervention for the sake of saving humanity.306  The 
images did not just spark public outrage among the media spectators, but 
came to be commonly referred to in political surroundings. The Former 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher criticized his successor John 
Major of not taking action by saying “I thought I would never see another 
Holocaust in my life.” It has also been reported that the American public 
approval of the intervention in the Yugoslav War sparked up from 35% to 
over 50% after the publication of the images. Furthermore the images gained 
a lot of attention in policy circles and were, for example, later used as 
evidence of Serbian war crimes at the War Crimes Tribunal in Hague. 
Therefore, some have seen these images as significant for the 1996 US troop 
deployment in Bosnia and as an emblem of the force of the CNN effect.307 But 
what did the images actually do at the international political level? 
There has been a lot of public controversy over the images of Trnopolje 
and Omarska camps. Most famously a magazine Living Marxisim (LM) 
claimed that the images were, if not fabricated, at least framed in their 
presentation in a way that they pointed to the monstrosity of Serbs—and 
consequently in the Western media they pointed to the necessity of 
intervention. The LM article argued that in the media and politics the 
framing of the images of ITN led to the conclusion that the depicted camp 
was a Serb concentration camp for destruction of the prisoners. However, the 
article asserted that, in reality, this was not the case. LM claimed that the 
facility was rather more like a refugee camp, from which the people were free 
to leave at will, and suggested that the pictures were shot from behind the 
barber wire in order to create a false impression of forced detainment. 
Thomas Deichmann, in his LM article, made the claim that the images and 
their use in the Western media produced a CNN effect, paving the road for 
the later deployment of Western troops on the ground in Bosnia in 1996.308 
Despite the commonly acknowledged data of Serbian war crimes, this quarrel 
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over the intention and framing of the images has been going on until recent 
years. 309  
Thus, the ITN images have been nominated as an occasion of the CNN 
effect really taking place.310 But David Campbell argues that what the 
televised images of atrocity actually lead to was more political pressure, 
which was more of a challenge for the US (and Western) officials to 
withstand. The West went, on this occasion, to lengths in the effort of not 
naming the events as genocide. Campbell claims that, at the time of the ITN 
images were aired, the political will to intervene was not there, and thus the 
intervention did not initially take place, in spite of the images and the heated 
debate. He goes on and argues that the Western policy with regard to the 
situation in Bosnia was not changed by the images, but he sees that rather 
the story the images told was effectively hushed down by Western leaders. 
Campbell sees the Trnopolje images, following the argument made by David 
Perlmutter (1998) on the effect of crisis images in foreign politics, more as 
“icons of outrage”, stirring controversy, accolades and emotion, but achieving 
absolutely nothing in regards to change in policy.311 
Nevertheless, the case of the Trnopolje camp images and their framings in 
media and in Western politics seems to strengthen the claim that images of 
suffering and crisis were, at the time of the heated CCN effect discussion and 
emerging Western humanitarian international orientation, utilized and 
presented in the Western publicity in line with the predominant political 
orientation and ethos of the time. But, the CNN effect, in regards to the role 
of suffering images in forcing or changing the politics of international crises 
or, especially, military intervention is very contingent and complex. Although 
the position of global interests and cold strategic political calculations as the 
number one driving force of intervention, military involvement and foreign 
policy decisions may not have been challenged or transformed by crisis 
reporting, nevertheless the legitimation of Western international actions 
altered in the era—and so did the images picturing Western warfare.  
 
Belief in Technologically Driven Causality 
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the CNN effect theses—as well as the 
Vietnam War syndrome argument discussed earlier—have been effectively 
rebutted in research, a belief on the political potency of mediatized atrocity 
images at the core of these arguments is noteworthy and remarkable, and the 
thesis still seems today very vital to the discourse on the effects of atrocity 
images. In wider terms this belief, resting on the history of humanitarian 
communication relying on a major part on the mediation of visual images of 
pain, seems not to have been born in the television era or the era of satellite 
technology, but it can be traced back in history, all the way back at least to 
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the times of the Enlightenment, and thus it has been influencing the 
discourse on images of suffering and politics of empathy during the past 
centuries.  
Technological innovations in the field of (visual) communication are 
commonly seen to have strengthened the impact of humanitarian images. 
Johanna Neuman argues that this hope of being able to influence 
humanitarian politics has been renewed time and time again in the course of 
history, every time a technological innovation has taken place. May it be the 
Guttenberg revolution, invention of photography, familiarization of pictorial 
magazines, or the use of real-time news coverage from crisis zones, it has 
commonly been hoped that images mediated through novel means could 
make a difference in the reactions to crises and the suffering of others.312 This 
line of thinking can also be found in the discourse on the power of revelatory 
images of war to generate anti-war sentiments at the turn of the century, as 
well as in the established discourse on the effect of the Holocaust images on 
the evolvement and institutionalization of human rights dealt with earlier. 
This hopeful belief has been again renewed in the TV-era, more lately by the 
live reportage from crisis zones in the form of the CNN effect, and even more 
lately by the use of Internet and social media in mediating distant distress. 
Therefore I argue that the historically formed, optimistic belief in the causal 
“the more we see, the more we do” phenomena is detectable throughout the 
course of the history of humanitarian communication, although shaped by 
the surrounding historical and ideological settings.   
Still today we seem to keenly believe in the centuries old idea that 
technology of (visual) mediation may alter the ways in which we (the 
spectating world) react to the suffering of others, and that mediated images 
of suffering may function as building blogs of a better, more secure and just 
world. Therefore, it could even be said that this idea banking on the potency 
of images in producing political outcomes lies at the core of the prevalent 
humanitarian discourse and is central in the overall use and position of 
visual images in humanitarian communication. The persistent (mythical) 
belief in the political potency of atrocity images in awaking empathetic 
reactions—or even in gradually bettering the status of humanity, in enabling 
a strengthened global moral ties between the sufferers and the spectators—
seems to suggest that almost a straight correlation between seeing more, 
caring more and doing more on the suffering of others (and even perhaps 
more forcefully preventing suffering) exists. This line of thought produces 
what I call a causality effect; a positive, technology-driven belief of the 
humanitarian political power of atrocity images in the context of 
international politics and their potency in furthering the humanitarian 
project, i.e. making the world a better, less violent, more humane place. 313 
This causality belief not only exists as a generally reiterated popular 
discourse but it also is foundational in the utilization of crisis images in 
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humanitarian settings, from organizational humanitarian communication to 
media’s crisis reporting. Moreover, the causality belief, in its diverse 
historical manifestations, seems to be quite often reiterated also in relevant 
research. Humanitarian organizations as well as news media constantly 
develop new and, wishfully, more effective ways of visually communicating 
the agony of others, attempting to raise the awareness of the spactators 
awareness. The hope of a more direct, and thus more forceful, effect seems to 
always be restored when new ways of mediating news and images from crisis 
zones is invented. This hopeful belief in the power of images exists and 
continuously hovers behind the discourse on crisis and suffering imagery. As 
in the TV-era, the belief was founded on the reliance in the mass media’s 
power of shaping public opinion, and the line of argument stresses that there 
is a causal logic embedded in the way that images of atrocity work on political 
levels. Furthermore, this common take on the power of mediated images of 
suffering on the humanitarian responses suggests that within contemporary 
Western democratic settings, public outrage created by “independent media” 
would then pressure the political decision-makers to increasingly take into 
account humanitarian issues in their actions and to reinforce humanitarian 
(military) interventions. I shall elaborate and develop this thought of the 
causality effect in more detail later and critically assess it in contemporary 
surroundings in chapter 7, when the uses of social media images in the 
international political settings are dealt with in the context of the Syrian war.  
2.5.5 VISUAL PRESENTATION OF THE WARS FOUGHT BY THE 
WEST: BLOODLESS LIVE TELEVISION WAR AT THE PERSIAN 
GULF  
Characteristically the foreign crises of the end of the twentieth century were 
efficiently mediated by new technological means, circulated unprecedentedly 
swiftly and predominantly pictured through images focusing on spectacular 
suffering. But this is not the whole truth on the representational practices of 
war in the post-Cold War era. Quite the opposite to the horrific images from 
Somalia, Rwanda and Yugoslavia, the Gulf War (1990-1991) has been termed 
by Jean Baudrillard as the war that did not take place. He argued this, 
despite the fact that the war—especially the combat phase “The Operation 
Desert Storm”—was made public by vastly circulated imagery, presented in a 
strikingly visual manner by novel means of visual mediation. What 
Baudrillard said in his essays was not that there was no violence going on at 
the Persian Gulf, but he claimed that what happened was, in terms of its 
(visual) representation, more like a simulation of war than a war in the 
conventional sense; an atrocity masqueraded as a war. Baudrillard argued 
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that the operation spelled a significant change in Western politics, warfare, 
and in the (Western) visual perception of war.314 
Western media audiences witnessed the Gulf War through live TV-shows 
from the comfort of their distant homes. The war was a media hit, a strange 
live show in which missiles shot from far away at a city of millions were 
openly seen in real time, but the destruction the ‘smart bombs’ induced was 
never visualized in the Western perception. It was a technological 24-hour 
show war, resembling a computer game. What we saw of the war was 
sanitized, technologized imagery of “surgical attacks” on buildings, structures 
or the enemy state, rather than attacks on human bodies, living creatures, 
distant habitats and cultures, conventionally associated with war imagery. 
The Western warfare at the Gulf appeared through media as an efficient, 
clean technowar, with no corpses and no suffering. Although we were 
bombarded with massive amounts of imagery, the restrictions on the 
mediation of information from the Gulf war theater were unparalleled in 
their strictness. Knowledge of the events of the war and the images presented 
of it, to the spectating Western audiences, were predominantly government 
controlled and military produced, in other words manufactured by the 
military and the Pentagon. This is why Baudrillard, among others, was 
amazed by the presentation of the war and what the intended perception the 
visual presentation of it implied. He saw the presentation of the Gulf war as 
an emblem of the global (Western lead) international politics to come. In his 
view, the presentations of the war obscured the reality of the conflict in a 
peculiar, unprecedented way, and by the stylized and selective performance 
led to misrepresentation, rather than to a realistic account of the situation. 315 
At the time of the Gulf War I was about ten years old; it was the first war I 
followed or witnessed somewhat consciously. I remember sitting in the dark 
living room (it was night time) of our safe and cozy house in central Finland 
with my sister and father, looking at the beams and flashes of greenish light 
lighting up the night sky of Baghdad as the US missiles apparently hit their 
designated targets.  I remember thinking that this is what war looks like; the 
way the events in TV looked like did not strike me as odd or altered, it was 
the way war was presented to me when I first encountered it through 
contemporary mediated imagery. The historical wars, which I of course 
already knew about and had seen photos of (the Finnish Civil War of 1918, 
the Second World War, the Finnish Winter War and Continuation War of the 
1930s and 1940s), were for me past wars, something that happened then, 
decades ago, a time unimaginable for me at the time. I cannot recall whether 
the flaring rockets lighting the night sky seemed false, true, novel, peculiar or 
horrific to me, or whether I associated them with suffering or human 
casualties. I probably already understood that it was a presentation of 
something happening, but it was a presentation of something that I did not 
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have any understanding of; like many things on TV are for a girl of ten years. 
In light of my own experiences, Baudrillard’s claim that war is, to us distant 
safe spectators, about presentations—about framing and stylizing, about 
perception and its management—seems poignantly valid. Regarding 
perception management and control over the visual presentations of war, the 
Gulf War clearly made history. (Included in the Illustration 2.4. is a still 
image from CNN reportage of the start of the war, and an image of the US 
missiles and Iraq air defense fire over Baghdad.)  
 
Governing and Framing the Presentation of War 
The Gulf War is often termed a war in which the US propaganda machinery—
taking its lessons from the Vietnam War and the reputed disaster the brutal 
images created for the US war effort—efficiently succeeded in hiding the 
bloody scenery of war from the sight of Western spectators. The Pentagon 
took visual mediation of war seriously, knowing that control over media—
especially television—was essential to controlling the military’s message in 
public. The way in which the Gulf war was seen marks a remarkable shift in 
how war (fought by Westerners) began to be presented to Western audiences. 
The procedures of controlling media and managing public perception used at 
the Gulf were already developed and tested in the Grenada, Panama and 
Falkland operations, but the procedures of control reached their high point 
in the Gulf War. A pool system was introduced in the 1983 Grenada 
operation, which efficiently controlled media reporting and remained 
relatively well hidden from the public gaze. The system, which was created in 
order to control media’s access to the war theater, to limit the number of 
reporters in the operation area and to govern the flow of information from 
the war zone, was effectively utilized at the Gulf.316 Of the roughly 1400 
journalist sent to the Gulf area to cover the war, the majority had to settle for 
the limited daily military briefings as their source of information. Only 200 
reporters were selected as pool members. The pool members were taken to 
chosen sites, told selected stories and were accompanied, at all times, by 
military personnel; “minders” who restricted the actions and controlled the 
movements of journalists and photographers. In addition to this, all the 
reports and images produced by the journalist were sent to the Joint 
Information Bureau, which censored them, before allowing them to be 
published by the media outlets that had joined the pool. Knowledge about the 
location of the allied forces was not to be revealed, and unpatriotic or critical 
angles and information that could jeopardize the public support of the war 
were generally frowned upon. For instance, no images of casualties or of the 
suffering inflicted by the Western coalition were allowed to be published. The 
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control machinery imposed over media in the Gulf War was the tightest in 
history, and it ensured that critical reporting of the war was minimized. The 
quickly resolved, novel and tidy looking technological media war was a 
publicity success, especially in the US.317 
In addition the polished and carefully selected bloodless techno war 
reports from the Gulf—disseminated predominantly by the military itself—
and the tight censorship control over the media, also disinformation 
operations and straight forward propaganda were used in shaping the public 
opinion on the war. Unscrupulous disinformation strategies were used in 
making the enemy look bad and inhumane in the public eye and, thus, to 
legitimate the war against Iraq and its evil leader Saddam Hussein. 
Macarthur has demonstrated how public relations companies, such as Hill 
and Knowlton, disseminated atrocity stories of the monstrosity of the enemy 
and outright lies were deployed in framing the operation as necessary and 
humane. Predominantly, in the Western publicity the war was presented as a 
justified war against an enemy, embodied by the evil leader Saddam Hussein. 
Hussein was regularly referred to as the “new Hitler”, and presented as a 
ruthless and nearly crazy enemy threatening peace, security, the Western 
way of life and humanity itself.  Often the Iraqi leader assumed a figure of a 
demonic eternal enemy, immoral adversary of the good West, who needed to 
be stopped from “raping” his neighboring countries. Whilst political leaders 
are often eager to mount biased enemy images, especially in the wartime, 
media is often compliant in disseminating and circulating them, and the 
public willing to follow.318 As the West was presented as a moral, 
humanitarian force, the enemy took the figure of the inhuman evil other.319 
By the joint effect of disseminating favorable information and effectively 
controlling the methods of mediation, and with the help of propaganda and 
misinformation, as well as of the careful political framing of actual events, 
the war against Iraq was predominantly framed, in Western publicity, as a 
necessary, just, clean, efficient, precise and humane war, inflicting no pain. 
Later on, the Gulf War has become infamous for uncritical reporting, strong 
censorship and disinformation campaigns.  
Governing the images showing corporal pain, suffering and death inflicted 
by the war was central to the restrictions of reporting and framing the war as 
humane. Images containing visual aspects associated with arousing empathy 
and creating solidary bonds between the distant spectators and the 
populations of the war area—such as detectable suffering, especially corporal 
suffering of civilian populations —were generally not seen in the Western 
publicity during the war. Seeing the suffering of the locals living midst the 
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raging war—especially when inflicted by the Western war effort—is 
commonly seen as potentially undermining the popularity of war midst the 
domestic media audiences. Likewise, the suffering or casualties of the 
Western troops were generally not mediated in an effort to secure the 
popularity of war. An emblem of the effort to hide the domestic human cost 
of war is the ban on picturing the coffins of deceased US soldiers returning 
home, implemented by President Bush (senior) at the time of the Gulf War. 
Journalists were denied access to the Dover Air Force Base, where the 
remains of the war deceased are flown back onto the US soil and the flag-
draped coffins are given their ceremony. Banning the broadcasting of the 
ceremony can be seen as dodging the “Dover test”, which has been used to 
describe the US public’s tolerance for troop casualties.320  
Rationalizing the need for the war and keeping up the popularity of the 
war at the domestic front are not the only detectable reasons for tidying up 
the presentations and hiding the atrocious aspects of the war from the 
perception of the public. The timing of the ban over showing the remains of 
the returning soldiers and the numerous other efforts in hiding the suffering 
induced by the Gulf War are also emblematic of a larger shift in picturing war 
waged by Western powers. As the discourse of humanitarianism and human 
rights forcefully entered the Western international politics from the 1990s 
onwards, the perception of Western war (in the West) has been forcefully 
humanized. Following the emerging humanitarianly framed spirit of Western 
international politics, the war was impelled—in order to fit the frame the 
West imposed on itself—to look humane, clear-cut and as if causing no 
suffering.  This humanizing tendency in the iconography of Western war, 
forcefully emerging from the presentation of the Gulf War, has been an on-
going trend in picturing Western warfare ever since. Often the reason for the 
change in the presentation of the Gulf War has been, in a quite simplifying 
way, pinpointed to the bitter media lessons of the Vietnam War. Even tough, 
clearly, the concurrent timing of the Western states adopting a humanitarian 
role in global conflicts, branding of the Western operations as humanitarian 
endeavors, and the emergence of the sanitized media presentations of 
Western war is noteworthy, and epic. The humanizing iconography 
describing Western war was given birth to by the age of emerging 
humanitarian foreign politics, and the Gulf war only spelled the start of this 
phenomenon.321  
Governing the presentation and framing of war—predominantly by means 
of controlling the imagery of suffering—does not only affect the ways in 
which the Western spectators understand the war their governments, and 
culturally and politically likeminded governments, are waging, but it creates 
also larger global structural biases and distortions.  This phenomenon is 
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illustrated by juxtaposing the modes of visually representing the violence of 
the 1990s wars in Yugoslavia, Rwanda or Somalia with the picturing of the 
Gulf War. As Western warfare and aggression was reduced to flaring lights in 
the night sky, technological “smart bombs” pictured as destroying precisely 
designated infrastructural targets and showing off of the hi-tech equipment, 
in contrast other crises of the era were shown through images of bloody 
carnage and suffering bodies. The visual juxtaposition of the concurrent 
global crises highlights the special character of the visualization of the Gulf 
War. The turn in the visual representation of Western-waged war at the Gulf 
marks a turn in how “our wars” have been presented as relatively non-
violent, and how the wars of “the others” continue to be pictured through 
images of brutality, corporal suffering and bloodshed.322 Visually picturing 
the wars of the others (wars in which the Western powers have not had a 
downright military involvement in) as bloody and violent and presenting 
Western warfare as virtually non-violent also lowers the threshold for 
Western militaries foreign interventions. The images of the violence and 
carnage in Yugoslavia, for example, were used in order to promote a 
Western-coalitions/NATO military solution to the situation. Whereas the 
Western answer to the situation was framed as a surgical operation, relatively 
bloodless compared to the heavily visualized massacre taking place on the 
ground. The tendency to picture the wars of others as bloody and effectively 
visually framing Western war as humane emerged in the 1990s and has been 
prevalent ever since. Consequently Western induced suffering and suffering 
of Western individuals remains relatively unseen in the West as Western 
bodies shown in their vulnerability are hidden from Western gazes. Whereas 
the brutality and pain caused by non-Western individuals and regimes and 
corporal suffering of non-Western individuals is, at the same time, brought 
forth by visual representations widely circulating in the Western publicity. 
This distinction in picturing Western suffering and Western inflicted 
suffering vis-à-vis non-Western bodily vulnerability and brutality creates 
significant political outcomes. Representational practices emerging at the 
time of the Gulf War are telling of the global politics of Western 
interventionism. They spell a change in the mode of picturing “Western 
wars” and the “war of the others” for years to come—and paradoxically reveal 
the conditionality of Western take on humanity in the age of humanitarian 
world politics. I shall develop these themes further especially in chapters 4 
and 5. 
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2.5.6 IMAGES OF CONFLICT IN THE AGE OF HUMANITARIAN WORLD 
POLITICS 
The humanitarianly framed interventionist spirit of Western powers became 
fortified after the early 1990s. A watershed in this regard is the Kosovo 
military campaign and the NATO bombing of Serbian forces in 1999. The 
Kosovo campaign spelled the start of an era of Western interventionist wars 
legitimated by humanitarian rationale and rhetoric. As David Chandler 
writes in his book From Kosovo to Kabul and Beyond, from the Kosovo 
operation onwards international interventions in the name of human rights 
and humanitarianism came to define Western international politics for years 
to follow.323 The development stemming from the end of the Cold War led to 
military-humanitarianism and it has become customary for Western 
governments to use humanitarian and human rights rhetoric as their moral 
and ethical shields and justifications for foreign interventions. (Western) 
humanitarian world politics started to emerge. This stipulated also a wider 
change in the ethos and spirit within the international sphere. Mika Aaltola 
argues that in this era humanitarianism became a key frame through which 
multifarious actors in the international field assess each other’s legitimacy 
and determine their power positions.  Moreover, the “humanitarian 
paradigm” has become an expression of the “international community” and 
contemporary Western hegemonic power.324 
From Kosovo onwards, Western humanitarian military interventions 
were normalized as a possible and seemingly effective way of securitizing 
crisis areas in turmoil, of governing the “disobedient” non-Western minded 
leaders, and of alleviating the suffering of the populations of crisis areas. But 
furthermore a system was born, in which intervention legitimized by 
humanitarian reasoning came to be widely seen as a right and a moral way of 
acting in the international political sphere. Consequently, criticizing 
humanitarianly framed interventionist actions was not only seen as outdated 
and old fashioned, but it was often blamed for being tantamount to 
approving human rights violations and terror.325 The shaping of the UN 
paradigm of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) can be seen as an emblem of 
the spirit and orientation of foreign intervention, which was placed above the 
Westphalian sovereignty norms. As the horrors of Holocaust gave birth to the 
1948 UN convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide 326, the crises of the 1990s—namely the Rwandan atrocity—marked 
a modern turning point for the notion of the necessity to protect humanity, 
placed over the sovereignty principles of Westphalian non-interference. 
Combined with a discussion on the right to intervene rising from the 
Western intervention in the Yugoslav Wars at the turn of the millennium—
especially from the 1999 NATO campaign in Kosovo—this new international 
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interventionist paradigm, the Responsibility to Protect, started to form. The 
outline and formation of R2P can be seen as a continuation of the historical 
evolution of the protection of humanity. Whilst states were formerly placed 
in the position of securing their people from mass atrocity and genocide, in 
the formulation of the R2P the international community was given the 
right—and a moral obligation—to intervene in the sphere of sovereign states 
in order to stop crude violations of human rights and to protect civilians.327 
The emphasis on the status of international community as the actors 
answering to human distress by interventionist means is emblematic of the 
ethos of the era.  
The September 11th 2001 terror attacks on the USA swiftly changed the 
climate of global politics. The “global war on terror” started with the US and 
allied forces operation Enduring Freedom´s air strikes on Taliban and Al-
Qaeda targets in Afghanistan on October 7th. The War on Terror marked a 
significant strengthening of the humanitarization of Western war. As the 
Afghan operation was legitimized by its targeting of the Taliban and Al-
Qaeda—seen to be responsible for the 9/11 attacks—it was also forcefully 
framed, rationalized and legitimized by humanitarian rhetoric. The operation 
was framed as an endeavor to secure the lives of the locals and to protect 
human rights and gender equality against the suppressing forces of radical 
Islamism.328  The operation soon became a multinational operation, as 
numerous countries around the world deployed troops to fight terrorism and 
inhumanity in Afghanistan. In 2003 a NATO-led International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) took the lead in the war. The multinational Afghan-
ISAF operation was mandated by the UN, led by a US General and had 
participants from nearly fifty countries from 2003 onwards, and it can thus 
be seen as an embodiment of a new kind of war waged by the international 
community in the name of saving and protecting humanity.  
In the era defined by “global war on terror” politicized humanitarianism 
has arguable become a powerful tool of Western global control and 
governance; a tool used to stabilize and control crisis areas according to 
Western standards of good governance and civilized, humane way of life. 
Critics of the political and militarized humanitarianism even state that a 
point has been reached when humanitarianism has evolved into a moral 
cover under which a powerful minority of the world’s countries—namely the 
United States—globally oversees its own interests. As Roberto Belloni states: 
“Humanitarianism has become a part of the control strategy designed to 
prevent the transmission of disorder and chaos from the global war zones, 
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and poor peripheral countries to the Western world.”329 This development 
has also spelled significant changes for picturing wars and crises, and it has, I 
argue, changed the ways in which Western spectators apprehend, valuate, 
imagine and feel about the suffering of distant others, and how the pain of 
others is encountered through visual representations. In the empirically 
orientated chapters (4-7) that follow I shall analyze further the multifarious 
contemporary modes of representing wars and crises, suffering and non-
suffering, and I shall investigate the changes brought about by the era of 
Western humanitarian world politics on visual representations of suffering 
and non-suffering, as well as examine the different political framing and 
utilizations of war and suffering imagery in the contemporary era (roughly 
from about 2001 to 2015) in Western publicity, politics and media.  
2.6 CONCLUSIONS 
By following the varying representational and mediation practices of visual 
images depicting the pain of others, the history and evolution of 
humanitarian ideas and the practices of the protection of humanity can be 
traced. Visual images of crisis, pain and of the need of help illustrate the 
history of humanitarianism, and the changes in humanitarian ideology and 
organizational/state settings slant the ways in which distant suffering and 
the need of help have been visually portrayed. The overview of the past nearly 
300 years from the point of view of ideas on humanity and visual 
humanitarian communication sketched above reveals some persistent 
patterns and themes reoccurring in the course of history. These main claims, 
underlying beliefs and mind-sets built into the framework of humanitarian 
communication and the different formulations and functions of the images 
within the discourse are at the core of this study in multitudes of ways. The 
historical overview and the detected patterns of display function as a 
backdrop against which I shall analyze the representational practices and 
uses of images telling of the distress of others in the more contemporary 
settings in the following chapters. The main findings drawn from the history 
of humanitarian visual communication, central to the following, more 
empirically orientated chapters are:   
1.) Visual representations displaying the pain of others are central to the 
humanity discourse and its evolvement. The pain of others encountered 
through visual images has been central in building solidary bonds between 
humans. Humanitarianism and apprehension of vulnerable life and thus life 
worthy of protection stems from encountering (visualized) the pain of others. 
The ways in which the pain of others have been presented to the spectating 
distant (Western) audiences have played a central position in the widening 
apprehension of humanity, and have been in an important position in 
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expanding the scope of what has been at different times comprehended as 
human lives worthy of protection, saving and rights. As the presentation 
practices change according to their presentational context and the wider 
surrounding mind-sets, ideas and paradigms of their era, the images of the 
distress of others unveil the evolvement and stages relevant for the 
development of humanity and humanitarian discourse. Moreover, 
throughout history the processes of visually representing and thus defining 
the humanity of others can be observed as a project promoted by pioneering 
individuals and groups, striving to broaden the scope of what can be more 
widely understood as belonging to the realm of humanity/protectable life. As 
the amazed and often outraged spectators have been encountered by emotion 
awaking images of the pain of others the conceptions of humanity and of 
lives worthy of protection have expanded, and the ways in which the pain of 
others has been encountered and reacted to have altered. However, images of 
the pain and distress of others are also inclined to be framed and governed 
politically and purposefully. Thus, tracing the utilization, framings, 
significations and contextual intentions of images of suffering and crisis in 
the contemporary settings reveal information critical for understanding the 
stage of humanitarianism, also in the contemporary milieu.  
2.) Observing the history of visually mediated suffering of others reveal 
persistent problems and dilemmas of ethical presentation. Objectifying, 
othering, distancing and inauthentic, even misleading presentations of the 
suffering of others are thriving within humanitarian communication 
throughout history. As presenting the vulnerability of others—especially in 
visual images—is tricky in moral and ethical terms, the history of visual 
humanitarian communication poignantly reveals the hierarchical, power-
bound and political nature of humanitarianism. The humanitarizing 
hierarchical power of the West over the rest of the world and the political 
nature of humanitarianism is vividly illustrated through the representational 
practices of mediating distant suffering over the years. Thus, visual 
representations of suffering and of the need of help offer a revealing insight 
into the historical evolution of humanitarianism and, moreover, a route 
through which the more contemporary stage of humanitarianism can be 
critically observed.  
3.) Throughout the history of visual humanitarian communication a 
theatrical mode of visual presentation and mediation can be detected. 
Humanitarian communication can be perceived as a theatrical arrangement 
through which the (Western) spectators are visually addressed, i.e. invited to 
see the pain of distant others, to respond and relate to it in a multitude of 
fluctuating ways. The theatricality of humanitarian mediation can already be 
vividly seen in the visual representations at the time of the Lisbon 
earthquake, that is, in the starting point of the politics of pity or (modern) 
humanitarian communication. In the visual humanitarian theater the 
pictured suffering individuals are placed at the center of the stage in order to 
arouse the empathy of the distant and safe spectators. Thus, often the 
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spectating audience and the emotions they go through (most commonly 
within the humanitarian frame, emotions of guilt, shame, indignation, 
outrage, the will to help, empathy) due to witnessing the pain of others are at 
the core of the arrangement, just like in a arrangement of a play in a theater. 
The spectating audiences are thus placed as the subjects of the arrangement, 
as the sufferers often remain as the objects of their gaze—and action. The 
humanitarian play of the images of suffering is arranged, governed, framed 
and directed by the mediating quarters; the avant-garde activists, 
organizations, the media and political actors and militaries acting within the 
wide humanitarian frame. The visual arrangements on the humanitarian 
stage—the casting of the story and the mode of addressing designed to invite 
the audience to relate to the suffering of others—change according to the 
historical evolvement of humanitarian ideas and practices. 
The theatrical arrangements of mediating distant suffering formulate role 
differentiations clearly visible throughout the history humanitarian visual 
mediation. As the safe spectating audience (as well as often the mediating 
quarters) are presented as strong, able, resourceful, willing and able to help 
the weaker suffering others, they are composed to carry the role of “full-
fledged Humans”, representing the height of humanity. In contrast the 
suffering victims in the images—and the objects of aid and humanitarian 
acts—often appear as weak, passive, nameless, dehistorized, and somewhat 
incapable characters or even bare life creatures, lesser human figures; the 
“Subhumans”. Also a third figure is relevant—although often implicitly 
present—to the humanitarian theater, namely the evil figure, causing 
suffering and threatening humanity and human integrity, the “Inhuman” 
character, often embodied as a foreign, bad and corrupted leader.  
The theatrical nature and the historically fluctuating modes of addressing 
the spectators embedded in humanitarian communication are at the core of 
my theoretical take, and are central to understanding the contemporary 
humanitarian visual communication. In the pages that follow I shall analyze 
the ways in which images presented within the contemporary humanitarian 
frame invite their spectators to see and perceive the unequal global world, 
and respond to the suffering and hardships of distant others. I shall develop 
these ideas further in the next chapter 3, in which I shall present my 
theoretical and methodical position in more length. The metaphor of visual 
theater will play a more central role in the following to the empirically 
orientated chapters drilling into the more contemporary uses and 
presentational practices of images of violence that follow.  
4.) The history of the visual mediation of images of suffering reveals a 
history of efforts of constraining and governing the presentations of suffering 
by regimes, states and militaries. There has a been a constant attempt to 
govern and control especially images revealing the bloody nature and bodily 
suffering inflicted by wars by warring states by a multitude of methods.  The 
history of control and governance over images cannot be grasped only by 
analyzing censorship attempts but by analyzing the predominant modes of 
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presentation. As we have seen while going through the history of visual 
humanitarian mediation, by making some things visible, others are often 
made invisible. Analyzing the contemporary methods of control and 
dominant structures of presentation is at the core of this study, particularly 
in chapter 6. dealing with the Western visual strategic communication on the 
Afghan war.  
5.) References to historical atrocity images are commonplace when 
discussing contemporary events of human distress. Moreover, modes of 
presenting distant suffering drawing from history are central to 
understanding, framing and judging the relevance of the suffering of others. 
Images of suffering often refer to iconized past atrocities, and topical 
atrocities are often politically framed and signified by historical references to 
the past. The visual memory of the Holocaust seems to be one of the pivotal 
reference points in the Western sphere. For understanding the contemporary 
humanitarian images, their uses and significations, historical references are 
central. I shall repeatedly return to the history of atrocity images in the 
chapters that follow.  
6.) Different modes of representing the pain of others –and thus also 
different modes of addressing and inviting the audience to perceive and 
identify with the suffering– exist and appear simultaneously, in different 
uses and contexts. These modes often contradict each other, but they also 
interact, affect and shape each other in a multitude of ways. The several 
concurrent modes of representation form segmented, collage-like images, 
through which the spectators encounter the suffering of others. Prevalent 
styles of presentation used in organizational humanitarian settings shape 
media representations, which then again affect the ways in which the 
suffering of others in referred to in political speech and presentations by 
state actors. In turn, presentations in organizational settings are influenced 
by the large-scale political framings guided by the way in which the pain of 
others is presented to us, and so on and so forth. Identifying the many faces 
of humanitarianism, the different modes of representation and their 
interrelationships is pivotal to understanding and analyzing visual 
humanitarian communication and the ways in which it works in 
contemporary settings.  
7.) Although at each time in history different parallel modes of 
representation—also with different intentions—exist, there seems to be a 
tendency of some modes of representation becoming established as the 
emblematic representations depicting distant suffering in their era. 
Therefore, some types of images and imageries are cemented as iconic, or 
thick images; emblematic and characteristically describing their epoch and 
its posture towards distant suffering. As these thick imageries describe the 
current ethos of their time, identifying and analyzing them reveals significant 
information on the status of humanitarian ideas that have produced and 
moulded them. The overall historical shifts and changes within humanitarian 
presentational practices and their ethos, thus, tell a vivid story of the 
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predominant preconditions a particular era places on humanity and on the 
understanding of human worth, but these shifts also illuminate and expose 
the dominant, global hierarchical power structures and attitudes of the 
presenting (Western) quarters towards the rest of the world. Locating the 
relevant thick images, describing the ethos of their era in multitude is at the 
core of the methodological take of this study, which I shall cover in the 
following chapter 3. 
8.) When following the visual trail of images of suffering it becomes clear 
that visual images of atrocity are at the same time ambivalent, and the 
messages they entail are tied to the context of their presentation. Reading 
images of atrocity in the context of their presentation, and revealing the 
contextual mode of addressing they entail is in a focal position throughout 
this study. But furthermore, the representational practices of mediating the 
pain and need of help of distant individuals are not confined to specific 
contexts, but images—especially iconic thick images—flow from one context 
into another, gathering different uses, framings, meanings and significations 
along the way. This phenomena can be seen for instance with the Holocaust 
imagery as well as images of the Yugoslavian wars.  As Sontag has pointed 
out, images of atrocity presented in different contexts may give rise to 
opposing responses: they may construct a cry for peace, or a cry for revenge 
or war. Alternatively, they may just produce awareness that terrible things 
happen.330 Following and taking into account these image flows—different 
contextual uses and meanings the images gather in their different settings 
and framings—is crucial in understanding the arrangement of 
humanitarianism and the ethos it takes in different time periods. The flows of 
images are, I claim, further strengthened in the contemporary era, which is 
marked by intensified communication practices and technologies. Thus, 
following the contemporary flows of humanitarian images is at the core of my 
research interests. I shall further develop my ideas on image flows in the 
following chapter 3.  
9.) Technological development in the field of visual communication has 
remodelled and changed the ways in which distant suffering has been 
presented to the spectating audiences. Technology also plays a focal role in 
how distant suffering is perceived and understood by the spectating 
audiences. Technology and the changes in technological mediation 
techniques in the field of visual mediation and media are, thus, at the core of 
the analysis also in the subsequent chapters of this study.  
10.) Looking at the historical uses and evolvement of humanitarian 
images it becomes evident that there is a thriving positive belief in the ability 
of images to bridge the gap between the sufferers and the spectators. This 
historically formed claim produces a causal way of thinking about the power 
of images, following the logic “the more we see, the more we care/do”, i.e. 
that by seeing more, the humanity would unify and wake up to comprehend 
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the suffering of others. This causality effect is tied to the technological 
evolvement in the field of visual mediation and has been revived time and 
time again in the course of history. The causal power of suffering images and 
their mediation was debated at the time of the Guttenberg revolution and 
later it was revived due to the invention of photography. In the television era 
the causality effect was called the “Vietnam war syndrome”, and at the time 
of satellite technology it took the form of “the CNN effect.” Although the 
thesis about the power of images to create more empathetic global relations 
and to direct foreign policy has been effectively challenged, it has 
nevertheless been revived again during the Internet and social media era. In 
the following empirically orientated chapters of this work, I shall locate and 
critically assess the historically prevalent causality belief in the contemporary 
settings, especially in chapter 7, which deals with the images of the Syrian 
war mediated via social media.  
11.) Within the recent decades and years humanitarianism has risen to a 
central position in the public life of the Western societies, and moreover it 
has begun to serve a focal role also in Western international politics. I call the 
era from the turn of the late 1990s onwards as the age of Western 
humanitarian world politics. The increased significance and visibility of 
humanitarianism, within the Western understanding of the world, as well as 
the heightened status of humanitarianism and human rights discourse in 
Western politics has hoisted humanitarianism into an influential 
(unconscious) ideology, which for a large part determines how people within 
the Western sphere see and apprehend the global world and their own 
position in it. The recent changes have meant significant changes also for the 
visual representations of distant suffering and war. The emerging 
humanitarization of Western politics has led to sanitized and humanized 
presentations of Western wars and suffering caused by the West and Western 
warfare has become less visible. In the post 9/11 world and in the age of the 
“global war on terror” this visual tendency has been further fortified. The 
visual humanitarization of the recent Western wars, revealed when 
juxtaposed with the picturing of other, non-Western conflicts/catastrophes, 
is central to all of the following empirical chapters of this study. The 
differences in visualizing the suffering and conflicts of the distant others, 
when compared with the suffering inflicted or experienced by Westerners, 
are a major starting point for this study. The recent overall changes within 
the representational practices and modes of addressing in the images of 
suffering and crisis is what I aim at tackling from a multitude of perspectives 
in the chapters that follow.  
In the subsequent chapter, after the tour of history of visual images of 
pain and humanitarian communication, I shall open up in more detail my 
theoretical and methodological take on analyzing and reading the images of 
pain and distress within the era of liberal humanitarianism and Western 
humanitarian world politics.   
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3 THE SPECTATORSHIP, ANALYZE AND 
ARRANGEMENT OF THE HUMANITARIAN 
TRAGEDY THEATER 
3.1.INTRODUCTION: RESEARCHING THE ACTS AT THE 
HUMANITARIAN THEATER 
As the history of visual humanitarian communication indicates, visual 
images of suffering have served a focal role in the formation of the ideas of a 
shared human community, development of international human rights and 
humanitarian paradigms. The mediation and representational practices of 
the images of pain closely follow the phases of the evolution of (Western) 
humanitarian ideas, and visual arrangements vividly reflect and 
communicate the dominant ethos of the humanitarian thinking of their era.  
Today the everyday life of Western publics is unparalleledly abundant 
with visual records telling of dramatic destinies and violent experiences of 
distant strangers. It is suggested that this is due to several parallel 
singularities. First of all, novelties in the media sphere—such as the ever 
more frantic tempo of mediation and global flows of images, induced by, for 
instance, the growing use of internet based communication and social 
media—bring the tragedies of others increasingly forcefully under the sight of 
distant onlookers. Additionally, the recent strengthening of the status of 
humanitarian organizations within the international sphere has increased 
the visibility of manifold campaigns and appeals in the public sphere and 
everyday lifeworlds of Western citizens. The intensified visibility of foreign 
suffering and the need of help of distant others is moreover increasingly 
infiltrating the Western sphere due to the heightened status of human rights 
and humanitarian issues within the contemporary Western international 
political agenda.  
Today visual representations of the pain, precarity and despair of distant 
others are perhaps most renownedly used in campaigning and fundraising of 
humanitarian organizations. But powerful and emotion evoking images are 
also topically and commonly utilized in and by the (mainstream news) 
media. Images of crisis and suffering are mediated for spectating audiences 
in order to convey information, facilitate our understanding of distant crisis 
and to inform us of their human toll. Academic research has been mostly 
interested in the use images of crisis and suffering in and by the media and 
by humanitarian organizations.331 But moreover representations of human 
suffering and precarity are today—at the age of Western humanitarian world 
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politics—increasingly discussed in actual political connections, particularly in 
the Western sphere. Images of pain and distress from mostly non-Western 
crisis areas are habitually referred to by high-level politicians at times of 
crisis and sometimes even produced, presented and circulated by (Western) 
governmental actors or actors close to them. Presentation and circulation of 
visual images of wars, crisis and suffering are moreover often controlled and 
governed by political, governmental and military actors. The centrality of 
humanitarian and human rights orientation within Western international 
politics has not solely increased the visibility and utilization of crisis and 
suffering images in political connections, it has also expanded the contexts in 
which such images are referred to and impacted on the ways in which these 
images are arranged, presented and intended to (ideologically) address their 
viewers. Thus images of suffering and crisis today address their spectators in 
a multitude of highly political ways also at the level of international relations 
and politics. Therefore I argue that humanitarian communication—and 
especially visual images of suffering presented within the wide humanitarian 
frame—is today a powerful resource of mediating the violent and dramatic 
events of distant places for Western spectators, but, moreover, a resource of 
communicating the world order and thus also a central arena constituting 
the ways in which Western spectators perceive the surrounding world.  
In order to read the intended, contextual messages and meanings of the 
more contemporary imagery, within the ample setting of Western 
humanitarian world politics, and to unveil the ways in which images of war, 
crisis and suffering invite their spectators to see and signify them, a 
theoretical framework is needed. The theoretical approach introduced in this 
chapter—and applied to the subsequent chapters dealing with the 
contemporary status of images of pain and crisis—draws from the theoretical 
body of work underlying the previously sketched history of visual 
humanitarian communication, and from the existing analysis of the 
arrangements and dominant representational modes.  In this chapter I shall 
introduce my theoretical framework through which I analyze the images and 
their status within the Western humanitarian world political frame: I shall 
introduce how I see humanitarianism today as functioning as an 
(unconscious) ideology which interpellates332 (or hails) its subjects through 
the spectatorship of emotive visual representations of crisis and suffering, 
and explicate how I see humanitarian visual communication taking a 
theatrical mode of addressing which resembles the casting, arrangement 
and narration of a tragedy play. Furthermore, I shall explicate the method 
and the circumstances that guided the way I have selected the contemporary 
cases/imageries dealt with in the following chapters 4-7.  
                                                
332 Althusser, Louis: Ideology and ideological state apparatuses. In: Lenin and philosophy and 
other essays. Monthly Review Press, New York, 1971, 85-127.  
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3.2 HUMANITARIANISM AS AN (UNCONSCIOUS) 
IDEOLOGY  
As previously denoted, humanitarianism, broadly understood, has risen from 
the margins into a prominent status within the international politics during 
the last decades. Humanitarianism is in the early 2000s world political 
context an influential discursive paradigm, but it is also a world outlook, an 
all-encompassing mindset within the Western public sphere that is hard to 
elude contemporarily. Also in this respect, humanitarianism is not only a 
powerful standard by which the Western powers estimate the legitimacy of 
others’ political operations and advocate their own political actions in the 
global world, but it also is a mindset which strongly determines how people 
living within the Western cultural and political sphere perceive the world 
around them, as well as their own status and the status of others in it.333 
Therefore, humanitarianism may also very well be understood as an 
ideology. An ideology can be described as “a fairly coherent and 
comprehensive set of ideas that explains and evaluates social conditions, 
helps people understand their place in society, and provides a program for 
social and political action.”334 Humanitarianism, within contemporary 
Western societies, in many ways fulfills this criterion, as we shall see later.  
As we have seen, going through the visual history and evolution of the 
ideas of a shared human kind in the previous chapter 2, humanity, human 
rights, protection of humanity and the development of humanitarianism and 
the evolution of the conceptions of humanity are historical in nature, 
politically constructed and ever changing. These ideas or cultural, discursive 
constructions have been versatile in their demarcation, content and political 
agenda. Nevertheless, contemporarily the belief in the universal 
advancement of human rights, humanitarianism and humanitarian world 
politics are commonly understood and presented as natural world outlooks 
revolving around fairly neutral actions of bettering the status of humanity, 
doing good and acting morally. In spite of their historically, culturally and 
politically constructed nature and background, the contemporary global 
political structures and actions which claim to aim at the progression of 
human rights and the alleviation of the suffering of others are often referred 
to and comprehended as somewhat eternal and neutral. Thus, in the 
contemporary Western discourse and in the prevalent understanding, the 
advancement of human rights and the acts of bettering the status of 
humanity by humanitarian means are commonly proclaimed as natural, 
“self-evident”, universal and ahistorical.335 Moreover, questioning the 
humanitarian act of “doing good” or criticizing the attempts to globally 
advance conceptions of human rights established by the West—even by 
                                                
333 Aaltola, 2009; Chandler, 2002; Douzinas, 2007 ; Belloni, 2007.  
334 Weber, Cynthia: International relations theory. A critical Introduction. Routledge, New York, 
2010, 4.  
335 On the changing nature of human rights and their often assumed “self evident” nature see, for 
example Hunt, 2007.  
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military means—are today commonly found to be inappropriate, or even seen 
as tantamount to approving human rights violations or being indifferent to 
the suffering of others.336 Thus, the contemporary politicized Western 
humanitarian outlook on the world works on two levels: on a rather 
conscious level, as an ideology proclaimed in declarations and used as a 
powerful legitimating tool, and on a more subliminal level as a powerful 
unconscious ideology, which nevertheless forcefully influences dominant 
Western conception and judgments on the world. 337 
Unconscious ideologies are world outlooks or conventional ‘truths’, which 
are understood as foundational to our understanding of the world, as 
commonsensical and natural. They often remain beyond conscious 
recognition as a coherent ideology and, thus, linger outside of critical 
evaluation and political debate.338 Louis Althusser suggests that ideologies 
never actually proclaim out in the open their ideological nature, but present 
themselves as the “right way to think”.339 This applies to the contemporary 
humanitarian paradigm poignantly. Just like the in-groups of (unconscious) 
ideologies in general, Western international political humanitarian efforts 
are often in the Western sphere believed to be essentially good and our 
humanitarian mindset on the world is habitually perceived as true and right. 
However, the influential political system of humanitarianism does not much 
welcome the label of a political ideology, but denies such accusations 
forcefully by claiming universality and neutrality and by referring to the 
virtue of morality and ethics. Contemporary global humanitarianism 
habitually portrays itself as “anti-politics”—this is central to its inner 
cohesion, functionality and legitimacy.340   
However, paradigms that, within a culture, “go without saying” are at the 
very core of the political. Roland Barthes describes such social constructions 
as de-politzed speech or Myths. Barthes claims that power functions through 
such depoliticized myths. Myth makes the historical and contingent seem 
eternal; it offers natural justification to political constructions and abolishes 
the complexity of human acts by referring to their natural essence. A myth is 
something that makes a fact and a natural truth out of an interpretation. Yet, 
messages that seem to contain apparent truths—naturalized self-evident 
contents and slogan-like messages—are nevertheless always historical, 
cultural and, thus, constructed, artificial, mythical and intrinsically political 
and ideological. Myths are manifestations of unconscious ideologies that 
influence our thinking in powerful, though often latent, ways. Unconscious 
ideologies and myths are often taken for granted and culturally naturalized, 
de-politicized paradigms that powerfully determine the ways in which the 
world is perceived.341 Humanitarianism, within the Western sphere today, 
                                                
336 As articulated by Chandler, 2006, 13-16. 
337 Barthes, Roland: Mythologies. Vintage Classics, London, 2000 (1957), 109-159.  
338 Weber, 2010, 5.  
339 Althusser, 1971, 175- 177. 
340 See for example: Douzinas, 2007, 78-79. 
341 Barthes, 1972 (1957), 109–111, 128–131, 142–145; Weber, 2005, 6–7.  
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indeed full-fills the criterion of a mythicized truth, and thus performs as an 
unconscious ideology, strongly—but often subconsciously—determining 
prevailing perceptions on the world.  
In his seminal text Ideology and ideological State Apparatuses (1971) 
Althusser explains how ideologies “recruit” their subjects by hailing, 
summoning or interpellating. He uses an everyday example of a police officer 
in the street shouting “hey, you there!” to explain the act of becoming a 
subject of an ideology. In the instant the hailed individual recognizes that 
(s)he has been addressed and acts, i.e. turns around to face the police officer, 
(s)he already has become interpellated into the subjectivity of an ideology 
and becomes a subject of the ideological apparatus represented by the police 
officer.342 Althusser perceives ideology as a construction—or an apparatus—
that has its own rules and practices to which its subjects are at the moment of 
the interpellation subjugated. Hence, a subject of an ideology sees the world 
according to the discursive principles of the ideology: (s)he adheres to the 
behavior, social practices and attitudes of the discourse.343 The act of 
interpellation, hailing or addressing is how an ideology creates its subjects 
and subsumes people under its ideological discourses.   
3.2.1 IDEOLOGICAL ADDRESSING OF THE HUMANITARIAN IMAGES 
When observing the history of humanitarian visual communication, it 
becomes clear that humanitarian images are often presented to their 
audiences with deliberate intentions: targeted to tell particular stories, with 
the intention of producing certain meanings and affecting their (intended) 
spectators in intentional, and often politically formulated, ideologically ways. 
In their contextual uses and surroundings within the humanitarian frame, 
these representations offer their audiences topically fitting suggestions of 
reading and provide different routes to react and to take action in order to 
alleviate the suffering of the individuals/populations at issue. Images 
presented in such connections have, for instance, pointed to different ways of 
helping, getting involved and changing the conditions that inflict inequality, 
suffering and atrocities. The contextual arrangements of humanitarian 
images have offered their spectators topical, intended and more or less 
ready-made suggestions to react and act in the face of the images. For 
instance, in the early nineteenth century within the frame of the abolition 
fight the suggested or intended messages and meanings of images depicting 
the suffering of slaves was to suggest and communicate the humanity of the 
slaves and to provide routes to oppose and abolish the system of slave 
trading. The Holocaust images, when presented to Western audiences in the 
post Second World War setting suggested a reading that not only presented 
the Nazis as inhuman inflictors of immense human suffering and the 
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Holocaust as the ultimate downfall of humanity, but also communicated the 
need for institutional and universal safeguarding of the human family. Then 
again, in the 1990s, the sanitized techno-images of the Persian Gulf War 
(produced primarily by governmental actors) presented to Western 
audiences were aimed at legitimizing the US Iraq intervention, as also the 
presentational practices and framings of the crude images of the Yugoslavian 
wars suggested a need of international humanitarian military intervention in 
the war.344  The history of visual humanitarian communication and 
contextual reading of the intended or preferred (Western) significations of 
different imageries in their contexts indicates how images of suffering trail 
and reflect the dominant humanitarian ethos and the dominant ideological 
settings of their time, and thus also show how they constitute Western 
spectatorship of such imagery.  
Because of the central standing of humanitarianism within the 
contemporary Western international politics, humanitarian political speech 
and rhetoric describing and legitimizing Western international political 
actions and aspirations has, over the recent years, particularly in the years of 
the “war on terror,” been permeating.345  In addition to textual 
proclamations, political rhetoric and speech acts346 centralizing on politicized 
humanitarianism, also visual representations depicting crisis situations and 
the suffering of others has served as a focal arena within the Western political 
humanitarian ideological theatrical addressing during the past years.347 I 
claim, that through multitudes of arrangements of visual representations of 
crisis and suffering, the topical politicized humanitarian apparatus 
interpellates the spectators of these images into a subjectivity of the 
humanitarian ideology, and, thus, the imageries invite particular, contextual 
readings formed according to the preconditions of the era. I see that the 
practice of visual interpellation through the presentation of mythicized 
images of pain and crisis is pivotal for the humanitarian ideology and 
functionality of Western humanitarian world order.  
In the contemporary situation in which humanitarianism has forcefully 
infiltrated Western international politics, I—on the grounds of history—claim 
that the representational arrangements of such images also trail the 
predominant preconditions of their representational surroundings and 
contextual (ideological) setting. Moreover, I thus hypothesize that such 
representations and their presentation also unveil interesting and significant 
traits of the recent Western worldviews and political constellations. 
Therefore, for instance, an image of a starving child in a foreign land, 
presented within the topical Western political ambiance and international 
                                                
344 This function of humanitarian images is exemplified in variety of cases in the chapter 2 of this   
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345 Douzinas, 2007; Aaltola, 2009; Barnett, 2011; Barnett& Weiss, 2008; Chandler, 2006.  
346 Austin, J. L: How to do Things with Words. The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard 
University in 1955. Oxford at the Clarendon Press, London, 1962. 
347 Douzinas (2007, 76) makes a claim that ”contemporary humanitarianism repeats and exaggerates 
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political setting, perhaps does not suggest to the viewers that they should 
imagine ‘neutral’ humanitarian assistance aimed at helping the ones in need 
with traditional humanitarian aid functions or that they should engage in 
such endeavors. But an image of distant suffering presented in the wider, 
politicized and militarized Western humanitarian frame might point to and 
advocate a militarily fortified and humanitarianly justified operation, aimed 
at intervening in the political and societal structures of distant (particularly 
non-Western) areas and the lives of their populations.  
Perceiving the contemporary and growingly influential humanitarian 
paradigm as an ideology that theatrically addresses its subjects through 
visual representations of human suffering and crisis is pivotal to 
understanding and reading the messages of the images presented within the 
humanitarian frame. It enables analyzing the contemporary utilization and 
presentation practices of images of crisis and distress. Perceiving 
humanitarianism as an ideology that hails its subjects through visual 
representations of pain and distress, moreover, enables one to perceive these 
representations as intentionally inviting certain readings and ways of seeing, 
and thus I see that they constitute a particular Western way of perceiving 
such images; the Western spectator of suffering. On the grounds of this, I 
shall, in the following chapters 4 to 7 focusing on the more topical 
humanitarian imageries of the post 9/11 era, analyze the contemporary 
ideological and politically formed modes of addressing and the contextual 
and intended significations and meanings of the imagery. Thus asking 
questions, such as how images of suffering are contemporarily presented to 
Western audiences, who presents them and with what intentional messages 
and through what kinds of contextual modes of addressing, is at the core of 
the following chapters of this study.  
3.3 THE HUMANITARIAN STORY AND VISUAL 
HUMANITARIAN COMMUNICATION AS A TRAGEDY 
THEATER  
As outlined in the previous chapter 2., humanitarian/crisis images within the 
humanitarian frame during the past nearly 300 years, is based on a 
sentimental narration —a humanitarian story—, in which the roles of the 
arrangement are habitually fixed according to a global hierarchy and 
conventions embedded in the workings of the global humanitarian 
apparatus. Particularly in the contemporary era the global roles of the full-
fledged Western “humans”, the helpers and the helped “subhumans” have 
become permeating also in downright international political settings. As 
Costas Douzinas phrases it: ”The global humanitarian sees victims of 
misfortune everywhere. Undifferentiated pain and suffering has become the 
universal currency of the South and pity the global response of the North.” 
He adds: “Pity is misanthropic. It is the closest we get today to the Hegelian 
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master and slave dialectic; the slave’ s recognition of the master in his 
position of mastery is not reciprocated, the relationship remains one 
directional.”348 Due to the hierarchical power relations of the humanitarian 
machinery and communication the spectators of the suffering others are 
most commonly the “full-fledged humans” of the Western sphere who look 
(down) at the less fortunate, the most often non-Western, helpless, and pain-
stricken inhabitants of crisis areas, who are often pictured as somewhat 
adolescent vis-à-vis the, on the average, safe and comfortable Westerners. In 
addition to these characters, yet another figure is indispensable for the 
humanitarian story: the evil “inhuman”. This third character—often foreign 
and intensively othered, even demonized—is the reverse side of the good self 
and the deranged version of the victim other. The inhuman is habitually 
pictured within the humanitarian story as the evil force, which inflicts 
suffering on the (innocent) victims, the heroes (the “humans” of the story) 
then again are attempting to remedy. Although this evil character is quite 
rarely visibly detectable in humanitarian imagery, and even if it often lurks in 
the fringe area of the stage, it nevertheless is essential for the functionality of 
the humanitarian story. Habitually the contemporary inhuman character 
within the Western story is embodied by violent, undemocratic and corrupt, 
bad leaders of non-Western areas or pictured in the body of a terrorist leader, 
unshackled by and threatening the humane norms of the international 
community.349  
Conventional representational practices of bodily vulnerability poignantly 
visualize and epitomize the humanitarian story, its fixed role divisions and 
differentiations, central for the functionality of global humanitarianism and 
Western humanitarian world politics.350Although this narrative arrangement 
is perhaps effective and sufficient in capturing the structural and narrative 
construction of the global humanitarian arrangements, I see that it alone is 
not entirely sufficient in helping us to understand how visual humanitarian 
communication works and how the images of suffering are contemporarily 
framed to address their viewers in political ways, creating their assumed 
viewer-subjects and the intended messages and meanings of humanitarian 
imagery. Lillie Chouliaraki in her book The Ironic Spectator aptly opens up 
the arrangement of humanitarianism (and humanitarian communication) as 
a drama action. She sees that the staging of suffering, its spectatorship and 
the moral education embedded in these arrangements, dates all the way back 
to the Antique and being already present in the theatrical arrangement of a 
                                                
348 Douzinas, 2007, 68. See also Chouliaraki, 2013, 26-36.  
349 Ibid. Douzinas, 2007, 66-78; see also Malkki, 1996; Butler, 2009, 63-100. I use the highly laden 
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referring to the role division of the humanitarian story. I am aware of the load such expressions carry, 
and I must underline that by using the terms I do not aim to make claims on the character of the 
groups/individuals as such, but to refer to the role given to them in the context at hand.  
350 Douzinas,2007, 66-75; Malkki, 1996. See also Butler, 2009, 63-100; Cohen, 2001; 
Chouliaraki, 2013; Moeller, 1999; Boltanski 1999 
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Greek tragedy.351 This theatrical arrangement becomes lucid when reading 
and analyzing the historical representational practices of humanitarian 
imagery presented already in the times of the Enlightenment.352  
Perceiving visual humanitarian communication as a theatrical 
arrangement, which resembles the setting and arrangement of a classical 
tragedy play, helps to conceive visual humanitarian addressing in a more 
comprehensive and multimodal way. I wish to develop this idea and to open 
up the tragedy form of humanitarian visual communication in more length, 
since I see that this helps to unwrap the way the visual images of suffering 
present their objects (most often the sufferers) and how the spectacles of 
suffering and vulnerability are intended to address their subjects (the 
assumed Western spectators) in contemporary humanitarian settings. But 
moreover the metaphor of tragedy theater helps to unveil how the images are 
arranged and governed, and how the organizing actors direct and arrange the 
emotive visual scenes at the humanitarian theater. The theatrical setting 
enables us to take into closer consideration the arrangers, the screenwriters, 
organizers and assemblers of the spectacles—organizations, media as well as 
political actors—who are often left out of the equation when scrutinizing 
humanitarian visual communication. In the following subchapters I 
approach the humanitarian tragedy theater drawing from the definitions of a 
tragedy that Aristotle introduced in Poetics.353 The idea of humanitarian 
visual communication as a theatrical tragedy theater is one that will 
permeate through the following chapters of this work.  
3.3.1 THE HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY THEATER  
In Poetics Aristotle defines a tragedy as a theatrical arrangement, which 
describes individuals suffering a tragic fate. In addition to the suffering main 
character(s) on stage, a focal component in a tragedy is the audience—the 
empathetic spectators following the act. Following Aristotle, the main 
objective of a tragedy’s storyline is to create and arouse emotions in the 
spectators, who are expected to empathize, be moved and touched when 
attending to the tragic fate of the main figure, sentimentally portrayed to 
them.354 Thus, although the starting point of a tragedy is communicating the 
tragic fate of the lead player(s) on stage, the emotions brought on by the 
sentimental story in the audience is the deeper purpose of the arrangement. 
Similarly the humanitarian (visual) communication has, at least ever since 
the times of the Enlightenment, highlighted and focused primarily on the 
                                                
351 Chouliaraki, 2013, 4, 23, 27-36, Chouliaraki points to Boltanski as introducing the theater frame 
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Action and Their Media Representation: The Case of France. Ethical Perspectives, 7/1, 2000, 3-16  
The metaphor of theater in relation to picturing suffering was already used by Boltanski in his book 
“Distant suffering”, but in a somewhat different way in which I use it.  See Boltanski: 1999, 24-27.  
352 See Chapter 2.1.  
353 Aristotle: Poetics. The Internet Classics Archive. Translated by S. H Bucher.  
354 Aristotle: Poetics.   
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spectator’s feelings and reaction in the face of the suffering of others. And 
thus the distant spectator has predominantly been placed as the (moral) 
subject of the humanitarian visual arrangement. Just like in a tragedy theater 
the feelings of awe, horror, fear, pity and compassion, and the will to help—as 
well as guilt—aroused in the spectators by vivid, often visual records of 
suffering are the driving forces of humanitarian communication355 Therefore, 
humanitarian communication often takes a form that considerably resembles 
the arrangement of a theatrical tragedy play, in which the suffering objects in 
their vulnerability are displayed at center of the stage, and the 
(distant/distanced) spectators constitute the audience. Thus, the audience 
actually functions as the decisive subjects of the play, who are invited to feel, 
to be moved and to react when faced with the pain of others presented to 
them in a form of a visual performance.356  
According to Aristotle, a tragedy play is an imitation (or a representation) 
of events that arouse the feelings of fear and pity in the audience. Thus, 
creating a tragic ambience and sentimental appeal are central to a properly 
functioning tragedy storyline. Moreover the (moral) character of the 
suffering main figures—appropriate casting and role differentiation —are 
also central to the functionality—the emotional force—of a tragedy. Aristotle 
describes that—in order for the sentiments of pity and fear of the audience to 
be mobilized—the main character of a tragedy needs to be a somewhat 
‘normal’ individual, in the sense that (s)he should not be too different from 
the average spectator in moral constitution. The main character should 
neither be bad nor evil, somebody who might be seen as deserving the tragic 
fate, since this kind of a storyline cannot mobilize the emotions of the 
audience in a sufficient way. Nor should the main figure be outstandingly 
virtuous, since, on the average, spectators cannot be expected to be especially 
righteous either.  
Moreover, in an Aristotelian tragedy hamartia is a central feature. By 
hamartia Aristotle means a bad choice made by the main character—a 
mistake guided by inner compulsions, ignorance or unawareness—which 
results in his/her misfortune. The spectators of the act detect and can 
identify the mistake—the hamartia—because of their remoteness and their 
more informed perspective as spectators. As the central aim of the tragedy 
play is to produce strong feelings of pity and fear in the audience, another 
focal point is catharsis. The storyline of a tragedy—after giving the audience 
a taste of misfortune happening to another human not completely alike nor 
unlike the audience—should, according to Aristotle, provide the spectators a 
release from or an absolution for these disturbing feelings—a catharsis. 
Thus, a tragedy should result in a discharge of the feelings of pity and fear, 
                                                
355 Sliwinski 2011, 20-21; Orgad, 2012, 60; Halttunen, 1995; Chouliaraki, 2013, 26-36. See also 
chapter 2.1.  
356 Chouliaraki, 2013, 4, 23, 27-36.  
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and thus, quite paradoxically, it is often described as leading to feelings of 
relief, purification, even satisfaction. 357 
Just as a theatrical tragedy play is an imitation of events that arouse pity 
and fear in the spectators, visual humanitarian communication telling of the 
tragedies of others is also always a representation of pain and catastrophe 
(framed, mediated and assembled) taking place in another place, another 
time.  A tragedy play is written and engineered by an arranging agent—by a 
scriptwriter, the assembler of the scene. In the light of the previously 
overviewed history, I argue that so is the case with humanitarian spectacles 
also. Visual spectacles presented within the humanitarian frame are almost 
invariably assembled, arranged and conveyed for the audience by a 
mediating quarter (with certain intentions), and thus the storyline included 
in the representations always molds the ‘real’ events in certain ways and 
provides preferred and suggested ways of seeing and reacting. Prevalently 
visual humanitarian communication, through which the Western spectators 
bear witness to mediated and framed miseries of distant others and are 
invited to experience strong emotions, and are, in the end, offered a route to 
a cathartic release from uncomfortable emotions, in many ways resembles 
the assemblage of a classical tragedy theater.358 Then, how are hamartia and 
catharsis manifested in the arrangements of the contemporary humanitarian 
visual communication? And how is the storyline of contemporary 
humanitarian tragedy theater composed and who arranges the acts in the 
theater?  
3.3.2 HAMARTIA IN THE CONTEMPORARY HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY 
ARRANGEMENT 
Within visual humanitarian representations the sufferers are commonly 
presented in rather conventional ways. As we have seen, it is essential for 
tragedy theater to contain hamartia, i.e. the downfall of the protagonist, and 
that the main character not be seen as deserving his/her fate. For the play to 
achieve its designed impact, the representation of (ideal) victimhood is 
central. The humanitarian suffering ideal victims are most often presented in 
the bodies of weak and innocent children, as well as of women, or they are 
habitually presented as crowds of civilian population, depicted as somewhat 
passive and innocent. Nevertheless the suffering victims usually are not 
presented as singularly virtuous, but in most cases they appear as 
coincidental victims, who happened to be in harm’s way. Usually the victims 
                                                
357 Aristotle: Poetics.  
358 I must underline that this is not to say that the tragedies mediated for the awareness of the 
spectators would not be ‘real’ or would be thoroughly planned by the mediating quarters. The tragedy 
theater here functions as a metaphor, which reveals the assemblage and arrangement of visual 
humanitarian communications.   The tragedy form perhaps quite simply is a form that the human 
mind reacts to strongly; or then perhaps we (Westerners) are so accustomed to this form of 
presentation that (visual) arrangements that resemble the form of a tragedy play affect us forcefully, 
and thus this form is much used also in humanitarian contexts.  
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are not pictured as gravitating towards harm’s way intentionally, nor are they 
usually presented as active subjects in the circumstances inflicting suffering 
on them (such as soldiers actively taking part in conflicts or even able bodied 
young men, stereotypically seen as active subjects, capable of molding their 
own destinies). Furthermore, the visualized sufferers are not habitually 
presented as evil or corrupt characters deserving their fate.359 Thus, although 
there are strongly stereotypical features in the ideal victims and how they are 
presented, the habitual sufferers of the humanitarian story are generally not 
too distant from the spectators in their moral composition, not evil, not 
particularly virtuous, but rather in this sense quite identifiable and mediocre. 
Thus, the role division of humanitarian communication is routinely formed 
according to the (casting) outline of Aristotle’s tragedy description on roles 
and moral positioning of the main characters on stage and the spectators in 
the crowd.  
Therefore, seemingly it might appear, that hamartia—the tragic mistake 
made by the central suffering character leading to his misfortune, which is 
central for the tragedy play—would not at all fit the (contemporary) 
humanitarian theatrical arrangement, which in everyday thinking most 
commonly stems from the idea of an innocent (passive) victim coincidentally 
at the mercy of violent events. But observing more closely, and taking into 
consideration the prevailing globally hierarchical nature of humanitarianism 
and humanitarian visual arrangements, in fact hamartia can be seen to be a 
central feature in the conventional visual humanitarian storyline. As was 
seen in the previous chapter 2, mediated records of suffering others have 
been commonly seen to produce sensations of horror, pity and amazement, 
and thus they have been seen to enable a compassionate encounter with the 
sufferers, leading to will to help, and further arousing imagination of a 
shared humanity and understanding of the fragility of all life. But at the same 
time, already in the representations of the Lisbon 1755 tragedy, the otherness 
of the victims has indeed played a focal position in the (visual) arrangement 
and spectatorship of distant suffering.360 The distance created by mediation 
places the spectators and the suffering objects in an unequal relationship, 
and thus alienates the viewers from the viewed, and consequently others the 
sufferers, making them appear somewhat different form the spectators. In 
this sense both in the setting of a classical tragedy play as well as in the 
arrangements humanitarian communication, hamartia separates the 
spectators from the characters presented on stage.  Moreover, due to the 
(spatial and often also temporal) remoteness of the spectators, the spectators 
often possess additional information that the suffering characters midst the 
                                                
359 See for instance: Boltanski: 1999; Moeller: 1999; Chouliaraki, 2006. ; Malkki, 1996. ; Cohen, 
2001; The visual dehumanization of refugees. Bleiker, Ronald, Campbell David, Hutchinson 
Emma& Nicholson, Xzarina. Australian Journal of Political science, 2013, 48/4, 398-416. See also 
chapter 4 of this study.  
360 Orgad, 2012, 60; Sliwinski, 2011, 43-45. See also chapter 2.1.  
Sometimes the victims of violence and pain, also in humanitarian contemporary contexts, are 
presented as deserving their fate. More on this in the chapter 6.  
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enfolding tragic events lack—just as in an Aristotelian tragedy. Because of the 
distance and the additional knowledge granted by remoteness, the spectators 
often cannot imagine themselves making the same mistake.  
Furthermore within contemporary humanitarian communication, the 
spectators—the Westerners gazing from the safety of their homes and 
relatively orderly societies—most commonly hear and see stories of the 
misfortune of individuals living in the non-Western, distant areas in turmoil, 
usually located in non-Western setting, in societies seen as less developed, 
less wealthy and less secure than our own. Thus, the global hierarchy of the 
privileged West and the less fortunate “rest” is typically inherently present in 
the visual representations of bodily suffering aimed at arousing 
humanitarian emotions. The othering, distancing and objectifying dimension 
of humanitarian visual communication is an ever-present dilemma and a 
continuous tack in humanitarian communication, especially central to visual 
mediation of suffering.361  
Therefore, when seeing the suffering of the inhabitants of less developed 
and less secure non-Western areas, what is ultimately seen—in addition to 
the smallest common denominator, the precarious human body—are the 
different hierarchical and globally fractioned segments of the humanity. 
Through visual humanitarian communication, the ‘the Third World’,  ‘the 
developing world’ of the non-Western world is articulated to the ’first world’-
on-lookers. Thus, while spectating mediated images of suffering through  
humanitarian visual arrangements, the Western spectators often tend to gaze 
at the unfortunates of this world, pictured in their immaturity and 
insufficiency. Thus the Western spectator often tends to see others— 
subhumans—people not quite like themselves, individuals (and areas) failing 
to live up to ‘their standards’, and thus interpret their hamartia—tragic 
mistake—ultimately as the simple coincidence that these people happened to 
be born into a wrong area and regime: a wrong place, at a wrong time. 
Therefore the tragic mistake of the objects of the image presented at the 
humanitarian theater is the fact that they were not born to be a part of the 
Western global nobility, not included in the rank of the spectators gazing 
from the Western safety. Thus, humanitarian imagery presenting graphic 
images describing the downfall of human rights and human worth, Western 
based ideals of a shared humanity, quite often seems to suggest that not 
being a Westerner today is the most terrible mistake you can make. Thus, I 
argue that Hamartia, stemming from the global political distinctions and 
hierarchies, is in fact at the center stage in humanitarian communication. 
Therefore hamartia can be seen as a persistent feature, included in the 
logic of global humanitarian communication, strongly determining the ways 
in which the Western spectators see the suffering individuals and areas 
presented to them in humanitarian images. I will develop these themes 
further and analyze the contemporary humanitarian hamartia in the 
                                                
361 See for instance:  Boltanski, 24-26; Chouliaraki¸27-29; Dauphinee, 2007; Malkki, 1996; 
Käpylä&Kennedy, 2014; Cohen, 2001, 206- 218.  
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subsequent chapters of this study, particularly in the next chapter 4, in which 
I contrast and compare the display of Western suffering with the suffering of 
the less-developed world and introduce a theater of proof created by the 
presentational practices of suffering images.  
3.3.3 CATHARSIS AT THE HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY THEATER 
In addition to hamartia, catharsis—an emotional cleansing or a healing 
sensation experienced by the spectator after going through emotions of fear 
and pity—is a focal component in an Aristotelian tragedy play. The central 
significance of a tragedy play is to produce sentiments of fear and pity and, 
then, to give the spectator a release from them, resulting—quite 
paradoxically—in feelings of emotional healing, even satisfaction. This 
characteristic mode of feeling, linked to the appeal and strength of a tragedy 
play, is also detectable as central function in the spectatorship of the visual 
humanitarian visual arrangements. I see that, correspondingly to classic 
tragedy arrangement, also in the (visual) humanitarian setting, the dramatic 
spectacles of suffering and despair offer their spectators ways to overcome 
fear and pity and, thus, create multiple routes to reach a humanitarian 
catharsis.  
Without the possibility of reaching a catharsis the spectators would only 
feel miserable in the face of troubling images of pain and distress. Thus such 
representations would perhaps be avoided, perceived as ‘numbing’ and 
turned a blind eye to.362 But once a route to a cathartic state is offered (by 
the sentimental education embedded in humanitarian communication), the 
spectators may reach a level of feeling at ease with themselves and even 
experience sensations of being ‘good’, acting morally, ’doing something’ and 
even feeling good about themselves. As discussed earlier, the catharsis today 
within the global humanitarian theatrical setting can be achieved in 
numerous ways: by making a phone call or clicking a mouse and donating a 
preferred amount of money to a cause, which is designed to alleviate the 
suffering of the objects depicted. Numerous methods of donation and 
participation are made as easy and as appealing as possible. Today we may 
ease the pain of others—and reach an individual humanitarian catharsis—by 
attending a beneficiary concert, watching a charity TV program and 
simultaneously sending money to a cause, paying a monthly endowment by 
becoming a sponsoring ‘godparent’ of an African child, or by just clicking the 
mouse and ‘liking’ humanitarian actions on social media. By ‘helping’, acting 
morally and responding to the addressing of the humanitarian appeal, a state 
of catharsis is attained.363   
But in addition to these softer routes—and more relevantly to my interest 
in the following chapters of this study—it may be argued that the 
                                                
362 See for instance Cohen, 2001, 168-195 
363 About the self-centeredness and entertainment dimension of contemporary humanitarianism see, 
Chouliaraki, 2013.  
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humanitarian catharsis has also been made attainable—especially towards 
the end of the twentieth century and beyond—by much harder, even 
militarized means. The spectator, facing an image of calamity might, for 
instance, reach an instantaneous humanitarian catharsis by becoming 
convinced that a suggested political solution or action aimed at the 
alleviation of this distant suffering—such as a military intervention aimed at 
securitizing a distant area in turmoil and rationalized and legitimized as a 
humanitarian solution—is an apt one and then giving political consent to 
such actions. Therefore, I argue, that a humanitarian catharsis may, in 
international political settings and, particularly, in the contemporary age of 
the humanitarian world politics, be achieved by supporting military-political 
solutions designed, framed, presented and marketed as alleviating the 
suffering of others. Thus, the cathartic release from fear and pity can be 
reached by giving governmental actors/mediating quarters the legitimation 
they need within Western democratic political systems to intervene in foreign 
crisis situations even by military means.  Moreover, the humanitarian 
catharsis today may then be even attained by participating in militarized 
humanitarian efforts first-hand; by working as a crisis management official, 
or even by enrolling to become a (humanitarian) soldier fighting in the name 
of a more just and humane world (order).364 Therefore, I claim that 
multifarious ways—from donation to voting, from dancing at a charity 
concert to consenting to political decision-making, and all the way up to 
carrying a gun—are contemporarily offered to Western spectators within 
humanitarian communication as routes of getting rid of the sensations of fear 
and pity aroused by seeing the plight and tragic fates of others, and reaching 
a catharsis. In the subsequent chapters of this study I shall pay attention to 
the routes suggested and provided to achieve a humanitarian catharsis by the 
contemporary visual humanitarian arrangements, and I shall analyze the 
visual contemporary humanitarian tragedy arrangements from this 
viewpoint.  
Because of the very cathartic function of (visual) humanitarian 
communication the arrangements of the humanitarian tragedy enable the 
spectators also to become active subjects of the theatrical arrangement. This 
seems to have been the case in many occasions throughout the course of 
modern history of humanitarian visual communication, during which the 
audience, its feelings as well as reactions when facing the suffering of others 
has been at the core of these arrangements. Accordingly, Aristotle notes that 
the character or the personality of the sufferers encountered through the 
tragedy are not the central theme. The spectators do not need to know too 
much about the personality of the main characters, since what is essentially 
interesting and important for the storyline and functionality of a tragedy is 
                                                
364 Such humanitarian addressing can be seen in the recruitment images of Western nations. See: 
Jantunen, Saara &Kotilainen, Noora: Drones, Missiles and Teddy bears: The crisis of the 21st 
century soldiership. In Binaries in Battle. Representations of division and conflict. Vuorinen, Marja, 
Huhtinen, Aki-Mauri & Kotilainen, Noora. Cambridge Scholars Publications, 2014, 94-98 
162
 163 
not what happens to the suffering characters on stage, but how the audience 
relates to it. 365 Just as theatrical tragedy play centers on the emotions of the 
audience, also humanitarian visual arrangements actually often leave the 
main characters displayed in their corporal substance speechless, casting 
them as objects. This dividing feature is persistently present in humanitarian 
communication, as we have seen while discussing the earlier history up until 
the turn of the century. Although from the 1980s onwards the discussions on 
making the voice of the victims and their personal stories heard has been 
central, when thinking about the ethics of representing the misfortune of 
others366, most commonly the spectators of the visualized tragedies still do 
not hear the personal histories behind the corporally presented destinies 
mediated for them and designed to evoke their imagination and emotions 
towards the suffering of this world.  
But, in addition to the central role of the spectators in the humanitarian 
tragedy arrangements, also the mediating quarters—the orchestrators of the 
play—, the diverse humanitarian actors and the media, which arranges the 
setting for displaying, presenting, circulating and selecting the acts of 
suffering that shall be referenced and thus frames them for the spectating 
audiences, play a central role in determining the mode of addressing, as well 
as the functionality of the humanitarian theatrical arrangements. Yet it 
seems that the role of these agents is, still today, rather under acknowledged 
in relevant research.367 
3.3.4 THE SCRIPTWRITERS AND ASSEMBLERS OF THE 
HUMANITARIAN TRAGEDY SPECTACLES 
According to Aristotle, in order for the tragedy play to be satisfactory, for the 
hamartia to be credible and effective, and for the catharsis to be attained, the 
story as well as the visual display needs to be carefully curated, planned and 
written. Aristotle defined the story—the manuscript of the play and the art of 
storytelling—as the most important feature of a spectacle that needed to 
comply with the rules of tragedy. The story needs to be effective in arousing 
strong sentiments of fear and pity, but its constitution also needs to 
accomplish a satisfactory outcome, catharsis. Aristotle continues describing 
the material staging as well as the orchestration of the tragedy in many 
words, but he places the script, the work of the author in creating a sufficient 
and functioning story, as a priority.368 As the skill of the author and a good 
story are central to the effectiveness of a tragedy play, likewise in the setting 
                                                
365 Aristotle: Poetics.  
366 Chouliaraki, 2013, 61-64; Cohen, 2001, 216-218; Code of Conduct: Images and Messages 
Relating to the Third World, CONCORD, 1989. 
367 The role of the humanitarian NGO’s as well as the media has been taken up in relevant research, but 
mostly the role of the governmental actors, politicians as well as the military as assemblers of the 
arrangements has been quite unacknowledged. See for example Chouliaraki, 2013; Choliaraki 
2008; Moeller, 1999; Boltanski 1999; Kennedy& Käpylä, 2014.  
368 Aristotle, Poetics.  
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of humanitarian visual mediation an efficient storyline and arrangement—
and thus the role of the mediators and assemblers of the suffering 
imageries—is pivotal.  
One might think that by the writes of the theatrical arrangements I would 
point to the photographers and other initial producers of the visual material, 
but rather I see the (institutional) mediators of the arrangements of the 
visual material as more interesting and noteworthy.369 As presenters, 
assemblers and the actors framing the contemporary visual humanitarian 
tragedy play are perhaps most commonly perceived the humanitarian 
organizations and their visual appeals. But as we have seen and discussed in 
chapter 2, also the mainstream media and political and governmental actors 
dealing with humanitarian, international issues, crisis and war clearly belong 
to this group.370 I argue that contemporarily—in the era of Western 
humanitarian international politics—what we see, how we see it, as well as 
what we do not see of the suffering of others is determined not only by the 
prominent humanitarian organizations, international institutions or by the 
(Western) mainstream media, but increasingly also by governmental, 
political and even military actors. Especially in the contemporary situation, 
these actors have the power to elevate some tragedies and some imageries 
into the public consciousness and societal/political discussion by referring to 
them, by using them in their proclamations and descriptions on foreign crisis 
situations or even by disseminating imagery, by governing and controlling 
the image flows and, moreover, sometimes by producing such imageries 
themselves.371  
I see that these manifold actors present, mediate, arrange and frame the 
suffering of others, and, thus, actively create spectacles of suffering and 
theatrical arrangements presenting the pain of others for wide, spectating 
audiences.372 Thus they are the scriptwriters and directors of the 
humanitarian tragedy theater, whom predominantly answer of the visual 
assemblages of suffering permeating the sight of the spectators.  
The power structures embedded in the global humanitarian machinery, 
its procedures, discursive, ideological and historical constructions, determine 
                                                
369 I must underline, my interest in this study is not in scrutinizing the rationale or motives of 
individual producers of the visual material—be they professional photographers taking the images for 
international news corporations or ordinary citizens capturing dramatic event on the spot and 
uploading them to the social media.  
On the criticism towards photojournalist in this setting see for example Linfield, 2010.  
370 This has probably has somewhat been the case throughout the modern history, but in the more 
contemporary setting I see that this function has become even more determining. As an example of this 
is the growing Western governance of war imagery from the Vietnam War Syndrome -discussion 
onwards, and particularly for example the governance, control, dissemination and design of the Gulf 
War imagery.  See chapter 2.  
371 Judith Butler discusses this  ”staging apparatus” and refers to these state functions in controlling 
and regulating the image flows and ”representability/unrepresentability” of suffering in Frames of 
War.  See: Butler 2009, 72-74. 
372 I am not here claiming that the media, humanitarian organizations or even the Western political 
actors have directly and explicitly created the circumstances that cause suffering in the first place. But 
what I claim is that they nevertheless perform as the mediators and scriptwriters of the performance 
that are aimed to reach and effect the spectating crowds. 
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the ways in which the suffering of others is presented to the spectating 
audiences, and the multifarious mediating agents furnished with diverse 
intentions determine through which arrangements the spectating audiences 
encounter the less fortunate fellow humans. Furthermore, the overall 
political, ideological, cultural and historically formed ways of seeing and 
perceiving the world—the unconscious ideology of humanitarianism—shape 
the ways in which the suffering of others are presented to the surrounding 
world. Additionally, Western spectators have grown accustomed to seeing the 
suffering of others in distinct ways, and through representational 
conventions that are culturally and historically familiar. The historically 
formed, conventional ways of presenting, as well as perceiving, affect the 
ways in which the theatrical arrangement of suffering is organized, and, 
moreover, how suffering is framed and intended to be seen, perceived and 
signified. The hierarchical power-settings embedded in the global 
humanitarian machinery, and its functions and practitioners, as well as the 
politically selective features determine whose suffering we see—and whose 
suffering remains unseen. Moreover, the representational practices of 
humanitarian imagery and images of suffering are governed by culturally and 
politically constructed norms and conventions of “taste and decency.” In 
addition to this, the material seen suitable for distribution from global war 
zones is also governed by political constraints and sometimes even regulated 
by influential high-level political actors of international politics.373   
The intention of a theatrical tragedy play is to give the spectators, through 
the force of storytelling, visual assemblage, and framing, a tour of horror, 
arousing fear in order to arouse pity, and then to provide a route to catharsis, 
a release from these emotions. Alike, I argue, images of suffering and despair 
within the humanitarian communication are set out for display with the 
intention of emotionally influencing their audiences.  The contemporary 
assemblers and presenters of tragic images, operating within the wide 
Western public sphere, assemble and arrange the spectacles of suffering 
guided by their often purpose-oriented intentions of addressing the intended 
audiences in certain ideologically formed ways. Thus, I shall in the following 
chapters (4-7) analyze the uses and arrangement of the images on the level of 
socially circulating discourses, by considering them on the levels of cultural 
norms and political utilization. By taking into account the status and position 
of the scriptwriters—the orchestrators of the theatrical setting of 
humanitarian visual communication—and analyzing the intentions of the 
actors answering for the assemblage of the arrangements and their suggested 
cultural/political readings within the contemporary humanitarian frame. I 
shall analyze and seek to unveil the contemporary theatrical arrangements of 
visually mediated distant suffering and crisis imagery.  
                                                
373 See chapter 2.4.5. Campbell, 2004; Butler, 2009, 69-83; Sontag, 2003, 59-65. For more see 
Chapter 4 and 7. 
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But before proceeding to untangling and analyzing the arrangements, 
messages and meanings of the contemporary humanitarian images, I shall in 
the following paragraphs, elaborate on how I have selected and sorted out the 
particular imageries—or acts or stagings in the contemporary humanitarian 
theater—to be scrutinized.  
3.4 THICK IMAGES 
As said, the selection of the visual images discussed in the history chapter 2 
was largely guided by previous research, and because these instances have 
been established as important watersheds and referential nodal points in the 
history of visual humanitarian communication. Thus, the formerly discussed 
images and episodes represent a somewhat conventional and established 
(perhaps canonized) ways of seeing the history of picturing atrocity and the 
Western history of evolution of humanitarian ideas. Many of the images 
discussed in chapter 2 may thus be referred to as iconic. The well-known and 
much referred to iconic nature of these images, thus, moreover, proves the 
significance of these imageries for the public imagination on the topic.  
The material of the subsequent chapters (4-7) of this study consists of 
various diverse types of images and imageries, presented by manifold 
quarters and circulated in multitude of different channels. The material 
includes images originally produced by local inhabitants of crisis areas and 
initially circulated through social media channels,374 The material also 
consists of images perhaps less familiar to the wider public, such as ‘ war 
branding imagery’ of international military organizations discussed in 
chapter 5. Some of the images analyzed are produced and presented by 
governmental actors of Western countries, mostly of the United States,375 as 
well as by influential international actors such as the NATO.376 But in 
addition to the images presented in such directly political contexts and sites 
of utilization, my interest predominantly lies in the representational 
practices, uses, framings and significations of these images within the so 
called Western mainstream media. Majority of the images analyzed in this 
study have been presented in and circulated in and through the Western 
mainstream media. 377 Such images can be seen as representations, which 
have, up to a certain extent, reached a major share of Western audiences.   
                                                
 
375 For instance  some of the material in chapters 5 and 6.  
376 Chapter 5.  
377 On ‘mainstream media’ and its functions (in remediating images of suffering):  The manufacture of 
news, Cohen, S & Young, J, Constable, London, 1972; Cottle, 2008, 111-113; Robinson, Pierce: 
Researching US Media-State Relations and Twenty-first century Wars. In Allan, Stuart & Zelizer, 
Barbie (ed.) Reporting War. Journalim in Wartime. Routledge, London, 2004. Hallin, D: The 
Uncensored War. The Media and Vietnam. Oxford University Press, New York, 1986; Barthes, 
Roland: Image, Music, Text, Fontana Press, 1977, 15-32; Hall, Stuart: The determination of News 
Photographs. In The manufacture of news, Cohen, S & Young, J, Constable, London, 1972; Chomsky 
&Herman, 2002 (1988). 
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As images of crisis and pain have a central role in international politics, as 
well as in Western contemporary public life, because of their strong emotive 
force and haunting character, and some images of pain have formed into 
well-known, much used and influential, iconic images. Calling an image of 
pain or war iconic is commonplace. By iconic it is often meant that such 
images are much used and circulated, familiar to many and well-known, even 
famous. These sorts of images are often displayed in cover illustrations and 
news contexts. They circulate fast in different mediums and gather 
multitudes of different utilizations in various contexts.  They are reproduced 
across a wide range of media, in relation to different genres and topics. Such 
images are thus widely known, as well as remembered and frequently 
referred to. They commonly are in their composition and arrangement 
culturally conventional and fulfill a certain criterion, when it comes to visual 
appearance, and are, thus, comprehended as pictorial. These kinds of images 
have cultural resonance; they are easily recognizable within a culture, easily 
read and familiar. Such images often point to well-known, familiar, historical 
images in their visual quality. Furthermore, iconic images are typically seen 
as extraordinarily metonymical and as encapsulating in regards to what they 
depict. 378 Such images are often widely discussed, and also taken up and 
analyzed in scholarly research.  
Many of the images discussed in the history chapter 2 may be 
characterized as iconic—but perhaps not all. The same might prove to be true 
of the images discussed and analyzed in the following chapters 4-7. All of the 
images discussed in this work are in some ways very emblematic, but 
perhaps not iconic, in their nature and status in the manner defined above. 
They all are not perhaps that well-known, circulated year after year in the 
media, scrutinized in research, or taken by famous photographers of famous 
people, winning photography contest or even much featured in the front 
covers of magazines, nor recirculated widely in different representations in a 
wide range of public culture. But what binds all of the images I have selected 
to be addressed together in this study is that they all may be described as 
thick. As has been explained in the introductory chapter, by a thick images 
(or imagery) I mean images that perhaps do not quite come up to the level of 
iconic, but which are, nevertheless, significant and worth of closer 
examination. Images that I call thick are often widely circulated at the 
particular point of time when they surface. Alternatively, the type of imagery 
they represent may be much used by the media/publicity to describe 
phenomena at a certain point in time. But thick images nevertheless multi-
modally and thickly (as an antonym to thinly, superficially) describe their 
objects (and events), as well as reveal significant traits of the political ethos 
descriptive of their presentational time and context. Thick images entail 
                                                
378 This is how David Perlmutter describes iconic (foreign political) images. Perlmutter, David, D: 
Photojournalism and foreign policy. Icons of outrage in international crisis. Praeger, Westport, 1998, 
11-20; See also: Hariman, Robert & Lucaites, John, Louis: No Caption Needed.  Iconic 
Phtographs, Public Culture and Liberal Democracy. University of Chicago Press, 2007, 27.  
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features, which, when analyzed in their cultural and temporal context of 
utilization, crystallize something very emblematic of the political ethos of 
their time and place.    
The term ‘thick’ I have adopted, with modifications, from Clifford Greetz’s 
concept of thick description. Greetz, an anthropologist, explained that, in 
trying to understand cultures of people, what he was interested in were the 
“webs of significance.” That is, he intended to take into account the social 
meanings and collective representations constituting significations. 
Following Greetz, a thick description—instead of a thin description, or 
superficial reporting—intends to interpret and take into account the social 
meaning behind collective representations, by analyzing and interpreting the 
contextual connections between people, the beliefs and manners and the 
characteristics of and temporal context of the event. 379 Thus, when analyzing 
thick images, a thick description and interpretation of their social and 
contextual meanings may be achieved.  
On the one hand, I have chosen the particular images/imageries for this 
research, because they clearly have relevance in light of their recurrent usage 
in the media and political context. But, on the other hand, I chose not to 
study some extremely thick, even iconic imagery, which distinctly describe 
their time and its ethos in a thick and an emblematic ways, which have been 
much discussed already in contemporary research literature, such as the Abu 
Ghraib torture images.380  One reason for this is that I strongly suspect I 
would not have many original new ideas to put forth on these much 
researched imageries, dwelled on by many brilliant minds before me. But 
beyond this, I also want to make a point that there is a corpus of not so well-
known and less researched imagery, which, nevertheless, tells descriptive 
stories of the politics of their time. These less well-known images are also 
hugely influential, because they constitute the bread and butter of visual 
humanitarian communication, and it is important to take them into 
consideration when aiming to uncover how images work in political 
humanitarian connections and contexts. I believe that by analyzing such 
more quotidian imageries also new directions for the study of such imagery 
in contemporary humanitarian settings may be opened up.  
3.4.1 IDENTIFYING AND FINDING THICK IMAGERY  
Then, how have I chosen to study and analyze the particular images 
discussed in this study? The imageries selected for analysis arise naturally 
from the Western media stream of the past 15 years. The ways these images 
                                                
379 Greetz, Clifford: Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture. In The 
Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays. Basic Books, New York, 1973, 3–30. 
380 See for instance: Sontag, Susan: Regarding the Torture of Others. New York Times, 23, 5 2004.; 
Butler, 2009; Hansen, Lene: How Images make World Politics: International icons and the case of 
Abu Ghraib . Review of International Studies.  41/2, 2015, 263-288; Dauphinée, Elisabeth: The 
Politics of the Body in Pain: Reading the Ethics of Imagery. Security Dialogue, 38/2, 2007, 139-155; 
Linfield, 2010.  
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were utilized, contextually and politically framed and signified stood out for 
me as striking, troubling, noteworthy, metonymic and thick at first glance. 
During the years of writing this study many instances and serendipitous 
juxtapositions of mediated thick imagery of suffering presented themselves 
to me in the Western media stream. In September 2009, a blurred image of a 
mortally wounded 21-year-old US Marine Joshua Bernard  (taken by an 
Associated Press photographer Julie Jacobson) stirred up a heated political 
and moral debate in the US, on whether the images should have been 
published or not. The debate told me about the political and global 
boundaries of representability (and unrepresentability)381 of human 
suffering. At about the same time with the debate on Jacobson’s images the 
Haiti earthquake (January 2010) took place. Blunt images of immense 
human suffering—images of identifiable and recognizable individuals, 
exposed, bloody, in pain or already lifeless—were scattered everywhere in the 
Western publicity. They were seen in appeals, in the news, and in the 
photographs of the US Army. The realization that pushed me into writing this 
study arouse from the contrast of these imageries. Whilst this difference 
between portraying casualties and death of Western and non-Western 
peoples in itself is not a new observation, I deemed it important to analyze 
this dynamic also from the more contemporary viewpoint. Thus writing, 
what now constitutes chapter 4 of this study, started form the observation 
that today the suffering of Western citizens—civilians and soldiers alike—is 
relatively nonexistent and invisible in popular and wide-spread visual 
representations, whereas concurrently the suffering of non-Westerners is 
abundant almost everywhere you lay your eyes on. This speaks of the visual 
performativity of humanness. The difference in the visual staging of suffering 
seemed to me to suggest different hierarchical strata of humanity and the 
Western humanitarian world political ideological thinking behind such a 
hierarchy. 
Success in contemporary warfare is essentially about winning the fight 
over the perceptions—the hearts and minds—of the surrounding world and 
justifying the desirability of the costly military operations to the home fronts. 
Visual imagery provides a central arena through which the distant spectators 
of war form their assessments on contemporary ‘overseas insurgency 
operations’ and the War on Terror. The communications team of the NATO-
led Afghanistan-ISAF operation (2003-2014) presented the events and the 
ISAF’s actions in Afghanistan through a massive amount of visual images 
uploaded onto their ISAF-Media on the flickr 382 image sharing site on the 
internet. This imagery created and circulated by the ISAF offers a revealing 
insight into the intentions and role division embedded in the visual 
narratives used to win over the hearts and minds of coalition audiences. As I 
discovered these perhaps quite extraordinary war images, instantly they 
stroke me as significant and striking; they invited me to think what their 
                                                
381 Butler, 2009, 72-76.  
382 https://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/ 
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intended messages were as well as led me to think what kind of, perhaps non-
deliberate narratives of the “humanitarian war” did they create. The visual 
material of chapter 5 is an interesting example of the visual branding—or 
visual strategic communication efforts—of the contemporary Western wars 
constructed and circulated by Western military officials and governmental 
actors. And hence this imagery speaks about how governmental actors are 
changing the way humanitarian imagery is utilized in the contemporary era.  
Chapter 6 deals not only with the contemporary foreign political 
opponents of the West but also with the Western identity as a global 
humanitarian power. Osama bin Laden was captured and killed in the 
Operation Neptune Spear in May 2011. Shortly after the operation I was 
talking with my colleague Saara Jantunen. While discussing the operation, 
the capturing of bin Laden and the Western discourse of humanitarian war, 
we spotted a spectacular visual pattern that seemed to connect the capturing 
spectacles of bin Laden in 2011 and Saddam Hussein in 2003. We saw that 
these visual spectacles narrated something significant about the 
contemporary visual presentation of Western enemies. The theatrical form of 
the humiliation and annihilation of these enemies, to us told a story of the 
humanitarian ethos of the Western world politics. Then, after the Libyan 
leader Muammar Gaddafi was captured and killed in October 2011 the 
pattern of representation that followed was very much similar to those 
picturing his precedent antagonist fellows making the (visual) narrative 
pattern even clearer, which cemented our earlier observations and compelled 
us to write about these spectacles in our separate research projects.383  These 
events visualize the central plots of the humanitarian story, as picturing the 
punishment of evil and the victory of the strong, moral Western 
humanitarian actors is essential for the functioning of the Western 
humanitarian world order.  
The reason for choosing the material of chapter 7 is somewhat similar 
and also highly personal. In the late summer 2013, I had just slowly started 
returning to work after my maternity leave, as the Ghouta Chemical attack of 
August 21st took place. Soon after the images surfaced in the media, it 
became evident that the utilizations of these images crystallized significant 
features of the visual staging of Western political theater of suffering. In 
addition to the novel mediation technique of social media, the images were 
also extensively referred to in the rhetoric of Western leaders in rationalizing 
a humanitarian military operation into Syria. I encountered the horrific 
social media images of the attack through Western mainstream media and 
could not escape them. Maybe because of being a fresh mother of a one and 
half year old baby boy, the images of suffocated small dead bodies lined up 
on a concrete floor, wearing nothing but diapers, moved and shocked me in a 
                                                
383 Saara and I both wrote separate and very different articles on the punishment narratives of the “bad 
boys” of Western world politics for Finnish Journal Kosmopolis, 4/2012. A modified version of Saara´s 
article can also be found in her Doctoral dissertation: Jantunen, Saara: Strategic Communication: 
Practise, Ideology and Dissonance. National Defence University, department of leadership and 
military pedagogy. Publication series1:11, doctoral dissertation, Juvenes print, Tampere, 2013, 145-166.  
170
 171 
profound way. I felt overwhelming grief and fear in the face of these images—
and I cried a lot while looking at them. But I also felt the need to understand 
how these images operated and how they were used in Western publicity and 
politics. Even though I did not want to look at the disturbing images that 
made me feel very anxious, I was compelled to write about their role in 
Western politics in relation to the Syrian War and about their significance in 
depicting how images flow in the global context and how they are 
contextually signified within these flows. These images certainly are thick; 
they entail something that deeply describes their time and the contemporary 
manners of mediating crisis imagery, and they, in a thick way, unveil how 
images of immense human suffering are utilized in contemporary 
international political settings. I felt that I had to include these images in this 
study.  
Besides identifying each of the cases as relevant for the study, 
coincidentally they all happened to intertwine with a story in my life and with 
my personal history. We are all, after all, products of our life time and the 
way that the representational practices embedded in humanitarian 
communication interact with our lives are part and parcel of the effect and 
power these pictures have on our modes of thinking and acting. 
Consequently, in a study like this one, the choice of the research material is 
partly influenced by emerging events, by humanitarian and political actions 
and the modes of their representation as well as by the effect that the images 
of suffering have on the wider public, me myself included. The next chapter—
Emotional Theaters of Proof: Humanity’s Conditionality in Humanitarian 
Images—analyzes the first contemporary staging of images in the visual 
humanitarian theater selected to be scrutinized in this study.  
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4 VISUAL THEATERS OF 
PROOF:HUMANITY’S CONDITIONALITY 
THROUGH IMAGES OF SUFFERING  
4.1 INTRODUCTION: THE THEATERS OF PROOF OF 
VISUALIZED SUFFERING  
Visual representations of vulnerable bodies have during the history of 
modern humanitarian communication served a focal position in shaping the 
apprehension of the shared vulnerable nature of all human kind.384 Images of 
suffering others have determined comprehensions of life worthy of 
protection, fostered demands in widening the boundaries of humanity, and 
activated benevolent sentiments and humanitarian actions. Also, today the 
ways of visually representing (bodily) vulnerability—the visual humanitarian 
tragedy theatre—occupies a central arena in which belonging to humanity 
becomes determined, and through the spectating of which, the value of lives 
of others are considered. 
When browsing through contemporary mediatized images of human 
suffering midst crisis, war and catastrophes presented within western 
publicity, a strictly hierarchical practice of representation becomes lucid. 
Representations depicting violated, suffering and dead bodies of non-
Western humans are presented to Western spectators on daily basis.  As on 
the other hand, vulnerable bodies and corporal suffering of Western 
individuals are relatively scarcely represented in the Western publicity and 
mainstream media. This is a well-acknowledged fact, simply because the 
humanitarian machinery tends to gravitate from the western sphere towards 
the non-Western world, and thus also the flow of images is predominantly 
orientated from the non-Western towards the western sphere. This visual 
tendency could perhaps also be explained by simply stating that lives of 
Westerners are more secure within relatively safe western societies and thus 
less liable to face violence.  But these explanations are not alone sufficient in 
explaining the prevailing disparity in the see-ability of non-Western bodies 
vis-à-vis their Western counterparts.  
I claim, that the highly hierarchical system which manifests itself in the 
contemporary see-ability/representability of some vulnerable bodies, and on 
the other hand the exclusion of representation/invisibility of some others in 
Western publicity, is a hierarchical system, historically formed, culturally, 
politically and discursively governed through varied representational norms 
and practices. I see this tendency reflecting the hierarchical humanitarian 
                                                
384 This topic has been discussed in more length in the former chapters of this work. See for example: 
Halttunen, 1995; Butler, 2004 ; Sliwinski, 2011.  
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system, the Western take on globally divergent value of life, as well as the 
ethos Western humanitarian international politics. Furthermore I argue, that 
the norms of upholding as well as the practices governing and constituting 
the representational arrangements of images of suffering are at a central 
position in demonstrating the apprehension of the value of life385, conditional 
nature of belonging to the realm of full-fledged humanity, and on the other 
hand, of not-belonging. This chapter deals with the hierarchical and 
conditional nature of belonging/not belonging, inclusions/exclusions of 
humanity which become demonstrated and visible through scrutinizing 
contemporary representational arrangements of images of suffering. This 
chapter thus analyses the visual norms and practices that govern the 
representation of images of crisis and pain, and therefore sheds light on how 
the contemporary Western spectator/spectatorship of images of suffering is 
constituted through representational patterns of humanitarian images.  
I argue, that the exposure to visual bombardment of vulnerable, weak and 
suffering non-Western bodies, and on the other hand strict (cultural and 
political) governance over the representation of visualized Western bodily 
vulnerability creates a visual theatre of proof (following Bruno Latour’s 
concept of theatre of proof) in which the conditionality of membership of 
humanity and different statuses of global lives become visually articulated 
and proofed.386 Thus, the objective of this chapter is analyzing the 
representational practices and visual features and substance defining the 
“human” and “subhuman” characters, which are central for the functionality 
of the humanitarian story and which are at the heart of the contemporary 
arrangements of the humanitarian tragedy theater.387  
The contemporary visual theaters of proof of (belonging to) humanity are 
in this chapter approached through a multitude of divergent contemporarily 
much circulated visual material: images of war and terrorism, images of 
natural catastrophe and epidemics as well as visual representations of 
refugees/refugeeness. Firstly, I will indicate through divergent contemporary 
cases, how the representation of non-Western suffering and Western 
suffering are rather rigidly and hierarchically arranged in the Western 
popular publicity.  The divergent visual representations of non-Western 
suffering circulating in the Western publicity are juxtaposed with the 
presentation/ governance patterns of Western suffering, and Western 
inflicted suffering. The ramifications of such representational practices in the 
context of human dignity and Western humanitarian international politics 
are pondered upon. The latter part of this chapter investigates the customary 
boundaries of visual performativity of humanness through images of refugees 
and refugeeness. Through examining the disproportional and rigid 
representational practices of human suffering I shall shed light on the 
political governance of images of suffering and analyze the contemporary 
                                                
385 Or following Judith Butler, grievable/ungrievable life. Butler, 2004.  
386 Latour, Bruno: The Pasteurization of France, Harvard University Press, 1988, 85–86 
387 See chapter 3.3. 
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representational patterns and arrangements of such images. But furthermore 
I shall take into consideration how the ethos of conventional Western global 
humanitarianism and Western apprehension of life worthy of protection and 
rights, and the conditional nature of belonging to the (full-fledged) humanity 
are constituted through the arrangements and spectatorship of such imagery. 
388 
4.2 THE HIERARCHICALLY STANDARDIZED VISUAL 
PERFORMATIVITY OF (BELONGING TO) HUMANITY 
When a natural catastrophe, terror attack or war hits non-Western crisis 
areas, pictures of vulnerable and wounded non-Western bodies commonly 
widely appear in the Western publicity. Contemporary examples of this are 
vast: The horrors of the Syrian war have been repeatedly brought home to the 
western spectators through graphic images of bodily suffering.  Bodies 
destroyed in the bombings, as well as rows of dead bodies of Syrians killed by 
the use of chemical weapons have over the recent years become painfully 
familiar to Western spectators.389 Likewise, images of bloody corpses of 
university students were widely used in the Western media to depict the 
horror caused by a terror attack in the Kenyan University of Garissa, April 
2015. Likewise, images of non-Western weak and vulnerable victims of 
natural catastrophes and sickness are commonly presented in rather blunt 
imagery. In 2015 heart-breaking images of the drowned refugee children 
acted as the ultimate wake up call for the Western spectators on the severity 
of the plight of the Syrian people and the refugees attempting to approach 
Europe.390 Westerners are spectating images of disfigured, suffering and pain 
stricken foreign bodies on a daily basis. This is despite of the lively academic, 
professional as well as public discussion of the last nearly 30 years on the 
ethics and effects of graphic images of suffering produced from the non-
Western global crisis areas, and displayed in Western publicity. The crux of 
this debate relies on the global hierarchy of suffering bodies391.  
                                                
388 Images dealt with in this chapter are compiled into collage illustrations (4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5), 
which can be viewed by the reader. These illustrations are compiled in an effort to firstly to provide the 
visual material discussed visible for the reader, but these illustrations moreover visually narrate the 
theaters of proof of humanity and act as sites of contemplation for the reader. More relevant imagery 
discussed can be found by following the links provided in the sources.  
389 The Syrian war has been reiteratedly referred to as a war mediated – also visually  – via the social 
media in a revolutionary way. Images of the Syrian war - and particularly imagery of the August 2013 
Ghouta chemical weapon attack  - are discussed in more length in the chapter 7. 
390 I here refer to predominantly to the widely circulated images of the drowned Syrian refugee child 
Aylan Kurdi, which caused an influential media spectacle in August 2015.  
391 The global hierarchy of picturing suffering was also discussed in the chapters 2&3.  
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4.2.1  THE GLOBAL HIERARCHY OF SUFFERING BODIES  
Generally the critique of the imagery bluntly mediating the suffering of non-
Western individuals for the sight of Western spectating audiences has 
stemmed from the problematic arrangements of humanitarian images, which 
have, particularly historically shown the pain stricken objects of the images 
in stereotypical and simplifying ways. The ethical as well as practical 
problems of representing the pain of others in (catastrophic bare life) 
imagery of bodily suffering have been extensively dealt with in academic 
discussion.  Chiefly this critique has targeted the imagery of suffering used by 
humanitarian organizations, which is generally aimed at arousing benevolent 
emotion and a will to help (donate) in their spectators.392 But the critique 
also hits home in the representational practices of the mainstream media, 
and media’s practices of depicting the suffering of others has also been 
widely academically discussed. 393  
The exhausting bombardment of crude “shock effect” pictures and the 
numbing amount of suffering presented to the Western spectating audiences 
has been claimed to diminish the moral and ethical responsiveness to the 
suffering of others, and rather than generating empathetic emotions, need 
and will to help, the endless visual flood of images of suffering crowds have 
been seen to produce “compassion fatigue” or  “boomerang effect”.394 Guided 
by this critique as well as practical hands-on observations, humanitarian 
organizations have from late 1980s onwards been drafting and outlining 
“codes of conducts on the images and messages” to govern the tone and 
contents of the messages sent from global crisis areas to the largely Western 
audiences. These guidelines have been complied so that the inhabitants of 
the non-Western world would not be presented to the potential helpers—the 
Western financially capable populations—in stereotypical, subjecting and 
simplifying ways; giving falsely a passive and helpless account on the subjects 
of help. Moreover, what has been central to this critique and representational 
turn of the recent decades is that crude representations have been seen to 
compromise benevolent emotional ties between the sufferers and the 
spectators, and thus seen as inadequate in in generating sufficient will to 
help, and producing necessary financial flows.395  
As was discussed in the chapter 2.4.1. after the 1980s, codes of conduct of 
images and messages regarding the representation of the “Third World”, 
compiled by humanitarian organizations (as well as the overall discussion 
                                                
392 Boltanski, 1999; Moeller, 1999; Chouliaraki, 2013; Chouliaraki, 2006; Chouliaraki, Lillie: 
Post-Humanitarianism: Humanitarian communication beyond a politics of pity. International 
Journal of Cultural Studies, 2010, 13/2, pp. 107-126; Sontag, 1977; Sontag, 2003; Cohen, 2001. For 
more on this discussion see chapter 2. 4.  
393 Ibid.; Media ethics. Issues and Cases. Patterson, Philip & Wilkins (eds.), Lee. McGraw-Hill, 
New York, 2008,pp. 206-208. see also:  Making hard choices in journalism ethics. Cases and 
practise. Boeyink, David & Borden, Sandra. Routledge, New York 2010; Society of professional 
journalist: Code of Ethics.  
394 Boltanski,1999 ; Moeller, 1999; Chouliaraki, 2013; Chouliaraki, 2006 ; Chouliaraki, 2010; 
Sontag, 2002 (1977); Sontag, 2003; Cohen, 2001.  
395Ibid; CONCORD: Code of Conduct on images and Messages 2006. 
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and development of organizational humanitarianism discussed in the chapter 
2.4.1.) have led to a situation in which visual representations used by 
humanitarian organizations in their fund raising and appeals have 
significantly altered. Topically humanitarian appeals more and more tend to 
engage their audiences through positive appeals, which attempt to show the 
objects of help as more active subjects and appeal to their spectators through 
concentrating on the similarity between the spectated and the (Western) 
spectators. Within recent years, humanitarian appeals have even oriented 
towards using visual representations that move away from the customary 
photorealistic accounts, and leaned towards often non-photorealistic post-
humanitarian appeals which attempt to engage their spectators with the 
suffering and need of help of others—their petitions revolving around the 
agency and emotions of the spectators.396   
In addition to the organizational sphere, the discussion over ethical issues 
regarding the uses of graphic and objectifying images of human suffering in 
and by the mainstream media has also been lively during the last decades. 
Hence, guidelines for making ethical choices directed and tailored for 
journalists and media houses have also been assembled. Associations of 
journalists have drafted codifications of ethical representations, which also 
deal with considerations of publishing tragic visual images. For instance, as a 
basic rule, photojournalists are encouraged to contemplate the privacy, 
intimacy and dignity of the photographed subject when pictured at times of 
dramatic events. The necessity to intrude into the “personal space” of the 
victim is instructed to be bared in mind and carefully contemplated while 
considering the nature of images published. Questions such as “should this 
moment be made public”, “will being photographed cause further trauma”, 
and “am I acting with compassion and sensitivity”, are urged to be asked by 
the ones producing as well as publishing such images. Issue such as “drawing 
the line” and “good taste” are discussed and ethical observation is 
encouraged.397 Generally there is no mention of different standards when 
producing or publishing photos of more distant foreign victims and (socially, 
culturally, spatially or emotionally) ‘closer’, Western or domestic victims.  
On the other hand, the concept of journalistic “globally comparative value 
of death” in publishing violent events is often referred to when discussing 
reportage of crisis and dramatic, violent events. By “comparative value of 
death” it is pointed to a tendency of (globally, culturally and politically) 
biased reportage, drawn on the principle of “nearest is dearest”:  for instance 
in America “one dead fireman in Brooklyn is worth five English bobbies, who 
are worth 50 Arabs, who are worth 500 Africans”. This tendency reflects a 
logic embedded deep in the human mind on caring most of the people whom 
are closest to us, and whom we identify with in cultural, geographical and 
                                                
396 Chouliaraki, 2013; Chouliaraki, 2010; Cohen, 2011.  See also chapter 2.4.1.  
397 Media ethics. Issues and Cases. Patterson, Philip & Wilkins (eds.), Lee. McGraw-Hill, New 
York, 2008,pp. 206-208. see also:  Making hard choices in journalism ethics. Cases and 
practise. Boeyink, David & Borden, Sandra. Routledge, New York 2010; Society of professional 
journalist: Code of Ethics.   
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political terms.398 However, as the standard of publishing crude images of 
pain remains divided along cultural lines, the logic of “nearest is the dearest” 
in the case of visual images of pain functions in a somewhat reverse manner. 
As Susan Sontag has noted, the further the victim of violence is culturally 
(politically and geographically and in regards to identity), the more eagerly 
gruesome images and detailed accounts of the violence encountered by her 
are featured in the Western publicity. And in turn, the closer the victim is to 
the intended spectating audiences, less visual representations of her physical 
suffering is usually shown.399 And thus, despite the altered conventions of 
visual representation in the organizational appeal field, and ethical codes of 
(visual) journalism by Western media, I can be argued, the visual 
representational style of Western mainstream media has not followed the 
softer current contemporarily commonplace in the appeals of humanitarian 
organizations.  
So, despite of the ethical considerations regarding presentation and 
publication of images of pain, codifications revolving around the concepts of 
dignity and honour of victims and culturally formed “codes of taste and 
decency”, the visualized non-Western pain in Western media remains the 
norm. The persistent use of images of suffering can be seen as quite 
understandable, regarding the long history and central standing of images of 
pain and crisis in humanitarian communication and in informing the 
surrounding world of distant catastrophes. Furthermore, it is quite 
expectable that up to certain extent the news media outlets cannot restrain 
from using photographic and photorealist representations in describing and 
mediating information on urgent foreign events. At least not in a way that 
might perhaps be possible for premeditated and carefully considered appeals 
of humanitarian organizations. But what is truly remarkable in the context of 
visual performativity of humanness is that while images of battered bodies 
flood in to the sight of Western spectators, these bodies almost as a norm not 
“our bodies”, but bodies of global others—“foreign bodies” of non-Western 
individuals. Thus it seems that the sketched ethical considerations seem not 
to be, in their full scope, applied when publishing representation of the 
inhabitants of the non-Western world. These considerations predominantly 
only govern the presentation of Western bodies.400  
This disproportion has essential consequences for apprehending and 
assessing the value of life and determining the humanity of “us” and “them” 
in global political context. As has been discussed, Judith Butler bases the 
body as the base of being, knowing, as well as feeling for the other. And 
furthermore, she sees the apprehension of shared vulnerable condition of all 
bodies (all humans) as the foundation of apprehending a shared humanity, 
                                                
398Moeller,1999,22; See also, Ginzburg, Carlo: Killing a Chinese Mandarin: The Moral 
Implications of Distance. Critical Inquiry, 1994, vol. 21, 46-60 
399 Sontag, 2003. ; Campbell, 2004; Hanusch, Folker: Publishing the Perished: The visibility of 
Foreign death in Australian quality newspapers. Media international Australia, Incorporating Culture 
and Policy, 125, 29-40, 2007.  
400 Campbell, 2004; Butler, 2009, 63-100.  
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or human community. But she acknowledges that some (human) lives (and 
bodies) are apprehended as more valuable than others; some lives are highly 
protected and grieved over, as some others are not so keenly supported, nor 
mourned over.401 This tendency is poignantly made clear by the globally 
differentiated representational practices of images of bodily human 
vulnerability.  Furthermore, as Monica Casper and Lisa Jean Moore have 
observed, visibility of some bodies and on the other hand the invisibility of 
some other (vulnerable) bodies is due to complex and intermingling 
conditions, such as race, gender, age, geography, status, class and 
citizenship—and power.402  Further, Allen Feldman has remarked, that often 
the pictures of dead foreign others act as messages of the Western mastery or 
superiority, and further of Western “cultural anaesthesia”: by presenting the 
non-Western “others” as the weak and vulnerable to violence, the Western 
“us” in comparison becomes presented as powerful, strong, even inviolable. 
403  
As the standard is that violent and crude pictures of human suffering in 
the midst of wars, crises and catastrophes are pictured through non-Western 
suffering bodies, and as, on the other hand the bodily suffering of Western 
citizens is rarely seen, visualizations of crisis create strong globally, culturally 
and politically divided conditional hierarchical arrangements and 
juxtapositions. Thus, looking through the representational practices of 
vulnerable bodies it seem, that while the inhabitants of the Western world 
seem to be safe from harm—living safely, protected by their orderly societies, 
political systems and the western human rights and humanity notions—the 
non-Western individuals appear comparatively looking as precarious, 
unprotected, even uncivilized—and are (re)presented in as weak corporal 
subhumanity.404 Therefore this predominant visual representational style 
also suggests, that the hamartia—the tragic mistake of the lead player of the 
humanitarian tragedy leading to his/her misfortune, as was discussed in 
chapter 3—is actually attributed by the coincidence of the sufferer being a 
non-Westerner.405 Thus, the representational arrangements of bodily 
vulnerability can be seen to exemplify and reflect, and moreover to construct 
and constitute the global rigidly hierarchical Western apprehension on the 
human kind and valuable life, by providing visual proof of the conditionality 
of humanity.  In the following paragraphs I will open up the concept of 
“theatre of proof”, and its usefulness in the context of reading and 
apprehending the (hidden) messages embedded in the globally hierarchically 
unevenly divided presentation practices of images of bodily vulnerability.  
                                                
401 Butler, 2004, 26-32.  
402 Caspers, Monica, J & Moore, Lisa, Jean: Missing Bodies. The Politics of Visibility. New York 
University Press, New York, 2009 
403 Feldman, Allen: On Cultural Anesthesia: from Desert Storm to Rodney King. American 
Ethnologist,  2/21, 1994, 404-418.   
404 I here refer to the hierarchical “humanitarian story” and the non-Western ”subhuman character” as 
discussed in chapters 2&3.  
405 See Chapter 3.2.1.  
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4.2.2 THE THEATRE OF PROOF OF VULNERABLE/INVIOLABLE 
BODIES 
In the 1880s French chemist Louis Pasteur aimed to prove germ theory and 
the functionality of vaccinations with the help of public, visual and corporeal 
illustrative shows. The 1880s public was skeptical of the effectiveness of 
vaccinations and germs as the cause of illnesses. This was mainly because 
they had no knowledge or understandable proof on the workings of 
epidemics or germ theory, and were thus reluctant to share the abstract and 
to the human eye invisible ideas of scientist. By publically staging live 
animals, vaccinating some of them and leaving some without a vaccination—
and tagging the vaccinated and non-vaccinated animals by different visual 
markings—Pasteur set up a dramatized visual “theater of proof” on the 
functionality of vaccinations. As Bruno Latour describes it:  
Pasteur’s genius was in what might be called the theater of the proof 
…Pasteur invented such dramatized experiments that the spectators 
could see the phenomena he was describing in black and white. 
Nobody really knew what an epidemic was; to acquire such 
knowledge required a difficult statistical knowledge and long 
experience. But the differential death that struck a crowd of chickens 
in the laboratory was something that could be seen ‘as in broad 
daylight.’... To ‘force’ someone to ‘share’ one’s point of view, one must 
indeed invent a new theater of truth. 406 
 
Thus Pasteur proved the effectiveness of vaccinations and the protection 
against illnesses they offered by conducting dramatic visual shows and 
proofing the effect of vaccinations by showing the corporeal proof to the 
spectators: dead carcasses of the non-vaccinated animals, and on the other 
hand, the alive bodies of the vaccinated animals belonging to the control 
reference group. Bruno Latour sees Pasteur’s genius in addressing the crowds 
by the usage of the spectacular visual proof; by visually and corporeally 
showing and thus making the crowd to visually bear witness to the 
phenomena, he persuaded, or even forced them to share his authoritarian 
point of view. 407 The idea and power of the theater of proof is in the use of a 
visual, spectacular representation as an expedient to show and prove an 
otherwise invisible phenomenon.  By making the spectators visually bear 
witness to the spectacle, the audience is persuaded to share the point of view 
of the authority, an authoritarian social discourse or an ideology.  Thus the 
arrangement of the theater of proof also functions as a particular method of 
producing certainty on an otherwise abstract and intangible phenomenon.    
In order to understand the use of the term and concept of “theater of 
proof” in the context of humanitarian pictures, let’s think of the suffering 
bodies of the humanitarian pictures as actors on the stage of a theatrical 
                                                
406 Latour, Bruno: The Pasteurization of France, Harvard University Press, 1988, 85–86. 
407 Ibid.  
179
Visual Theaters of Proof:Humanity’s Conditionality Through Images of Suffering 
 180 
(tragedy) play. As has been discussed in the previous chapters of this work, 
visual images of suffering and bodily precarity have served a great role in the 
apprehension of a shared human condition, formation and evolution of 
humanity discourse, the institutionalization of human rights and within the 
development of humanitarian world politics. Pictures of suffering are 
inevitable for the humanitarian discourse for it to convoy its message. 408 
Thus, pictures of pain and corporeal suffering in the context of the widening 
apprehension of protectable life, political and institutional formation and 
evolution of human rights, humanity discourse and humanitarian world 
politics can be seen to produce a type of “theater of proof”. In humanitarian 
context the suffering corporeal body has been used to illustrate the otherwise 
invisible: the pain felt by others, the need for help, distress of faraway bodies 
and the madness of war, as well as making the abstract ideas of humanity 
and human worth see-able—as something concrete and tangible. Just like 
Pasteur’s test animals, the suffering bodies in the pictures are set on the stage 
to make the invisible ‘truth’ and function of the paradigm ‘black and white’. 
By viewing the arrangements of images of suffering as a visual 
humanitarian theatre of proof which produces certainty and visually 
illustrates the value and need of protection of human lives, and by placing 
such representations under examination in their contextual, ideological and 
visual surroundings, the meanings, messages and effects of this type of 
picturing may be scrutinized. And moreover, by scrutinizing such visual 
arrangements also underlying Western conceptions on the world and on 
humanity may be retrieved. This, abstract and often unconsciously affecting 
notions of human rights, the humanity discourse and politics of 
humanitarian ideology become “black and white” in the theatre of proof of 
visualized bodily human vulnerability. The distinctions and global/cultural 
differences and divergent norms in visual presentation of bodily vulnerability 
underline the ideological power and function of Western humanity politics, 
human rights and humanitarianism discourse. I argue that, authoritarian 
arrangements of images of suffering presented in public force the spectators 
to see and witness corporeal pain and the fragility of human life in certain 
rigid arrangements and settings, and thus they forcefully affect political 
emotions, humanitarian responses and apprehensions of valuable life. Thus 
they also aim to demonstrate the power, effectiveness of and need for 
humanitarian world politics.409 In the subsequent pages of this chapter I 
shall illustrate by contemporary examples, how the theatre of proof of images 
of suffering works to demonstrate the power and dominance of the (Western 
way of life exemplified by) humanitarian ideology, as well as the (globally) 
stratified conditionality of humanity.   
                                                
408 See chapter 2.  Sontag, 1977; Moeller, 1999; Zelizer, 1998; Sliwinski, 2011.  
409 Butler, 2009, 67-670, Sontag 2003, 85.  
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4.3 CONTEMPORARY HUMANITARIAN THEATRES OF 
PROOF OF PICTURING TERROR, PAIN AND 
SICKNESS 
Marred bodies of the victims of a terror attack from Africa and images of 
hundreds of civilian casualties of the Syrian War, lying in long rows on a cold 
concrete floor—normal mediation of daily news, and visually mediated 
business as usual from the topical chaotic crisis zones. A blurred image of a 
wounded Western soldier in Afghanistan, American citizens leaping to their 
death from a collapsing building in the aftermath of a terror attack—
widespread public outrage centring on the disrespectfulness and 
tastelessness of picturing individuals in their critical moments of 
vulnerability.  Weak and vulnerable bodies of non-western victims of 
catastrophes aided and saved by strong, militarized western helper figures: 
an arrangement never averted, which thus produces stories of global 
hierarchies and power structures.  
In the following paragraphs I will investigate the differences of 
(corporally) picturing the suffering of Western individuals and non-Western 
individuals in contemporary widely circulated media images. I examine the 
forms of governance of such images; norms and restrictions placed on visual 
representation of Western pain, and on the other hand the public 
presentation patterns of non-Western pain. I shall as well contemplate on 
what the public arrangements of images of suffering communicate to 
Western spectators when apprehended as a humanitarian theatre of proof on 
human worth. Through the themes of personhood, honour and dignity I shall 
analyze how the distinctions in visual presentation of human suffering 
articulate and configure the Western conceptions of a singular human kind 
and (un)conditional human worth. Moreover, l shall pay attention to the 
ways of picturing of not only pain, but also its alleviation. Thus I also take a 
look at images produced and circulated of the ones helping and governing the 
lives of the weak—and analyze what these arrangements tell of Western 
comprehensions of the global division of capabilities and (human) character, 
and of the ethos of the humanitarian world politics of the early 2000s.  
4.3.1  BLUNTLY EXHIBITING THE SUFFERING AND BRUTALITY OF THE 
NON-WESTERN SPHERE 
It is commonplace for a Western media spectator to find herself facing a 
mutilated or a dead body of unnamed distant stranger. This has happened to 
me hundreds, if not thousands of times. One such occasion was late August 
2010. I was at home browsing through daily news late at night on my laptop, 
as I encountered a piece of news from Somalia: A terror attack carried out by 
a terrorist group Al- Shabaab in Mogadishu hotel killed 31, among them 6 
181
Visual Theaters of Proof:Humanity’s Conditionality Through Images of Suffering 
 182 
members of the Somali Parliament.410 What stalled me at face of this news 
was perhaps not amazement due to the bloody terror attack, taking place in 
unruly Somalia, but rather the way the news on the attack was illustrated. As 
I clicked the Reuters story open, what I encountered was a bloody body of a 
member of the Somali parliament who was killed in the attack. Another 
image accompanying the news bluntly and recognizably showed another 
dead Somalian MP being moved by soldiers and locals, covered in blood, his 
head hanging lifelessly as he was lifted.411 Also an image of Somalian 
(Western backed provisional government’s) soldiers dragging the dead body 
of a member of the Al-Shabaab killed during the fight behind a military 
vehicle was included in the slideshow of images illustrating the events. 412 To 
say the least these images and the scenery they paint are brutal, but in fact 
what these images communicate in a global political context and how, is not 
uncommon. (For these images see illustration 4.1.413) 
When looking at the images I was astonished, firstly because the imagery 
pictured members of the Somali government in such a blunt and brutal way. 
Furthermore, what caught my eye was that as the bodies pictured were 
nominated as members of the parliament, the names of the victims 
nevertheless were not mentioned. This simply would not be the case in 
picturing members of the parliament or other high-level politicians of the 
Western sphere, nor even usually Western ‘ordinary civilian’ victims of terror 
attacks.414 Neither would an image of an act in which a body of a killed 
terrorist is being degraded behind a vehicle be generally seen as normal 
mediation of information in the Western context. What evoke me was this 
norm of bloody representation from the non-Western crisis zones seems to 
prevail despite of the fact that the Western media’s ethical norms generally 
recommend that images published of dramatic events which include human 
suffering should be carefully pondered upon and avoided. In choosing images 
to illustrate dramatic events involving human suffering, journalistic 
codifications recommend avoiding violating the “sense of self” and the 
privacy of the victim, as well as place importance on the use of “good taste”. 
As media norms stress ethical approaches such as treating “every subject (of 
a photograph) as an end, not as an means to an end”, this sort of a visual 
arrangement clearly points otherwise. 415 Thus I started asking questions: 
why were these images selected to publish, and what do they communicate in 
their contextual surroundings?  
                                                
410 Somali militants storm hotel, 31 dead includes MPs. August 24.2010, Reuters.  Also other 
Western news outlets ran the story with same or similar images: At Least 30 killed in Somali 
Hotel Attack, New York Times, August 24, 2010.  
411 See illustration 4.1. 
412See illustration 4.1 
413 Included in the illustration 4.1 are the three mentioned images included in the Reuters story 
Somali militants storm hotel, 31 dead includes MPs. August 24.2010, Reuters.   
414 Susan Sontag writes that “the powerless are not named in the captions”. Does this then mean that in 
comparison to Westerners not even the Somalian MP’s have power? Sontag, 2003, 70. , see also 
Butler, 2009, 94 
415 Media Ethics, issues and cases, 2011, 208.  
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It may be argued that the images showing the human toll and brutality of 
the acts—both from the side of the al-Shabaab terror and also in relation to 
the violent retaliation of the Somalian (Western back) government forces—
describe and vividly illustrate the events and make them extremely tangible 
for a Western spectators. They without a doubt throw the brutality of 
terrorism in a ‘failed state’ straight at the face of the spectator in an 
extremely blunt way. The images, especially when accompanying the text of 
the Reuters news, give a painfully clear picture of the violence, havoc and 
uncontrolled circumstances in conflict-ridden Mogadishu at the moment of 
the events.  The news text highlights how the event shows that the 
government forces well as African Union peacekeepers have failed to bring 
order to Somalia tormented by violent anarchy for already two decades. The 
uncontrolled situation of Somalia, atmosphere of violence and fear, sense of 
panic and impending threat, brutality and bloody nature of the conflict (from 
both sides) are made very evident and highlighted by the intermingle of the 
images and the text. As the images concentrate on showing the human toll 
and brutality in corporal arrangements, the text goes on to describe “how the 
blood of the dead is leaking out of the hotel”, and how workers cleaned the 
floor by pushing the bloody water out of the hotel with their brushes, and 
how men, decapitated and armless, riddled with bullets were lying outside 
the site of the attack.416 Thus the arrangement can be seen to amplify the 
sense of threat and fear, and build up an image of a totally failed state in a 
state of uncivilized brutality.  
Thus I argue, that rather than arousing empathetic sentiments in the 
spectator/reader, or strengthening emotional ties and bridging the moral gap 
between the sufferers and the spectators, the arrangement of the images and 
the text produce sentiments of fear and resentment, which stem from 
highlighting the brutality, extreme bloodshed and chaos. As the extreme and 
chaotic brutality of the event is underlined, the distance between the safe 
Western spectators and the victims depicted in the images grows. Added with 
the violent retaliation of the government forces emphasized by the 
arrangement of the news story and the images, the sensation of distance and 
belonging to another world are perhaps even more amplified for the Western 
spectator. 417 The cooperative effect created by the images of the dead MP’s 
and the degraded body of the Al- Shabaab fighter underline the cruelty and 
spirit of inhumanness and uncivilizedness of both sides of the conflict. Thus 
empathetic sentiments of the spectator are even less probable to be aroused, 
since neither the mutilated Al-Shabaab fighter nor the dead politicians are 
presented as innocent or impartial “ideal victims” who’s suffering should be 
particularly mourned over. Rather, it could be said, that the images are used 
in a way, which presents the political situation in the area as potentially 
threatening (also to the wider surrounding world) and in a total quagmire. 
Thus the exhibition of the bodies seems rather to be “a means to an end”, 
                                                
416 Somali militants storm hotel, 31 dead includes MPs. Reuters August 24.2010 
417 Cohen, 2001, 193-195.  
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than an end in itself.  Moreover, as the news concentrates on the threat of 
islamist terrorism, it also highlights that even though the Western powers are 
not tempted to send forces to Somalia to fight the threat (as was pointed out 
in the text), they are keen to support the legal government forces (and 
“transitional federal institutions”)418. Thus, the West (United States and well 
as the EU) are presented as forces providing help, standing on the side of 
security, tranquillity, civilization and a more prosperous future of Africa. 419 
What makes the visual arrangement of this news story so noteworthy is its 
relative prevalence in the mediation of information of the contemporary 
Western mainstream media.   The arrangement of the photos depicting the 
situation in Somalia are not unique, but rather follow a visual norm of 
picturing violent events of the non-Western world, which would not be 
applied in presenting similar Western events.  Equivalent was for example 
the case with the terrible news of a terror attack killing almost 150 people in 
the Kenyan university of Garissa April 2015. The news of the terrorist attack 
was commonly run in the Western media illustrated by brutal images 
depicting horror at the scene.  The images habitually depicted dead bodies of 
the victims in lecture rooms: knocked over chairs, tens of often recognizable 
and tangled up corpses of university student lying in pools of blood. The 
news of the terror attack was often also accompanied with images of student 
at the spot in panic and crying, as well as images of the bloody and injured 
victims at a hospital. The images of horror, again caused by an Al-Shabaab 
were openly circulated in the Western media, despite of their bloody and 
graphic nature. 420 Images of dead or even wounded students after Western 
school shootings (which can sometimes be seen as a type of terrorism421) 
would not, as a rule be published in Western mainstream media. Nor are 
were images of recognizable victims of the 2105 January or November Paris 
terror attack, or mutilated victims of the April 2016 Brussels attack shown in 
Western mainstream media representations. (An image, which was widely 
circulated in the Western media picturing the Garissa attack, is included in 
the illustration 4.1) 
Again, it could be said, that the use of such imagery was presented in an 
attempt to illustrate the nature of the situation at the campus and “the extent 
                                                
418 Quotations from the news text:  
”Analysts agree that, despite their worries about Somalia serving as a base for international Islamist 
militancy, there is no appetite among Western powers to send forces to Somalia.” 
”In Massachusetts, John Brennan, assistant to U.S. President Barack Obama for counterterrorism 
and homeland security, said Washington would "continue to work very closely with those in Africa, 
particularly in the Horn of Africa and Somalia, who are interested in ensuring that Africa can build 
and realize its full potential and prosperity for all Africans."   
”EU foreign affairs chief Catherine Ashton said the EU remained fully committed to providing long-
term support to the transitional federal institutions of Somalia.” Ibid.  
419 Ibid.  
420 See for example: 147 Dead, Islamist gunmen killed after attack at Kenya collage. April 
3,2015, The CNN; Paraded in front of a primary School: Gruesome pictures emerge of the 
terrorist’s bodies being put on display as survivors of the Kenya massacre is found 
alive after hiding in a wardrobe for two days. April 4, 2015. The Daily Mail:  
421 See for example: Aaltola, Mika: Koulusurmaaja rinnastuu itsemurhapommittajaan. September, 
25,2008, Vieraskynä, Helsingin Sanomat.  
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of al Shabaabs crimes”422.  The images of dead bodies in a classroom were 
seen by Western media outlets to “reveal the true horror of the massacre “. 423 
But clearly the choice of the visual footage again communicated much more 
than just neutral dissemination of information. Rather, the arrangement of 
images in mediating the news by the use of violent imagery, paints a picture 
of threat of islamist terrorism (towards Christian people) and in doing so, 
quite ruthlessly intrudes the “personal space” of the victims and exploit the 
victims at extremely fragile moments. It could be asked, does the publication 
of such images actually somehow enhance the understanding or perception 
of the Western spectators of the events, or were the images published only to 
produce gruesome sensations of astonishment in a rather pornographic or at 
least sensationalist (meaning aiming to arouse quick and intense emotional 
reaction by exploding graphic, and rather personal visual material)424 
manner.   
There are many differences in these two cases, but what binds them 
together is the arrangement of showing brutal violence taking place in a non-
Western setting by utilizing graphic and blunt picturing of non-Western 
bodies. Although the publication of such brutal images is seemingly justified 
by mediating information on foreign crisis situations for Western media 
spectators, the contextual arrangement seem to be quite stereotypically 
centered on the violent brutality of the non-Western crisis zones. Moreover 
the publication of these images clearly compromises the ethical practices 
drawn by Western media houses themselves. The reportage of these cases 
and especially their visual assemblage and the way they were chosen to be 
presented in Western media cannot be termed as misrepresentations per se. 
But they nevertheless by the use of graphic images, clearly present the events 
in somewhat stereotypical and ethically dubious, even pornographic ways. 
Thus the arrangement of the images create a theatre of proof, which 
visualizes and provides proof of the uncivililizedness of the pictured areas, 
create impressions on their innate tendency for violence and the precarity of 
the lives of the people inhabiting them.425  
Then, what can be learned from the examples of the visual arrangements 
in braking the stories of the 2010 terror attack in Somalia and the Garissa 
University attack of 2015, and their visual arrangement by juxtaposing these 
imageries with the representational practices of images depicting the 
suffering of Western individuals midst terror attacks and war?  
                                                
422 As Journalist for New Yorker explained his decision of sharing brutal images of the victims on 
Twitter. See: Garissa massacre and the dissemination of Graphic photos.  Latif Dahir, Abdi, 
April 10, 2015, Sahan Journal. 
423 Ibid.  
424 See for instance: Halttunen, 1994, 312- 325.  
425 What is further interesting here is that the picturing Somalia and Kenya here is rather generic, 
despite of the fact that the two African countries are very different in their economic and societal build. 
The two countries thus just seem to represent ”Africa” as a one big crisis area, without making 
distinctions between the conflict-ridden Somalia and rather stable Kenya.  
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4.3.2 THE GLOBAL CONDITIONALITY OF PERSONHOOD, HONOUR 
AND DIGNITY 
Ethical codes of Western media habitually encourage fair and considerate 
approach on publishing images, and especially when picturing persons at 
times of distress and pain respect and compassion are recommended to be 
bared in mind. The Code of Ethics the Society of professional journalist urge 
journalist to “minimize harm” and to treat all “sources” as “human beings 
deserving of respect”.426 But the conventions of media representations and 
the choices made with regards to which images to show and which not, are 
not solely in the hands of journalists, or not even solely governed by 
influential media houses. Culturally driven codes of taste and decency, as 
well as straightforward political restrictions govern the conventions of how 
pain is presented and encountered in visual images.  
Publishing images of war casualties and suffering inflicted by war has 
throughout history been objected to strict governmental control. This is also 
an issue in which—in especially times of conflict and war—self-censorship of 
(national) media(s), “rallying around the flag” -effect and “manufacturing 
consent” has played a part in.427 These predispositions are still today in place.  
As an example of the regulation of the presentation of images of war 
causalities in the Western media, a rather resent case of US (Governmental) 
visual censorship is enlightening.  Until a few years ago it was forbidden to 
take and circulate photos of the coffins of US soldiers deceased in wars waged 
overseas. The ban on photographing the returning caskets of soldiers was 
implemented at the time of the Gulf War (1991) by President Bush.428 
Attempts to politically control and ban publication of images of war is quite 
comprehensible from the point of view of Western strategic political and 
military aspirations, as images pointing to the bodily precarity and suffering 
of soldiers has been seen to damage war efforts and to diminish the public 
support of military operations. Thus Western high-level politicians have 
controlled the visibility of such aggravating imagery. 429 But restrictions on 
publishing images of dead or wounded Western soldiers  (or other 
individuals) are not only placed because of political efforts of governmental 
actors to ban the circulation and visibility of images of Western bodily 
precarity. The presentation and circulation of such images is habitually in the 
West frowned upon and widely perceived as offending the rights, dignity and 
                                                
426SPJ Code of Ethics. Society of professional journalist, September 6.,2014: 
http://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp 
427 This was dealt with in the chapter 2. For more, see for instance: Reporting war, Journalism in 
war time, 2004; Cottle, 2009; Chomsky & Edwards, 2002.  
428 On the ban on the photography of the coffins, see: Butler, 2009, 65; Pentagon Ban on 
Pictures of Dead Troops Is Broken. Carter, Bill, New York Times, April, 23.2004; Pentagon 
Rethinks Photo Ban on Coffins Bearing War Dead. Scott Tyson, Ann and Berman, Mark, 
Washington Times 17. 2.2009. See also Caspers, & Moore. 2009. For more on this subject, see also 
Chapter 2.4.5 
429 See Butler, 2009, 65.  These themes are also dealt with in the chapter 5, when the images of the 
Afghan war are discussed.  
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honour of the depicted victims. 430  (Included in the illustration 4.2 is an 
image of flag draped coffins returning to US soil from war.) 
A case of such intermingle of political control and cultural governance 
restricting our view on suffering of Western individual midst war, is the story 
of an image of a mortally wounded US soldier Joshua Bernard at his last 
painful moments in Afghanistan, taken by an Associated Press (AP) 
photojournalist Julie Jacobson in 2009. Jacobson worked in Afghanistan for 
AP as an embedded journalist431 moving along with the troops.  She had 
signed the embed rules in order to be able to do her job as a photojournalist 
mediating the situation in Afghanistan, and to be able to move around in the 
area.432  One day her embed-unit was ambushed. Jacobson followed the 
embedding rules and took photos of the situation from afar, without 
meddling in the occurring events. As a result, grainy pictures taken from 
distance, barely recognizably showing Bernard mortally wounded by grenade 
came into existence. Jacobson and AP contemplated publishing the pictures 
for a few weeks, after which they came to the conclusion, that the images 
should be published, in order to show the bloody and unfortunate reality of 
war.433 (Included in the illustration 4.2 is the Photo of Bernand, taken by 
Julie Jacobson in 2009.) 
Visually showing an image of the dying US soldier in the Western media 
evoked public discussion and comments from the highest political circles. 
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates intervened personally in the discussion, 
stating that AP should not have published the picture. Gates resented the 
publication of the photos on the grounds of “respect of the soldier”. He 
stressed that the media company should have had a sense of honor and 
sensitivity towards Bernard’s family by not publishing such photos of their 
loved one. Gates accused AP of “lack of compassion and common sense”. He 
called the presentation of such footage as “appalling” and saw it as 
representing bad judgment and lack of decency.434 The Western media’s 
“codes of taste and decency”435 and the Western cultural norms of decency 
forcefully come into play in the case of the picture of Bernard, as Defense 
secretary Gates namely called the publication of the picture as offending the 
                                                
430 This discussion is exemplified by for example by the high level political and moral discussion stirred 
up by a picture taken by Associated Press photographer Julie Jacobson in the autumn 2009 of a 
mortally wounded soldier Joshua Bernard in Afghanistan. For this discussion see:  Behind the 
scenes: to Publish or Not. New York Times, the Lens Blog. September 4, 2009; Joshus Bernand 
Photo: Marine Dies in Afghanistan. Huffington Post, October 20, 2009.  
431 More on the embedded journalism and its effects on the media practices and messages see: 
Thumber Howard, Prisoner of news values: Journalism, professionalism and identification in 
times of war.  In Reporting War. Journalism in wartime. 2004, 190-205; Robinson,  Piers: 
Researching US media – state relations in twenty-first century wars. In Reporting War.2004, 96-
112.  
432 Pubic affairs guidance (PAG) on embedding media during possible future operations/Deployments 
in the U.S. central command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR).  
433  AP and the Death of a Marine, September, 3, 2009, The Associated Press; Dunlap, David, V : 
Behind the scenes: rewriting new rules. October, 15, 2009, The New York Times LensBlog.  
434 Dunlap, David: Behind the Scenes: To Publish or Not? New York Times, Lens Blog September 4, 
2009.  
435 Campbell, David: Horrific Blindness. Images of Death in contemporary Media. Journal for 
Cultural Research, Vol. 8/1, 2004.  
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common sense of taste and decency. Correspondingly media 
recommendations in regards to publishing imagery of suffering often also 
point to the abstract notion of “good taste”.436  As Susan Sontag writes in her 
book Regarding the Pain of Others: ”Good taste is always a repressive 
standard when invoked by institutions and acting as obscuring a host of 
concern about public order and public morale that cannot be named”. 437  In 
the case of the public presentation of pictures of suffering, the question of 
what is of good taste or what is decent, make visible the boundaries of 
culturally defined decency as well as human dignity as cultural, political, 
globally and contextually conditional constructions. When juxtaposed for 
instance with the cases of Somalia and Kenya discussed earlier, it becomes 
clear that same rules and definitions of (in)decent and (dis)tasteful do not 
apply to all humans in the same extent. What is revealing here is that 
publications of the picture of a dying US marine is seen as indecent and 
appalling, violating the honor of the Western person and sufferer of political 
violence. But on the other hand, displaying the marred body of a Somali 
legislator is seen as normal news, mediation of information, and business as 
usual.  
The tendency to attempt to hide precarious Western bodies, can also be 
seen to tell a story of Western de-realization of the nature and bodily effects 
of war; the humanitarization of the concept of the new war, and of the 
reluctance to face fragile human corporeality and mortality attached to the 
concept.438 But it is not just that Western military related deaths and 
suffering—potentially jeopardizing the popularity, support for, and 
humanitarian image of Western waged war—that are habitually cleansed 
from the Western media representations. David Campbell has observed that 
codes of “taste and decency” also more generally govern the presentation 
practices of visual images of suffering and violence in the Western media, 
causing particularly Western bodily suffering to disappear from the media 
scene. Placing harsh pictures of suffering Westerners on display and 
visualizing deceased Western bodies is widely resented by audiences and 
thus avoided by media houses. This is often also done on the grounds that 
showing this type of suffering is immoral, tasteless and indecent.439  
A well-known and much discussed case of public outrage at in the face of 
contemporary images depicting Western suffering is the image of the falling 
man. The collapsing Twin Towers hit by aeroplanes became the iconic visual 
representations of the events of the 9/11:  pictures of towers coming down 
and the destruction of the metaphorical structures—representing the 
symbolic stately body under attack—were repeated over and over again in the 
media, and have been iconized as the leading way to illustrate the events. But 
early on after the catastrophe other ways to visually represent the event —
                                                
436 Media ethics. Issues and Cases. 2008, 206-208.  
437 Sontag, 2003, 61-62; Jantunen& Kotilainen, 2014.  
438 See for instance, Butler, 2009, 64-66.  
439 Campbell, 2004.  
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also images showing suffering bodies and corporeal humans heading for 
their destruction—were also circulating in the Western media. The pictures 
of the “falling man” taken by photographer Richard Drew—images of 
individuals jumping or falling from the burning towers–were early on 
commonly used to picture the chaos and suffering caused by the terror 
attack. The picture of the “Falling man” was displayed in front pages of 
numerous newspapers the morning after the attack—but soon after the 
pictures referring to bodily human suffering were cleaned away from the 
imagery of the event. Images of the “falling men” were seen unfitting and 
indecent for picturing the tragedy— again namely on grounds of personal 
integrity and decency, respect for the honour of the suffering individuals and 
their close ones.440 (Included into illustration 4.2. is a frame showing a man 
falling from the World Trade Centre 11th of September 2001.)  
Bodily suffering or even images pointing to the impending bodily 
destruction of Western persons as a means of representing the disasters were 
widely repudiated and resented by the Western viewers.441 The newspapers 
that ran the picture of the falling man were soon charged of exploiting the 
death of the pictured man, stripping him of his dignity, invading his privacy 
and turning his personal tragedy into pornography. The bottom-line in the 
critique was that the man falling from the tower had an identity (although his 
identity was not verified and remained a mystery), he was a person; someone 
had to know him and care of him—and the picture was thus offending.442 
This, when juxtaposed with the non-Western cases dealt with earlier, 
exemplifies how cultural and global conditionality on questions of 
personhood, identity, personal integrity, honour and dignity of the victim 
pictured at fragile moments are at the core of the discussion on “taste and 
decency”.  
Correspondingly, for example Western school shootings are strictly not 
pictured through imagery showing the corporal plight of the victims.443 
Discussion on recirculating the brutal images of beheadings of Westerners 
conducted by ISIS (The Islamic State, a brutal terrorist organization famous 
for its distribution of brutal imagery) has been recently heated in the West. 
Redistributing the images of ISIL has not only been seen to advance the 
bloody terror strategy banking on circulating terrifying and brutal imagery 
(as this has been the primary reason), but also violating the personal 
integrity of the (Western) victims pictured in the images. Similarly, when the 
                                                
440 Barbie Zelizer: Photography, Jornalism and Trauma, 2002;  in Journalism after September 11 ; 
Zelizer, Barbie: About to Die, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010, 41-52. see also 
Caspers&Moore, 2009.  
441 Embedded in the Western media practices on picturing western suffering also a great danger of 
derealisation stalks: the prevalent tendency of avoiding to show the bodies of westerners is also 
assuming that the western persons are safe from corporeal suffering, pain and mortality: the essential 
conditions and elements of being a living, corporeal human-animal. 
442 Junod, Tom:  The Falling Man. September.9.2009, The Esquire.  This thinking also suggest that 
the non-Western subjects of the images would not have anyone; no-one would care of them, and they 
would not have a family… Surely they do. But this is rarely discussed. See Sontag, 2003, 65.  
443 As an example of this the media treatment of the Finnish School shootings of Jokela (2007) and 
Kauhajoki (2008).  
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office of the French satire magazine Charlie Hebdo was attacked by Islamic 
terrorist in January 2015, circulating and distributing images of the victims 
was habitually frowned upon in the West. Circulating the imagery was 
warned about in the media, as it was seen as advancing the goals of the 
terrorists and moreover commonly perceived as distasteful and violating the 
honour of the victims.444  
What is noteworthy here is that Bernard as well as “the falling man” and 
for example the Western victims of the Paris attacks—were seen as persons; 
individuals with a names, life stories, history, friends, family, as humans 
deserving dignity. The personhood, dignity and rights of Western 
individuals are seen to be at stake in the visualization of bodily Western 
precariousness, suffering and death. But concurrently the problematic of 
personhood rarely stands out when picturing suffering midst wars and 
catastrophes of the non-Western world.445 As it is habitual to display imagery 
of non-Western victims in the Western media in their bodily vulnerability, as 
well as in namelessness and through de-personifying picturing, it therefore, 
in the light of the representational practices, seems, that non-Western 
humans are regarded as less human than their Western counterparts.446  
What is furthermore noteworthy here is that the Somali MP’s pictured in the 
Reuters story on the terror attack were not even named, regardless of their 
high societal standing as high level politicians and legislators. What this 
points out is that not even high societal standing of the victims in the non-
Western world changes the tendency of picturing the suffering of the non-
Western world in the form of nameless masses and crowds.447 Thus it seems, 
that in the light of contemporary norms of visual representation, individuals 
seen to belong to the realm of non-Western life may be portrayed in their 
bodily vulnerability in “undignified” manners, while correspondingly the 
dignity of Western individuals constantly needs to be safeguarded. Then, 
what is meant by dignity, constantly referred to when arguing against 
publication of images showing Western pain?  
The phrase “human dignity” is commonly referred to when discussing 
human rights, yet there is no universal definition of the term. Thus it is used 
rather inconsistently.448 The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights declares: “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
                                                
444As examples of banking the brutal ISIS imagery for example Hashtag campaigns #DontShare and 
#ISISmediaBlackout which surfaced after the killing of the American photojournalist James Foley. 
ISIS Images depicting local, non-western victims have not generally hoisted such campaigns. See for 
example: #ISISmediablackout goes viral following the purported execution of James 
Foley, Washington Post, August 19.2014.; Mieti, ennen kuin jaat kuvan 
terroristihyökkäyksestä. Pullinen, Jussi,  Helsingin Sanomat, January 7, 2015.  
445 It must be added that this double standard is from time to time taken up in critical discussion on 
publishing crude images of non-western individuals. But what is remarkable is that this discussion 
generally does not change the reality in which the majority of the media spectators encounter these 
spectacles through mediatized images.  
446 Butler, 2009, 76- 77.  See also Sontag, 2003, 65, 70.  
447 Malkki, 1996, 11/3 , 377-404.  
448 Helis, John: Hannah Arendt and Human Dignity: Theoretical Foundations and 
Constitutional Protection of Human Rights. Journal of politics and Law, 1/3, 2008, 73-78, 73.  
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rights”. 449 This emphasizes the natural, inherent and unconditional nature of 
human dignity as the staring point of human rights and their up holding. But 
in the light of the representational practices and debate revolving around the 
publication and representability of visual images of pain,  “human dignity” 
seems not to be unconditional, but rather globally very unequally divided. 
Also Hannah Arendt saw human dignity as an essential quality of man, and 
the starting point of universal human rights. But Arendt also saw the 
safeguarding of human dignity stemming from a membership of political 
community—not from inalienable natural laws or just the coincidence of 
being born human. For Arendt human rights are debated in particular 
political communities, and the safeguarding of human dignity requires 
humankind’s right to belong to a genuine (universal) political community. 
Thus for Arendt loss of dignity is “not the loss of specific rights, then, but the 
loss of a community willing and able to guarantee any rights whatsoever”. 
For Arendt “only the loss of a polity itself expels him (a man/or a human) 
from humanity”. 450  Then, what does this mean in the context of the globally 
and hierarchically divergent representational practices of contemporary 
images of pain, and references to human dignity?  
In regards to presentation of images of suffering most often only the 
loss/violation of dignity of Westerners is taken up, worried about and 
mourned over, whereas the dignity of non-Western objects of such images is 
scarcely even mentioned.  Thus, it seems, that this arrangement places 
Western individuals as members of a political community in which human 
dignity is safeguarded, but locates the non-Westerner humans outside of this 
human polity. In turn, Arendt envisioned the human community as a 
universal and cosmopolitan community that should include all humans alive, 
not as a matter of belonging to a nation or a political regime. But the 
(Western) representational practices of images of pain, the differentiated 
norms of representation and the divergent discussion on rights and dignity 
suggests, that it is (in the predominant Western perspective) actually the 
membership of the Western political and cultural regime, which is seen to 
guarantee and determine the dignity—the intrinsic value—of human beings. 
Thus the prevalent representational practice actually articulates an 
underlying (Western) assumption that if one does not belong to the in-
group—the political community of the West—one’s dignity is not as forcefully 
safeguarded and cared over, or it even stays unmentioned. The 
representational practices show, how the ones outside of the Western 
political regime remain at the state of “abstract nakedness of being nothing 
but human”, outside of the human polity, which is able to safeguard 
humanity and dignity.451 Thus, the ones outside of the Western political 
                                                
449 UN Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, article 1. (“All human beings are born free and equal 
in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood.”) 
450 Arendt, Hannah: The Origins of Totalitariansm, Harvest, Harcourt, Brace & company, San 
Diego, 1971 (1951), 297-298.  
451 Arendt, 1971 (1951), 297.  
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community remain to be pictured as humans in a reduced manner—as 
subhumans of the humanitarian story 452. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter 2, during the history of visual 
humanitarian communication it has been habitual to portray vulnerable 
individuals and groups in their bodily precarity. It has been commonplace to 
use a visual strategy of suffering bodies to claim (human) rights of repressed 
groups and articulate their status as fellow humans worthy of protection.453 It 
has furthermore been common to point out, that if atrocities experienced by 
groups or individuals are not visually depicted in images, and information on 
their plight has not been thus mediated and verified by visual proof, the 
suffering is at risk of being left without notice and recognition by the 
surrounding world. As Susan Sontag has phrased it “if there is no image of 
the suffering, there is no atrocity”. 454  Thus the regime of protectable and 
valuable life has been historically seen to be broadened by presenting and 
circulating visual records of the suffering bodies.  
Nevertheless, it seems that over the last decades this logic has been 
compromised and turned upside down. Almost as a rule, the ‘full humans’ of 
the Western sphere may not be presented in images of bodily vulnerability, 
since it is seen as compromising the honor, dignity and their 
uncompromisable value as human beings. But on the other hand, the non-
Western humans are on regular bases shown in visual images centering on 
bodily vulnerability in order to tell stories of not just their plight and 
vulnerability (and need of protection), but also to mediate the overall turmoil 
of the non-Western sphere they inhabit. In the West, publication of such 
images is seen as acceptable because of the norms of dignified 
representations are not fully applied to the non-Western individuals, seen as 
somewhat reduced in their humanness. Therefore it seems, that the 
restrictions and cultural conventions and norms of publishing and circulating 
violent imagery are increasingly forcefully politically governed, in patterns 
that are tightly tied to global hierarchical power structures. As the 
vulnerability and weakness of non-Westerners is communicated, the 
vulnerability of Westerners is being concealed through visual 
representational practises of images of suffering. Thus the arrangements of 
images of suffering, violence and pain have become an arena through which 
the underlying notions of conditional value and globally differentiated regard 
of life is contemporarily articulated.455  
At the base of Western political self-apprehension, world politics and 
international human rights institutions the universally unconditional value of 
all human lives is overtly reiterated. Yet, it seems that the realization of this 
concept is nowhere to be found when approached from the perspective of 
visual images of pain and global differences in their 
                                                
452 Douzinas, 2007. See also chapters 2 and 3.2.  
453 More on this see chapter 2. See also Sliwinski 2011; Chouliaraki, 2013.   
454  Sontag, 2003, 85; see also: Butler 2009, 69-70 
455 See: Butler, 2004, 19-50.  
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distribution/presentation. Rather, the predominant visual representational 
practices show the human kind as divided into different, very differently 
comprehended and valued strata, based on rigid global, regime resultant 
conditionality. The representational practices and conventions of images of 
pain thus suggest, visualize and provide certainty on the divided 
apprehension on the value of Western vis-à-vis non-Western lives. Thus, at 
the theatre of proof of images of suffering the otherwise 'invisible' 
background notions of Western based universal human rights, unalienable 
human worth and the politics of belonging to the regime of protectable life/ 
unprotected life become visualized.  But moreover Western representational 
practices and arrangements of images of vulnerability and suffering can be 
seen to articulate Western humanitarian world order and dominance over 
the rest of the world. In the following paragraphs, I will go on to explain how 
I see them doing that.  
4.3.3 THE STRONG, INVIOLABLE HUMANITARIAN WEST TAKING 
CARE OF THE PRECARIOUS AND SICK REST 
The tendency of judging Western suffering and non-Western suffering on a 
different scale and thus representing them differently (in Western publicity) 
can be seen to draw from a wider frame than merely the codes and 
conventions of the media, or even political governance of such issues. 
Picturing far away events in bodies of humans whom are located in 
geographically, culturally and politically divergent settings through different 
norms may be, up to a certain extent, seen as somewhat understandable in 
the light of how the human mind tends to work. The sensitivity and 
reluctance for seeing death and suffering of those who are closest to us, may 
be seen to be inherent in human thinking. According to Western moral 
philosophy we tend to feel emotionally closer with the suffering of 
individuals resembling ourselves culturally, politically, societally, age and 
appearance wise, as well as geographically and historically. The closer the 
one suffering is to us is in all these loci; more empathetic we tend to feel 
towards her. Thus we also tend to grief the suffering and death of our like; we 
are more touched by it, more sensitive to it, for it also reminds us of our own 
vulnerability and mortality. And vise versa: suffering distanced from us, 
taking place far away settings and pain experienced by a person not so 
similar with us is met with reduced amount of empathy—and thus also felt 
easier to encounter and see.456  
From this ‘nearest is the dearest’ tendency it is also drawn, that we often 
turn our eyes away from the suffering of our like. This tendency expands 
from the personal level to cultural as well as political: we would like to see 
                                                
456 Ginzburg, 1994, 46-60; Butler, 2004, 37-38.  This tendency has furthermore been acute for 
humanitarians through the decades, since bridging this moral gap (partly by the usage of visual 
material) has been as one of their central objectives. 
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ourselves, the likes of us, our political and societal system and world views as 
being secure, inviolable and safe from harm. This streak is furthermore easily 
utilizable for political actors and especially warring states: covering up of the 
brutal sides of war and political violence inflicted on the others, as well as 
hiding the bloody effects of war on “our bodies”, is often in the interests of 
Western warmongers fighting contemporary “surgical wars” in the name of 
protection of humanity. The reluctance of seeing the suffering of our like is in 
contemporary political connections sometimes thus stretched even to the 
point in which the visual arrangement of war wound up denying our own 
vulnerability.457 Challenging the comforting anesthesia of humanitarian war 
and seeing the brutal side of the recent warfare in Western bodies may cause 
too much pain and distress. 
It has become a visual norm to globally differently represent political 
suffering and human vulnerability. Yet, this representational practice does 
not solely reflect the “nearest is dearest” –tendency. This prevalent 
representational norm works to construct and amplify the apprehensions of 
the spectators on the globally hierarchically distributed value of life, and 
articulates Western dominance over the weak rest of the world.  As Feldman 
remarks, the tormented bodies of distant and foreign individuals may, for the 
Western spectator, thus act as messages of Western superiority and amplify 
Western “cultural anaesthesia”.  While the contemporary representational 
practices habitually present the distant, non-Western people as weak and 
vulnerable, they concurrently wound up picturing them as subordinate to us 
and reduced in their humanness, compared to the inviolable “us”.458  
Therefore, it might be argued that representations of suffering non-
Western individuals are presented to the Western audiences in an attempt to 
articulate their rights and lives as entitled to protection, as an effort to ‘lift’ 
and include them to the regime of protectable life. And admittedly, a 
humanitarian driven developmental—or even colonial—streak is also 
perceivable in this arrangement. But moreover, the representational 
practices and their global and regime driven differentiations—in addition to 
being a site where the conditionality of belonging to full-pledged humanity is 
articulated—serve a central function in communicating the western world 
order and dominance over the rest of the world.  This tendency is poignantly 
visualized in contemporary imagery of foreign (natural) disasters and 
epidemics, and the militarized humanitarian help provided by Westerners in 
global crisis zones.   
 
                                                
457 See: Butler, 2004; Butler, 2009.  
458 Feldman, 1994.    
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The Visual Politics of Humanitarianly Taking Care of Haiti and Ebola 
A massive earthquake hit Haiti in January 2010, claiming lives in numbers 
hard to imagine—on this poor island between 230 000 to 300 000 human 
beings lost their lives. Instantly disturbing imagery from the scene of 
destruction flooded the Western media. Habitually these images presented 
the victims of the devastation in ways rather customary for depicting non-
Western natural disasters: in victimhood, passivity, corporality—and reliant 
on outside help. Illustrations used in the Western media showed bloody 
bodies of Haitians in the ruins, hysterical people at the site of the 
destruction, destroyed material surroundings, people being pulled from the 
debris of the collapsed buildings, as well as aid given to the victims of the 
catastrophe.459  (Included in the illustration 4.3. is one of the first 
photographs of the Haiti earthquake that went viral: an image of a victim of 
the Earthquake taken by Haitian photographer Daniel Morel showing a 
woman midst rubble.)  
The immense scale of the destruction and an earthquake460 as its cause 
forcefully aroused the benevolent sentiments and actions of the surrounding 
world. The Haiti earthquake accumulated enormous media attention, and an 
unprecedented amount of donations from private people around the world. 
But it also enticed a massive amount of governmental crisis relief and 
military humanitarian attention. After the catastrophe, a state of 
humanitarian emergency was declared in Haiti. Although at first, the 
majority of help was given by locals, the most notable and recognized aid 
operations came from abroad, particularly from the US.   In the course of the 
US Operation Unified Response to Haiti, United States took control of the 
international relief efforts. United States sent about 20 000 troops into Haiti, 
took control of the entry and exit point to the city of Port-au-Prince, sent 
military vessels to the coast of Haiti, took control of the Airport and 
responsibility for security. Thus, although the territorial integrity of Haiti 
remained, it may be argued, “the sovereignty of life at Haiti became de-
politicized, internationalized and negotiable”. The Haiti emergency provided 
the US a momentum to act as a global Good Samaritan, but the forceful 
response of the US can be seen as an international political act of militarized 
and containing disaster interventionism. 461  
In addition to the typical catastrophe imagery, the Haiti disaster was 
visualized in remarkable ways. Due to the Western “compassionate 
                                                
459 In pictures: Haitian Earthquake, January 13, 2010, BBC News ; Haiti’s Earthquake: A 
photo gallery, January 22, 2010, New York Times.  
460 Earthquakes can be seen as iconic events of natural disasters: suddenly and unexpectedly striking 
whoever on their way. They are non-political catastrophes, which may be imagined to encounter any of 
us. Because of their nature earthquakes have a power to touch universally, and thus are often reacted to 
emotionally and empathetically, often more so than wars and political upheavals, since they require no 
political side-taking. As was pointed out in the chapter 2, earthquakes may also be seen as one of the 
initial sites of catastrophe visually mediated for the sight of far-away spectators.   
461 Moore, Annica: Catastrophe and containment: A critical Analysis of the US response to the 2010 
Earthquake in Haiti. In: The Politics and Policies of Relief, Aid and Reconstruction. Attina, Fulvio 
(ed.), Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, 113-132, 113-114.  
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intervention”462 and the strong presence of militarized Western disaster 
interventionism, imagery that strongly juxtaposes weak and suffering 
Haitians and strong Western helpers emerged in the Western publicity. 
Images of helpful (US) soldier figures, armed and dressed in military 
uniforms, yet compassionately aiding the ones in need and moreover keeping 
up the control in a precarious and chaotic situation often visualized Western 
presence in Haiti in the Western media. Well-equipped Western soldiers 
were pictured delivering aid, handing out food packages, taking care of the 
victims and carrying the wounded to safety. Also images of armed US 
soldiers patrolling the streets of Port-au-Prince while maintaining overall 
security were run in Western publicity. Thus, due to the forceful militarized 
disaster interventionism of the US, an interesting visual feature in the 
pictures presented from Haiti emerged: the figure of a Western 
humanitarian soldier463 pictured gently taking care of the local victims but 
concurrently visualizing the strong Western military presence and 
dominance. 464 (Included in the illustration 4.3. is an image of the US 
Defense department showing US soldiers carrying a victim of the catastrophe 
on a stretcher.) 
The visual contradiction of the strong Western militarized helpers and on 
the other hand the weak, powerless, physically wounded Haitians visualize 
and offer proof of the distinction of the strong and humane West, and the 
weak, corporeally bleeding, in-need-of-help global south. In these pictures 
the Western humanitarian power and strong military dominance over the 
poor and peripheral global south becomes visually tangible.465  
(Governmental) Help and relief in (natural) disasters is more than a matter 
of altruism; intervention into fragile situations such as the Haiti earthquake 
is an act of political power, global governance and a form of communicating 
the world order. In the context of Western humanitarian international 
politics, the visual arrangement of a strong West and helpless Haitians can be 
seen also as a means of gaining political power and prestige, by presenting 
the Western power as helper of humanity and guardian of the helpless 
majority of the world’s fragile populations. Showing the victims as helpless, 
bloody, naked and desperately in need of help and protection can lead to 
pleas and consent of dominance over the suffering crowds, the people, areas 
and cultures seen and presented infantilized: as helpless, weak and unable to 
take care of themselves.    
                                                
462 The US Military In Haiti, a compassionate Invasion, January 16, 2010, The Time.  
463 In the next chapter 5, which deals with the Afghan war, I will go into more depth to describe the 
figure of humanitarian soldier and its relevance for contemporary visual images of war.  
464 Such images were presented by the US government, but also featured in the western media in 
describing the situation at Haiti. Defence.Gov. Photo essay 100124-D-0000G-002.JPG. 
Department of Defense. January 24.2010: Haiti: US troops start to leave earthquake-ravaged 
island. February 15.2010. The Telegraph ; Haiti earthquake: Sovereignty takes back seat as 
US takes command.  January 29, 2010, The Guardian.  
465 The history of Haiti and the United States moreover amplify and build up the significations of the 
arrangement of the images.  
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The distinction of the less developed and suffering south and competent 
and militarized humanitarian West, visible in the picturing of the Haiti 
earthquake is also manifested in the pictures presented in the Western media 
of the 2014- 2015 Ebola outbreak in West Africa. In 2014, hemorrhage fever 
caused by the Ebola virus reached epidemic proportions, causing more than 
11 000 deaths namely in West African nations of Liberia, Guinea and Sierra 
Leone.  Summer 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the 
outbreak a “public health emergency of international concern”. 
Sensationalist and frightening images of the Ebola victims hoisted fear and 
pity in the surrounding spectating world.466 Soon after the WHO 
announcement, also US president Obama announced the Ebola outbreak in 
West Africa being “the top national security priority for the United States”. 
President Obama furthermore added that “When a disease of disaster strikes, 
Americans help”. The United States decided on the measures to take in order 
to “contain and combat” the disease at “the source”. The measures included 
sending American about 3000 US military troops to build medical facilities 
and training local medical workers in Ebola containment in West Africa.467 
Thus, in addition to the frightening images of weary individuals sickened by 
the disease, images of the isolated victims at hospitals and makeshift 
detention centers and medical staff dressed in insulated suits, also imagery 
presenting American soldiers fighting the dreaded disease in West Africa 
was circulated in the Western publicity.468 (Included in the Illustration 4.3. 
are media images of the Ebola victims, as well as US government images of 
the aid endeavor.) 
Correspondingly to the Haiti earthquake images, also these images 
present the Western helpers as advanced, strong, humanitarian, able bodied 
and militarized. The strength of the Western helpers was again further 
fortified in comparison to the helpless and disease stricken locals. 
Westerners were presented acting as tutors, providing their technical and 
material aid and superior professional skills. A strong developmental streak 
is embedded in these representations: they point to the less-developed nature 
of the non-Western world and concurrently visually underline the 
insuperability of the West. The militarized Western helpers are pictured as 
taking care of the situation that the “global minors” cannot handle. As the 
images picture the Western intervention into the emergency situations, they 
also differentiate the global roles:  aid is been provided by the full-fledged 
                                                
466 Times Coverage of Ebola: Pulitzer-Winning Articles and More, April 20, 2015, The New 
York Times ; Ebola Outbreak: Telegraph photojournalist Will Wintercross reports from 
Liberia 2014, The Telegraph  ; Ebola Outbreak: Liberia Hospitals and Treatment Centres 
Struggle to Cope [PHOTOS], October 6, 2014, International Business Times. 
467 President Obama on America´s response to Ebola: “When a disease of Disaster 
Strikes, Americans Help. October 28, 2014, The White House; Fact sheet: U.S Response to 
the Ebola Epidemic in West Africa. September 16, 2014, The White House.  
It is relevant to remark here, that many other, also non-Western nations contributed to the fight 
against Ebola, such as China and India. 
468Such Images: 10 things to Know about Ebola, October 14, 2014, US News; The US Military’s 
War on Ebola, October, 7, The Atlantic; US Troops head to Africa for Ebola mission:  
October, 1, 2014, USA Today.  
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Western humans to the populations of non-Western crisis areas “still 
struggling to gain access to full humanness”469. Thus, through the 
predominant the visual representation practices of Haiti and Ebola, the 
strength of the West is emphasized, as concurrently the weakness and 
impotence of the non-West is being articulated for the Western spectator.  
The militarized conduct of humanitarianism is at the foreground in both 
of the imageries depicting Western militarized aid in non-Western 
emergency situations. The aid operations thus appear as a militarized and 
effective tour de force of the Western powers. These images poignantly 
epitomize the contemporary military-humanitarian ethos and force of the 
West over the rest of the world. As these ways of visually representing foreign 
crisis show the Westerners as militarized, strong and potent, they show the 
rest of the world as impotent victims, and objects of the Western militarily 
fortified compassion and control. 470 The visual juxtaposition of suffering 
non-Western bodies and the strong bodily inviolable humanitarian Western 
helpers illustrate the triumphant story of Western practices, humanitarian 
paradigm and world order—and on the other hand to show the 
precariousness and vulnerability of the bodies not protected by the 
membership of the Western polity.  Moreover, what binds these images of 
the Haiti earthquake 2010 and the Ebola outbreak 2014-2015 together is that 
both of the military humanitarian interventions into foreign emergency 
situations, in addition to being compassionate operations aimed delivering 
“more aid more quickly to more people”471, can be seen to communicate 
securitization and containment of these areas and the threats they breed—
disorder, sickness and capricious surplus people—by military-humanitarian 
means.  
Among the objectives of both of the humanitarianly legitimized and 
rationalized operations was the securitization of the areas, as well as 
containment of risks within the areas of their emergence. Development is 
always tied with security. By aiding areas of emergency, the harms therein 
are attempted to be contained and prevented from spreading.472 Thus in 
addition to altruism, compassion and morality, also very evident strategic 
self-interest beyond international recognition of the West (the US) as a 
humanitarian super power played a central part in both of the operations 
discussed. In the case of the Ebola outbreak it is obvious that preventing the 
disease from spreading was in the interest of all. The American operation was 
not even rationalized and legitimized in the official statements solely by 
altruistically helping the populations of the West African nations, but by 
securitization of the situation and containing the virus from spreading. 473 In 
                                                
469 Butler, 2009, 76.  
470 On military humanitarianism, see chapter 2 and for instance: Chandler, 2005 ; Chandler, 2001,  
Douzinas, 2007; Belloni, 2007.  
471 As described by Hillary Clinton. Cited in Moore, 2012, 121.   
472 Duffield, 2007. 
473 Fact sheet: U.S Response to the Ebola Epidemic in West Africa. September 16, 2014, The 
White House.  
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the case of Haiti, as Annica Moore points out, one of the aims of the massive 
military-humanitarian operation was to prevent the Haitians from leaving 
the Island and seeking refugee in the West, namely in US. As the disaster left 
one million people homeless and caused significant trouble for the rest of the 
community the threat of massive migration flows was acute. One of the major 
functions of the US aircraft carrier quickly moved to the coast of port au 
Prince was surveillance of the population; as well a disseminating messages 
demotivating and deterring potential refugees from leaving the area. The 
forceful military deployment was to also give a signal that aid was given to 
the population at the spot; there was no reason to leave. It was in the interest 
of US also to attempt to securitize the area and quickly try to rebuild the poor 
country as a sufficient place to live in order to hinder the flow of unwanted 
people to West. 474 Thus the orientation of developmental-military-
humanitarian projects is rather to contain the problems and disorder, 
prevent them from spreading and actually in both of these cases, to manage 
and prevent the unwanted or threatening populations from moving.475  
Thus the people governed by these operations are—in addition to being 
visually presented majorly through weakness, helplessness and lessened 
humanity—seen as “unwanted” surplus life which must be controlled, 
contained and prevented from moving geographically.  As Mark Duffield 
argues, the inhabitants of the Western cultural and political realm appear as 
“insured life” protected by the sustaining institutions of their national states, 
as the inhabitants of the rest of the world are “uninsured” life, which is 
presumed to be self-reliant. This uninsured “waste life”476 thus remains as 
the global precarity at mercy of poverty, violence and vulnerability. This 
“uninsured life” is therefore also often governed by the global powerful, by 
means of development and humanitarian interventions. The surplus life is 
moreover seen as potentially dangerous life, in need of constant governance, 
rescue, reintegration and containment, as a necessary part of constituting 
liberal political order itself. 477 The visual representations of the Haiti 
earthquake and the Ebola outbreak and their Western governance and 
control produce arrangements which produce narratives on the Western 
actors and providers of help, Western dominance, as well as the (non-
Western) suffering or helpless objects of help, and thus of the global 
humanitarian order.  
The visual theater of proof constituted by the images of Haiti Earthquake 
and West African Ebola outbreak thus exemplifies how the strong West is 
governing the weak rest. This act at the visual theater of proof offers the 
spectators of these images proof of the Western supremacy and dominance. 
But also concurrently provides evidence of the non-Western weakness, 
fragility and inability to help itself, lives which are at the mercy of Western 
                                                
474 Moore, 2012, 129-130.  
475 Duffield, 2007.  
476Zygmund Baumann refers to non-western surplus life, or ”uninsured life”, as “waste life”.  
Baumann, Zygmund: Wasted lives. Modernity and its outcasts. polity, Cambridge, 2004.  
477 Duffield, 2007, 216- 218.  
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help and benevolence.   The arrangements of these images visually illustrates 
how the Western human rights paradigms and Western “civilized lifestyle” 
grants the Westerners a “vaccination” against the weakness caused by 
unorderly society and chaotic non-Western lifestyle—and how the non-
Western bodies left without a “vaccination” remain precarious and weak: 
they must be aided, secured, contained and their movement must be 
restricted by the ‘global adults’.  Therefore these visual arrangements 
moreover produce narratives of the non-Western lives as unfit surplus 
human material that must be not only helped but controlled and contained in 
order to secure the safety of the West. Therefore the visual theater of proof 
produced by these images in turn suggests that gaining access to full-blown 
humanity, human worth and alleviation from suffering is achievable only by 
the membership of the Western political realm478.  
Therefore such imageries, which present the strong humanitarian West as 
helpers of the suffering rest of the world, exemplify the non-Western 
hamartia of the humanitarian theater poignantly:  The “tragic mistake”—the 
Hamartia—of the sufferers presented at the contemporary humanitarian 
theater most often is the fact that they were not born into the protected 
global nobility, as Westerners. As the global nobility, the rich and the 
powerful appear bodily inviolable and may move freely and cross any global 
borders they wish, the poor and the miserable are pictured in their bodily 
suffering, controlled and governed by developmental and humanitarian 
means—contained, and not allowed to move freely. 479 The frames, 
boundaries and different segments of humanity are marked by different 
visual performativity.  This leads us to the theme of the next paragraph, 
which is visual performativity of humanness in the context of refugeeness 
and the “European refugee crisis” 
4.4 THE MISERABLE “SEA OF HUMANITY “– THE 
CORPOREAL POLITICS OF PICTURING THE 
REFUGEE CRISIS 
Media framings and political discussion over the images of the 2010s 
‘European refugee crisis’ 480 poignantly brings forth the questions of visual 
performativity of human fragility, need of help —and humanness—in a 
contemporary setting.481 The number of people fleeing to Europe and taking 
                                                
478 As was also argued in the chapter 3.2.  
479 Baumann, Zygmund: Globalization. The Human consequences. Columbia University Press, New 
York, 1998, 77.  
480 I here refer to the ’refugee/migration crisis’ of the 2010s, especially the inflated situation starting 
from 2015.  
481 This subchapter dealing with the refugee imagery was written during the late summer/autumn 
2015, motivated by the acute crisis and the need to understand the heated societal discussion revolving 
refugeeness and refugee imagery.  
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the Mediterranean route482 has dramatically increased after the Arab Spring 
uprisings (2011), and for example after the fall of the Libyan ex-leader 
Muammar Gaddafi, who had been influential in banking migration flows 
from Africa to Europe. Further the chaotic political situation and turmoil in 
the Middle East and North Africa, growing influence of ISIS, and acutely the 
gory Syrian war has driven unprecedented amounts of people to leave their 
countries of origin and seek refuge in the West during 2015.483  In this 
situation, images of the ‘sea of refugees’; rickety boats loaded full of people 
seeking refuge, crowds of asylum seekers at European reception centers as 
well as images of refugees drowned en route searching a better life, have 
become familiar to all media spectators in the Western sphere.  
Ways of picturing refugees and refugeeness are particularly interesting in 
the context of visual performativity of need of help, fragility and humanness 
in a global perspective, since refugees (especially in the case of the ‘European 
refugee crisis’) attempt to cross (national) borders and move spatially from 
one place to another in a geographical sense. Furthermore, by moving from 
one area to another, the refugees also contest the boundaries of political and 
cultural regimes. Moving and refugeeness is thus also an attempt to stretch 
the global, hierarchically divided boundaries of humanity. Seeking asylum is 
in essence arguing for the protection of one’s right to live and demanding 
human rights—an attempt to make claims based on the idea of unconditional 
universal humanity entitled and worthy of protection. Refugeeness thus 
exemplifies (a sudden and acute) attempt to move away from one sphere of 
humanity into another.  
Looking at the visual representations of refugeeness—and especially 
scrutinizing how refugeeness is performed in visual images, and how such 
images are discussed in the Western politics and publicity—is highly 
revealing when analyzing how (the presentation practices of) visual images 
articulate humanness and the conditionality of belonging to the human 
family. These images, when approached as a visual theater of proof on the 
conditionality of humanness, bring forth the Western take on the value of 
(non-Western) human lives. Discussion on and picturing of the refugee crisis, 
refugees and refugeeness in the Western publicity can thus also be seen as an 
arena, in and through which the Western spectatorship of suffering is 
constructed, and Western conceptions of the hierarchies of humanity are 
reiterated and produced. The images of refugees offer revealing scenery into 
the ways in which humanitarian images are often intentionally arranged and 
signified in order to produce certain political emotions.  
                                                
482Although the Mediterranean route(s) has been under most discussion and are topically most 
significant, refugees today take many routes to enter Europe. See for instance: Migratory Routes, 
Frontex (accessed November 25. 2015; 6 charts and a map that show where Europe´s 
refugees are coming from – and the perilous journeys they are taking, September 16, 
2015. The Independent.  
483 Mediterranean Crisis 2015 at six months: Refugee and migrant numbers highest on 
record. UNHCR, Press Release, July 1, 2015 ;Refugees/migrants Emergency Response –
Mediterranean, UNHCR (retrieved November 20, 2015).  
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During the summer 2015 the refugee crisis expanded: more people 
reached Europe, and more people died on the way trying. European train 
stations, border crossings and reception centers all the way up north filled 
up, and the societal and political discussion on migration policies and refugee 
issues were at center of the European mainstream media’s attention. 
Concurrently attitudes and postures on refugees strongly divided the 
continent: some expressed their sympathy and solidarity to the refugees 
vocally, and pleaded to international conventions on human rights, the 
shared nature of humanity and the obligation to help one another. At the 
same time others boisterously attempted to repudiate the need and 
entitlement of help of these people, demanded stricter border control and 
more effective measures to stop the flood of unwanted human material into 
the West. As the situation of refugees was in the limelight of Western 
publicity and societal discussion, the refugees and their plight also became 
poignantly visible in the everyday lives of Europeans and imagery describing 
the people striving to move towards Europe/West infiltrated the Western 
consciousness.  
Ronald Bleiker et al. argue that media images of asylum seekers are a 
central arena in and through which political debate on refugees has been 
framed.484 But as always, messages of visual images are ambivalent and 
multifarious. Thus the stories told by the topical refugee imagery in the case 
of the 2015 ‘European refugee crisis’ was miscellaneous, even contradictory, 
and typically formed according to their divergent uses, framings and 
contextual intended messages. I shall analyze the different visual 
arrangements through which the refugees and the refugee crisis have been in 
the recent years (around 2010s and especially year 2015) represented in the 
Western (European) publicity. Bleiker et al. have found that the refugees are 
often (in the 2000s Australia) depicted in images of anonymous crowds, as 
well as pictured through images of refugee boats filled with people. They 
found that refugees were significantly more rarely portrayed as individuals, 
in close up images with recognizable facial expressions of other features 
exemplifying their individuality, than in imagery of crowds and masses.485 In 
relation to the picturing of the 2015 European refugee crisis a similar visual 
representational pattern may be detected. Images of the refugee boats 
approaching Europe486, masses and crowds of refugees making their way 
                                                
484 The visual dehumanization of refugees. Bleiker, Ronald, Campbell David, Hutchinson 
Emma& Nicholson, Xzarina. Australian Journal of Political science, 2013, 48/4, 398-416.  
485 Ibid. ; see also Malkki, 1996.  
486 Such images widely used in the contemporary western media reporting: Deaths in Austria, 
Mediterranean raise migration's grim toll in Europe, August 27, 2015, CNN; Europe’s boat 
people. The EU’s policy on maritime refugees has gone disastrously wrong, April 25, 
2015, The Economist ; Masked 'Commandos' Are Attacking Refugee Boats Off This Idyllic 
Greek Island, August, 13, 2015 The Huffington Post; Pääministeri Sipilä: Schengenin 
tulevaisuus on kriittisellä polulla, jos järjestelykeskuksia ei saada pystyyn. November 
11, 2015, Helsingin Sanomat ; The Guardian view on the refugee crisis. Much more must be 
done and not just by the UK. September, 3, 2015, The Guardian. As an example of this sort of 
picturing is for example an image of a refugee boat taken by Massimo Sestini of a refugee boat 
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across Europe487, groups of people at the reception centres and at border 
crossings488 have served as a predominant visual arrangement through which 
the crisis has been presented in Western publicity. (Included in the 
Illustration 4.4. are some much used media images that picture the refugees 
as large crowds and masses.)  
It is notable that such visual representational styles—centring on boats, 
and large groups of unnamed crowds and masses of people—most commonly 
used in depicting refugees, has been found to more often lead to politics of 
fear and threat, rather than succeed in arousing humanitarian sentiments 
such as compassion and will to help.489 Correspondingly, also in the 
contemporary European situation this sort of imagining has been commonly 
framed to picture malevolent and hurtful invasion of culturally different 
crowds of people attempting to sink the ‘European way of life’ and societal 
order under their tide. Interestingly such imagery of the refugees and refugee 
crisis—and such visual performativity of refugeeness—has served as a major 
arena of argument for political actors opposing “multiculturalism”, holding 
anti-immigration attitudes, or even openly xenophobic stances. Furthermore, 
such images have been seen to show and visually verify the bogus nature of 
the asylum seekers. In these framings and readings, the entitlements of the 
need of help of the pictured fellow humans, as well as their motives for the 
exodus, has been questioned and strongly criticized, and moreover the value 
of these individuals as human beings (worthy of our help and protection) has 
commonly been placed under doubt.490  
However, in addition to the representations concentrating on large 
masses of humans, there is also an alternative tendency in picturing the 
situation and visualizing the need of help, plight and the dangers the asylum 
seekers face, as well as the human toll of the crisis. The situation of the 
refugees has also been depicted through highly emotive imagery, which has 
primarily focused on individuals and their (bodily) anguish in harsh 
                                                                                                                                     
approaching Europe  in 2014. The photo won the World Press Photo contest in 2015, and circulated 
widely in the Western media. This image is included in the illustration 4.4. 
487 Such images by the media, see for example: Drone footage of Migrants and Refugees 
travelling across Europe, In pictures, The Telegraph.; Hungary Closes main border 
crossing with Serbia, September, 3 2015, The Guardian ; En Tiedä kaunanko jaksan yrittää. 
September 4, 2015, Helsingin Sanomat; The Police escorts Migrants through Slovenia, in 
Pictures: October 26, 2015, The Guardian;Why Migrant don’t want to stay in Hungary.  
September 5, 2015: New York Times.  
488 Such picturing see for instance: Poliisi päästää pakolaiset Tanskan läpi Ruotsiin, October, 
10, 2015, Helsingin Sanomat; Suomi ehkä mukaan estämään ihmissalakuljetuksia 
Välimerellä, May 15, 2015, Helsingin Sanomat; President Obama directs administration to 
accept at least 10000 Syrian refugees in the next fiscal year. September, 10, 2015 
Washington Post ; US will accept more refugees as crisis grows, September 20, 2015, New 
York Times; Vastaanottokeskus hämmentää kirkkonummelalaisessa kylässä. Osa 
vanhemmista ei enää anna tyttöjensä kulkea yksin. August, 25, 2015, Helsingin Sanomat ;  
Finland Lowers Asylum seekers forecast to 30 00- 35 00.  October 14,2015: Business Insider.  
489 Ibid.; Bleiker et al, 2013; Slovic, Paul: “If I look at the mass I will never act”: Psychic numbing 
and Genocide. Judgment and Decision making 2/2, 2007, pp.79-95.  
490 Such political argumentation, for example: Hungarian PM: “we don’t want more Muslims”. 
Al Jazeera, September 4, 2015; Sink immigrant´s boats –Griffin. BBC, July 8th, 2009; Slunga-
poutsalo: Elintasosurffarit käännytettävä pikaisesti – eriarvoistavat tuet poistettava. 
Suomen Uutiset,  August 21, 2015 . 
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conditions. Images of individualized human distress, single victims pictured 
in close up images, presented with knowledge of personality, personal 
history, names and identity have been seen to arouse benevolent sentiments 
in their spectators. Furthermore, such images have frequently taken 
children—often perceived as innocent ideal victims—as their primary 
objects.491 Thus the individualizing mode of picturing entails addressing, that 
can be seen to point to shared humanity in need of help. In such 
representations the objects of the images have been presented as human 
subjects worthy of amnesty and refugee status (in accordance with the 
Geneva conventions) —and thus entitled to our help. (Such personified 
imagery is included in the illustration 4.5.) 
Thus, images of the plight of certain others have been framed in a way 
that has worked to arouse compassioned feelings and sentiments of 
belonging to a same register of humanity as people in Western spectating 
audiences. Such imagery of the refugees have also been often framed as 
offering proof of the suffering of these people, by showing the suffering and 
distress of the refugees in a visual, and sometimes even in crudely corporeal 
manners. Such imagery has been utilized in illustrating the humanitarianly 
unsustainable conditions at the borders of Europe, and to point out the 
necessity to answer to the crisis in more efficient and more humane manners. 
This sort imagery has also frequently illustrated media stories in which 
political critique towards the European immigration policies have been taken 
up. In such contexts, the visualized suffering of these people has served as a 
political tool of persuasion targeted to address European politicians, and 
Western citizens who have the democratic right to influence the decision 
making in regards to immigration and border practices of their countries.492  
Therefore it may be said, that the picturing of the refugee crisis, as well as 
the attitudes and reactions on the visual representations of refugees 
approaching/seeking refuge in Europe have been ambivalent, and rather 
rigidly fixed according to the political stances towards immigration of their 
presenters/commenters/contexts of presentation. The assemblage of refugee 
imagery can therefore also be seen to reflect the apprehension of humanity 
and human worth of their commentators also in larger terms. Therefore the 
visualizations of the refugee crisis unveils the contextual ambivalence of 
suffering/crisis imagery in an extremely politicized contemporary setting, 
and shows how visualized (bodily) performativity of refugeeness is a matter 
of political assemblage and contextual signification. 
                                                
491 Such images are for example the spectacular and iconic image of the drowned Syrian boy Aylan 
Kurdi which surfaced early September 2015:  Shocking images of drowned Syrian boy show 
tragic plight of refugees The Guardian, September 2, 2015. As well as images of other drowned 
refugee children such as: Pictures that need to be seen, August 29, 2015, Migrant Report. As well 
as for instance images of the plight of refugee children in Europe, see for instance:Where the 
Children Sleep. Photos by Wennman, Magnus, (text by Bergfeldt, Carina, Wiman, Erik& Weigl, 
Kerstin) Aftonbladet, 2015. Such framings can be seen also in for instance: Migrants find a 
unbridled route to Greece. (Photo by Daniel Etter) August 17, 2015, New York Times.  
492 Ibid.  
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In the following subchapters I shall discuss and analyze the imagery used 
to describe the refugee crisis and the political signification of such imagery in 
the Western publicity over recent years and especially in the contested 
situation of the 2015. I shall scrutinize the images as acts at the humanitarian 
visual theater of proof of the (visually demonstrated) hierarchical 
conditionality of belonging to the realm of (protectable/valuable) humanity. 
First I shall analyze the political significations of images of refugee boats and 
crowds, flows of migrants and masses of asylum seekers at border crossings 
and reception centers, and the political debate surrounding these sorts of 
visual representations. Secondly, I shall pay attention to the other principle 
type of picturing refugees and refugeeness in the Western contemporary 
media publicity: images of individual refugees and primarily emotion 
evoking representations of sorrow and suffering of namely child refugees and 
dead refugee children. I analyze the significations of these images in the 
context of visual performativity of humanness and universal human worth.   
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4.4.1  HUMANITARIAN CRISIS OR BOATS FULL OF BOGUS 
SUBJECTS? VISUALLY (DIS)PROVING THE HUMANITY OF 
REFUGEES 
Primarily the Western media arrangements of the refugee imagery can be 
seen to have been targeted to rather dispassionately inform the public of the 
topical situation. But informing of political issues—especially visually—and 
newsworthiness (of an image) is never neutral. In relation to the refugee 
crisis, sometimes even the very same imagery that has been generally utilized 
and framed to rather dispassionately to tell of the situation at the borders of 
Europe, has been in other connections quite contradictory framed to 
illustrate the threat posed by the asylum seekers to the European nations 
under the ‘uncontrolled avalanche’ 493 of the migrants and thus arranged and 
targeted to induce fear rather than solidarity in the Western spectators. 
Recurrently in the statements of (European) anti-immigration actors, images 
of the refugee boats and crowds of asylum seekers have been framed to 
epitomize the threat these people fleeing war and seeking a better life in the 
“West” pose to the “European way of life”, and the societal, cultural 
(religious) as well as economic resilience of the recipient countries.494 In this 
line of arrangement and argumentation, the differences and differentiations 
between “us” and “them”— the Western full-fledged humans worthy of good 
and secure lives and, the surplus humans of the non-Western sphere seen as 
unentitled to protection or good life—as well as aggressively combating life 
not seen as belonging to the same register as “us”, are essential. In this view 
the refugees are presented as unwanted, foreign surplus (Muslim) life, that 
should be halted and contained, denied the right to move and seek 
protection, and to articulate their plea of humanness. 495 
This thinking at its extreme is exemplified for example by the aggressive 
argumentation of British Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Nick 
Griffin, who already in 2009 told the BBC how he thinks that the refugee 
boats should be sank at the sea, before arriving to Europe, in order to 
“combat the flow” of people seen as “illegal”. In this line of argument the 
floods of people seen as unwanted have been recurrently rhetorically 
presented as “drowning” Europe or “swamping of the EU by the Third 
World”. 496 Within these discourses, the threat to the Western well fare, “our 
way of life”, Western/European cultural and even societal and economic 
sustainability has been presented as threatened by the invasion of the 
                                                
493 Images that represent the refugees in such manners, see for instance: Europe’s boat people. The 
EU’s policy on maritime refugees has gone disastrously wrong, April 25, 2015, The 
Economist ; Drone footage of Migrants and Refugees travelling across Europe, In 
pictures. (accessed November 25, 2015) The Telegraph; Poliisi päästää pakolaiset Tanskan 
läpi Ruotsiin, October, 10, 2015, Helsingin Sanomat. 
494 Examples of this sort of (populist anti-migration) rhetoric and visual positioning for example here: 
A Nightmare reborn, September 17, 2015. Gates of Vienna: http://gatesofvienna.net/2015/09/a-
nightmare-reborn/ 
495Migration crisis: Hungary PM says Europe in grip of madness, September, 3 2015, The 
Guardian.; Hungarian PM: “we don’t want more Muslims”. Al Jazeera, September 4, 2015.  
496 Sink immigrant’s boats –Griffin. BBC, July 8th, 2009.  
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invasive migrant crowds. Moreover, the humanness of the refugees has 
within this discussion been widely placed under doubt, as the subjects of the 
images have not even been seen as humans worthy of protection and rights 
which are commonly perceived in international humanitarian/human rights 
conventions to follow the status of human.  
Such visual arrangements and mode of addressing, topically much used in 
the context of refugee imagery, is in many ways typical and characteristic of 
the (historically formed) ways of picturing the others in need of our help, and 
objects of humanitarian assistance. Liisa Malkki writes about how visually 
depicting refugees as large masses, presented in their namelessness and 
voicelessness, and through their physical vulnerable, bare condition and 
mere existence has historically been emblematic in picturing refugees and 
refugee crises. The imagery of refugeeness predominantly pictures the 
recipients—or in this case applicants—of help, primarily in a visual form of 
weakness, (bodily) suffering, and as dehistoricized, nameless crowds and 
masses497. Malkki analyses the ramifications visual arrangements that have 
represented refugees as “the miserable sea of humanity” have had on 
Western understanding, stances, attitudes and reactions towards refugees 
and refugeeness.  The ways of visually representing refugees is often 
standardized according to authoritative narratives—familiar from 
representations of humanitarian actors and organizations as well as media 
images— much used and circulated in the (Western) publicity. Such 
represenations have thus served as the primary form of receiving information 
and knowledge on “them”. Although images of refugees have often been used 
in rather philanthropic affiliations and in humanitarian contexts, they 
nevertheless have largely determined they ways in which Western on-lookers 
have become to rather rigidly understand and perceive refugeeness. These 
dominating visual representational practices have influenced the ways in 
which refugeeness is visually performed, which has had its effect on 
apprehending what refugees look like, or how they ought to look like and how 
they should (visually/bodily) perform themselves.498 These historically and 
authoritatively formed ways of visually presenting refugees and refugeeness 
can be seen to be at the heart of the Western discussions with regard to the 
topical visual representation of refugees in the 2010s.  
The historically formed, standardized and rigid arrangements of 
visualizing and conceptualizing and spectating refugees/refugeeness, can be 
seen as the bases of the heated discussions that have flared for instance in 
relation to the refugee crisis discussion in Finland in 2015. As Finland is 
among the Eastern European EU member states, in which mass scale asylum 
seeking and refugee issues have a rather short history on the global scale, the 
Finnish discussion on the performativity of refugeeness in the context of 
visual images of refugees is eye opening, and thus I shall concentrate on this 
Finnish (2015) discussion for a while. The Finnish discussion, which can be 
                                                
497 This was also discussed in the chapter 2.  
498  Malkki, 1996, 385- 390.  
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seen to largely draw from the performativity of refugeeness, has for a large 
part concentrated on the definition of a genuine, ‘real refugee’. The search for 
exemplary victims worthy of help, and on the other hand locating “bogus 
subjects” perceived as not worthy of help and protection have occupied a 
central arena in this discussion.  Especially young men crossing the 
Mediterranean and reaching their destinations in the EU (most commonly 
pictured in the imagery of crowds and masses) have been in this discussion 
not seen as ‘real refugees’, and thus have often been framed as ‘bogus 
subjects’ motivated by economic reasons, rather than “real distress”. The 
suffering of such subjects does not appear as severe enough. The false nature 
of these asylum seekers has often been signified by references and 
descriptions pointing to the visually detectable well-being and well-offness of 
the subjects in the images presented by the media. 499 
This line of thinking is exemplified by A Finnish populist right-wing 
politician and Member of the EU parliament Jussi Halla-aho’s (from the 
populist and anti-immigration oriented Finns Party) statements in which he 
called the refugees taking the Mediterranean route “iPhone men” (In 
Finnish: “iPhone-miehet”). The accusation of the use of modern 
technological devises (seen as unsuitable for refugees—but quite suitable for 
Europeans) was at least partly motivated by the images of the refugees given 
to the Western spectators in which many of the refugees are shown as 
possessing and using smartphones. By calling the refugees as “iPhone men” 
Halla-aho strived to indicate and frame the refugees as subjects not really 
entitled to help, but rather as subjects too well off to be seen as suffering 
victims and rather seeking to come to the Western countries on bogus 
excuses. 500 In the same spirit Halla-ahos’s party member, member of the 
Finnish parliament, Riikka Slunga-Poutsalo referred to the refugees by 
calling them “living-standard-surffers” (“Elintasosuffarit”). She claimed that 
four out of five asylum seekers seemed to be able-bodies and healthy men of 
18 to 50 years of age, whom should be “defending their fatherlands, instead 
of coming to Finland to live on the social well-fare”. 501 The (assumed) 
                                                
499 In 2015 Finland, terms such as “asylum-tourists”, “Fake-refugees”, “iPhone men” and “living-
standard-surffers” have been introduced in the debate on refugeeness and the suspected inauthenticity 
of the refugees.  
500 Halla-aho used the term “iPhone men” in his Facebook status in august 2015. And has repeatedly 
used the phrase ever since. The usage of this term by a visible and active anti-immigration politician, 
and a Member of the European Parliament caused a media sensation in Finland. 
https://www.facebook.com/jussi.hallaaho/posts/828897627230433 (The whole post in Finnish here: 
”Suomeen odotetaan tänä vuonna 15 000 iphone-miestä. Hallituksen linja näyttää olevan se, että 
tärkeimpiin lähtömaihin, Somaliaan ja Irakiin, ei palauteta ketään. Seuraavaksi alkaa sitten 
perheenyhdistämisrumba, joten odotamme mielenkiinnolla alkaako hallitus ohjelmansa ja 
perussuomalaiset vaalilupaustensa mukaisesti ajaa perheenyhdistämissääntöjen 
järkeistämistä.Suuri osa turvapaikanhakijoista tulee Suomeen Ruotsin kautta, epäilemättä Ruotsin 
viranomaisten kehottamana ja ehkä jopa kustannuksella. Dublin-sääntöjen perusteella Suomen ei 
pitäisi edes käsitellä näiden ihmisten hakemuksia, mutta hallitus näyttää olevan eri mieltä.Se, että 
Ruotsi on - ministeri Orpon sanoin - kyllästetty, johtuu ruotsalaisten pitkään jatkuneesta hölmöstä 
politiikasta. Meillä ei ole mitään solidaarisuusvelvoitetta Ruotsia kohtaan. Sen sijaan meillä on 
solidaarisuusvelvoite omia kansalaisiamme ja tämän maan tulevaisuutta kohtaan.”)  
501Slunga-poutsalo: Elintasosurffarit käännytettävä pikaisesti – eriarvoistavat tuet 
poistettava. Suomen Uutiset,  August 21, 2015.  
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material well-offness, physical condition, age, gender and the economic 
motivations (all reportedly visually observable in media images) of the 
asylum seekers fleeing the horrors of war, was again utilized in order to 
frame them as bogus subjects, not deserving help. The openly xenophobic 
anti-immigration populist’ actors have in their rhetoric reclined strongly to 
the (right) visual performativity of refugeeness. 502 
Halla-aho’s phrase  “iphone men” as well as Slunga-Poutsalo’s arguments 
metonymizes two distinct and much used arguments often arising from the 
visual features and performativity of refugeeness, which have been central in 
questioning and disputing the real need of help and sincerity of the 
refugees—male gender, young age and (relative) economic and material well-
offness.  Along with the pejorative references to the use of modern mobile 
technology, not seen as suitable or appropriate for the status, behavior and 
performativity refugees, also references to expensive brand clothing worn by 
the mostly male asylum seekers have been taken up by political ‘immigration 
critique’ actors.503 Thus, visually depictable character, modern and decent 
(similar to ‘our standards’) clothing, along with the use of novel media 
technologies, added with male gender associated with strength and active 
able-to-help-them-selves qualities, have been used to undermine the need of 
asylum and help from these people. 504 Such characters and features are seen 
to collide with the visual signs of the “exemplary victim”. In relation to 
refugee discourse, Malkki (already in 1996) has noted that once the visual 
signs traditionally associated with refugeeness and victimness decrease, the 
level of refugeeness decreases. This happens in the eyes of not only the 
public, but also the perception of authorities of refugee issues. Visual traits 
and signs of “real” and “pure” refugeeness are often physical wounds, marks 
of “real violence”, dirtiness, physical raggedness and torn clothes and “having 
nothing”. Typically the plight and need of help has been also materialized in 
the bodies of female and child victims, associated with helplessness and 
victimness.505 Visual traits of economic and material well-being—or even 
suspected wealth—and (suspected) strength of the people approaching 
Europe has thus been conceptualized and signified as diminishing their need 
of help, and seen as emblems of their bogus refugeeness and status as illegal 
subjects. Therefore, the exemplary refugee victim, according to the 
                                                
502 On the racisim enbedded in the Finnish immigration policy, see : Rajas, Jarmila: State Racist 
Governmentality: A Foucaultian Discourse Theoretical analysis of Finnish Immigration Policy. 
Doctoral Thesis, Loughborough University, 2014.  
503Examples of such rhetoric: 5 Major Myths of Europe’s refugee and migrant crisis 
debunked. September, 16. 2015, The Huffington Post ; Perussuomalainen kansanedustaja 
kaivoi maahanmuuttoväitteillensä pohjan netistä ja myöntää, faktatietoa ei ole 
olemassa. July, 21, 2015. Etelä-Suomen Sanomat.  
504 Habitually fake (or deliberately biasedly framed) imagery centring on the well-being, physical 
performativity  seen as unsuitable for refugees (muscular habitus, clothing) as well as accusations of 
islamist extremism have been used in order to turn the attitudes of westerners against refugees. See for 
instance: The fake refugee images that are being used to distort public opinion on 
asylum seekers. September, 16, 2015, The Independent.  
505 Malkki, 1996, 384- 385; See also Chouliaraki, 2013. This theme was also dealt with shortly in the 
chapter 2.3.3.  
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standardized and historically formed way of picturing (and visually 
perceiving) refugees—and to which the populist anti-immigration parties can 
be seen to point to in their critical pleas—should be presented in visible 
bodily vulnerability and weakness, detectable in body of the refugee subject.  
The picturing of refugees has customarily (photographs taken as well as 
circulated by professionals and authorities) centered on imagery that both 
emphasize their existence as a nameless and dehistorized masses and 
crowds, but also highlights their physical, corporeal wounds, pain, 
vulnerability and helplessness. This, according to Malkki, is because the 
corporeal wounds of the silent masses tend to speak to the on-lookers and 
spectators of the plight of the refugees in a manner perceived as more 
believable and accurate than the personal accounts of the refugees, or 
“refugee stories”. Verbal accounts of refugees are often considered not as 
reliable as visually depictable bodily proof: marks of violence, bodily 
suffering and having nothing, bare existence. Refugee’s stories are often seen 
as overtly dramatic, hysterical or even tendentiously false. As Franz Fanon 
observes, for the “native” the “objectivity is always against him”. Following 
this, Malkki claims, much the same can be said in the case of the refugees, as 
wounds and corporality also in their case also speak louder than their words. 
506  Thus it seems, that the spectators tend to need visual verification of the 
pain and plight of distant others—  “bare facts” given by bloody and tragic 
images are insisted—the narration of the subjects in not enough. Similarly, 
Elaine Scarry writes in her book The Body in Pain that while the pain to the 
sufferer herself is often unquestionable, real and tangible, the most reliable 
and true account there is, yet the pain of others always remains under 
suspicion and questioning, as something that needs to be proofed. 507  
Photographs and visual images of the pain of others are thus often needed 
and utilized to overcome this void of experiencing pain first hand, and 
believing and observing the pain of others. Images presenting the pain of the 
refugees in vulnerable bodily settings strive to show to the suspicious remote 
potential helpers the situation of the other under pain and in need of help in 
the most reliable way possible.  This customary bare life imagery—presenting 
the plight of the refugees in corporeal, dramatic and bloody ways—is the kind 
of imagery that seems to be missed and called for in the populist anti-
immigration rhetoric.  Smartphone using, able-bodied youngish men dressed 
in rather decent, Western-style clothing for the European anti-immigration 
or openly xenophobic voices gaining much influence in the European 
discussion, do not seem to describe and perform the plight of the refugee 
subjects in a “right” way.  
Moreover, the tendency and tradition of picturing the genuine need of 
help and “real refugeeness” principally through the bodily suffering works to 
silence the refugees (just as the objects of humanitarian actions and 
interventions in many other cases as well) and places them into a status of 
                                                
506 Malkki, 1996, 384-385.  
507 Scarry, 1985.  
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voiceless objects, who’s stories are heard through dramatic images arranged 
by specialists and the media, rather than by their own narration.508  
However, picturing the objects of humanitarian action and populations in 
need of help in bare life imagery of corporeal pain, as well as in the form of 
helpless masses tormented by illness and weakness, works to distance the 
objects of help from the potential helpers; the spectators of the images. This 
kind of imagery—as we have seen previously in this study—is in the forefront 
in creating global humanitarian hierarchies, dividing the world into (mostly 
Western) strong able to help ‘human-subjects’ and the helpless and 
corporally suffering ‘subhumans’, plunging differentiated groups of people 
into segmented categories of humanness, and thus works to maximize the 
distance between the helpers (spectators) and (spectated) the objects of 
help.509  
Also, as has been reiterated in a multitude of research, this tendency in 
humanitarian visual communication moreover serves to paralyze the 
spectators of the images; such images are often even seen as producing 
phenomena sometimes called “compassion fatigue”, “I’ve seen this before 
syndrome” or “boomerang effect”, which have all been seen to actually work 
to diminish the ability of the spectators to connect with the objects of the 
images and thus seen to decrease their will to help.510 Therefore, when 
picturing refugees as suffering masses, having nothing and through physical 
bare existence, the very same political actors now claiming that the refugees 
appear to be “too well off”, might very well, when facing bare life imagery, 
argue that these people have nothing in common with us, as they seem to 
occupy a different stratum of humanity, and therefore cannot be welcomed 
into our societies. As visual signs of sameness (strength, well-offness, active 
status and able bodiedness) function as ground for denial of the status of 
genuine a refugee, then the bare-life representations work to widen the void 
between the refugees and the one’s spectating at their images as humans, and 
moreover often point to cultural difference, and may be argued to showcase 
the uncivilized, unfitting nature of the applicants, too diverse with us to be 
“integrated” into our western societies.511    
Furthermore, what is remarkable here is that usually (visual) features and 
attributes pointing to similarity between the objects of help and the helpers 
(the spectators of the images) are seen to fortify the solidary bonds between 
the sufferers and the observers of the suffering, and thus to strengthen the 
sentiments of compassion and will to help. Visually detectable, shared 
features such as similarity—regarding age, physical appearance, cultural 
similarity, race, gender, as well as parallel physical performativity at large—
                                                
508 Malkki, 1996.  
509 Douzinas, 2007, See chapter 2.4.1& 3.2. 
510 This phenomena and effects of negative appeals and bare life imagery were dealt with in the chapter 
2. See also Chouliaraki, 2013, 55-61; Cohen, 2001, 185-195, 214-218. 
511 This sort of arguments are often used within the anti-immigration rhetoric, especially when 
decribing refugees (immigrants) coming from islamic states and areas. See for example: Migration 
crisis: Hungary PM says Europe in grip of madness, September, 3 2015, The Guardian.  
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have been seen to increase the compassionate and solidary reactions of the 
observers/spectators.512  But, in the case of the refugees, visual 
performativity and visual traits of sameness seem to actually work 
aberrantly. This might be, because of picturing and debating refugeeness is, 
from a humanitarian point of view, rather different from many other forms of 
picturing global humanitarian crisis and need of help. As the humanitarian 
catharsis may be today attained by a Western spectator rather easily—by 
participating in a campaign or a charity concert, allotting some money with a 
click of a mouse to an organization working at the crisis zone, or even by 
supporting a militarized humanitarian intervention into the crisis area by 
democratically legitimizing such action, as was discussed in chapter 3.—
dealing with the refugees demands more from the spectating audiences and 
potential helpers. It is far more demanding to welcome refugees into ‘our 
societies’, as potential neighbors, co-workers, and countrymen entitled to the 
same social benefits as the spectators, than just (mostly financially) 
outsourcing the responsibility to care of and help the distant strangers to 
organizations, professionals and state actors. Therefore, I argue that the 
imagery of refugees and refugeeness works at somewhat different density 
than many other types of humanitarian imagery. Thus, picturing refugees, 
from the politicized, anti-cosmopolitan, even xenophobic anti-immigration 
point of view, in which the subjects seeking asylum and our help are in the 
first place perceived as somewhat dubiously human compared to one’s self, 
creates a dilemma. In this hostile context, the refugees have no way to win: it 
is impossible for them to be pictured in a way that would make them seem as 
fully-human, suitable and legitimate subjects worthy of help, welcomed to 
our societies—and ultimately, to be perceived as humans on the same scale 
with the Western spectators.513  
The refugees, within the xenophobic, anti-immigration and “anti-
multiculturalism” discourse have a rather limited prospects of being treated 
as humans on the same scale as the Western spectators and ‘full-fledged 
humans’ are: they are always framed and perceived as being of a wrong 
quality or wrong moral essence because of the way they are presented or due 
to the way they perform their role as objects claiming the benevolent 
reactions/actions of the surrounding (Western) world. Therefore rhetorical 
references to the visual performativity of refugeeness made by the political 
actors holding an anti-immigration stand unveil the ever more ground 
winning, influential and loud voiced attitudes and stances on the conditional 
nature of humanity within the Western/European migration/refugee 
discussion. As Judith Butler puts it: ”It is not just that some humans are 
treated as humans, and others are dehumanized; it is rather that 
dehumanization becomes the condition for the production of the human to 
                                                
512 Ginsburg, 1994.  
513An internet meme I stumbled upon “If she floats she is an economic migrant, if she drowns she is a 
refugee” pinpoints this dilemma rather poignantly. See: 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2015/09/if-she-drowns-shes-a-refugee-if-she-floats-
shes-an-economic-migrant.html 
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the extent that a “western” civilization defines itself over and against a 
population understood as definitionally illegitimate, if not dubiously 
human.” 514  This mode of thinking can be seen to be at the heart of the 
xenophobic stances and anti-immigration politics, growingly influential and 
loud voiced in European societies in mid 2010s.  
4.4.2 HUMANITY WASHED ASHORE—VISUALLY CLAIMING THE 
HUMANITY OF REFUGEES 
Along with images of refugee boats and crowds of asylum seekers at the 
European border crossings and reception centers, blunt images of migrants 
and refugees struggling for their lives in the Mediterranean Sea, as well as 
pictures of the drowned bodies washed ashore on the coasts of Europe have 
been quite commonly used to visualize the refugee situation over the recent 
years. Such dramatic images have been widely circulated and frequently 
featured in the wide Western publicity and mainstream media already from 
early 2000s onwards. Illustrative examples of such imagery are the award 
winning images of migrants taken by a Spanish photographer Juan Medina 
near the Canary Islands in early 2000s. 515 Images of horrified and nearly 
drowning men in the sea, clinging to life buoys, as well as images of bodies of 
the individuals who did not make the journey alive, washed ashore on 
European beaches have been used to tell of the flows of migrants, their 
despair and the horrors they face trying to reach Europe. Perhaps most 
effective this imagery is when it strongly juxtaposes the relaxed and worry-
free leisure and well-being of Westerners sunbathing on the very same 
beaches where the asylum seekers are struggling for their lives or washed 
ashore already dead.516 (Juan medina’s award winning photographs of 
migrants from 2004-2006 are included in the illustration 4.5.)  
Such images have been often utilized in pointing out the unsustainability 
and problems of European immigration policies. For example Juan Medina’s 
images are clearly targeted to arouse benevolent sentiments in their 
spectators by reporting the horrors of the journey, as well as to point to the 
European (unbearable) outlooks towards people seeking a better life in the 
West. But their visual posture and contextual textual framings in the Western 
publicity have nevertheless often strongly pointed to difference, and can thus 
also be seen again to articulate sentiments of fear, threat and invasion of life 
somewhat seen as unwanted into the Western sphere. Firstly because most 
                                                
514 Butler, Judith: Precarious Life, Powers of mourning and violence, London, Verso, 2006, 278. 
515 A well-known example of such imagery of “would be immigrants” in the water, is a photo taken in 
2004 near the Canary Islands by photographer Juan Medina, which won the World Press Photography 
award in 2005. This image is included in the illustration 4.5. More of Medina’s images of Asylum 
seekers at the borders of Europe see for example: The Horrors of the Sea. April 27, 2015, BBC.  
516 A poignant example of such images is Juan Medina’s photo from May 2006, of a man who made his 
way to Europe, crawling on a beach in the Spanish Canary Island, while tourists are sunbathing on the 
background. see:  In search for a better life, July, 2010, Reuters.   
(Caption: 'A would-be immigrant crawls after his arrival on a makeshift boat on the Gran Tarajal beach 
in Spain's Canary Island, May 5, 2006) This image ios included in the illustration 4.5.  
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often the distressed individuals pictured are youngish adult, black/dark 
skinned men; features that are often seen to point to cultural difference, 
otherness and at the same time ability—and responsibility—to take care of 
themselves.  Moreover, habitually the names of the objects of the images 
have not been provided, as also other information shedding light on their 
personal histories, life stories is usually not included. Additionally the people 
in the images are recurrently textually framed and referred to as “would be 
immigrants” and even “illegal immigrants”.517 Thus, besides benevolent 
significations and messages, also these images—regardless of their blunt and 
dramatic visual features—have been from time to time framed and 
conceptualized as depicting the expansive threat of the foreign and culturally 
different crowds trying to flood the “old continent” and its moral and cultural 
order. Thus the threat that these “uncontrolled” flows of people and 
unwanted masses pose to the European or Western way of life has yet again 
been widely associated with the suffering objects of the images in their 
multiple contextual significations. Nevertheless, this style of visually 
representing the migrants/asylum seekers somewhat differs from the 
habitual images of nameless crowds, as this picturing points out the 
individuals in the crowds and the humans behind the statistics. Moreover, by 
also pointing to the striking dissimilarity of Westerners sunbathing on the 
sunny beaches where the globally less fortunate wound up dead, they also 
work to exemplify the unsustainability of the global arrangement and the 
morally questionable European reactions to people attempting at crossing 
the political borders of Europe.  
In larger terms, a more personal visual strategy in depicting the humans 
in need of help—close up imagery of individual human beings, identifiable 
facial expressions and even naming and personalized story telling included in 
the imagery—is generally seen to more effectively arouse benevolent 
reactions and humanitarian emotions in the spectating audiences. As with 
other humanitarian imagery, arrangements which personalize and center on 
the individuality of the sufferer and sameness between the sufferer and the 
spectator is seen to create stronger solidary bonds between the spectators 
and the depicted than images of depersonalized crowds and masses. Such 
personifying—and thus humanitarianly more effective—style of 
representation has also been seen to be less frequent in case of picturing 
refugees. 518 But in the highly the contested situation of the intensified the 
refugee crisis (namely in 2015 as the crisis expanded) a visual strategy of 
                                                
517 The presentation of Medina’s award winning image for the World Press Photo site also points 
out, that majority of the immigrants who made it to Europe “were deported almost immediately”. This 
can be seen to point to the “bogus nature” of the comers in the eyes of the European legislation.  World 
press photo caption of the image:  
Would-be immigrants from Africa are rescued from the sea, after their makeshift boat had capsized. 
The boat, carrying 36 people, overturned during an operation by Spanish civil guards in November. 
Seven of the immigrants were lost, but the remainder were saved. Authorities in the Canary Islands 
had already detained over 5,500 illegal immigrants that year. The majority were deported almost 
immediately.   
518 Bleiker et al, 2013; Malkki, 1996; Chouliaraki, 2013; Cohen , 2001.  
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emotive close up images, personified stories and hauntingly disturbing 
imagery of human suffering, highlighting the need of help of the refugees can 
be detected strengthened in the Western (European) publicity.   
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Personifying the Refugees 
It seems the intensified stage in the refugee crisis produced—maybe even 
demanded—a different mode of picturing, one of visually stressing and 
underlining the individuality and personhood of the comers. Such images can 
be seen as a counter reaction to the traditional de-personifying style of 
picturing refugees, as well as to the anti-immigration debate which has taken 
as its strategy to dehumanize the asylum seekers by presenting them as 
bogus (humanitarian) subjects, or even claiming their reduced humanness. 
Personified picturing and visual storytelling, which can be both seen as 
striving to mitigate the difference between the people in need of help and the 
potential helpers by visual means (along with providing information on the 
individuality and including personal stories, names and even refugee voices) 
flooded the Western publicity particularly in 2015. An example of such 
picturing is Daniel Etter’s image of Iraqi refugee, Laith Majid. In this 
emotive image, which went viral late summer 2015, Majid, dressed in a life 
vest is pictured crying and holding his children, after their dangerous boat 
journey safely reaching the Greek island of Kos.519 The representational style 
of this image clearly stresses the individuality of the asylum seekers, by close 
up images of recognizable faces and emotional postures. The story 
accompanying the images provides names and stories, and attempts to bring 
home the sincerity of the need of help and humanness of the refugees. The 
visual images and the text aim to bring the story of Laith’s family for the 
spectating audience through themes to which most people can relate to—
parenthood, fear, anxiety, parental worry, love. This image can be seen 
emotively centering on the similarity of the spectators with the ones in 
despair. (Included in the Illustration 4.5.Daniel Etter’s photo of Laith Maijd, 
which was published August 2015 in the New York Times. ) 
Similarly touching are images of refugee children shot by photographer 
Magnus Wennman during 2015. In his project Where the Children Sleep 
Wennman pictures refugee children sleeping —in the streets, market places, 
border crossing, hospitals, reception centers, parks and forests—while 
making their way across Europe. Wennman’s reportage includes detailed 
personal information on the children pictured: their names and ages, their 
whereabouts, where they left and why, what they had to leave behind (toys, 
homes, friends, family, schools, health). The reportage includes descriptions 
on the journey of the children and their families, as well as on the political 
situation hindering their seek for a refuge and journey in Europe (Hungary 
closing its borders etc.) and the trouble they face along the way. 520 The 
                                                
519 Migrants find an unbridled route to Greece. (Photo by Daniel Etter) August 17, 2015, New York 
Times.  
520 Where the Children Sleep. Photos by Wennman, Magnus, (text by Bergfeldt, Carina, Wiman, 
Erik& Weigl, Kerstin) Aftonbladet, 2015. One can also detect an intertextual reference to the 
photographs of James Mollison’s Where Children Sleep – Project and a book. In Mollison´s work 
the bed rooms of children around the world are presented, and the significance of the place of rest for 
children in different settings is exemplified.   http://jamesmollison.com/books/where-children-sleep/ 
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images and the reportage is heart breaking, as it for a Western spectator 
juxtaposes the material wealth and well-being, secure everyday life and an 
accessible cozy bed at reach of an average European, with the unbearable 
conditions the often traumatized small asylums seekers have faced in their 
counties of origin and continue to face in the ‘civilized’ wealthy Europe. As 
the edge of the images are children as ideal victims—often apprehended as 
innocent, pure and in need and entitled to protection—deprived of a own bed 
and secure place to rest, the tormenting message for a (Western) spectator is 
the intolerable conditions in which the asylum seekers live in Europe. The 
appeal of the reportage is built around the theme of common human fragility, 
and a plea for humane treatment for humans suffering amongst us. The 
visual arrangement of presenting the refugee situation through children 
deprived of safety and acceptable living conditions speaks the language of 
sameness, which is in many ways the starting point of humanitarian 
emotions and will to help.  The children depicted in the images ‘could be our 
own’, they often look familiar, they are dressed in colorful clothes we see on 
the child next door, they long after lost toys we see at the shops we go to, but 
the objects of the images are placed in totally wrong, heart wrenching 
settings. They miss security, ease and happiness—the kind of life ‘our 
children’ are allowed to live. (Included in the illustration 4.5. are images of 
the Magnus Wennman’s series Where the Children Sleep published in 
Aftonbladet, 2015.) 
This change in the mode of picturing the refugees may be seen to stem not 
only as a counter reaction to the anti-immigration speech and 
dehumanization of the refugees gathering a louder voice in Europe, but also 
from the altered situation in Europe at a time when the number of asylum 
seekers radically increased. The need to see and present the newcomers as 
individuals and human beings “just like us” is at the heart of this more 
benevolent and personal style of picturing, centering on similarity and 
aiming to arouse understanding of the plight of others, and thus the will to 
help of the spectators. Therefore these acts of picturing the ones in need as 
individuals sincerely in need of asylum and entitled to it (in accordance to 
international conventions), can also be seen as political appeals for a more 
humane politics and as pleas for more effective means to help the people who 
are entitled to help. However, visually showing other humans in fragile 
bodily settings and laid bare in their vulnerability also always conveys other 
significations—they are acts of claiming and articulating the humanness of 
the subjects depicted.  
 
The Miscellaneous Politics of the Images of Drowned Refugee 
Children 
Although images of lifeless bodies of refugees trying to enter Europe have not 
been unseen in the Western publicity over the years, the visual 
representation of the refugee crisis in the Western publicity took a strong 
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turn in the intensified situation of late summer 2015.521 The questions of 
claiming the humanness of the asylum seekers by publishing strong emotive, 
visual representations, presented with a deliberate motivation to influence 
the political discussion and decision-making on the issue reached its peak in 
the form of a visual spectacle of drowned refugee children. In the extremely 
heated political situation dreadful images of dead refugee children were 
forcefully hammered into the retinas and consciousness of Western 
spectators, as they flooded the mainstream as well as social media. 
Late August 2015 Migrant Report, a Malta based NGO specializing in 
migration issues, decided to publish images of the child victims perished as a 
refugee boat capsized near the coast of Libya. These images taken by Libyan 
relief workers bluntly show the bodies of drowned refugee children on the 
shores of a Libyan coast town Zuwara. Images of small bodies lying face 
down in the sandy beach some wearing diapers, some dressed in their pretty 
dresses, all dead and washed on the shore all alone after their unsuccessful 
attempt to seek protection are heartbreaking and hard to look at. These small 
children in their contextual setting signify not only the victims of war, but 
also of human trafficking, and European migration policies. The images 
poignantly and heart wrenchingly epitomize the human toll behind the 
statistics constantly reiterated in cold numbers. Still, the victims depicted 
remained unidentified and unnamed for the media consumers. 522  (Included 
in the illustration 4.5. are some of the Migrant report’s images of drowned 
refugee children published August 2015.)  
Even if the problematic ethical considerations of publishing photographs 
of dead children are evident, the circulation of these images at that very 
moment was commonly justified by their urgently political nature. These 
images were presented as “pictures that need to be seen”, as the Migrant 
Report titled their story on the disaster. The images were framed as unveiling 
the unbearable conditions of the refugees approaching Europe by showing 
tangible bodily proof of the victims, and emotionally putting faces on the 
refugees and the crisis taking place right at the moment. As the newsletter 
editor Mark Micallef of the Migrant Report stated: …  ”we respect the dignity 
of those children more by publishing the photos of their bodies than by not 
publishing them. If the pictures move a single politician holding an unhelpful 
position, their death would not have been completely in vain.”523  
A few days after the publication of the haunting images by the Migrant 
Report, images of a dead refugee child found on the beach of a Turkish town 
                                                
521 Now, in retrospect in early 2016, one might say that this style of picturing was rather short lived—a 
momentary surge—and after the spectacle of fall 2015, the predominant picturing went back to the 
images of crowds and masses. Maybe the power of the emotive, persofying, haunting images was 
exhausted.  
522 Pictures that need to be seen, Migrant Report: August 29, 2015; You might as well ignore 
photos of dead refugee babies on Africans shores. August 31, 2015, The Dailybeast.  
From August 2014 to August 2015 the reported number of individuals drowned at the Mediterranean 
was more than 3500. see: Mediterranean Sea, Data of Missing Migrants, Deaths in the 
Mediterranean by month, 2014 and 2015 
 Missing Migrant Project, International Organization for Migration, IOM.  
523 Ibid.  
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Bodrum, formed into an enormously visible media spectacle in the whole of 
the (Western) world.  A Turkish photojournalist Nilüfer Demir was 
documenting the aftermath of yet another capsized refugee boat on the coast 
of Turkey, and took photos of a victim: a three year old Kurdish Syrian boy 
named Aylan Kurdi, laying face on the sandy beach. In another frame shot 
by Demir the dead little body of Aylan is pictured in the arms of a Turkish 
gendarme, while he is carrying the little boy’s remains away from the beach. 
These images shocked and outraged the surrounding world: they flowed 
across the mainstream and social media like wildfire; no one could escape 
the heart wrenching scenery. 524 (Included in the Illustration 4.5. are the 
images of Aylan Kurdi shot by Nilüfer Demir, September 2015.) 
The images picture a small child—a child who could live next door to us 
(dressed in clothing familiar to the spectating western audience)—in a 
dreadful yet calm and strangely beautiful posture, speaks the language of 
sameness and familiarity. There is no blood, no torn clothes, just a small 
body of a perfect human creature, lifeless on the shore. Yet, it is extremely 
hard to repudiate the plight and suffering so evidently present in the image. 
Again the publication and circulation of the heartbreaking images was 
rationalized by the political force and potential of the revealing scene the 
images offered. Nilüfer Demir, the photographer who took the images, stated 
that she wanted to make the tragedy heard, hoping that the image would be a 
call for action and have an improving impact on the situation at the borders 
of Europe. She stated that she hoped the images would serve as a call to 
action: ”I have photographed and witnessed many migrant incidents since 
2003 in this region”, she said in the interview. “Their deaths, their drama. I 
hope from today this will change”.525 Thus, in both of these cases the 
hamartia, the tragic mistake leading to the peril of the refugees was seen 
necessary to be visually show to the surrounding world.  
The potential of these images in raising awareness and ‘doing good’—
serving the rights of the victims and even perhaps saving others like them to 
come—was thus seen as more urgent and valuable than the questions of 
dignity of the objects of the images, and other ethically problematic aspects 
in representation. Showing, publishing and circulating images of dead 
refugee children was thus seen as a humanitarian practice, used in arguing 
for the humanity of the victims, their entitlement for asylum and moreover as 
a plea for a more benevolent, humane politics. This logic actually largely 
complies with the standardized and historically formed ways of picturing 
repressed groups as (bodily) vulnerable victims and thus aiming at awaking 
benevolent and solidary emotions in the spectators, and further claiming the 
                                                
524 Shocking images of drowned Syrian boy show tragic plight of refugees. September 2, 
2015, The Guardian; Family of children found on Turkish beach were trying to come 
to Canada. September 3, 2015. The Ottawa citizen; Brutal Images of Syrian Boy Drowned Off 
Turkey Must Be Seen, Activists Say. September, 2,2015, New York Times; Aylan Kurdi: 
Syrian boy's family took deadly voyage after Canada refused refugee application, 
September 16, 2015, The Independent.   
525 Photographer who found Syrian toddler dead on Turkish beach was petrified. 
September, 3 2015, The Washington Post.  
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victims (or the groups she/he represents) right for protection.  The images of 
dead refugee children were primarily stated as been published and circulated 
because of their messages as news worthy representations “showing the 
reality of these people”. It was reiterated that it was necessary for the 
Western audiences to confront the human toll of the Syrian war, the topical 
situation of the refugees and the humane cost of European migration policies 
by looking at the images.  Thus the humanitarian potential of graphic images 
of suffering—claiming the authenticity of suffering and thus verifying the 
need of help of these people (and the groups they represent) by presenting 
visual, corporeal proof—was the leading rationale behind publishing and 
circulating these images. Accordingly, the images were quite bluntly used as 
political weapons in pressuring western decision makers into facing the 
consequences of European migration policies. For instance the British Prime 
Minister David Cameron was criticized for his strict stances by reclining to 
the image of Aylan Kurdi, and was demanded to change his “heartless”, 
“cruel” and “out of touch” attitudes and political alignments towards the 
refugee crisis. 526  
What is remarkable in the case of Aylan’s image is that the victim was 
given a name, an identity, a story and a history. The heartbreaking and 
emblematic story of little Aylan’s family was soon after the publication of the 
images echoed throughout the Western media.  Everyone learnt the name of 
the small victim, and of his brother, 5-year-old Galip, and their mother 
Rehan. Both of who also perished as their boat capsized.  Even the only 
survivor of the family, father Abdullah, was given an active voice in the 
media.  The Kurdis were identified as a Kurdish family fleeing from the 
Syrian town of Kobane, massively destroyed in the war. The family fled the 
war to Turkey, and was trying to emigrate from there to Canada, but their 
application was refused. Thus, the family decided to take the dangerous route 
from Turkey to the Greek Island of Kos, on which they perished as their boat 
capsized. Abdullah Kurdi’s statement that he had now lost everything, and 
wants nothing more than to sit on the graves of his family was echoed in the 
worldwide media. Moreover, what can be seen as rather unusual in such 
cases, he actually indirectly consented with the presentation and circulation 
of the images of his child by stating that he “wants the world to remember his 
son”.  The spectacle created by the images of Aylan Kurdi and the story of the 
family point a finger not only towards the governments and political groups 
causing wars and terror, creating suffering and refugeeness in the first place, 
but in a clear, blunt and emotive way show to the Western spectators the 
ramifications of the dysfunctional and unsustainable migration policies of 
the EU and the bland negligence of surrounding world. Thus, the image and 
the story together aim at arousing emotions of shame and quilt, waking up 
the consciousness of Western spectators, and to force the Western on-lookers 
                                                
526 Brutal Images of Syrian Boy Drowned off Turkey Must Be Seen, Activists Say. 
September, 2, 2015, New York Times.  
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to face the harsh reality of the people fleeing war and chaos. As Nadim 
Houry, Human Rights Watch deputy director for the Middle East and North 
Africa described the images; the images are the “Biggest indictment of 
collective failure”. 527  
Publicizing the images with the personal history of the family can be seen 
to fortify the argument of trying to give a face to the tragedy and thus 
affecting the politics and attitudes towards migration and asylum seekers. 
Enclosing the personal story of the family with the tragic image at least 
partially breaks the code of representing refugees as de-historized and 
nameless crowds. But, although this time the “subaltern” (the father of Aylan 
Kurdi, a victim himself, as also other members of his extended family) was 
given a chance to speak528, again in the case of refugees, the story alone was 
not enough, not without photographic evidence of the “real” bodily suffering 
in the body of an exemplary victim (an innocent child). The body of a child 
was needed in order for the voice of the refugees themselves to be credible. 
Solely a verbal story of the horrors of war, the voyage and its dangers and 
tragedy so many before and after the Kurdis have gone through would have 
not been sufficient in validating the horror experienced by “the others”, nor 
to show the essence and worth of refugees as humans “just like us”.529  In this 
way, it may be said, that physical vulnerability—in the case of refugees—still 
today speaks louder than words. The words—or “refugee stories” —are not 
considered as believable as visual accounts of “real” bodily suffering. 
Moreover, the picture of Alyan can be seen to have been so efficient not only 
because of the topicality of its timing, but because of its visual composition, 
its’s visually iconic nature in many senses.  Therefore, visually endorsing and 
proofing the extent and nature of the plight of refugees to the somewhat 
suspiciously postured audience is at the core of publishing the images. 
Again—just like so many times in the bloody course of history—a tangibly 
bleeding corporeal icon, photographic evidence, was needed to validate the 
doubtful words of the incredible non-Western sufferers.  
Thus furthermore, the spectacle of Aylan Kurdi shows, how Western 
spectators need visual corporal proof of the humanity of “the others”, before 
being able to apprehend them as belonging to the regime of humanity and 
the regime of life entitled to protection, asylum or a decent life. The visual 
arrangements of picturing refugees in relation to the heated crisis of 2015 
lays bare the constant need of corporal and tangible—horrifically emotive—
                                                
527Senior British Politicians tell David Cameron: When dead children are being washed 
on beaches-it’s time to act. September 3, 2015, The Independent; Syrian Toddler’s Dad:” 
Everything I was Dreaming of is Gone”, September, 4, 2015, CNN: Shocking images of 
drowned Syrian boy show tragic plight of refugees. September 2, 2015, The Guardian;  
Family of children found on Turkish beach were trying to come to Canada. September 3, 
2015. The Ottawa citizen: Aylan Kurdi: Syrian boy's family took deadly voyage after 
Canada refused refugee application, September 16, 2015, The Independent.  
528 I here refer to the idea of Gayatri Charkravorty Spivak in her Essay (1983/ 1988) ”Can the 
Subaltern Speak?”.  
529 Parashar, Swati: On Images, Stories and the Need to Hear More. E-International Relations, 
October 8, 2015.  
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proof of the humanity of the others in order to be compassionate.  But 
concurrently the very same function actually unveils some underlying 
negative assumptions on the (needy) others as “subhumans”—reduced in 
humanness in comparison to the “inviolable Western us”. The visual 
spectacle of the dead little Aylan—as also the other benevolent imageries 
stressing and calling for the humanity and entitlement of asylum and rights—
thus actually articulate how extremely hard it is for the well-off distant 
spectators to apprehend the value of the lives of the others and to see their 
essence as humans on the same level, on the same scale as their own. 
The movement of people crossing the political boundaries of different 
regimes of humanness (the West and the rest) poignantly reveals the global 
conditionality of human worth. The arrangements of visual performativity of 
refugeeness in Western publicity, impressiveness and repeated force of such 
visuals, reiterated again and again, unveil how the lives of the non-Western 
“subalterns” are generally assumed to be less human than their Western 
counterparts”. Yet, all of us humans (should) know—or at least that is what is 
declared in ceremonious declarations—that we all are human animals—very 
similar in our genetic, bodily as well as, psychological, psychosocial and 
emotional build, needs and aspirations—it seem that this is not tended to be 
recognized, but constant reproof of the fact is needed in the form of tragic 
visual images. It seems, that it is only in visual images of extreme pain and 
vulnerability—sublime loss—where the essential sameness of the suffering 
others and “us” seem to recognized. And then again, the waves of compassion 
die out as out a suddenly as they are born. Another heartbreaking image of 
an exemplary victim elsewhere is always around the corner. 
4.5 CONCLUSIONS: THE VISUAL CONDITIONALITY OF 
BELONGING TO FULL-FLEDGED HUMANITY 
The apprehension of valuable life, and the claims made for protection of such 
lives can be seen (historically) stemming from the apprehension of all human 
lives sharing a precarious and bodily vulnerable essence. As visual records of 
pain have been seen as a more forceful arena in mediating the pain of others 
to remote on-lookers than mere worlds, mass scale mediation of visual 
images of bodily pain have been seen as a major arena for articulating the 
pain and need of protection of (distant) lives to (remote) spectators.  The 
representational practices of images of pain and vulnerability have thus been 
seen to comprise a visual theater, through which claims for protection of the 
lives of the others has been made. Thus images of pain have functioned as an 
arena through which tangible and emotively forceful proof on valuable life 
has become articulated, and which has provided certainty on the otherwise 
abstract notions of belonging to the regime of protectable and valuable life.  
The unconditional and universal nature of human rights and human 
worth can be seen as corner stones of the societal order of Western societies 
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and public life, international politics and Western self-apprehension. But 
when the notions of the unconditional value of all human lives and dignity of 
all humans is approached through visual images of suffering and their 
(global) representational practices, a radically different scenery into the 
notions of global human worth are revealed. Sieving through contemporary 
images of human vulnerability, war and crisis presented in the Western 
publicity, a strictly hierarchical, globally and politically segmented practice of 
presentation is clearly detectable: publication and circulation of visual 
representations bluntly showing non-Western suffering bodies are a norm in 
contemporary global mediation of information, while concurrently Western 
vulnerable bodies are scarcely visible. Therefore, the contemporary practices 
governing the picturing of vulnerable humanity in its bodily precariousness 
can be seen as a strictly hierarchical and authoritative arrangement, which 
provides certainty and tangible proof of the globally, geographically, 
culturally and politically conditional nature of human worth and value. The 
representational arrangements of images of pain and vulnerability thus 
comprise a visual theater of proof on the conditionality of belonging to the 
regime of protectable humanity.  
This globally and politically segmented normative representational 
tendency in the seeability of vulnerable and suffering bodies places chaotic 
and brutal events and bodily suffering into the non-Western global and 
political sphere and claims the inviolability of Western bodies. Moreover as 
media’s codes of taste and decency aimed at the protection of the dignity, 
honor and humanity of the individuals depicted in times of trauma and pain, 
mainly only govern and restrict the visual representability of Western 
vulnerability, the dignity and humanness of non-Western individuals 
becomes contested. Western lives are understood as belonging to the regime 
of protectable lives, seen as grievable and valuable, but the personal dignity 
of non-Westerners in the context of visual arrangements of pain and 
suffering is rarely mentioned. Therefore, today predominantly only bodily 
suffering of bodies not quite rated (in the Western point of view) as full-
fledged members of humanity is seen in Western publicity.  
Moreover, the visual representational practices of human vulnerability 
serve a central function in communicating the Western world order and 
dominance over the rest of the world.  This tendency is poignantly visualized 
in contemporary imagery of foreign disasters and the Western militarized 
humanitarian interventions into such situations.  Picturing the strong 
humanitarian yet militarized West vis-à-vis the sick, helpless and the weary 
rest produces revealing scenery into the global developmental dominance of 
the West over the non-Western lives seen as lives in a lessened manner. Thus 
the function of the humanitarian theater of proof of images of suffering is at 
least twofold: it articulates globally (culturally and politically) conditional 
understanding of belonging to humanity, as it visualizes and provides 
certainty on the power of the Western way of life and Western political 
ideology marked by humanitarianism and human rights.  And at the same 
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time it makes visible the humanitarian Western dominance over the rest of 
the world. Therefore these visual arrangements produce narratives of the 
non-Western lives as unfit surplus human material that must be not only 
helped, developed and civilized, but also controlled and contained in order to 
secure the safety of the West. The visual theater of proof produced by these 
images suggest, that gaining access to full-blown humanity, human worth 
and protection from suffering (insurance/vaccination towards vulnerability) 
is achievable only by the membership of/belonging to the Western political 
realm.  
By observing the representational practices of Western /non-Western 
bodies at large it becomes lucid that plight and suffering may generally be 
show visually and corporally only when the object of the image is perceived 
somewhat inferior to the global Western elite. Thus, showing the suffering of 
the non-Western others in a visual manner, is not anymore so much about 
making us aware of the distant atrocities (as it still is also this) but has also 
become a means of indicating the status of the sufferers in the global 
hierarchy. The visual representational practices of the refugee crisis and 
political references made adverting to the images of refugees, in many ways 
exemplify the miscellaneous visual politics of belonging to humanity. The 
(full-fledged) humanity of the refugees is on the one hand contested by 
references to the (unfit) visual performativity of need of help and protection. 
And on the other hand, by making claims on the humanity of the refugees 
resting on dramatic visual representations of their suffering, the underlying 
negative assumptions on their reduced humanness are revealed. At the 
theater of proof of the contemporary images of suffering, the otherwise 
'invisible' background notions of universal human rights, unalienable human 
worth and the politics of belonging to the regime of protectable life/ 
unprotected life become visualized. In addition, the various normative 
presumptions concerning the picturing of the world, its hierarchies, the 
inhabitants contained therein, and the conditionalities of (non)belonging 
become visually articulated.  
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5 HUMANITARIAN SOLDIERS, 
COLONIALIZED OTHERS AND INVISIBLE 
ENEMIES: VISUAL STRATEGIC 
COMMUNICATION NARRATIVES OF THE 
AFGHAN WAR 
5.1 INTRODUCTION: A MILITARY VIEW INTO 
CONTEMPORARY WAR 
  
“You may not be interested in war – but the war is interested in you” 
Leon Trotsky530 
 
Recent military operations have had more to do with information and 
cognition of people than ever before. In the post 9/11 era wars are waged not 
only on the ground, in the air, in maritime surroundings, but also in the 
evermore complex and frantic information environment. The role of 
information today is not only pivotal in mediating the events of war, but also 
in shaping how war is now conceptualized, perceived, comprehended and felt 
by large populations.531 In post 9/11 wars fought by the West and the 
international community532, rigorous imago formation has been central. 
Carefully created, novel and widely approved, easily adoptable “warbrands”, 
which can be fitted to the expectations, mindsets, values, attitudes and 
visions of the audiences, are vital in topical wars. The age of post-modern war 
can be seen as an epoch of intensifying strategic communication, marketing 
or branding of military operations, public diplomacy policies and public 
opinion control.533 The emphasis on communication strategies, strategic 
communication and winning the battle for the hearts and minds of the people 
                                                
530 This quotation is often attributed to Leon Trotsky, although there is no concrete evidence that 
Trotsky really said this. However, the aphorism describes the logic of military-strategic communication 
very well. 
531Huhtinen, Aki -Mauri: Sanasota. Johdatus Sodan ja Sodanjohtamisen 
Filosofiaan.Maanpuolustuskorkeakoulu, Helsinki, 2005, 57, 72–73, 76–77; Huhtinen, Aki-Mauri: 
Keinosota.Taistelu vastaanottajista. Elan Vital, Lahti 2003, 33–34; Virilio, Paul: Ground Zero, 
Verso, New York, 2002, 24–27, 33–34, 35–36. ; Zizek, Slavoj: Welcome to the Desert of Real. Verso, 
London,2003;Baudrillard, Jean: The Spirit of Terrorism , Verso, New York 2003 28–34; Virilio, 
Paul: The Information Bomb. Verso, London, 2000.; Understanding Information Age 
Warfare. Alberts, David, S et al., CCRP Publications, August 2001, 9–34, 43–52. 
532 As also stated before (Chapter 1.), by international community I refer to the term as it is often used 
in international relations and in the realm of human rights and moral value systems. International 
community often refers to all of the peoples, cultures and governments of the world, and their common 
moral duties and obligations. However, the use of the term can be seen as problematic, since it can be 
used in political, economic and military contexts to gain authority and legitimization. See, for example: 
Fehrer, 2001; What is the International Community, 1 September 2002, Foreign Policy. 
533 Huhtinen, 2005;57, 72–73, 76–77; Huhtinen, 2003, 33–34; Virilio, 2002, 24–27, 33–34, 35–36; 
Zizek, 2003; Baudrillard, 2003, 28–34. Understanding Information Age Warfare, 2001, 9–34, 43–
52. 
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has, in recent years, significantly ascended up the Western war agenda and 
become more important in war strategies.534 In this competition the best 
stories win; the narratives that show and present war according to the 
expectations, sentiments, mindsets and value systems of the target audience 
are most likely to be successful. Thus the followers and media spectators are 
the consumers of war, and the war is interested in us.535 
The war over public perceptions is fought on many fronts and with a 
variety of weapons. Powerful visual representations are pivotal when it 
comes to persuading people to see war in certain ways. The Western 
alliance’s communications strategy with regards to the war in Afghanistan 
(2001-2014) elevated the importance of new media, social media and 
interactive, realtime communication. As discussed above, the power and 
status of visual images in shaping perceptions of wars has been long 
recognized. However, visual representations have recently roused more 
concern and received strengthened attention in Western military strategies. 
Over the past few years, more emphasis has been attributed to the use of 
visual materials when building up the image of Western military operations. 
Nowadays, instead of just talking about “combat-cam”, the US and NATO 
manuals for strategic communications talk about effective usage of “visual 
messages and narratives” and strategic usage of visual representations.536 
This chapter examines the visual strategic communication endeavor of the 
multinational NATO-led Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) operation. The study chiefly deals with the situation of the Afghan 
operation in 2011, when the transitional stage of handing out the 
responsibility from the ISAF to the Afghan National Forces (ANA) and other 
local security institutions gradually started. At the time societal discussion on 
the nature of the operation and the desirability of carrying on the long 
dragged operation was heated, namely in the north-European publicity.537 
                                                
534 One of the key aspects of the Counter Insurgency Theory (COIN) is to win over the support of the 
populations via communication, and thus to win the war. For more about COIN, see: Nagel, John, A: 
Learning to eat soup with a knife. Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. University 
of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2002; The US Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Marine corps 
Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2007. For further 
information on the topical military strategic communication and its challenges concerning 
Afghanistan, see: Commander’s Handbook for Strategic communication and 
Communications Strategy. Version 2.0 US Joint Forces Command, Joint war fighting Center, 
October 27, 2009; Allied Command Operations (ACO) Strategic Communications 
directive, September 15, 2008; Allied Command Operations and allied command 
transformation Public Affairs Handbook. July, 2010; Principles of Strategic 
communication, US Department of Defence, August 2008; Payne, Kenneth: Waging 
Communications War. Parameters, Summer 2008, 37–51. On the western fight to win the counter-
propaganda of the Taliban, see: Taliban Propaganda: Winning the war of Words? The 
International Crisis Group, Asia Report N°158 – 24 July 2008; Taliban winning the war of 
Words. Taliban slick Propaganda confronts US. BBC News. U.S struggles to counter 
Taliban propaganda, October 1, 2010, Washington Post. 
535  Huhtinen, 2003, 33–35, 28–29; Zizek, 2003. 
536 See: Commander’s Handbook for Strategic communication and Communications 
Strategy, 2009; Allied Command Operations (ACO) Strategic Communications 
directive, 2008; Principles of Strategic communication, 2008. 
537 This chapter is mostly based on a working paper that was published by the Finnish Institute of 
internationals affairs in August 2011. See: Kotilainen, Noora: Humanitarian soldiers, Colonialized 
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The new kind of post 9/11 era war fought by the international community 
(almost 50 nations participated in the ISAF538) the long, dragged out and 
complex Afghan operation at the start of the transition period, the war wary 
populations of the coalition participant nations and resilient critique 
combined with the evermore frantic and demanding information 
environment, together with the acute need to convince the broad 
international community of the desirability of the expensive and burdensome 
operation and its successfulness—create an intriguing starting point for study 
of the strategic communication endeavor of the Afghan war. The 
multinational Afghan ISAF operation was mandated by the UN, and can be 
seen to represent a new kind of embodiment of the international 
community—the values, aspirations, practices and aims of the multinational 
community within world politics.539 Therefore, analyzing and reading the 
ISAF imagery offers an insight into recent military strategic communication 
messages, uses of imagery within contemporary Western warfare, as well as 
to the spirit bestowed on the humanitarianly legitimized military operations 
of 2000s conducted by the international community.  
In this chapter I shall track down what kind of means, messages and 
narratives the Western strategic communications machinery used—namely 
during towards the end of the operation in the contested situation of 2008-
2011—in order to more effectively convince and address the publics of the 
coalition nations on the desirability of the operation. The aim is to analyze 
and interpret what kind of visual messages and narratives the strategic 
communication images entail. When interpreted with Panofsky’s 
iconographical - iconological frame540 and analyzed in the context of 
                                                                                                                                     
Others and Invisible enemies. Visual Strategic Communication Narratives of the Afghan War. The 
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Working Paper 72, August 2011.  
Most of the ISAF images referred to and analyzed in this chapter are form years 2008-2011. After the 
transition period the Nato-led ISAF operation (2003-2014) was terminated at the end of the 2014. As it 
is stated by Nato: From 2011, responsibility for security was gradually transitioned to Afghan forces, 
which took the lead for security operations across the country by summer 2013. The transition 
process was completed and Afghan forces assumed full security responsibility at the end of 2014, 
when the ISAF mission was completed. A new, smaller non-combat mission (“Resolute Support”) was 
launched on 1 January 2015 to provide further training, advice and assistance to the Afghan security 
forces and institutions. ISAF’s Mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014), Nato:  
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm 
538 In 2011 there were 43 Troop-contributing nations in ISAF and the total strength is 
approximately(March 2011) 132 203 (about 90 000 of which belong to the US). US General (from the 
summer of 2010) David Petraeus commanded the NATO operation. Since 2006, the US army 
operation “enduring Freedom” (Started in 2001) has been part of the NATO-led multinational 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which has been active since 2002. ISAF is mandated by 
the UN. For more information on the operation in 2011, and about the formation of ISAF and the 
historical evolvement (involvement or evolution) of the operation, see:  International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures.  
539 As ISAF announced its mission in 2011: In support of the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, ISAF conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and will of the 
insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces 
(ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in order to 
provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population. See about 
ISAF mission and official texts concerning the operation: Archive: official texts. NATO:   
http://www.rs.nato.int/archives.html 
540 Panofsky, 1955, 26-54. 
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predominant world politics, the images tell stories of their presenter as well 
as their audience, but also of the values, mindsets and attitudes of their time 
and of the topical world order they are presented in. Thus, when reading the 
visual narratives utilized by the strategic communication effort, aspects of 
the Afghan operation often left unaddressed in political speech, can be 
indicated, revealed and set out in the open. 
Under scrutiny in this chapter are the visual strategic communications 
images produced and presented by ISAF in an Internet social media 
surrounding majorly during the contested years of 2008-2011. The material 
of the study consists of a set of visual images, numbering in the thousands, 
produced and presented online by the public affairs unit of the ISAF 
operation on the site ISAF media photostream on Flickr 541. I see that these 
representations are mainly designed to influence and address the 
populations of the coalition countries; that is, the ‘home front’ or the 
domestic, mostly Western audience of the ISAF operation.  
In the following subchapter 5.2 I shall open up the recent evolution and 
concepts of information warfare and strategic communication, as well as 
elaborate on the environment in which the strategic communication of the 
Afghan war operated at the time. I shall touch upon the different aspects, 
challenges, sides and novelties of the recent communication war endeavor—
keeping focus on the communication aimed at influencing the mostly 
Western audiences. I will also briefly explicate how the material of the study 
is handled and divided into different narratives that are descriptive of 
Western information warfare and strategic communication, and of the 
current discourses and paradigms contemporarily governing our thinking. In 
chapter 5.3. “The Humane War”, I shall analyze the different kinds of visual 
narratives that can be found in the material that describes the operation. I 
analyze and mirror the emblematic pictures and their messages alongside 
topical Western discourses, worldviews, attitudes, political paradigms and 
structural changes within international politics of recent years. While going 
through the large amount (over 15 000 pictures) of visual material, it became 
evident that some narratives were ‘made visible by invisibility’; that some 
themes and sides of the operation do not visibly stand out in the ISAF 
imagery. Thus, chapter 5.4 “The War Unseen”, focuses on the ‘aspects 
missing’ from the narratives used to legitimize, justify and market the war 
effort to the audiences. Things left unaddressed, unmentioned or scantly 
addressed tell the story of the politically ticklish sides of war, and of aspects 
that do not fit the overall justifications and rational of the operation. But 
things left unmentioned also tell us about the frames in which the Western 
                                                
541 The visual study material is retrieved and can be found at: 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/  
By Early April 2011, there were 15 044 images picturing the operation downloaded on the Flickr 
service. The images are usually produced (photographed, selected etc.) by ISAF personnel (soldiers, 
communications officers, and sometimes by the US army or relevant Aid agencies) and presented and 
publishedby ISAF. I, therefore, see that the images represent the narratives, perspectives and 
standpoints of the ISAF operation. 
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audience of these visual narratives—are willing to encounter this war, and of 
frames in which Western spectators are perhaps willing to see themselves 
and others in this global world. In chapter 5.5, I shall draw conclusions from 
the findings and observations made from the different metanarratives found 
in the ISAF pictures. 
 
5.2 VISUAL NARRATIVES OF WAR AND STRATEGIC 
COMMUNICATION 
“We need to understand the people and see things through their eyes. 
It is their fears, frustrations, and expectations we must address”542 
 
Today’s frantically updated news, fast paced media representations, 
plenteous and striking visual images and strong narratives of war forcefully 
affect what we see of the world and how we see parts the world not directly in 
our natural sight. We also reflect our comprehension of our own statuses and 
roles in today’s world, as well as our feelings and political emotions towards 
the distant others of the global community, according to the representations 
presented and mediated to us with regards to war.543 But, media, expert 
assessments, scientific analyses and representations of popular culture are 
not the only soldiers in this vital battle space of today’s war. Different sides 
taking part in today’s military conflicts seek ferociously to disseminate 
information and to influence the perceptions people have of their struggle, 
actions and aspirations, as well as the justifications of their fight.544 In this 
global information struggle over the perceptions of large populations, all 
possible weapons are used: narratives addressing our fears, beliefs and 
worldviews. Within this frame also visual images that affect our emotions 
and work on our cultural values, therefore showing us “proof” of how things 
are and acting as sites of witnessing, are utilized by military actors.  
As was pointed out in the chapter 2, publication of crude images of human 
suffering inflicted by Western militaries have been especially from the 1980s 
and 1990’s onwards ever more forcefully governed and restricted. 
Nevertheless harsh photographs of suffering inflicted by Western warfare, 
and even images of violent war crimes committed by Western forces, have 
occasionally surfaced from the recent wars. In the age of swift real-time 
communication, mobile phone cameras and social media, the unexpected 
revelatory information outbursts are ever more difficult–or next to 
                                                
542 A quotation from Stanley McChrystal in ISAF Commander’s counter insurgency Guidance, 
August 2009. http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/counterinsurgency_guidance.pdf  United 
States Army General McChrystal was the commander of the ISAF and commander of the U.S Forces 
Forces in Afghanistan, until 2010.  
543  Weber, Cynthia: Imagining America at war. Morality, Politics and Film.  Routledge, NewYork, 
2006, 10–13; Baudrillard, 2003, 27–31; Sontag, 1977; Sontag , 2003; Sontag, 2004; Butler, 
2009, 63–100; Moeller, 1999, 33–53. 
544 Huhtinen 2003, 28, 33–35; Glover, 2008, 221–227. 
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impossible—to control by militaries.545 These visual revelations and ‘runaway 
images’ have often damaged the reputation and public imago of recent 
military operations and increased disillusionment and brought about 
opposition towards the wars. The 2003 Abu Ghraib torture pictures stirred 
up a vivid discussion on the procedures of the US forces and strongly 
damaged the reputation of the Iraq operation.546 Revelatory image outbursts 
into the hidden scenery of the Afghan war are numerous. For instance a 
Danish documentary Armadillo (2010) showed revealing images of barbaric 
violence perpetrated by Danish ISAF soldiers in Afghanistan, and stirred up a 
lot of discussion in the Nordic countries concerning the conduct and 
attitudes of the soldiers, as well as the desirability of Danish participation in 
the operation.547 Likewise, violent runaway photos of war brutality damaged 
the reputation of the Afghan operation, when Der Spiegel (20 March 2011) 
published a set of photographs exposing the conduct of the so-called US “Kill 
Team”. The images portray ISAF soldiers posing with the bloody corpses of 
dead civilians that the soldiers allegedly killed for “fun”. The coalition feared 
a major public backlash, and expected an Afghan retaliation due to the 
pictorial eye-opener.548  Similar was the case with a sensation brought about 
by the revealing scenery of a video picturing US soldiers urinating on the 
dead bodies of Taliban fighters summer 2011. 549 These revelatory instances 
powerfully illustrate the power of images of suffering and violence in today’s 
warfare, as well as the position of visual images in formation of public 
imagination regarding war, the power and difficulties of images in forming 
attitudes towards war, and on the other hand the challenges and difficulties 
faced by visual military strategic communication.  
However, visual images of war and military operations can also be used 
and understood in just the opposite way. Pictures of war do not solely tell 
emotive stories of suffering or the madness of war, but they also offer a 
powerful and persuasive arena for mediating positive stories of military 
operations—heroic tales of honor and victory. Pictures of war heroes, heroic 
soldiers, leaders and winners have been elevated to iconic positions, acting as 
agents of identity formation, comprehension and strong emotions—and thus 
political action. They can also be used to market wars in effective and 
influential ways. 550 Although the power of visual images as mediators of 
information and as power players in wars and crises has long been 
recognized, only recently has the Western military communication strategy 
                                                
545 Sontag, 2003 & 2004; Butler, 2009, 78–83. 
546 See for example: Sontag, 2004; Hansen, 2015.  
547 Homepage of the documentary: www.armadillothemovie.com/armadillo/TRAILER.html;see also: 
Armadillo: the Afghanistan war documentary that shocked Denmark, The Guardian,June 3, 2010. ; 
Kotilainen, Noora: Afganistanin Sodan Pojankasvot. Ulkopolitiikka, 3/2010.  
548 See: On “The “Kill team” Images: US Army Apologies for Horrific Photos from 
Afghanistan. March 21, 2011, Der Spiegel.   
549 US marines charged over urinating on bodies of dead Taliban in Afghanistan. 
September 24, 2012, The Guardian.  
550 Sontag 1977 & 2003; Butler, 2009, 95–100, Weber, 2006, 10–13; Baudrillard, 2003, 27–31.; 
Moeller, 1999, 33–53. Burke, 2001; Goldberg, 1991. 
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elevated the role and status of visual images and narratives in the use of 
military strategic communication. Images of war, utilized by military actors 
in strategic communication endeavors, act as one of the major tools shaping 
our perceptions of war today. So, how has the Western military strategic 
communication deploy visual images in recent years? And how have images 
been utilized in the current Western fight to influence public opinion? In the 
following, I shall first briefly open up the concept and recent evolution 
strategic communication as a segment of military information warfare. 
Secondly, I shall open up the usage and workings of visual images in the 
recent ISAF strategic communication effort in Afghanistan. 
5.2.1 VISUALLY WINNING OVER PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS 
Psychological operations, propaganda and communications have long served 
an important role when waging wars. Even in the writings of ancient war 
strategists, influencing the perceptions of one’s adversary, as well as 
misleading the opponent with information and using it as a weapon, is 
granted a central role in winning battles and wars. The basic ideas of using 
intensive psychological manipulation disseminated via mass media in order 
to alter and construct the opinions, assessments and thinking of large 
populations, stem from the times of the Second World War. Still, the 
information operations of today have their roots in the teachings of the past, 
as today’s information operations namely build on thoughts and methods 
developed during the propaganda warfare of the Second World War.551 
Even though modern propaganda is the precursor to the current 
information warfare, over the years the meaning and means of utilizing 
information in warfare have expanded and the field has significantly 
changed. The environment where the military strategic communication 
operations currently work is miscellaneous, very crowded and complex. 
Furthermore, despite the long roots of information at the service of the 
militaries and its use as a tool of warfare—information warfare as it is today 
understood—it is a rather newly acknowledged sphere in this field. The first 
courses of information warfare were taught in the central US army academies 
in the early 1990s, at the dawn of this new post-modern warfare. 
Simultaneously, novel descriptions of information warfare sprung up in 
Western military strategy. In 1993, the Pentagon brought up information as a 
“strategic asset” and “information/knowledge warfare” in its memorandums, 
with more emphasis on psychological operations influencing “emotions, 
motives, objective reasoning and ultimately behavior” becoming more 
common in US Army briefings at the time of the first Gulf War.552 
After this, the weight of information has continuously grown heavier and 
the shift in highlighting the status of information in warfare has been vibrant. 
                                                
551 Huhtinen, 2005, 58–60. 
552 Toffler, Alvin & Toffler, Heidi: War and Anti-War. Survival at the dawn of the 21st Century 
Little Brown & Company, New York, 1993, 139–141. 
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The extremely rapid changes in the information environment in recent 
decades—facilitated by modern technologies and new real time media 
distribution methods, such as the Internet, digital cameras, cell phones and 
Internet-based social media like Facebook, Twitter, Flickr, Instagram, 
YouTube, as well as the internet information exposure sites such as the 
WikiLeaks—have drastically changed the settings in which strategic 
communication topically works. Militaries—as well as insurgent groups and 
other parties involved in topical conflicts —are now forced to promptly react 
and respond to the challenges of the drastically expanded information 
environment and new type of irregular, hybrid warfare.553 
The quite novel term information warfare refers to (military) 
information operations that are carried out during a crisis or a conflict in 
order to accomplish certain objectives, or to advance certain goals. 
Information operations include the efforts to influence military and political 
decision-making, operative capabilities and public opinion by using 
information as a target or a weapon. Like other military operations, 
information operations have both defensive and offensive sides, and can be 
conducted in political, psychological, social, economic and military methods, 
and at any level (tactical, operational and strategic) of warfare. The range of 
information warfare spans from tactically “hard” offensive cyber-attacks on 
an enemy’s information systems to “soft” defensive surveillance of the 
information environment.554 
Strategic communication can be seen as a sub-category of the ample 
domain of information warfare, and the term is mainly used by military 
actors and governments. Strategic communication refers to psychological 
operations and processes that seek to preserve, influence and enhance the 
credibility and favorable conditions of the operation, and to advance the 
interest, policies and objectives of the party concerned. The US strategic 
communications and communication strategy handbook from 2009 defines 
the capabilities of US strategic communications as follows: to inform and 
educate, to persuade and coerce. Four specific strategic communications 
goals are to: 1) Improve credibility and legitimacy 2)Weaken an adversary’s 
credibility and legitimacy 3) Convince selected audiences to take specific 
actions that support US and International objectives, and 4) Cause a 
competitor or adversary to take (or refrain from taking) specific actions.555 
Thus, the main functions of psychological information operations—or 
strategic communications—are to work to sustain the morale of the troops 
                                                
553Virilio, 2000; Commander’s Handbook for Strategic communication and 
Communications Strategy. Version 2.0 US Joint Forces Command, Joint war fighting Center, 
October 27, 2009; Allied Command Operations (ACO) Strategic Communications 
directive, September 15, 2008; Allied Command Operations and allied command 
transformation Public Affairs Handbook: July, 2010; Principles of Strategic 
communication, US Department of Defence, August 2008; Payne, Kenneth: Waging 
Communications War. Parameters, Summer 2008, 37–51; Taliban Propaganda: Winning the 
war of Words?,2008.  
554 Huhtinen, 2005, 60–61; Toffler & Toffler, 1993, 139–141. 
555Commander’s Handbook for Strategic communication and Communications 
Strategy. 2009, Chapter 3,pp. 18–19. 
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and to influence the perception of civil populations (directed at different 
target audiences, such as domestic populations, decision makers of coalition 
countries, local populations, neighboring populations, etc.), as well as to 
protect populations and troops from the offensive information operations of 
the enemy and counteract enemy propaganda efforts.556 
During the later years of the Afghan operation—namely after 2008—a 
significant shift and an intensifying trend in Western Afghanistan public 
diplomacy and communications strategy took place. As the war proved 
burdensome, hard to win and is diminishing in popularity, the coalition 
players in Afghanistan paid more attention to the development of the 
communications strategy and strategic communication. After 2008 US 
Strategy for Afghanistan-Pakistan and NATO’s directives for strategic 
communication clearly state that a more effective and better-resourced 
strategic communications plan was to be created for the Afghanistan 
operation. The long, drawn-out war has seriously damaged the reputation 
and imago of both the war and the warmongers. These papers stipulate that 
the imago and reputation of the operation—and of NATO and its allies—have 
to be improved and communication backing its popularity and image must 
be intensified in order to win the war.557  Concurrently, more vigorous 
communication schemes were made and the status of communications was 
emphasized in the strategies; NATO’s strategic communication was 
strengthened in order to win over the support of local populations. The other 
aim was to achieve one of the main goals mentioned in the NATO strategy:  
to involve the ever more skeptical international community more closely and 
actively in the war effort.558 This meant addressing and persuading the 
domestic front more effectively, in order to improve the reputation and 
imago, as well as to secure the success and future of the operation. 
This chapter concentrates on this turning point of the communication 
strategies, and focuses on the ‘soft’, or ‘humanistic’, and defensive sides of 
the information warfare carried out by ISAF towards the end of the Afghan 
operation. The interest is focused on psychological warfare and operations 
targeted to influence values, attitudes, perceptions, emotions, opinions, 
motives and decision-making processes. My focus is on how the perceptions 
of civil populations and decision-makers at the domestic front of the Afghan 
war—namely the populations of the coalition countries, i.e. mainly Western 
people—were targeted by coalition information warfare/strategic 
                                                
556 ibid; Huhtinen, 2005, 60; Understanding Information Age Warfare,  Alberts, David, S et 
al., CCRP Publications, August 2001. 
557 Principles of Strategic communication, 2008; NATO allied Command Operations 
directive for strategic communications, 2008; 
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communication operations in new media surroundings, by the use of visual 
materials. 
Skepticism, criticism and opposition towards the operation and its 
objectives, and doubt as to the prospects of winning the war, rose towards the 
end of the operation among the participant nations, and some of the coalition 
members—for instance Canada and the Netherlands—decided to withdraw 
their troops from the area.559 The ever more war-critical audiences and 
policy-makers of the NATO ally and partner nations participating in the 
operation were to be assured of the functionality, desirability and 
accomplishments of the coalition action as well as the necessity of the war. 
The conceptions and blessings of the populations of more than 40 nations 
involved in the coalition were central to the successful continuation of the 
operation. Despite of—or perhaps namely because of—the growing Western 
skepticism, the 2009 US strategy for Afghanistan stresses that the 
international community must, in coming years, assume more responsibility 
for the operation and counterterrorism action in the area. By using enhanced 
and strengthened strategic communication, NATO and the US were calling 
on the coalition countries to better understand what is at stake for the whole 
international community.560 The challenges of the new information 
environment and the unease over the operation placed demands on NATO 
the strategic communication, particularly on the messages aimed at 
encouraging the populations of NATO ally and partner states to support the 
operation. What was then done in this contested situation in order to visually 
win over the hearts and minds of the domestic fronts?  
More fierce communications plans of the NATO-led and US-commanded 
forces were developed and put into action. The aim was also to develop 
targeted and effective messages and narratives suitable for different 
audiences. Timelier, faster, more reactive, frequently updated and more 
precisely targeted, agile information and communication was stressed. 
Namely within the communications strategies formulated after 2007, ISAF 
stressed the importance of increased efforts towards more accountability, 
transparency and accessibility. More weight was put on strategic 
communications via public announcements, press releases and the enhanced 
use of new media communication tools such as Facebook, Twitter as well as 
the photo-sharing community Flickr, and the utilization of strategic visual 
messages was highlighted.561 In these strategies, it is highlighted that the 
information and messages disseminated to the audiences have to be easily 
                                                
559 The Netherlands withdrew its troops in 2010, and Canada 2011.  
560 White Paper of the Interagency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.  
561 See for instance: Allied Command Operations Strategic communications Directive, 
September 15, 2008; Implementation of the Department of Defense Strategic 
Communication Plan for Afghanistan. September 12, 2007. 
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accessible, understandable and have to appeal to the audience and influence 
it.562  
An active and imaginative implementation of strategic themes and 
messages designed to resonate, appeal and influence target audiences, which 
include explanations for and justifications of the actions, were highlighted in 
the NATO strategic communication directives of the time. It is stated, that 
the themes and messages used in the strategic communication have to 
constitute a logical, instinctive and consistent narrative on the organization 
and its actions and objectives. These narratives have to resonate with the 
target audiences, thus these messages are on the one hand fitted to the 
mindsets of the locals, and on the other to the worldviews of the coalition 
nations’ populations. 563 The use of unconventional communication arenas, 
more extensive use of the Internet and the 24/7 information environment, as 
well as tailored messages aimed at addressing the previously unaffected or 
unreached stratums of Western populations, have become more prominent 
in the recent US and NATO strategic communication plans and strategies. It 
was stated that the communication has to reach out to different segmented 
audiences in order to make them understand “what the US and NATO are all 
about”. Thus strategic communication fights to counter the opponent’s use of 
information, but it is particularly aimed at enhancing alliance success. It is 
stated that in order to assist the operations and manage public perceptions, 
gaining and sustaining the support of the public and opinion leaders of the 
coalition countries (NATO nations and partners) is vital. 564 As NATO's 
Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan, ambassador Mark Sedwill 
stated in early 2011, the most important thing in communicating the 
importance of war to domestic populations is to: “make people realize that 
NATO is making progress; as people will tolerate deaths if they perceive that 
the sacrifice was not in vain”. 565 Therefore, the NATO strategic 
communication was pointed towards making people see the operation as 
fruitful and worth taking part in, regardless of the heavy human cost. 
5.2.2 ISAF ON FLICKR 
Pertaining to the new strategic communications plans, ISAF launched a new 
type of website in late 2008 (http://www.isaf.nato.int/). This website 
integrates ISAF’s Facebook and Twitter pages, and links to content sharing 
                                                
562ACO Strategic Communications, Aco Directive nr. 95-2, New Allied Command 
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site YouTube and photo sharing community Flickr. Also, blogs and other 
frequently updated content appear on the site. As a press release on this site 
states, it is launched “in an effort to more quickly deliver current relevant and 
accurate news and information about military operations in Afghanistan 
directly to the public”.566 The regularly updated “ISAF medias photostream” 
on Flickr 567 consists of thousands of pictures telling stories of the operation. 
ISAF´s Flickr site consists of images of the soldiers serving in Afghanistan, as 
well as ISAF operations and of local people and everyday situations on the 
ground. The communications press release states that the pictures give a tour 
of “life on the ground in Afghanistan” and offer a “real insight into the 
mission and life on the frontline of NATO operations”. According to the press 
release, posting pictures on Flickr is part of the effort that ISAF has recently 
made in “striving to make our mission in Afghanistan as accessible to our 
audience as possible”.568  
The ISAF Flickr photographs are mostly shot by military ISAF 
personnel569 and can be freely used by members of the media as well as a 
wider audience. It is stated that these pictures are meant to convey and 
mediate information from the Afghanistan operation, and to influence the 
public imagination and perceptions, or the coalition home front of the ISAF 
operation. The images are intended to be used and distributed, in order to 
make the ISAF operation visible, imaginable and available to the intended 
audiences from the viewpoint of the military and ISAF actors. The presented 
pictures are also said to illustrate the positive sides and progress —that, 
according to the press release, are often left unreported—seen by NATO 
forces on the ground, as well as to show some of the “challenges that we still 
face”. As the briefing states, the photos are, most importantly, meant to “give 
you a little flavor of the daily life of our colleagues and friends who are 
serving there”.570 The images are thus designed to give spectators a ground 
level account, to show a “real” and “true” account of the operation and to 
allow an understanding of the actors and the operation conducted by the 
ISAF. The statement describes the audience as “us” and the “ones on our 
side”; the ones interested in the operation. The shape of the text and type of 
addressing suggests to the reader that the effort in Afghanistan is a shared, 
collective endeavor. The text suggests that this is something ISAF wants to 
share with the audiences, which they, due to distance, cannot see without the 
help of the ISAF communication effort. 571 Due to the communication 
                                                
566 International Security Assistance Force launches a new website. News Release. ISAF 
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channel, the content of the Flickr images and the mode and tone of the 
addressing, I recognize that the target audiences of these representations are 
mostly the populations and decision makers of the participant countries 
interested in the situation in the Afghanistan-Pakistan area, as well as also 
members of the media.  
Due to the Internet environment, social media/interactive multimedia 
arena, and specified and selected target audience, the Flickr site may be 
argued to clearly represent the new public diplomacy and strategic 
communications agenda of the Western coalition. Also, because of the novel 
use of visual material, Flickr pictures can be seen as an example of the new 
approach and as an expression of the new kind of strategic communication 
recently drafted and aimed at influencing the Western coalition audiences. 
Placing photos on Flickr can be perceived as an attempt of striving to mediate 
prompt information and influence the audiences to encounter the operation 
in positive ways. Thus the photos and their contents are here perceived as a 
part of the NATO strategic communication endeavor and analyze and 
interpreted in this context. What is significant and interesting when it comes 
to the narratives meant to brand the operation is, that such representations 
always reveal more than the carefully constructed strategic story. Narratives 
and stories of the war and its justifications and objectives, which are 
designed to influence public opinion, do not work in a vacuum. They can be 
seen as expressions of wider Western ways of thinking and thus they form a 
part of a larger discourse. This is what makes reading into them so 
remarkable and interesting. 
The narratives found in the Flickr images are perceived to conform to the 
deliberately formulated messages of the strategic communication effort of 
the Afghan war. Thus, they figure some of the topical currents of today’s 
world politics, as well as the central paradigms, justifications and objects of 
today’s military operations (waged by the international community). In 
addition to this, the stories told by the images need to resonate with the 
target audiences; they have to appear supportable within the discourses 
framing today’s ideas of the functions of ‘international community’, 
humanity and acceptable, just war. But the narratives comprised by the 
images do not solely tell of the spirit and conduct of the present wars; they 
also make visible the terms and frames in which war waged by the 
West/international community can be shown, presented and justified to the 
intended audience of today in persuasive and widely acceptable ways. Thus, 
these narratives reveal significant information on the worldviews and stances 
of their presenter, but also about the audience and about “the Western us”, 
the citizens and policy-makers of the countries participating in the war. Thus 
I see that the images presented by ISAF constitute an interesting and a 
revealing scene at the contemporary visual theater of humanity constituting 
the Western spectators.   
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The ISAF media’s photostream on Flickr is an extensive source material; 
by early April 2011572 there were over 15 000 single pictures telling of the 
Afghan operation on the site. The pictures presented on Flickr can be seen as 
one wide and multilayered visual narrative of recent Western war. The 
analysis of ISAF‘s images was conducted by going through the mass of visual 
material (and the related capitations). The starting point is that recurring 
appearance of some visual and narrative features throughout the material 
proves the significance and standing of the stories told by the images. 
Subsequently, I divided the concurring thick imagery, which I saw of telling 
descriptive stories of the recent warfare (and contemporary humanitarian 
world politics), into thematically differing groups and into different 
categories in order to analyze the stories these different types of images tell. 
Some emblematic pictures—examples of such thick images—of each category 
are presented in a form of collage illustrations (5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5), 
which enable the reader to see descriptive examples of the Western war 
branding imagery while reading. In the course of the analyses I also refer to 
other similar pictures found in the material. 
5.3 THE IMAGES OF WAR TODAY: HUMANE WAR 
A picture of war: blue skies and sunny weather over an Afghanistan roadside 
landscape; an ISAF soldier is leaning towards to a local child, calmly and 
gently taking care of him, as a heavily armed fellow soldier keeps watch in the 
background. Image 1 of Illustration 5.1 573 is in many ways emblematic and 
representative in visualizing and describing the Afghan mission. (See image 
1. in the illustration 5.1) The visual composition, arrangement, 
juxtapositions, language and messages of this image are typical and recurring 
in the ISAF visual material depicting the war. By visual appearance the 
soldier—positioned as the central figure of the image—is strong. He is heavily 
armed, wearing an ISAF uniform as well as a helmet and other modern 
military accessories, he seems ready for combat, physically strong and well 
built, well protected and equipped. But the soldier pictured is not behaving in 
what is perhaps traditionally seen as characteristically ‘soldier-like’. Instead 
of entering into combat with the enemy or acting in other action traditionally 
                                                
572 When the collection of the study material was finalized.  
573 Picture 1 can be seen in the collage illustration 5.1, and can be found here: 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/3137404397/in/set-72157611673009576 
The caption of the Image:  MAYWAND, Afghanistan--A medical technician for 2nd Platoon Alpha 
Company for the U.S. Army's 2nd Brigade 2nd Infantry (2-2 INF) performs a medical check-up for a 
child at a local village near Combat Outpost (COP) Terminator in the Maywand District of Kandahar 
Province on Dec. 23, 2008. Construction began on COP Terminator earlier this month by the 62nd 
Engineers that work out of International Security Assistance Force Regional Command East and will 
be used to house members of the 2-2 INF while they conduct security operations in Maywand. ISAF 
Photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Aramis X. Ramirez. 
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associated with military tasks, the soldier is pictured in an overtly 
humanitarian position. In the picture, the strong, militaristic soldier is bent 
over an Afghan child and holding a stethoscope: he is gently taking care, 
nurturing and providing medical assistance to a local child. The image places 
the child as the subject of the care and object of the operation; as the child 
and the local veiled woman holding the child are pictured calmly, contently 
and passively receiving help from the coalition soldier. 
Such visual arrangement between the ISAF soldiers and the local 
inhabitants is one of the most common and emblematic ways of presenting 
the operation via images. Furthermore the landscape in the background is 
typical for the ISAF imagery: rural, empty, dry, wasteland-like surroundings 
are most common in pictures describing the landscape of Afghanistan. The 
commonly recurring juxtaposition of the Afghan wilderness, its emptiness 
and rural, un-modern, un-built surroundings, combined with the local 
Afghans as receivers of help, alongside the modern, strong and helpful 
soldier figure—when read in an iconological frame—constitute a multitude of 
visual messages. What is also noteworthy in the pictorial disposition of image 
1. of the illustration 5.1 is the figure of the armed soldier patrolling in the 
background; the figure gives a sense of safeness and security, but also an 
impression of the need for armed protection which points at the local 
insecurity. The main figures of the images—the soldiers, the child and the 
local inhabitant receiving help—act as symbols of the Afghan war, and 
epitomize the objectives of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan when 
described in visual images. 
5.3.1 THE HUMANITARIAN SOLDIER 
The most visible key figure in ISAF imagery is arguably the above-sketched 
figure of the gentle and humanitarian ISAF soldier.574 Images of soldiers 
engaging in functions that can be broadly termed as humanitarian, are 
strikingly common in the imagery. These images constitute the visual 
narrative of the humanitarian soldier. Visual descriptions of the ISAF 
soldiers as humanitarians entail numerous recurring features. The figure of 
the humanitarian soldier is most commonly pictured with local people—
especially children. ISAF soldiers are often pictured carrying out healthcare 
and health education tasks. The soldiers are pictured educating and civilizing 
the locals: advising, teaching skills and customs and furthering human 
rights/women’s rights in the area. Pictures of soldiers handing out food 
packages and relief help, playing with children, handing out toys and sweets, 
mending locals’ minor wounds, teaching hygienic customs and building 
roads and school house. Images picturing ISAF soldiers taking part in 
humanitarian action or behaving in a friendly and helpful manner towards 
                                                
574 For representations of the humanitarian soldiers see also chapter 4.3.3 , where the Haiti 2010 
earthquake and Ebola epidemics are discussed.  
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the local people constitute a notable part of ISAF’s strategic communication 
images.575  
All in all, the soldiers of the images are acting in a humanitarian spirit. 
Image 2 of illustration 5.1 576 illustrates this humanitarian spirit in an 
emblematic way: here the ISAF soldiers are presented as friendly helpers, 
smiling and handing out water bottles to the orphaned children surrounding 
them. What is noteworthy in the images presenting the Afghan operation is 
the visual juxtaposition of the strong, helpful, armed coalition soldier and the 
orphaned children avidly accepting and welcoming the help and care given to 
them by the soldiers. Image 3 of the illustration 5.1 577 also illustrates some of 
the important features of this modern soldier figure. In this image, the 
uniformed and armed British ISAF soldiers are pictured patrolling a field in 
Afghanistan, but in midst of this military function they find the time to make 
a local girl (on the right, dressed in a traditional gown) happy. The soldiers 
are pictured bettering relations with the local inhabitants by giving the little 
girl a teddy bear. Smiling and nurturing yet strong; kind and friendly but 
armed; as well as secure and trustworthy yet militaristic, are the visual 
features recurring in the images and determining this figure. The figure of 
the ISAF soldier appears so humane and sensitive, that while looking at these 
pictures it is often hard to remember that this figure ultimately represents 
military power in a war-stricken area where people (civilian and military) are 
being killed every day. The visual features and actions in which this figure is 
presented are multiple: the humanitarian soldier has many forms, shapes 
and roles.  
Image 4 of the illustration 5.1 578 presents the ISAF soldiers as lifesavers, 
as the image offers an insight to a coalition medical care facility where a 
                                                
575 For such emblematic images of the humanitarian soldiers, see for example pictures: 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/3040863306/; 
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http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/4748021811/in/photostream/ 
576 Illustration 5.1, Image 2.  Caption: U.S. Army 1st Lt. Joshua Edgington, Texas Agribusiness 
Development Team-04, hands out bottled water to kids from an orphanage near the construction site 
for the Arbaba Environmental Park in Ghazni, Afghanistan, Oct. 12, 2010. 1st Lt. Edgingtonand other 
members of the ADT were checking on the progress of the park, which will provide a central location 
for conservation and agriculture training in Ghazni. ISAF photo by U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Joseph 
Swafford.   http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5096674476/in/photostream/ 
577 Illustration 5.1, Image 3, Caption: KAJAKI, Afghanistan – British Maj. Grant Haywood, 
Commander of Company X, 2nd Battalion, Parachute Regiment, watches Cpt. Doug Beattie, 
Operational Mentoring Liaison Team, here June 15, 2008 give a stuffed bear to a local resident 
during a patrol south of Kajaki Dam. The ISAF soldiers are responsible for the security of the dam as 
well as working with the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police to assist in security for 
local villages. (ISAF photo by Staff Sgt. Jeffrey Duran, U.S. Army) 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/2755581527/ 
578 Illustration 5.1, Image 4, caption: A coalition medical team treats children after an insurgent 
attack in Muqer district, Ghazni province. A joint coalition and Afghan National Security Force 
patrol was attacked by insurgents with mortar rounds and rocket propelled grenades. The insurgent 
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coalition medical team is treating an Afghan child injured in an insurgent 
attack. In addition to the coalition facility mentioned in the text, the male 
figures in the foreground of the image are recognizable as military personnel 
by their clothing and weapons they carry. The chief object of the action in the 
image remains the small body of the weak, injured child and the narrative 
that directly presents the coalition forces as the saviors of civilian lives in the 
area.  Images 5 579, 6 580, 7 581 and 8 582 of the illustration 5.1 present the 
ISAF soldiers communicating with the locals, giving aid and building good 
relations. Pictures of this type are common in ISAF imagery. What is 
interesting is that the dominant arrangement of the ISAF soldiers in the 
imagery is picturing the soldiers in poses and activities usually not affiliated 
with the traditional soldier. The main attributes visually represent these 
brave new warriors of today’s global battlefield as humane, care-giving, 
helpful, and deeply intimate and compassionate spirits, who are securitizing 
and rebuilding Afghan society, bettering the lives of the locals and, in some 
cases, saving them. On the whole, the humanitarian warrior figure is 
performing more like a peacekeeper—a friendly companion of the people or a 
humanitarian worker—than a traditional soldier. 
The humanitarian soldier figure prominent in ISAF pictures has perhaps 
started to look familiar to many Western spectators in recent years; but in 
historical terms it is rather a new acquaintance. What does the emergence of 
the figure of the humanitarian soldier stand for? Why is this figure so 
prominent in recent strategic communication images and why are the 
contemporary Western soldiers pictured in this way? What are the messages 
and narratives embedded in this figure in the context of the Afghan war? 
                                                                                                                                     
fire hit Afghan civilians in the nearby Yarbi Kala village.  
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5378001350/ 
Other such images from hospitals etc. see: For such images from 
hospitals etc, see, for example: http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/3040905874/; 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/3040076233/; 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/4092331226/; 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/sets/72157626809060641/ 
579 Illustration 5.1, Image 5: Kabul, Afghanistan (Feb. 17, 2011) - - An Air Force member speaks to a 
village elder and offers him a blanket with the help of an interpreter during Operation Outreach's 
humanitarian mission in Kabul City today. Operation Outreach is a team of American military 
volunteers at Camp Pheonix in Kabul and they have donated blankets, fuel doughnuts, school 
supplies, clothing and food to several refugee villages near Kabul: 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5455801790/ 
580 Illustration 5.1, Image 6: Afghan children receive humanitarian aid from Polish soldiers in Dehe 
Khoda Ydad, Afghanistan, Feb. 28, 2011. (U.S. Army photo by Spc. David Zlotin) 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5490856231/ 
581 Illustration 5.1, Image 7: Caption: Staff Sgt. Cary Anderson, a team leader with Lima Company, 
3rd Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment, greets an Afghan child in Habibabad during a joint patrol, 
Dec. 13. Marines and Danish soldiers, alongside their Afghan National Army counterparts met with 
locals during a joint patrol to establish relationships in the area. 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5265297822/ 
582 Illustration 5.1,  Image 8: Caption: Sgt. Cody T. Romriell, a combat engineer with 2nd Battalion, 
9th Marines, helps local farmers dig out a clogged canalduring the construction of Typhoon 3 in 
Marja, Afghanistan, Sep, 9. Marine engineers with 2/9 have been constructing new patrol bases in 
their area of operation in order to increase force protection. Typhoon 3 is one of the many being 
built. http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5043262267/in/photostream/ 
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What does this figure say about the politics of our time, and of the 
contemporary war waged by the West and the international community?  
The humanitarian peacekeeper-like spirit and the humanitarian actions of 
the ISAF warriors visible in the images could both be seen as reminders of 
the historical peacekeeping mission roots of the ISAF, and as markers of the 
initial functions and objectives of the ISAF operation. Initially the ISAF 
operation was created in accordance with the 2001 Bonn Conference as an 
UN-mandated multinational crisis management and reconstruction 
endeavor, which NATO took leadership of in 2003. The initial political 
decisions to take part in the mission were, in many participant nations, made 
in a situation far different from reality in Afghanistan in later years of the 
operation. The operation and its objectives have, since the initial times, 
strongly expanded and evolved, as the operation has also involved US troops 
since 2006.583 Because of this history, the operation was many countries 
originally discussed and promoted mainly as a peacekeeping, reconstruction 
and assistance operation, which was to primarily focus on societal 
reconstruction and security, human rights and humanitarian questions, as 
well as more specific issues such as anti-drug work, gender equality and 
education. At the beginning of the operation, taking part in a war or a ‘war-
like situation’—as the operation has always been seen in the United States—
almost never surfaced in the political discourse of some of the participating 
countries. This was especially true in the participating states that are not 
plenipotentiary members of NATO, such as Finland and Sweden.584 In many 
of the European coalition countries, societal discussion on the changed and 
recently more war-like nature of the operation was towards the end of the 
operation and in namely the transitional phase (particularly during 2008- 
2010) heated; and the debate about whether the mission should be termed a 
war or something else was, from time to time, a hot topic in the media and 
politics.585 
Since the justifications, objectives and reasons given for the ISAF 
operation were for a long time in many of the participant countries almost 
entirely peacekeeping oriented, the use of the humanitarian soldier figure 
utilized in strategic communication can be seen as congruent with these 
initial justifications and conditions. Thus, the figure of the humanitarian 
soldier can be seen to ascend from the past, as well as partly outdated 
justifications and the realities of the operation, and seems to stem from the 
initial words used in many of the participant countries to justify and describe 
the objectives of the operation. But this does not solely suffice to explain the 
                                                
583 For the history and evolution of ISAF, see: ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014). 
584 Salonius-Pasternak, Charly & Jarno Limnéll: Miksi Afganistan on Tärkeä Suomelle? 
National Defence University, Department of Strategy, Julkaisusarja 4: Työpapereita No. 30. 2009, 3–
4. 
585 For Finnish discussion on the matter, see Salonius-Pasternak, Charly: Suomi on paraikaa 
sotaa käyvä maa, 24 July 2009, Helsingin Sanomat; Paavo Arhinmäki: Suomi on ollut 
sodassa jo pitkään, 28 July 2009,Helsingin Sanomat.;  Stubb ja Häkämies: Suomi ei ole 
sodassa, 25 July 2009 Helsingin Sanomat; Lindholm, Jari: Afganistan on Suomen sota, 25 July 
2009 Suomen Kuvalehti. 
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visual emergence of the figure—indeed there is more embedded in the figure 
of the humanitarian soldier. 
 
The International Humanitarian Order and the Figure of Humanitarian 
Soldier 
The figure of the humanitarian soldier, so visible and central in the ISAF 
images, can be seen as emblematic of something far more extensive of 
contemporary world politics than just the justifications and political rhetoric 
that is used to explain the Afghan operation (for populations of the coalition 
member states). The figure of the humanitarian ISAF soldier can be 
perceived as an embodiment of the international coalition’s presence in 
Afghanistan, but also in broader terms an embodiment of the topical 
humanitarian international order, and the spirit of (Western lead) human 
rights-driven world politics of recent years.  
Humanitarian and human rights rhetoric and the imperative of helping 
distant people and individuals in need—saving people from evil states and 
regimes unbinding to universal humane values and human rights norms—
has become one of the central political idioms of Western international 
politics of the recent years and decades.586 This strengthened humanitarian 
paradigm of particularly the post 9/11 world politics is visible in ISAF photo 
material. Human rights and humanitarian arguments—the moral imperative 
and the action of helping the distant other in need and despair—acted as the 
major initial justifications and reasoning behind the Afghan war. The moral 
tone of obligation, and the imperative to help the suffering and oppressed 
Afghan nation, surfaced in political speech soon after the demand to 
demolish and destroy the terrorist cells that were behind the 9/11 atrocities. 
These humane and peacekeeping operation-like justifications have been 
central, particularly when justifying the operation to the European 
participant states of the ISAF operation.587  The figure of the humanitarian 
soldier also acts as a reflection that represents the justifications given to the 
operation, and served as a guarantee of the legitimacy of the military 
endeavor in the country. The visual figure of the humanitarian soldier in the 
use of the strategic communication machinery gives the Western audience a 
visual passage to the ground level of the operation, and visually proves that 
the soldiers are helping and acting humanely. The visual figure provides 
proof of the operation as a just and desirable one; an endeavor drawn 
according to the moral-political spirit of the time. The soldier figure 
extensively pictured in a humanitarian light—conducting humanitarian 
efforts and working for the betterment of humanity—addresses Western 
audiences in powerful ways according to the moral and ethical paradigms (or 
                                                
586 See for example: Chandler, (2002) 2006; Douzinas, Costas: The Many Faces of 
Humanitarianism. Parrhesia 2007/2, 1–28, 6–8. 
587 See for example: President Bush declares “war on terror”. Speech to a Joint Session of 
Congress, September 20,2001.; ISAF Mission; Chandler, 2006; Weber, 2006.  
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the unconscious ideology of humanitarianism) widely embraced in the 
Western sphere. 
On the top of this, the Afghan war and the figure of the humanitarian 
soldier as an embodiment of it act as illustrating examples of how 
humanitarianism and human rights driven international politics have, in 
recent decades, risen as a political alternative to the Westphalian system. 
This system, which has allowed sovereign states to dominate international 
relations for more than three hundred years, has clearly eroded in the past 
few years. In the Westphalian system—determined by an international 
community, constituted of sovereign states with elusive authority and control 
over their territory as well as jurisdiction, and with force the chief source of 
legitimacy—international law has constituted the set of norms aimed to 
guarantee the peaceful coexistence of sovereign states. In turn, contemporary 
politicized humanitarianism allows—in addition to non-governmental actors 
such as humanitarian NGO’S—the international community and also political 
state actors, to play an important role at an international level and within the 
boundaries of sovereign states. This has previously, according to Westphalian 
norms, been practically the domain and responsibility of sovereign states.588 
The breakdown of the Westphalian system has given room to use of 
humanitarian justifications and human rights as power political tools in 
international politics. And thus humanitarian and human rights concerns 
have started to surface as the central justifications for international 
operations, and even military endeavors. 
This brave new soldier figure, used in military strategic communication, 
acts as corporeal manifestation and a symbol of the international 
humanitarian order and community at work on a practical level. The strong, 
heavily armed and muscular but righteous global player is taking care of and 
educating the ‘weak and inept Afghan people’, and tending to the wounds of 
the civilians. The nurturing and assisting humanitarian soldier, who is 
helping the locals to build solid, Western-like governance, is corporally and 
visually underlining the spirit of the Western-led humanitarian world order. 
But moreover, the figure also illustrates some of the topical problems and 
challenges neutral humanitarian organizational work is facing today, as it 
shows some of the moral, ethical and practical problems that lie within the 
intermingle of human rights and humanitarianism with powers politics and 
military conducts. The figure visually illustrates the changed role and identity 
of today’s soldiers, and defines the blurred line between neutral 
humanitarian work and military humanitarianism. Thus, the humanitarian 
in military uniform also makes visible the current difficulties faced by neutral 
humanitarian work in crisis areas and displays the diminishing of 
humanitarian space in today’s global war zones, by showing that the 
                                                
588 Belloni 2007, 451–452; Douzinas, 2007, 6–11. 
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distinctions between the humanitarians and soldiers are only to be uniform-
deep.589 
All in all, what needs to be kept in mind when critically assessing today’s 
international order and military interventions is that today’s military 
humanitarianism—protection of “universal humane values” and human 
rights by arms—is currently widely used in international politics by Western 
states (or the international community) as de-politicized standards, excuses, 
justifications and as a legitimatizing paradigm enabling them to play an 
active role within the boundaries of sovereign states.590 This order is 
specifically present and visible in the Afghan operation and its strategic 
branding. The ethos of this order is descriptively expressed in the ISAF 
imagery through the figure of the humane and humanitarian soldier, and 
used in the military strategic communication effort aimed at gaining support 
for the Afghan operation. 
 
Non-Political Humanitarianism Beyond Criticism? 
The central role of human rights and humanitarian conduct in current 
Western-led world politics is often celebrated by Western political leaders as 
a triumph of the universally shared sacred values of all humanity. It is seen 
as evidence of the significant progress of humanity and an outstanding 
collective achievement for all humankind.591 Although politics is often 
regarded as an expression of self-interest, human rights-based politics is 
commonly perceived to be an expression of altruism, the sacred collective 
values of a moral community and acts of moral consensus.  Thus Western-
based humanitarianism and human rights-justified politics—even military 
interventions—are often rationalized, argued and perceived (in the West) to 
originate from altruistic motives of helping the ones in need—disregarding 
politics or self-interest.592 Questioning the principles of human 
rights/humanitarian-based military maneuvers—even in extreme cases such 
as removing governments of sovereign states from power, air strikes, 
bombardment of civilians and the establishment of long-time protectorates 
in ‘failed states’—advocated by human rights and ethical principles has 
recently often been seen as “heresy”. David Chandler argues that the 
(Western) consensus of recent world politics dictates that almost anything 
done in the name of human rights is right; and in addition to this, it is often 
understood that criticism is not just wrong but tantamount to supporting 
human rights violations. This has led to a situation where questioning the 
motives and justification of humanitarianly legitimized and branded wars are 
very easily interpreted as supporting brutality and inhumanity, or having a 
                                                
589 For more on the problems and challenges the neutral humanitarian NGOs are facing topically, 
partly due to “military-humanitarian interventions” as well as the moral and ethical problems faced 
today due to “humanitarian power politics”, see, for example: Fox, 2001; Rieff, 2002; Chandler, 
2006; Barnett, 2010; Chandler, 2001; Belloni, , 2007, 451–474. 
590 Douzinas, 2007, 1–28. 
591 Chandler, 2006, 12–15, 19. 
592  Ibid. 14–19.  
249
Humanitarian Soldiers, Colonialized Others and Invisible Enemies: Visual Strategic 
Communication Narratives of the Afghan War 
 250 
hostile attitude towards human rights, promotion of gender equality, 
democracy and freedom of speech.593  And in the context of the Afghan war, 
approving of, or even supporting the extreme Islamism and the terror of the 
Taliban-regime and their inhuman politics.  
The language and rhetoric of the protection of these sacred rights in states 
seen as undemocratic or in areas seen as weak in human rights terms—such 
as Afghanistan—have been utilized as powerful legitimizing tools. These 
paradigms are hard to argue against within the Western contemporary 
widely shared discourse of universal human rights and insuperability of 
protection of the individual, or what I call the unconscious ideology of 
humanitarianism. And thus, as mentioned earlier in chapter 2, some critics 
of the recent years militarized humanitarianism even say that point has been 
reached where humanitarianism has evolved into a moral cover under which 
powerful countries—namely the United States—oversee their own interests 
around the world.594 The much used visual figure of the humanitarian soldier 
in the use of military strategic communication can also be seen to draw its 
suggestive power, as well as its function and figure, from this humanity 
discourse, which appears to be beyond criticism. Human rights-based politics 
and humanitarian principles are currently widely talked about and expressed 
as undeniable, natural and universal values; as something that the whole of 
humankind consensually supports.595 This is why international political acts, 
and even military interventions justified by humanitarian goals or by the 
protection of human rights, can be seen as serving as a powerful and 
outstanding means of persuading people to see even violent and sometimes 
morally dubious political acts as legitimate and worth supporting.  
Thus, the power, applicability and usefulness of humanitarian features—
and the visual figure of humanitarian soldier as an embodiment of Western 
humanitarian goodwill—in the use of the strategic communication machinery 
is effective.  The visual features of the soldier figure (kind, helpful, humane, 
nurturing, tutoring, supporting, smiling, playful, strong, protecting, etc.) and 
the actions presented (education, help, humanitarian aid, reconstruction aid, 
playing with children, humanely communicating with locals, securing the 
area, mending wounds, giving gifts, saving lives, etc.) thus appear to be 
beyond criticism. The reason for this is that they point to, and seem to 
represent, the sincere and high-minded aspirations of the strong and 
humane Western/international community’s influence on the ground at 
foreign crisis zones. Within this dominant discourse, criticizing the 
humanitarian soldier within the ISAF imagery thus also becomes 
questionable. Questioning the goodwill or altruistic actions of the 
humanitarian soldiers—visually proven in the reoccurring images to be 
unquestionably conducting good work and advancing human rights issues 
                                                
593 Ibid. 5, 13–16. 
594 Belloni, 2005, 1, 8. 
595 Chandler, 2006; Barnett, 2010; For more on the evolution, historical readings and evolution of 
human rights, see: Hunt, 2007. 
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among the Afghan population—could easily be interpreted within 
humanitarian discourse as the questioning of universal humane values. 
Criticism could also be seen to undermine the self-evident good human rights 
aspirations of the international community and of the ISAF operation on the 
whole.  
The figure of the humanitarian ISAF soldier pictured as a nonpolitical 
global humanitarian, and the embodiment of the healing hand of the 
international community’s presence on the ground in Afghanistan, acts as 
perfect justification, as well as a marketing image for the operation. In 
addition to this, the figure of the humanitarian soldier works as an effective 
‘guise’ for involvement in military action within current world politics and 
prevailing humanitarian discourse. For the contemporary Western viewer, 
interpellated by the unconscious ideology of humanitarian politics, it is all 
too easy to agree with the underlying principles and universal values that the 
figure represents, and perceive the figure through the unconscious, totalizing 
ideology of Western humanitarianism.596 The humanitarian soldier figure 
can thus be seen as the embodiment and expression of the unconscious 
ideology of humanitarianism: a construction which claims to be self-evident, 
universal, a-political and a natural expression of Western altruistic, 
humanitarian aspirations in the area—but which therefore is at the very heart 
of political. The ideas and paradigms justifying and explaining the recent (the 
Western/international community waged) wars and attempts at gathering 
support for them are emblematically present in the figure of the 
humanitarian soldier. This figure is a perfect example of how, in the context 
of humanitarian world politics, power works through myths by taking the 
politics out of the ideological, and thus presenting culturally constructed 
paradigms and stories as natural and undeniable universal truths. 597 
Humanitarianizing the operation with the help of the figure of the 
humanitarian soldier makes the Afghan operation seem a-political, and thus 
morally beyond criticism. 
In addition to this, the new form in which the soldier is visually presented 
can also be seen as confusing. Images that present the soldiers primarily as 
humanitarians and helpers—as friendly, unintimidating and non-violent 
figures—lead the audience to think and feel that the reality of the war is non-
violent. The figure of the humanitarian soldier is targeted to address the 
spectators to see the war as practically nonviolent, just and supportable, and 
the war effort as unambiguously endurable and “good”. Using the language, 
messages and narratives of the “protection of humanity carried out by 
military means”, and by presenting soldiers as helpers and guardians of 
human rights and value, in many ways fits the mindsets of the Western 
‘civilized global citizens’ of the recent years— and thus the imagery effectively 
addresses and powerfully persuades the Western target audiences. 
                                                
596  Belloni, 2007, 463–471. See chapter 3 on humanitarianism as an unconscious ideology.  
597 Barthes, 2000, 142–145. 
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Presenting war and soldiers in military strategic communication narratives 
according to the values and dominant, widely shared paradigms of their time 
is good marketing: it sells and can be expected to contextually gain the 
support of the coalition spectators 
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5.3.2 THE PROTECTED OTHER 
The ISAF Flickr site contains a vast amount of photographs, that on the one 
hand paint a picture of the operation and the international coalition’s action 
in the area, but on the other visually represent the local populations in 
multitude of signifying ways. In this subchapter I shall analyze the ways of 
picturing the local Afghans in the ISAF Flickr images. When looking at the 
images that picture the Afghans, I examine how the actions, position, status 
and appearance are visually presented vis-à-vis the presentation of the ISAF 
troops, as well as the coalition objectives in the area. I will start by presenting 
an image type of the ISAF soldiers, which is slightly different in its 
appearance and action from that of the humanitarian soldier: the strong and 
more militaristic ISAF warriors. After this, I shall move on to analyze 
pictures that represent the ISAF-Afghan military and civil co-operation in the 
area, from which I shall analyze the visual messages embedded in the images 
that present the local Afghans vis-à-vis the ISAF soldiers and personnel.  
These images, besides working as intentional strategic messages revealing 
the principal conscious intentions of the strategic communication effort, also 
portray the local inhabitants and actors in culturally signifying ways, and can 
thus be seen as representations of a faraway area and a foreign culture. 
Therefore, the images provide a window also to subliminal (Western) 
attitudes and worldviews of the presenter. The ways in which locals are 
pictured—in addition to purposefully describing the operation and the 
situation on the ground—also unintentionally illuminate and unveil some of 
the conventional ways and frames in which Western communication and the 
coalition’s domestic target audiences are used to seeing and picturing 
Afghans and, more broadly, ‘the others’ of this world. Other here signifies the 
targets of humanitarian and development aid, the populations of the areas 
seen as “less developed” and different from the Western viewpoint; such as 
for example Islamic cultures. 
 
Clean Hi-tech Warfare and Trouble-Free Co-operation 
The figure of the humanitarian soldier discussed above is not the only visual 
figure in which the ISAF warriors are pictured. Among the imagery there are 
also a lot of images picturing ISAF soldiers in day-to-day tasks, carrying out 
training and patrolling activities; in actions more customarily associated to 
military functions. There are also a vast number of images describing 
military meetings and high level visits from generals and politicians.598 As 
the humanitarian soldier is commonly pictured with local civilians, the 
modern cosmopolitan brothers in arms are usually pictured with other 
soldiers and local security personnel. In these images the ISAF soldiers are 
typically posing with weaponry, modern arms and equipment, thereby 
                                                
598 Such images for example, see: http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5433717504/; 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5433717504/ 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/4641642143/; 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/4903766137/ 
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corporally presenting the coalition power, the muscular force and capacity of 
the coalition arms and personnel. In these pictures, heavily armed soldiers 
are often testing and presenting their weaponry and training by patrolling or 
taking part in everyday military activity. The images of the soldiers, as well as 
the arms and other hi-tech equipment, paint a picture of a strong and 
effective, modern, powerful and ready to act military. These images allow the 
viewers to see the operation and the coalition presence in Afghanistan as 
efficient and strong. They visually and corporally present the coalition’s 
power and the strong presence on the ground, and work to sustain belief in 
the operation’s success. (See image 9 in Illustration 5.2 ) 599 
As these modern warriors are usually pictured other coalition soldiers or 
Afghan security personnel, and not with civilians as the humanitarian 
soldiers, these figures do not act in such humanitarian manner as their softer 
counterpart, but instead appear more military-like. The image of the modern 
brothers in arms, training and simulating war seems to work as a more 
masculine, strong and more traditional soldier like correction figure when 
compared to the image of the civilian-orientated humanitarian soldier. These 
soldiers seem strong and trustworthy, thanks to their powerful and modern 
weapons. But what is noteworthy is, that despite carrying heavy weapons and 
possessing the firepower, equipment and training to shoot, fight and 
“neutralize” the opponent, the modern soldiers in these images never fully 
exercise or release their capacity: they do not use their firepower in the 
images. Pictures present training, patrolling, and normal “peaceful” everyday 
military routines, as well as visits from the operational commanders and 
other military events (Images 9&10, in the illustration 5.2),600 but no 
pictures of combat, downright military operations or causalities are 
presented.601  
A large number of images presenting the hi-tech ISAF soldier include 
scenes where the soldiers are participating in joint action, co-operation and 
interaction with the local soldiers of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 
the local police forces.602 These images depict shared security tasks, the 
                                                
599  Such images see illustration 5.2: Image 9. [ISAF does not provide a caption for this photo.]  
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5381004854/;  and Image 10, Caption: Benjamin K., a 
German military service member, scans the horizon while securing a 4th Combat Aviation Brigade, 
4th Infantry Division CH-47 Chinook supporting an unmanned aerial vehicle recovery mission in 
northern Afghanistan, Dec. 20. The capable 4th CAB Chinook supported the German troops in sling 
loading the UAV. (Photograph by U.S. Army Sgt. Sean Harriman, 4th CAB Public Affairs Office): 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5302229644/; and other similar images: 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5470184241/;  
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/4080166554/ 
600 See for example the images 9&10 in the illustration 5.2. and : 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/2957212147/; 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5096242657/; 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5096211471/in/photostream/; 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5856321722/in/photostream; 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5847990304/in/photostream; 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5197720504/in/photostream/; 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/4649277399/ 
601 The invisibility of combat imagery is further discussed in the chapter 5.4.  
602 See, for instance, pictures 11–15 in this paper. 
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education of the national army troops and tasks such as delivering relief help 
or conducting construction work in the area. The co-operation of the ISAF 
troops and the local security officials seems to be carried out in total 
harmony, consensus and even close friendship among the ISAF soldiers and 
their Afghan counterparts. No disagreement, misunderstandings or 
difficulties are present in the images.  Just like the civilian Afghans and the 
international troops are pictured in an ambiance of seamless co-operation, 
the coalition soldiers by looking at the Flickr images seem to be brothers in 
arms with the local security officials.   
What is interesting and remarkable in the visual language of these images 
is the visual arrangement and positioning of the local actors and the ISAF 
soldiers. In most of the images describing the joint efforts of the ISAF troops 
and the local military and security partners, the ISAF soldiers are presented 
as trainers, tutors and leaders vis-à-vis their local counterparts. The visual 
language of the images underlines the dominant position of 
ISAF/West/international coalition. Thus, the locals are usually seen in 
supporting roles or tasks, or as straightforward subjects of help and targets of 
tutoring and education. The images present the coalition soldiers teaching 
the local security personnel how to handle and fire weapons, while they guide 
and closely monitor them. This arrangement of action/statuses is rarely 
inverted, meaning the locals are not pictured tutoring the international 
troops, nor would the ISAF troops take part in Afghan-organized work in the 
area. The positioning seems relevant and understandable, as one of the main 
objectives of the ISAF troops was to train and educate the local security 
authorities in order to be able to handle the task of securitizing the area 
without the help and supervision of the coalition forces after the transition 
period. By such dominant visual arrangement the leadership of ISAF is being 
strongly manifested. But in addition, the imagery can be seen to exhibit the 
capabilities of the Afghan National Army and police—trained by the 
international troops—in maintaining security in the area. 603  
 Different estimates concerning the date of the coalition departure or the 
transition of responsibility were in the 2011 still not concretely decided. The 
year 2014 (which later then actualized) was at the time frequently mentioned 
as the point of ISAF withdraws. In 2011 General David Petraeus described 
the transition as a process of “thinning out” Western responsibility when the 
situation allows it, and not “handing off” responsibility when the coalition 
feels like it.604 Thus, these pictures can be seen to underline the planned 
NATO strategies of handing over security tasks to the local authorities as 
soon as they are capable of handling the job. By showing the seamless 
                                                                                                                                     
 
603 The ISAF Mission as stated on the website: In accordance with all the relevant Security 
Council Resolutions, the main role of ISAF is to assist the Afghan government in the establishment of 
a secure and stable environment. To this end, ISAF forces conduct security and stability operations 
throughout the country together with the Afghan National Security Forces and are directly involved 
in the development of the Afghan National Security Forces through mentoring, training and 
equipping. see: http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html 
604 An interview with General Petraeus, February 9, 2011.  
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cooperation and trouble-free, friendly co-existence of the locals and the 
coalition troops, belief and trust was therefore cast on the designed 
finalization and success of the operation. Thus presenting such imagery 
underlined the capabilities needed to fulfill the objectives of the power 
transition according to the planned schedule. Visual representations of 
seamless co-operation, friendly co-habitation and happy and grateful 
recipients of coalition advice, help and Western tutelage can also be seen to 
work to build the support and trust of the operation in the eyes of the target 
audiences addressed. Therefore, imagery such as this is aimed at producing 
the motivation needed to carry on the mission by showing that progress is 
being made in securitizing the area and visually demonstrating that the locals 
are happy with the operation, co-operation and the overall process. Positive 
pictures of co-operation in security and reconstruction work, as well as 
images of friendly co-habitation and co-operation with the locals, underline 
that the Afghan state and the state of Afghanistan are evolving in the 
direction desired by the international coalition and ISAF. These pictures 
motivate the viewers of the pictures, and they see the operation as worth 
taking part in; things are evolving as planned, co-operation is trouble-free 
and the local populations are willing to and capable of taking responsibility 
for security and carrying on the work and legacy of ISAF in the area. Visually 
showing to the intended audience that the coalition help and presence is 
needed is persuading the viewer to see the war as necessary and as an 
efficient project.  
The ISAF Flickr imagery moreover vividly demonstrates the patronizing 
position of the international troops over their Afghan counterparts. In the 
images the ISAF soldiers are in the lead: they teach, give advice, tutor and 
educate. Therefore, the visual language of the pictures creates positioning 
whereby the local actors assume a strongly subsidiary status. This 
juxtaposition is evident for example in the in image 11 of the illustration 
5.2605, in which an ISAF soldier is physically supporting an ANA soldier 
during shooting practice: the former is pictured behind the practicing young 
ANA soldier and holding him by the shoulders in a little brother-big brother-
like visual position. Similarly, in image 12 included in the illustration 5.2 606  
coalition soldiers are pictured overseeing an ANA shooting practice. The 
visual language of the image is meaningful in its symbolic positioning: the 
practicing apprentices—the ANA soldiers—are lying on the ground as the 
coalition soldiers oversee the action standing up, therefore underlying the 
difference in status between the experts and their pupils. Even when 
                                                
605 See illustration 5.2, Image 11: Caption: During the whole course ANP members 
learn how to take maximum benefit of their official weapon, AK 47 7.62mm rifle. At the shooting 
range they perform shooting tactical exercises. On the picture a member of the Spanish POMLT show 
how to aim their rifle. http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5253341411/ 
606 See illustration 5.2, Image 12. Caption: U.S. Army military Police Soldiers from 401st Military 
Police Company, 720th MP Battalion based at Fort Hood, Texas serve as range safeties for Afghan 
National Police personnel at a weapons range during a month long train-the-trainer course on 
Forward Operating Base Airborne in Wardak Province, Afghanistan, Jan. 23. 
Image 12: http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5391048059/ 
257
Humanitarian Soldiers, Colonialized Others and Invisible Enemies: Visual Strategic 
Communication Narratives of the Afghan War 
 258 
describing the close relationship between the locals and the ISAF soldiers, 
this juxtaposition of statuses prevails.  In image 13607, a local policeman and 
an ISAF marine are presented in an overtly friendly and close interaction.608 
The Marine hugs the local policeman while smiling and posing for the 
camera. The related caption describes the local police and ISAF 
representatives as often being close—perhaps even friends. But concurrently 
the language of the picture visually underlines the subordinate position of the 
local police in relation to the international coalition troops. The by 
appearance young, almost child-like local police officer smiles timidly, adopts 
a stiff stance and leans ahead, while the heavily armed and far sturdier, 
smiling Westerner holds him by the shoulder. The strong, big brother-like 
ISAF soldier is portrayed as protective and friendly, as well as mindful 
towards the local officer. Such imagery, by underlining the friendly, efficient 
and seamless co-operation, however, simultaneously produces a visual 
presentation of the locals as somewhat child-like and weak, and creates a 
clear leader-subordinate juxtaposition. (See illustration 5.2)  
In the ISAF Flickr images the subordinate position, the status of 
secondary actor and the arrangement of the locals as the subsidiary objects of 
action are recurring, and thus noteworthy. By the representational 
arrangement the ISAF personnel is thus presented as the more developed, 
strong, adult actor—the human figure of the humanitarian story— whom is 
pictured giving advice to the adolescent Afghans. Thus, the ways in which the 
locals are pictured in the images, in relation to the ISAF personnel, also 
enclose content other than that perhaps deliberately intended by the 
presenter. Representations of culturally different areas and people often 
mirror subliminal paradigms, attitudes and impressions the presenter has on 
the other. In the following subchapter I shall move on to further analyze what 
kind of meanings and signifying ways of expression the images of the locals 
enclose. 
 
 
 
                                                
607 See illustration 5.2, Image 13. Caption: FORWARD OPERATING BASE JACKSON, Sangin, 
Helmand province, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – Corporal Michael Creighton, a team leader 
with the Police Mentoring Team, 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, smiles and hugs an Afghan 
Uniformed Policeman during a stop at a local AUP station, Nov. 21. Creighton, a 25-yearold native of 
Los Banos, Calif., and his fellow Marines teach the AUP weapons handling, discipline, and patrolling, 
but they also live with and are good friends with the Afghan policemen. (Official U.S. Marine Corps 
photo by Cpl. Ned Johnson) 
608  For similar images, see: http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5197459832/in/photostream/; 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/4649278101/ 
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The Colonialized Other 
A prominent number of the ISAF pictures present the operation in 
Afghanistan through pictures of reconstruction and development that has 
been enabled by the international troops. Images describing the ISAF actions 
in order to securitize the area are frequent among the type of images. These 
pictures habitually present happy Afghans part taking in co-coordinated 
work, which is led by the international actors. Here again, the helpful, 
humane, protective and patronizing humanitarian soldier is the most 
prominent figure describing the ISAF, Western or international community’s 
role in the country. But the figure of the humanitarian soldier that represents 
the tutoring, healing and securing hand of the international community also 
creates a flip side. The other side of the coin is contracted of the ways in 
which the local populations—the receivers of outside help, aid, as well as the 
objects of the teachings and cultivation—are pictured in the imagery. When 
reading the messages of the images, a duality of responsibility and leadership 
between the locals and the international troops becomes lucid.609 The helper 
and the helped, the tutor and the pupil, the providers of the help and the 
subordinate receivers of help exemplify of the two different sides of the same 
coin. 
The visual juxtaposition of the West/international community (the 
humanitarian, strong and modern soldier figure) and the local Afghans is 
visually apparent in the majority of the ISAF images. One major visual theme 
that is vividly detectable and noticeable from the visual representation of 
locals is the representation of a different culture and of a less developed area, 
a foreign land and the foreign customs of Islam, Muslim people and of 
Islamic culture and its society through Western eyes. Afghanistan is an 
Islamic state, and this shows in the pictures, even if it is not always referred 
to or mentioned verbally. Here, also, the landscape and material culture 
visible in the images becomes noteworthy. When reading into pictures of 
other cultures, the external appearance of the persons pictured is crucial. 
What people look like, how they are clothed and how they appear physically 
is of significance when reading the messages of images. As Franz Fanon 
writes in his book, Studies in a Dying Colonialism: “The way people clothe 
themselves, together with the traditions of dress and finery that custom 
implies, constitutes the most distinctive form of a society’s uniqueness, that 
is to say the one that is the most immediately perceptible.”610 These 
differences in visible culture become even more significant and culturally 
noteworthy when Islamic culture and its people are visibly presented for the 
mostly Western viewers in the environment of  military communication.  And 
in reference to the war in Afghanistan—that was initially started as a 
                                                
609 For such images for example: images 11, 12, 15, 16, 17 (Illustrations 5.2 & 5.3)  
and, for example:  http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/4748021811/in/photostream/; 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/4668355797/; 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/4668978796/in/photostream/; 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/3311582148/ 
610 Fanon, Franz: Studies in a Dying Colonialism. Earthscan Publications,  London, 1989 (1959), 35. 
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response to “Islamic terrorism”. Ways of clothing, dressing customs and the 
appearance of people become more visible when locals are presented away 
from security tasks and other similar activities; i.e. when the locals are out of 
uniform. In the following pages I will mostly analyze images that depict the 
locals in their cultural surroundings, while taking into consideration their 
action, positioning, roles and status vis-à-vis the ISAF troops. 
As said, many of the ISAF images provide a glance into the material 
culture, scenery and landscape of Afghanistan. The poverty of the area and 
the insuperability of Western help, modernity and development are time and 
again juxtaposed in the images through the physical appearance of the locals, 
landscape, material culture and background of the images. Images 14–19 
included in the Illustration 5.3 611 all serve as examples of this. The 
uniformed, modern ISAF soldiers are presented as clean, official, technical, 
disciplined, modern and advanced. They are portrayed as tutors, leaders, 
experts and enablers of development. The locals pictured beside the ISAF 
personnel thus seem not to be in charge but under the tutelage of Western 
influence, but moreover they are often traditionally dressed, and their 
appearance habitually also makes them seem dirty and poor vis-à-vis the 
Western military appearance. The Afghan landscape by Western standards, 
in addition to being empty and often without infrastructure, seems rural, 
poor and underdeveloped. The fact that the most common landscape seen in 
the images is rural and images of cities or towns are rare merely serves to 
underline the impression of rural underdevelopment and poverty. As 
developing the area served as one of the major objectives of the operation, 
the pictures surely show that there is still lot to accomplish. The poorness of 
Afghanistan is a fact: the country in 2011 was one of the poorest countries in 
                                                
611 see Illustration 5.3, Image 15: U.S. Navy Petty Officer 1st Class Iascc Baca, a builder and Khost 
Provincial Reconstruction Team engineer, teaches proper mortar mixing techniques to local 
engineers, construction contractors and foremen during a monthly contractor training session held 
at the Civil Military Operations Center, Khost, Afghanistan, Nov. 14. Engineers from the Khost PRT 
provided construction quality assurance training to locals in order to facilitate high quality 
construction practices in the region. (Photo by U.S. Air Force Staff Sgt. Stephen J. Otero, Khost 
Provincial Reconstruction Team Public Affairs) 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/4132144703/ Image 17, Caption: CAMP BASTION, 
Afghanistan – A British Royal Irish soldier gives school supplies to local children outside Camp 
Bastion June 6, 2008. The ISAF soldiers provide the Force Protection to Camp Bastion and will often 
visit local villages to give out donated supplies. (ISAF photo by Staff Sgt. Jeffrey Duran, U.S. Army) 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/2756487952/in/photostream/ 
Image 19, Caption: Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander of NATO and International Security 
Assistance Force troops in Afghanistan, visits a successful road construction project in the 
Badakshan province, Regional Command North, Sept. 30. Petraeus also attended a shura with 
Afghan President Hamid Karzai and U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry. (Photo by 
U.S. Navy Chief Petty Officer Joshua Treadwell)Image 19: 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5038984037/in/photostream/ 
Image 20, Caption: GURESHK, Afghanistan—Royal Army Sergeant Adam Kennedy of the Royal 
Engineers Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) regiment conducts mine awareness training with 
local Afghan residents outside of the Host Nation Clinic at Forward Operating Base Price on Jan. 27, 
2009. Military leaders at Task Force Helmand are beginning a rigorous mine awareness campaign 
wih local residents, Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army to teach proper identification 
and marking of unexploded ordinance with the goal of reducing civilian casualties from accidental 
handling of explosive devices. ISAF photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Aramis X. Ramirez. 
Image 20: http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/3238372698/#/ 
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the world, with a life expectancy of 44 years; 42% of the population live 
under the UN poverty line.612 The landscape, infrastructure and material 
culture visible in the images all work to paint a picture of extreme poverty, 
and of a weak country that has been reduced time and again to rubble in the 
past 40 years of conflict.  
Image 14 included in the illustration 5.3 sums up some of the common 
compositions used when picturing the locals vis-à-vis the way in which the 
coalition actors are presented. In the image, a soldier (in uniform, named) 
and local (unnamed, dressed in a traditional gown) “high-five” after 
undertaking a joint task of unclogging a canal at the construction site of a 
new patrol base. What jumps out of the composition and the story of the 
image is the visible difference in appearance. The composition presents a 
bigger and stronger Western soldier who is named and the smaller helped 
local who remains nameless—and can thus be seen to represent a part of the 
mass of “Afghans”. Also, the extremely Western habit of greeting (high five) 
imposed on the Afghan man sticks out.613 The picture does not just talk about 
the soldier helping the traditional Afghan man with work-related issues, the 
good co-operation evident and the grateful receivers of help, it also accounts 
the West and the international community and its patronizing influence, 
imposing Western cultural practices on the locals and picturing the locals as 
the instructed and the cultivated crowd; and thus, from the Western point of 
view, as the underdeveloped, culturally different others. (See Illustration 5.3)  
Similar positioning is apparent in image 16614 which pictures a 
traditionally clothed Afghan man is sitting down at a coalition medical center 
as a uniformed ISAF actor apparently measures his blood pressure. Also, 
image 18 615, picturing an Afghan girl’s worn sandals on her dirty feet, 
accompanied with a text explaining that she is waiting for a new pair of shoes 
from the US soldiers, repeats the same arrangement and narrative. 
Development, know-how and help are pictured to emanate from the ISAF 
figure, which represents outside help, Western style modernization and 
                                                
612 Afghanistan. World Bank fact sheet: http://data.worldbank.org/country/afghanistan (2011) 
613 Illustration, 5.3, Image 14. Caption: Sgt. Cody T. Romriell, a combat engineer with 2nd Battalion, 
9th Marines, high-fives a local after helping him unclog a backed-up canal during the construction of 
Typhoon 3 in Marja, Afghanistan, Sep, 9. Marine engineers with 2/9 have been constructing new 
patrol bases in their area of operation in order to increase force protection. Typhoon 3 is one of the 
many being built. 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5043265509/in/photostream/.  
For other images whit similar arrangement, see: 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/3745894616/; 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/4084691875/; 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/4084925343/ 
614 Illustration 5.3, Image 16: Caption: HERAT, Afghanistan--An Afghan local receives medical 
treatment at the International Security Assistance Force Role 2 Medical Center on Camp Arena, Sept. 
23, 2008. The center provides medical treatment to military personnel assigned to the camp and 
local residents. (ISAF photo by U.S. Air Force TSgt Laura K. Smith) 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/2887435270 
615 Illustration 5.3, Image 18. Caption: 091204-F-9171L-311 An Afghan girl wearing worn sandals 
waits for a pair of shoes being distributed by U.S. Soldiers , Boragay Village, Zabul Province, 
Afghanistan, Dec. 4, 2009. (U.S. Air Force photo by Tech. Sgt. Efren Lopez) 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/4165467527/ 
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development; while on the other hand, the local Afghan receiving the medical 
care and the girl in the broken sandals are representative of the local 
Afghans: the passive, non-Western helped. Both of the locals depicted are 
passively resorting to the outside help and thus, in the composition of the 
images, become the weaker, less developed party. Both of these images 
represent the way in which the Afghans and the ISAF action are depicted in 
the strategic communication imagery, but symbolically such images and the 
juxtaposition of the figures also tell another story. This division and duality 
in the representation offers a window into the Western ideas about the 
operation and the Western presence in the area. These photographs 
illuminate the ways in which ISAF is picturing the West, the Westerners, 
“our” operation action, the international community, Western values and 
aims, as visually presented and intended to address mainly Western 
audiences. On the other hand, these images represent the ways of depicting 
different, foreign cultures, areas and people. Thus, they open up a route to 
the representation of the others used in contemporary strategic military 
communication, designed to motivate and legitimate the war.616  
As cultural bias and attitudes can be relatively easily hidden and left 
untouched in written texts, visual material is often bound to reveal 
stereotypical positioning of “us” and “them”. When encounters between 
cultures are visualized, images are likely to be more or less stereotyped; they 
lack nuances and tend to place one culture (way of life, style, type, etc.) above 
the other.617 The traditional mode of life and traditional appearance (visible 
in clothing, landscape, material culture and appearance) that become evident 
in the imagery are often, in Western perception, seen as equal to 
underdevelopment.618 It seems that in the ISAF images, the Afghans and 
Afghanistan, the traditional Afghan way of living, physical appearance (the 
veil, the Burka, the beards, the traditional gowns of the men, the worn shoes 
of a child, etc.) become associated with underdevelopment, helplessness and 
weakness; the objects ISAF was set to remedy. And then, on the other hand, 
the Western style modern military appearance, behavior, features and 
functions become associated with power, capability and development. In the 
eyes of the Western viewer, the imagery thus underlines the weakness and 
subordination of the Afghans and emphasizes overwhelming dominance of 
the West. Therefore it seems that the ISAF images repeat some of the age-old 
Western cultural inversions of “us” and the Orientalized “them”.  
This kind of dominant arrangement thus also tells a broader story of 
Western thinking: the story of Western insuperability, the need to cultivate 
and impose one’s own customs, conventions and ways of thinking upon the 
less developed Other. The positioning of the helped and the helpers—the 
composition of masters and subordinates familiar form the visual 
                                                
616 See also chapter 4, and the representations of ”disaster humanitarianism” in the case of Haiti and 
Ebola epidemics.  
617 Burke, 2001, 123–126. 
618 Said, Edward: Covering Islam. How The Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest 
of the World. Vintage, London, 1997 (1981), 29–30. 
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representations of the colonial era discussed above—is so repetitive and 
strikingly visible in the ISAF pictures that it cannot escape the eye. It can 
even be said that the historical conventional Western way of presenting 
different cultures and peoples—especially the Islamic world—in 
Orientalizing and colonializing ways is at its most visible in the images of the 
ISAF. By Orientalism, Edward Said meant that the Western practices of 
circulating stereotypical representations of the Orient (the East, Asia, the 
Arabs, the “non-Western world” and “other” cultures in general) often 
present the cultural other as a subordinate to the Westerners. Orientalizing 
representations habitually presents the non-Western cultural others as 
barbaric and brutal, or as childlike and underdeveloped—as well as primitive 
and immature.619  
Historically familiar orientalist ways of representation are detectable in 
much of the ISAF imagery that pictures the locals. The local populations are 
generally not pictured in the ISAF images as brutal or barbaric (which was 
has been customary for orientalist representations), but the Afghans in the 
ISAF images are mostly pictured as child-like, immature, in need of help and 
guidance, and subordinate in character and position vis-à-vis the Westerners 
and their practices. According to Said, the Europeans constructed their own 
identity by researching, observing and building representations of the 
“Orient”. Just as the Orient is often described as irrational, primitive and 
underdeveloped, Western identity is conversely built as rational, civilized and 
developed.620  A similar type of projection becomes evident when observing 
and reading the ISAF representations of the Afghans. The others—
representatives of different cultures, mindsets, areas, etc.—are often seen as 
an antonym of the self. Features and attributes opposite to ours are often 
associated and inserted into the others. The helpless and weak Afghans 
become the antithesis of the strong, modern West, the international 
community and the ISAF.  The others are seen as different from “us” and 
thus often “less or worse”: less developed, less advanced and weaker; 
lessened in their humanity—and thus the Afghans in ISAF images become 
presented as the subhumans of the humanitarian story. This juxtaposition—
characteristic for the logic and the plot of the theatrical humanitarian tragedy 
form—is strikingly evident in visual representations of the ISAF. 
Critics of topical military humanitarianism have observed a similarity of 
statuses and roles between colonial times and the present era. As discussed 
in the chapter 2., in the colonial era, Westerners used to carry the “the white 
man’s burden” – the obligation to spread civilization, reason, religion and 
law to the “barbaric” parts of the world. The main characters of this colonial 
story were the colonial administrator, the master, the missionary and the 
barbaric, uncivilized savages, that needed help, saving, tutelage and 
guidance. Nowadays, it may be argued, the colonial buzzword and concept of 
civilizing the cultural others has been replaced with humanity, 
                                                
619 Said, Edward: Orientalism. Penguin classics, London, (1978) 2003. 
620 Ibid.  
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humanitarianism and development, and the topical main characters are now, 
in addition to the humanitarian workers, also the humanitarian soldiers, the 
(Western) militaries and the international community, who all act as state 
builders around the global crisis zones. On the other side of this picture are 
the weak sufferers and suppressed locals of the failed states and the helped 
people of the crisis areas. The humanitarian soldiers and the helped locals of 
failed states are the faces that have replaced the old colonial figures of the 
past.621 In addition to this, the representation and juxtaposition of the ISAF 
actors and the locals works wonderfully in the use of military strategic 
communication: the images and positioning also reinforce and construct the 
Western identity as superior and the image of the West/coalition as strong, 
efficient, needed and able to win the fight in Afghanistan. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
621 See for instance: Douzinas, 2007, 21.; Ignatieff, Michael: Empire Lite, Vintage, London, 2003, 
17. For the colonial history of humanitarianism See chapter 2. 
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 The Grateful Locals and the Emancipated Others 
One of the major narratives constructed by the ISAF images is constituted of 
the following elements: crowds of Afghans enthusiastically shaking hands 
with General Petraeus—the commander of the ISAF operation—while smiling 
and welcoming the military leader622; images of happy smiling children 
receiving gifts from the ISAF soldiers623; orderly and friendly fellow soldiers 
avid to learn from their big brothers624; and grateful, humble and calm 
women and men receiving development aid, health care and advice from the 
ISAF officers 625. (See Illustrations 5.1, 5.2, 5.3& 5.4)  A narrative of civilizing 
the Afghans is very clearly visible in the images. As said, Muslims and Islamic 
culture have habitually been presented, in Western representations (both 
historically as well as in recent decades), as aggressive or even violent, 
barbaric —and often cut as a terrorist figure.626 But what is different in the 
ISAF images when compared to the customary old colonial prototypes and 
nowadays frequent media representations of aggressive Islamic terrorists, is 
that the locals in the ISAF images are not at all pictured as barbaric, violent 
or brutal, but rather as docile, happy, very friendly, although habitually child-
like and weak, but nevertheless accepting of the coalition presence and action 
in the area. This kind of representation of local populations can be seen as  
effective from the viewpoint of the strategic communication endeavor 
backing the operation. Picturing the locals as barbarians or as violent, 
mistrustful and discontent would not only be detrimental to the strategic 
communication aim, but additionally it would not fit the current 
humanitarian story.  
Pictures of happy, cooperative and content locals (civilians as well as the 
local security force personnel) market the operation in an up-to-date 
humanitarian style and thus aim to help to win over the hearts and minds of 
the coalition home fronts. These images encourage the spectators to think 
and feel that the operation is a just and an efficient one, also wanted and 
unanimously supported by the local populations. The happy and grateful 
receivers of aid and Western teachings are intended to motivate the 
audiences of the pictures to see the endeavor in a positive light. The images 
seek to provide proof of the operations as what the weaker Afghans 
unanimously want.  The grateful figures of the Afghans also communicate to 
the (Western) viewers of the images that the locals pose no danger or threat 
to the soldiers or the coalition effort, as they are calm, content and tamed. All 
in all the images convey a message of a legitimate operation steadily 
progressing and worth taking part in. The same mechanism, and mode of 
representation has been detected and utilized in the imagery of humanitarian 
                                                
622 Image 19, illustration 5.3.  
623 Images 17, 6, 5, 3, for example. 
624 Images 11, 12, 13. 
625 Images 16, 15, 14, 2, 5. 
626 For more on the figure of the Islamist Terrorist, see, for example: Said, 1997. and chapter 6 of this 
book.  
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organizations and development NGO’s: Pictures of happy, appreciative, 
orderly and accepting crowds of aid receivers more effectively encourages 
humanitarian action and money flows; much more so than images of 
suffering or angry, frustrated masses or ambivalent reactions towards 
outside help.627 
Aside from the “docile locals” narrative, what can be seen in the images is 
what is often done by giving help, as well as civilizing and developing less 
fortunate people and areas: imposing what are seen as civilized or Western 
ways and customs on the less developed world and the culturally different 
others. The practices of imposing one’s own culture on the other is extremely 
present in the ISAF images depicting the helped and “civilized” locals. This is 
visible, for example, in image 14 discussed above, in which an ISAF soldier is 
“high-fiving” the bearded, local Afghan man dressed in a traditional white 
costume. The cultural practice of the high five is hardly very Afghan; and 
neither are the figures of Mickey Mouse, Donald Duck and Minnie Mouse, 
which are all used in a ISAF mine awareness campaign.628 (Illustration 5.4, 
Image 20) Such traces of cultural predominance are occasionally made 
visible by the imagery. They can be seen as accidental slips, but also as 
indicators of indifference towards cultural differences and nuances. Also, on 
a much deeper level than just imposing straightforward cultural practices 
and markers on the other, this practice of not taking cultural differences into 
account or pushing one’s own ideas of good, tolerable life and value systems 
on others is in many ways visible in the ISAF imagery. This projection 
becomes visible in many of the images depicting development and 
emancipation. 
The narrative and ethos of the development furthered by ISAF troops in 
Afghanistan is extremely present in the ISAF images. This is understandable 
given the development of the area is one of the major objectives of the ISAF 
mission.629 ISAF troops building schools and infrastructure, handing out aid, 
                                                
627 See for example chapters 2&4 and Chouliaraki, 2013; Cohen 2001.  
But despite of this style of presentation, according to interviews of Afghans, the ISAF presence in the 
area does not seem to be so 
unanimously supported, but many Afghans feel resentment and distrust towards the troops. See, 
for instance: The Trust Deficit: The Impact of Local Perceptions on Policy in Afghanistan. 
Erica Gaston and Jonathan Horowitz, October 2010, Open Society Foundations. 
628 Illustration 5.4. Image 20, Caption:  
GURESHK, Afghanistan--Royal Army Sergeant Adam Kennedy of the Royal Engineers Explosive 
Ordinance Disposal (EOD) regiment conducts mine awareness training with local Afghan residents 
outside of the Host Nation Clinic at Forward Operating Base Price on Jan. 27, 2009. Military leaders 
at Task Force Helmand are beginning a rigorous mine awareness campaign wih local residents, 
Afghan National Police and Afghan National Army to teach proper identification and marking of 
unexploded ordinance with the goal of reducing civilian casualties from accidental handling of 
explosive devices. ISAF photo by U.S. Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Aramis X. Ramirez (RELEASED) 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/3238372698 
629 The ISAF mission is depicted as such: to “ facilitate improvements in governance and socio-
economic development in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is 
observable to the population.”; “ISAF supports reconstruction and development (R&D) in Afghanistan, 
securing areas in which reconstruction work is conducted by other national and international actors. 
Where appropriate, and in close cooperation and coordination with GIROA and UNAMA 
representatives on the ground, ISAF also provides practical support for R&D efforts, as well as support 
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teaching government officials, educating populations, encouraging modern 
practices, developing healthcare etc., constitute a majority of the ISAF Flickr 
images. But development, just like humanitarianism, is not innocent, 
altruistic and simply non-political as it often is presented to be, and as it may 
seem at first glance. The images narrating ISAF-enabled development in the 
area embed themselves in many messages that only open up when 
scrutinized in the context of contemporary world politics, and when analyzed 
in more depth. Development can be seen as a political keyword, as well as a 
political global governance and securitization practice, that is topically widely 
used not only by aid agencies but utilized by states in international 
politics.630 Development or emancipation as terms can be used, for example, 
in counterinsurgency war rhetoric, and thus they offer powerful justification 
for military engagement and war. The description of ISAF’s mission is to: 
“facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development in 
order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is 
observable to the population”. War and military acts are nowadays widely 
seen by the international community as preconditions of developing failed 
states and the underdeveloped corners of the world. As Mark Duffield states 
in his book Development, Security and Unending War, we are have, in 
regards to recent wars been often been told—and especially in the case of the 
Afghan war—that more fierce and more war-like posture, even more so that 
was at first planned, is required to solve the conflicts of today. It is often said 
that war and military suppression are necessary for development to follow 
and take root in “failed states” and global crisis zones occupied by 
international troops. This has led to a situation in which development (just 
like humanitarianism) becomes mingled with war. In this situation, 
development can also be used as a tool to further political goals in so called 
failed states. Development carried out by military tools can be seen as a 
practice of governing and contain risks and threats, seen to potentially stem 
from these areas, such as terrorism, political extremisms, disorder and 
migration.631 
On the bases of human rights violations, terrorism, humanitarian 
emergency, epidemic sickness and developing of failed states, Western 
influence in global crisis areas has, in recent decades and years, increased. 
Usually, the relationship between the helper-developer and the helped-
under-developed—the West and “the rest”—is presented as a relationship of 
mutual self-interest. However, both increased penetration and 
interventionist politics could also be seen as essential for the West’s own 
security. Although development is often presented in the ISAF images in a 
way that makes it seem non-political, it can also be interpreted as a de-
politicized practice, a guise and a Western interstate technology of security to 
                                                                                                                                     
for humanitarian assistance efforts conducted by Afghan government organizations, international 
organizations, and NGOs.” http://www.isaf.nato.int/mission.html 
630 Duffield, 2007. On development as a liberal practice of governance see also chapter 4 of this work.  
631 Duffield , 2007, 215–222. See also chapter 4.3.3.  
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govern the worlds of people.632 Political, as well as military involvement in 
faraway, less developed areas and in societies inhabited by culturally 
different others under the guise of modernization and development, is not 
exactly a new phenomenon.  
As discussed in chapter 2., the concepts of civilizing, cultivating and 
helping the culturally others have also been used to govern the less developed 
corners of the world after the colonial era; often in the form of 
modernization. As Said states, the modernization of Muslin countries can be 
seen as a child of Orientalism. In the times of the Cold War, the 
modernization theory was often seen by the West as an ideological answer to 
the increase of revolutionary upheaval in Asia, Africa and the Muslim/Arab 
countries. Modernization was then used by the US for example, to block the 
spread of communism. By planting modernization, ‘good leadership’ and a 
political system resembling the Western style of governance, countries and 
areas seen as backward were molded in to a shape unthreatening to the West. 
The local Muslims were then often presented as child-like victims of their 
own nature and barbaric political leaders, while the West was presented as 
the bearer of progress, civilization and development.  The discourses, 
practices and representations of modernization, humanitarianism, civilizing 
and colonializing the others constitute the figures and roles of the helped, the 
evil and the helpers; the weak uncivilized, the brutal; and the strong civilized. 
633  
When looking at the ISAF images and reading their narratives, this story 
and its arrangement of different characters does not seem to be far from 
visual representations of the Afghan operation. The official developmental 
ISAF objectives and the imagery of the helped weaker locals, when read in 
the context of the historical colonial and developmental projects and their 
ethos, constitutes an interesting narrative on the operation, and the 
contemporary Western gaze on the global world. It moreover highlights the 
hierarchical divisions of different levels and characters of humanity.634 The 
imagery seem to communicate an updated orientalist story of development 
and modernization planted by international (Western) armed troops, into a 
backward failed state tyrannized by its political system and 
underdevelopment—and populated by non-Western child-like locals.  
Because of the strong political power positioning, post-development 
research has questioned the whole concept of development: developing the 
global others has been construed as Western violence and forcefully pushing 
Western ideas, practices and ideals towards non-Western areas and people. 
As such, development has been seen as a political practice parallel to 
colonialism and imperialism.635  Consequently—and in addition to justifying 
                                                
632 Ibid, 219–220. 
633 Said, 1997, 28–31; see also Douzinas, 2007 
634 Said, 1997, 28–31; see also Douzinas, 2007. 
635 See for example: Mattila, Päivi & Vuola, Elina: Kehitys. In Toinen Maailmanpolitiikka. 
Kymmenen käsitettä feministiseen kansainvälisten suhteiden tutkimukseen. Eds. Kantola, Johanna & 
Valenius, Johanna. Vastapaino, Tampere, 2007, 216. 
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military interventions, securing one’s own interest and containing threats– 
what is often achieved by helping, civilizing and developing less fortunate 
people and areas is the forcing “the Western ways”, customs and ideals on 
the less developed world—or the culturally different others. An interesting 
and revealing passage into the development-driven colonialist visual 
representations of the local Afghans, and of the external modernization and 
‘Western ways’ imposed on the less developed other, are the images of 
Afghan women within the ISAF imagery.  
One of the most important narratives legitimizing the war and 
intervention and the ISAF operation in Afghanistan was the development-
driven idea of the betterment of the Afghan woman’s position. Women’s 
rights and liberating women from under barbaric and intolerant political 
regimes, unwilling to protect and respect women’s rights and the ideals of 
gender equality, have become the moral justifications of Western war efforts 
in the age of “war on terror” and humanitarian war. Human rights violations 
in general and women’s rights violations in particular have in recent years 
become powerful justifications for the international community to intervene 
and play an active (and military) role within the boundaries of another state. 
Feminist scholars have also acknowledged this harnessing of gender rights in 
to a legitimizing discourse of war, often skeptically.636 
The schooling of girls and education of women were among the most used 
justifications for the Afghan operation. Freeing, emancipating and bettering 
the societal standing of women who had been left without social, economic 
and educational rights under the Islamist era has been one of the central 
aims proclaimed by the international coalition and the ISAF operation. 
Furthermore, the rights of women have been sedulously repeated in the 
political speech that has legitimized and backed the operation.637 Against this 
background, the vast amount of pictures of emancipated women within the 
ISAF imagery is not surprising. Showing images of happy, active, content, 
emancipated and freed women is a powerful tool in the toolbox of the current 
information warfare and strategic communication which backs the operation 
in Afghanistan. But what else do the images of emancipated women 
articulate to the Western viewer of the ISAF images? What kind of meanings 
do these pictures entail, and how do the images present the ISAF operation 
and the women of Afghanistan? What kind of signifying messages of the 
operation, as well as ISAF activity and the outside emancipation endeavor of 
the Afghan women, Afghanistan and Islam, do the pictures enclose?  
 
A Woman Unveiled is a Woman Saved? 
                                                
636 Wylie, Gillian: Women’s rights and righteous war. Feminist Theory, 2003, 2/4, 217; Kouvo, 
Sari: Ihmisoikeudet,In: Toinen Maailmanpolitiikka. 10 käsitettä feministiseen 
kansainvälisten suhteiden tutkimukseen.2007, 266–267. 
637 Wylie, 2003: George W Bush Warns Against withdrawal from Afghanistan: ‘Women 
would suffer’,  April 1, 2011 The Huffington Post. 
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Encouraging images of local women are well represented in ISAF imagery. 
The Western home front viewer of the ISAF images who most likely, in some 
extent believes in gender equality and gender rights, probably feels relief 
when looking at some of the imagery depicting the activities of the Afghan 
women, liberated from under the strict rules governing their lives and 
oppressing their rights under the Taliban era. Images of Afghan women/girls 
sitting in classrooms being educated by the coalition soldiers visually 
represent development and the emancipation of women. The photographs of 
ISAF also tell us that the women of Afghanistan are due to the multinational 
operation able to play soccer and compete in sports, a matter that was 
facilitated by the ISAF effort in order to better the status of women in the 
country. When compared to the treatment and juridical rights of women 
under the Taliban era, Afghan women proudly showing their inked fingertips 
as a markers of them casting their vote, as well as images of smiling little girls 
in a classroom while waiting the coalition soldier to better their schooling 
facilities, most probably satisfies the viewer bound to Western humanitarian 
mentality.638  (See images 21 -25 in illustration 5.4) 
Such images depicting the emancipated women of Afghanistan habitually 
show the ISAF troops as enablers of development, emancipation and as 
facilitators of women’s liberation. (See the images 23 & 23 in the illustration 
5.4) An average Western liberal viewer—touched by the humanitarian 
ideology and believing in human and gender rights and the humane 
justifications of the operation—when looking at image of an unveiled woman 
in many cases, feels happiness, satisfaction and relief. The contextual intent 
and the iconlogical message of such visual representations for the Western 
spectator is that the Afghan women are emancipated and liberated, freed 
from the shackles of an oppressive, traditional Islamic order, by the help of 
                                                
638 See Illustration 5.4.Image 21, Caption: U.S. linguist Shafiqa Ansary of Union City, Calif. (right), 
and U.S. Army Master Sgt. Darla Sheasley of Everly, Iowa, veterinary technician for the Iowa 
National Guard’s 734th Agribusiness Development Team, answer questions while providing basic 
animal care training to 22 women from the Chowkay District Jan. 31. (U.S. Army photo/ Sgt. Tessa 
Poppe) http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5426991970/ 
Image 22: Caption:  Afghan women show off her inkstained fingers in Kabul after taking part in their 
country's parliamentary elections Sept. 18. Photo courtesy USAID. 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5000541503/in/photostream/ 
Image  23: Along with heating and electricity needs, the Farah Provincial Reconstruction Team 
assessed that the Farah City Fourth District Girls School they visited, Dec. 9, needs more space for its 
over 1,700 students as evident by a first grade classroom filled to its capacity with 50 young girls, 
Farah, Afghanistan. (Photo by Master Sgt. Tracy DeMarco, Farah Provincial Reconstruction Team) 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/4194180173/ 
Image 24, Caption: The Afghan Women's International Team (in red) played a friendly, yet 
competitive, game of soccer against a team of International Security Assistance Force women (in 
gold) on April 1. The game ended with neither  team scoring a goal, but the real goal of the game was 
met. The Afghan women had an opportunity to play their sport against another women's team.The 
team does not get the opportunity to play against other teams in Afghanistan, so the game was 
chance for them to play a new opponent and build a relationship with women from several NATO 
countries, said Khalida, the coach, and a player of the Afghan Women's International Team. 
Image 25, caption: (KABUL, Afghanistan, Oct. 29, 2010) Players from Afghanistan's national 
women's soccer team posed for pictures after a friendly match against an international pickup team 
of women assigned to the International Security Assistance Force Headquarters in Kabul. The 
Afghan women controlled much of the game, but scored just once. That goal, which came in the first 
half, was enough for the win. http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5125728807/in/photostream/ 
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the military operation. Thus, the images in their contextual position intend to 
show that the ISAF operation has made a positive difference and advanced 
the gender equality of the Afghan women. The visual narrative of 
modernization and development, as well as the imagery of the women 
emancipated by the help of ISAF, create a narrative that suggests that the war 
has been inevitable for development and emancipation; they imply that the 
war and coalition military presence on the ground was inevitable before the 
Afghan woman could be freed. 
But images of Afghan women attending schools, graduating from the 
police academy, voting, playing soccer or undressing her veil, may give the 
spectator premature satisfaction. Such images may be casting false belief on 
the achievements of the ISAF operation and the immediate effect of the 
external help on the status of Afghan women. The attitudes towards women 
are deeply rooted in culture and society (as also in Western societies) and the 
oppression of women is most apparent in domestic and private, everyday 
lives of women, and in the attitudes and value systems of the people. Often 
the local communities also support these structures. There is only so much 
that a state-system or outside (military) influence can do to the grass root 
level practices which prevent women freely and plenipotentiary participating 
in the functions of education, society, politics and private life.639 These 
systems and attitudes do not change in an instant; they cannot be brought 
into a society overnight and be expected to flourish soon after seeding. It 
takes years to break societal gender systems; this can be vividly seen in many 
Western societies. Furthermore, inequality between the genders is often 
more easily identified and seen in other cultures—in faraway places and 
especially in “less-developed” areas of the world640 than in cultures closer to 
one’s own. It is easier to detect and try to mend the gender equality questions 
and shortages in the other, than to notice structures producing inequality in 
one’s own, familiar surroundings. That is not to say women’s rights would 
not be insufficient in Afghanistan or in some other parts of the Islamic world. 
However, what is typical of the predominant Western political discourse, as 
well as feminist discourse, is that Islam is often presented as a religion 
naturally and by definition repressive to women and disregarding of women’s 
rights, as opposed to other religions—namely Christianity.641 
In post-development and post-colonial feminist research, Western-based 
feminism and women’s liberation are often perceived (especially by non-
Western scholars) as a part of Western cultural hegemony and colonialism. 
West as a norm also means the Western woman as a norm. In Western 
feminist discourse, ‘Third World women’ are often seen as a homogeneous 
group labelled by oppression and powerlessness. Chandra Mohanty talks 
about discursive colonialization, whereby the Third World woman is often 
                                                
639 Kouvo, Sari: Ihmisoikeudet, 266. In: Toinen Maailmanpolitiikka, 2007. 
640 Sontag 2003, 85. 
641 Toinen Maailmanpolitiikka. 10 käsitettä feministiseen kansainvälisten suhteiden 
tutkimukseen.  
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constructed as traditional, backward and weak vis-à-vis the Western norm of 
the modern, advanced and emancipated woman.642 It seems through looking 
at the ISAF images that the women of Afghanistan are most often 
emancipated according to Western principles. It is assumed that the societal 
standing of women and the condition of gender rights are mended when the 
Afghan women are acting, in predominant Western view, in an emancipated 
manner—as a liberated Western-style woman. 
Westerners are usually quite feeble in detecting the structures and 
conventions that inhibit the freedom of women (and sexual minorities), as 
well as norms that repress genders in their own surroundings and societies, 
but agile in detecting imperfections in the cultural others. This could also be 
said about the discussion concerning the use of the Burka in Western 
European countries643, as well as the strong condemnation of the practice of 
female circumcisions as opposed to Western women’s appearance and 
beatification norms, such as plastic surgery, or the gendered violence 
towards women still persistent in many Western countries.644 All in all, the 
whole universality of the Western ideas of feminism and women’s liberation 
has been strongly criticized by the non-Western (as well as many Western) 
feminists. Critics of Western-based ethnocentric feminism have also brought 
to the fore the idea that above “universal sisterhood”, “universal feminist 
claims” and the oppressive patriarchal system there are a vast number of 
power structures that differentiate women globally, such as colonialism, 
racism, imperialism and globally and culturally unequally divided wealth. In 
post-colonial feminist studies, Western feminism is often regarded as one of 
the West’s import products. Western feminist ideas are placed upon non-
Western women, and emancipatory language is used as a means of forcefully 
thrusting something foreign on what is seen as underdeveloped and 
backward women of the orient.645 
Clothing and apparel are important markers of identity and culture, 
which are visible and prescriptive especially in visual representations. 
Clothing and external appearance are even more significant in visual 
representations of the Muslim women. As clothing traditions reveal 
belonging to a certain type of society and culture, the veil (or burka)—which 
carries many culturally signifying implications—worn by Muslim women is 
often at once noticed and essentialised by spectators. The veil, so apparent in 
Afghan society, as Fanon describes it, presents a disturbing mystery and 
miscellaneous trouble for the Western viewer. The veil, a headscarf or a 
                                                
642 Mohanty, Chandra Talpade: Under Western Eyes. Feminist Scholarship and Colonial 
Discourse. In: Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism, ed. Mohanty, Chandra 
Talpade, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres. Indiana University Press, Indianapolis 1991, 51–52; 
Mohanty, Chandra Talpade: Cartographies of Struggle: Third world women and the Politics of 
Feminism, in Third World women and the Politics of Feminism, 1991, 51–52. 
643 For example, the law prohibiting the public use of the burka and the nigba in France came in 
to effect in early April 2011, as well as the French  ‘Burkini-ban’ that stirred vast discussion on 2016.  
644 See for example: Kennedy, Aileen: Mutilation and Beautification. Australian Feminist studies, 
vol 24, 2009, 
211–231. 
645 Mattila & Vuola, 2007, 211; Mohanty, 1991 a&b. 
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burka, also presents a puzzle for   development projects and feminist 
emancipation efforts.646 Just as traditional modes of life, customs, apparel 
and appearance often equate to underdevelopment and “uncivilized” culture, 
so the veil is often seen in the West to point to the oppression of women and 
to a disregard of woman’s rights.647 Fanon explains how the Algerian women 
of the colonial era were subordinate to their colonial masters: they were the 
subjects of seduction and were forcefully tired to made to convert to their 
masters’ culture and  be “unveiled”, in order to better fit the Western cultural 
description of a modern woman.648 Emancipating women and placing them 
in, according to Western perception, progressive and liberating positions can 
also be seen as a process of unveiling the women.  
Picture 26 of illustration 5.4 649 in which the Afghan women are portrayed 
practicing shooting dressed in trousers, could be seen to portray ISAF’s 
visual practice of undressing or stripping the veil that belongs to Islamic 
culture. Thus, this image concurrently represents modernization and the 
emancipation of women, as it also represents the culture and modernization 
of the master, which are imposed upon the Afghan woman. When seeing the 
veil removed, many Western viewers may sigh and be relieved—another 
woman is liberated from Taliban terror or Islamic oppression. But as these 
women can be seen as liberated, they may also be seen as stripped and 
civilized according to the worldviews of the master and the Western 
perception of women’s liberation and gender equality. The practice of 
unveiling the Afghan women, seen in the images, and thus presenting them 
as saved from oppression, can also be viewed as a manifestation of the 
totalizing Western humanitarian ideology placed on the culturally other. 
Women’s rights, gender equality and the schooling of girls are such strong 
and powerful, naturalized subjects in many Western societies that they are 
often seen as indisputably noble aims; and questioning the aims and 
practices used to further these goals that are seen to be universal may be 
regarded as supporting the oppression of women. The intent of such images, 
within the Western military strategic communication can be seen as 
attempting to show how a woman unveiled by the ISAF is a woman saved. 
 The strategic communication imagery of ISAF paints a multilayered 
picture of the operation, the war and the situation in Afghanistan. The 
images allow us an insight to the ground level of the operation and show the 
operation in an appealing light in order to sustain its support. However, the 
ISAF imagery also communicates some of the structures of today’s world 
                                                
646 Fanon, 1989 (1959), 34–35. 
647 Said, 2007(1978), 27–31. 
648 Fanon, 1989, 35–44. 
649 Illustration 5.4, Image 26, Caption: Kabul –Afghan National Police women qualify on the AK-47 
rifle during thetactical training program portion of the police basic training course at Kabul Military 
Training Center, April 13, 2010. During the eight week course, trainees learn police-specifics such as 
penal and traffic codes, use of force and improvised explosive device detection. The course also covers 
the Afghan constitution, human rights and two weeks on weapons and tactical training. (U.S. Air 
Force photo by Staff Sgt. Sarah Brown) 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/4522480681/in/photostream/ 
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politics, as well as global power structures—and moreover essential features 
of the humanitarian political zeitgeist of our time. All in all, addressing of the 
ISAF strategic communication images—pictures of the humanitarian 
soldiers, trouble free co-existence of the ISAF troops and the images of the 
grateful locals, as well as the images of emancipated women—all suggest to 
the Western spectator that the humanitarian catharsis, in this act at the 
humanitarian theater, may be attained by supporting the ISIS operation and 
consenting to the continuation of it. The ISAF images aim to address the 
target audiences in strategic manners, and thus work to construct the 
conceptions concerning topical world politics, war and the surrounding 
world of the Western spectators.  But concurrently the images also, perhaps 
partly unintentionally, reveal some paradigms that are left unsaid about the 
operation in written accounts and the spoken word, for visual 
representations habitually reveal stereotypical picturing formed according to 
cultural attitudes and political objectives. But what aspects of the operation 
and the coalition action in Afghanistan are not made visible, hidden or 
scantly addressed within the recent Western visual military strategic 
communication, this is what I shall look into in the following subchapter.  
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5.4 THE WAR UNSEEN 
 
“If there is no picture, no photographic evidence of the suffering; there is 
no atrocity.”  Susan Sontag 650 
 
As visual images are pivotal in mediating information from global crisis 
zones, and utilized in multitudes of ways in visual military strategic 
communication, however, some things that are usually seen as belonging to 
military conflicts, operations and war-like situations are left out—or are 
indirectly addressed in such imagery. These themes, left unseen, are also 
relevant when reading and analyzing the strategic communication imagery 
and the messages they entail. The unseen war creates narratives, just as the 
pictured operation does. What is framed out of the images makes the viewers 
focus and imagine, and to ignore and confine. Thus, the unmentioned 
construct the frames in which the war, the situation in Afghanistan, and the 
ISAF operation, are understood. In this chapter I will concentrate on some of 
the visual “blind spots” of the ISAF imagery and address the missing aspects 
left out of the narrative: the features that are framed out of the narrative of 
the contemporary war and western lead military action.  
5.4.1 THE INVISIBLE ENEMY AND THE PROTECTED COALITION 
SOLDIERS 
What sticks clearly out in the ISAF imagery is the invisibility of the enemy 
figure. The Afghan operation was throughout violent; the number of 
causalities was on the rise at the start of the transitional phase; and the 
fighting and insurgent attacks were frequently reported in the media. 
However, the ISAF images do not visibly present the “enemy”, the figures of 
the “insurgents” and “terrorists”, nor do they visually show the antagonist.651 
Given that representations of the “Islamite terrorist” are frequent and much 
used in popular culture and media imagery circulating in the West, it is 
noteworthy that such figures are absent from the ISAF imagery.652 Why is 
this, and what does this tell us in the context of strategic communication? 
What does this say about the war and the operation in broader terms; and 
what does the “invisibility of the enemy” communicate about the principles 
and the narrative of the contemporary war waged by the “international 
community”? 
The invisibility of the enemy in the ISAF imagery seems to indicate that 
the enemy really is, in today’s counter insurgency operations, quite rarely 
                                                
650 Sontag 2003, 85. 
651 For more regarding civilian deaths in Afghanistan at the time when the images discussed here were 
produced, see: Afghanistan Annual Report 2010: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflicts. ; On 
the Coalition causalities year by year see: ICasualties. Coalition military Fatalities by Year.  
652 For more on the figure of the Islamist terrorist, see: Said, 1997; Burke, 2001, 128. And the 
following chapter 6.  
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encountered face to face. On the other hand, the tendency to avoid showing 
the corporal opponent may well be because the advisory in today’s war is not 
dressed in uniform, meaning that the enemy could be practically anyone. Not 
picturing the enemy in a human figure therefore descriptively illustrates the 
paranoid reality of the war on terror on the ground.653 This paranoid spirit of 
today’s war is well visualized, for example, in the Academy Award-winning 
movie The Hurt Locker (2008, Kathryn Bigelow), which tells the story of a 
US army bomb squad unit working in Iraq.654 In recent wars opposition and 
the enemy have been very hard to visually spot, especially in warzones 
defined by insurgency and terrorism, such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria. 
The enemy fighters in Afghanistan were not an army in a traditional sense; 
the insurgents do not carry identification badges or uniforms, and thus in a 
visual sense they might resemble local “civilians”. A “Taliban fighter” could 
look like an Afghan civilian, as this is the logic of an insurgency war. Visually 
personifying the enemy in the strategic communication images could thus 
lead to a mixed situation, whereby the ISAF images picturing the cooperative 
Afghans receiving help, protection and developmental aid from the coalition 
forces would be hard to visually distinguish from the figure of the enemy. 
This visual absence of the aggressive opponent also relates to the 
presentation type that we have already discussed—the figure of the tame and 
grateful local help receiver. Leaving the enemy visually unaddressed thus 
suits the strategic communication endeavor, as the tame and grateful locals 
are a much more desirable object of help and motivators of the operation.   
Two quite opposite characters illustrated in a fairly similar visual figure, 
could and would be perplexing, and personifying the civilian-like enemy in a 
visual human form could thus be seen to visually tarnish most of the local 
peace-loving civilians as potential terrorists. 
Although the figure of the enemy, the opponent or the “terrorist” is not 
personified in the form of a human figure, the weapons the opposition use, as 
well as the mark that the insurgent attacks leave and the damage they cause, 
are from time to time visualized in the ISAF images. The most common way 
to depict the opposition of the enemy in the ISAF imagery is by picturing the 
weapons the coalition troops have confiscated or found on the enemy 
fighters.655 (See Illustration 5.5, images 27 & 28) The confiscated arms often 
presented in the images as pillage. When reading the images in an iconology 
frame, images presenting the arms can be seen to point to the potential 
danger and threat that the otherwise invisible enemy poses to civilian lives, 
                                                
653 See, for example, Zizek, 2002, 37. 
654 See: The Hurt Locker,2008, IMDb:  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0887912/ 
655 Illustration 5.5. Image 27, Caption: Afghan and coalition forces discovered home-made explosives 
during a search for a Taliban improvised explosive device facilitator in Zabul province, Dec. 12. 
Additionally, they found a weapons cache including chest racks, assault rifles, fragmentary grenades 
and rocket-propelled-grenade casings. The facilitator was detained along with two of his associates. 
(DoD photo)   http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5253831322/ 
Illustration 5.5.Image 28, Caption: Insurgent weapons, munitions and Improvised Explosive Device 
components recovered during the joint Special Operations Task Group/Afghan National Security 
Force operation against the insurgent stronghold in southern Afghanistan. Photo courtesy Australian 
Government Department of defence. http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/4077005599/ 
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as well as the coalition soldiers. Presenting the arms as pillage taken from 
their users also indicates that the arms and the potential threat they pose 
have been neutralized, taken care of and made harmless. The images 
depicting the confiscated armory of the enemy often portray “improvised 
explosive devices”, homemade bombs and weaponry that could be described 
as quite weary and shabby by appearance. The appearance of the arms and 
the technical capacity of the insurgent weapons, when compared to coalition 
arms, seem outdated, obsolete and weak, yet at the same time vicious. As the 
coalition arms pictured in the images underline capacity, modernity, 
cleanliness and preciseness, the arms of the enemy, judging by their visual 
appearance, do quite the opposite. The outdated arms visually point to the 
traditional and even backward ways of the opponent: his weak economical, 
structural and technical condition and skills, as well as the disorder and 
imprecise nature of insurgent warfare. Yet, concurrently these weapons also 
point to the disruptive force, vicious power and violent operating method of 
the advisory. The dirty-looking and improvised weapons are the ones used in 
the persistent and relentless opposition. They also point to the challenging 
task of rooting out insurgent activity in the area. 
Insurgents and enemy violence are sometimes, although quite rarely, also 
manifested in the images in bloodier, more concrete ways. Image 29 656 
shows a shoe in a puddle of blood after a suicide bomb attack. The caption 
explains that the attack claimed lives of “multinational personnel” and 
damaged nearby infrastructure. Occasionally, the suffering or even death of a 
member of the coalition personnel is also addressed in the images. However, 
the injured or dead bodies of coalition members/ISAF soldiers are never 
visible in the images. On the other hand, as discussed above, the imagery 
contains some graphic images that show corporal suffering in the bodies of 
the local people, although these too are relatively rare.  
When the power and deviation of the enemy is shown through pictures of 
corporal suffering, it is most often presented in images of hospitalized locals 
and namely injured children. In many of such images, the coalition personnel 
is portrayed in the figure of the humanitarian soldier.657 The soldiers are 
pictured as attending to or enabling the medical care of the wounded. And 
habitually the ISAF soldiers are depicted playing with the injured children, 
                                                
656 Illustration 5.5., Image 29, Caption: KABUL, Afghanistan: A shoe stands alone in a puddle of 
blood after a suicide bomb attack went off on Jan 17. A vehicle born improvised explosive devide 
(VBIED) exploded near the German Embassy and a US base. The VBIED killed and wounded 
multinational personnel and damaged vehicles and nearby buildings. ISAF Photo by US Air Force 
Tech Sergeant Brenda Nipper. http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/3203442818/ 
657 Illustration 5.5., Image 31, Caption: KAPISA PROVINCE, Afghanistan: Service members from Task 
Force La Fayette provide medical attention to a local Afghan who was injured during a rocket attack 
that killed and wounded Afghan civilians, in the Tag Ab market in Kapisa province, Afghanistan, 
yesterday. The victims were medically evacuated to several military hospitals. (Photo by French 
Army ADC Jean-Charles Thorel, Task Force La Fayette) Image 31: 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/4114227024/ 
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cheering them up and “trying to make their pain a little more bearable”.658 
(See Illustration 5.5 Image 3o & 31) The images of wounded locals suffering 
from insurgent-inflicted violence show the brutality of the enemy in the most 
powerful way: through visual records of bloody bodily pain. An image of a 
local male victim lying on the ground immediately after an insurgent rocket 
attack (Image 31) also names the coalition and Afghan service members as 
the helpers. Thus, this image also points to the help and relief offered by the 
coalition and its allies as a counterforce of insurgent violence. Picturing the 
victims of the destruction through images of bodily suffering within strategic 
communication effort, aim to point the severity of the situation for the 
spectators. But as the ISAF images only depicts the suffering the Afghan 
civilians, when the pain has been inflicted by the insurgents, and as the 
imagery concurrently presents the coalition and ally forces as the helpers, the 
imagery can thus be seen to address the viewers in a way that encourages 
continued participation in the operation. 
What is remarkable in the ISAF’s visual manner of describing the enemy 
is that, as the opponent is presented only through arms, firepower, violent 
deeds and the destruction he causes, the enemy becomes de-personalized, 
thus almost mythical and hard to grasp; invisible. The enemy is “the Taliban” 
or “the insurgents”, but the corporal human behind the monolithic enemy 
hides from the gaze of the spectators. Thus, the enemy is not shown in the 
figure of human, but the ISAF soldiers are. Remembering that terrorism and 
the 9/11 attacks conducted by extreme Islamists were the underlying reason 
for the war (as well as freeing the country from under the Taliban order and 
scattering the international terrorist groups and terrorist safe heavens in the 
area) it seems strange that there are no images of the terrorists in imagery 
targeted to assure the spectators and motivate the war. It is hard to say 
whether the invisibility of the enemy can be solely explained by the fact that 
the enemy in Afghanistan really was so invisible. The invisibility of the enemy 
might also be seen to point to the fact that opposing, destroying, 
“neutralizing”, killing and fighting something that is not visually shown in a 
human figure has often been seen as easier than seeing the opponent eye to 
eye. But not picturing the enemy in a human form may also be seen to point 
to the discourse of the protected coalition/Western soldier. 
                                                
658 Illustration 5.5., Image 31, Caption: KAPISA PROVINCE, Afghanistan: Service members from 
Task Force La Fayette provide medical attention to a local Afghan who was injured during a rocket 
attack that killed and wounded Afghan civilians, in the Tag Ab market in Kapisa province, 
Afghanistan, yesterday. The victims were medically evacuated to several military hospitals. (Photo 
by French Army ADC Jean-Charles Thorel, Task Force La Fayette) Image 31: 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/4114227024/ 
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5.4.2 THE INDIVIDUALS AND THE CROWDS 
The discourse of the protected coalition soldier is visually manifested in 
another blind spot of the imagery. Another, visually almost unaddressed 
topic within the ISAF images are the wounded or fallen coalition soldiers. 
Clear, visual corporal suffering of coalition personnel is totally absent from 
the images. There are, however, a few images in the material that picture the 
coffins of fallen coalition soldiers.659 (See Illustration 5.5, image 32) The ban 
of publishing images of US soldiers coffins (which was lifted in 2009) was 
discussed in the former chapter 4. Images picturing war casualties and 
returning caskets containing the dead bodies of fallen soldiers have been 
known to damage the war efforts and diminish public support for recent 
wars. Therefore, showing the coffins of fallen soldiers in the ISAF strategic 
communication images is certainly quite daring. Visually encountering the 
coffin, known to contain bodies of those who deceased in the war, points 
towards war inflicted pain and loss. Nonetheless, the casket is as close as the 
ISAF images get to addressing physical vulnerability and suffering on the 
part of coalition personnel. There are no images showing the bodies of 
wounded or deceased coalition soldiers in the imagery. This is not surprising 
since, as was also discussed in the chapter 4., presenting and publishing 
photographs of the wounded bodies of Western soldiers is widely seen in the 
West as banal, tasteless and brutal, as well as offensive to the rights and 
honor of the victims and as a violation of the personal integrity of the person 
in question.660  
This phenomenon is distinct in the ISAF strategic communication images. 
It is expectable, that audience does not want to see harsh images of Western 
bodily suffering; and for military strategic communication, surely dead 
bodies of their own boys/girls do not encourage support for the war. It is 
evident that death and the human cost of war seen in bloody images would 
reduce support for the operation. In addition to this, the bodies of dead 
soldiers do not fit the justification given to the Afghan operation, nor the 
rhetoric of the war, and its public image.661 The suffering and potential death 
of coalition soldiers is clearly a troublesome issue, which the coalition does 
not want to address in the images. But by not showing pain (or showing it 
very rarely and indirectly), danger and the potential for death, the images 
also come to imply, or perhaps even aim to indicate that the coalition soldiers 
are protected, safe from harm, inviolable and strong. However, what is 
                                                
659 Illustration 5.5 Image 32, Caption: HERAT, Afghanistan—Spanish Army soldiers load the remains 
of a soldier killed onto an aircraft headed for Spain, Nov. 10, 2008. The soldier died during a vehicle 
borne improvised explosive device attack near Shindand in western Afghanistan. The soldiers were 
performing an International Security Assistance Force mission at the time of their death. (ISAF Photo 
by U.S. Air Force Tech. Sgt. Laura K. Smith) 
Image 32: http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/3026818205/ 
Other images of the coalition coffins: http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/3181644214/; 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/3180806353/in/photostream/ 
660 See Chapter 4.3.2.  
661 See for example: Petley, 2003, 72; Zizek, 2003, 38–39. 
 
283
Humanitarian Soldiers, Colonialized Others and Invisible Enemies: Visual Strategic 
Communication Narratives of the Afghan War 
 284 
interesting—as was also discussed in the chapter 4—is that the rule of non 
visualized pain does not seem to apply to the bodies of the locals. Although 
the picturing of wounded locals is quite rare in the imagery, Afghans are 
occasionally presented in imagery of suffering and corporal pain. As ISAF 
images show local Afghans in the midst of the war and crisis and in corporal 
pain, the images can be seen to point to the potential threat and danger in the 
area. Thus, they offer justification for the operation. But on the contrary, 
showing coalition damage would point to the weakness and violability of the 
operation. This feature can be seen to point to the phenomena more broadly 
discussed in the former chapter 4: The implications of distance on our sense 
of solidarity and empathy, as well as the global, cultural and political 
differentiations of the honor and dignity of humans, and eventually the 
Western conditional stance on the universal human value, unveiled by 
representational practices of images of suffering.662  The fact that this very 
same visual positioning, which tends to hide the suffering of westerners and 
quite freely exhibit the suffering of the “global others” that was detected in 
the former chapter, can also be found in these military strategic 
communication images, further proves the significance of the phenomena 
and visualizes and reveals the Western stance and attitude towards globally 
and culturally divided humanity, human worth and the integrity of the 
human body.  
5.4.3 THE NARRATIVES OF UNSEEN AGGRESSION AND THE 
IDENTITY CRISIS OF TODAY’S SOLDIER 
As discussed, another blind spot in the images is the absence of coalition 
soldiers in combat situations. As described above, the ISAF soldiers are 
habitually pictured as carrying heavy weapons and they practice and handle 
arms. But what is remarkable is that the ISAF images never picture soldiers 
in “real combat” or in other potentially violent action. And there is no single 
image within the ISAF Flickr material analyzed in this study, that would 
point to a situation in which an ISAF soldier has caused human suffering. 
Violence and suffering caused by the coalition and its allies is painted by the 
pictures as non-existent, and the violence is solely devoted to the enemy 
forces. Thus the imagery gives a nonviolent, peaceful and humanitarian, yet 
strong (bodily inviolable), image of coalition action and presence, and locates 
violence solely into the enemy. This is, of course, understandable from the 
point of view of the strategic communication effort: there is no point in 
showing the brutality of war while simultaneously building support for the 
operation by promoting its humane spirit and noble aims. Showing 
aggression and violence among the images would be conflicting, 
contradictory and even damaging to the humane grand narrative created for 
the operation.  
                                                
662 See chapter 4.  
284
 285 
It is easy to understand while looking at the ISAF imagery—the messages 
it contains and the narratives it creates—that aggression or violence of 
coalition soldiers does not fit into the strategic communication narrative of 
ISAF. Nevertheless, Western audiences surely did hear and see the news in 
which the situation in Afghanistan was portrayed as relatively violent: people 
were killed, people got killed and firefights and insurgent attacks were a 
reality there for all the duration of the operation. Everybody surely also knew 
that in reality the ISAF troops were armed with real bullets, they took part in 
military missions, used fire power, and the operation caused human suffering 
and also civilian deaths.663 Absence of such imagery can be seen to hide a 
very evident side of the military operation, and thus to create a narrative gap 
between what is commonly know by the public and what is shown by the 
ISAF. In addition to this, the absence of such images also creates interesting 
arrangements, and reveals notable aspects of today’s war waged by the West 
and the international community. What kind of narratives does this visual 
denial of violence and aggression create? And where does the non-violent 
presentation of the Western war effort and action stem from, and what does 
it tell us? 
The unseen violence of the ISAF imagery can be seen to stem from larger 
discourses, political change and the cultural currents of recent years. Despite 
the overall media surroundings (fiction, movies, videogames, news, 
documentaries, etc.) being flooded with atrocious images, media images of 
wounded or dead Western soldiers and Western-afflicted pain in political 
conflict have become few in recent decades. The disappearance (or thinning 
out) of the suffering of Westerners and Western-afflicted violence in wars 
and conflicts is an evolution that has to do with the new type of warfare. 664 It 
can also be attributed to the tightening of media control by the Western 
militaries and the Western media inlet’s invocation of the criteria of “taste 
and decency”. There has also been talk of embellishing the images of war in 
recent times due to Western military restrictions on war photography—for 
example regarding the policy of embedding war journalists. This 
development was more broadly discussed in the chapters 2 and 4.  The 
relative absence of such imagery, added with the amplified visual military 
strategic communication, has arguably lead many Western spectators to feel, 
think or at least hope that the Western military presence, soldiers, war efforts 
and practices do not cause suffering or are in essence non-violent. When the 
brutality and violence of the coalition soldiers are very seldom seen, and as 
the political speech and justifications of war are humane and highlight the 
                                                
663 According to the UNAMA Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection of the Civilians in Armed 
Conflict (2010), the coalition and pro-government forces were responsible for 440 of the civilian deaths 
(16% of the total) recorded in Afghanistan in 2010. Anti-Government elements were responsible for 
75% of civilian deaths, and 9% were unaccounted for. See UNAMA: Afghanistan. Annual Report on 
Protection of the Civilians in Armed Conflict (2010).  
664 By this I mean the humanitarization of war, the concepts  such as the “war on terror”, war fought by 
the international community and in the name of human rights, the intermingling of humanitarian 
aid and war, the concepts of precise, “surgical war” and “war without causalities”. 
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protection of civilians and human rights, thus it has been tempting and easy 
to think and hope that Western violence does not exist. 
Paradoxically, this phenomenon can be perceived through recent 
sightings of atrocious war images: “escaped” pictures of extreme violence 
revealing the brutality of Western/international coalition military personnel. 
Although the military governance over images of war and imago/image 
control is tight and the cultural conventions and media practices shun violent 
images, images revealing and exposing brutality, inhumane practices and 
human suffering inflicted by the coalition soldiers have from time to time 
surfaced in the media and gathered significant notice in the West. Such 
examples from recent wars include the Abu Ghraib torture pictures (2003), 
the documentary Armadillo showing Danish soldiers killing unarmed men 
(2010), the “Kill Team” images published by Der Spiegel (2011), and the 
instance of American Marines urinating on the dead Taliban fighters (2011) 
mentioned above.665 These instances are examples of “escaped” visual 
information conflicting with the official story of today’s war waged by the 
West and the international coalition. These kinds of sightings of images have, 
in the age of “war on terror”, caused several media spectacles, vivid societal 
discussion—and a lot of anger and disillusionment. The revelatory sensations 
of atrocious images that have leaked from the theaters of recent wars have all 
caused the Western world to ask “is this really what we are doing”, “how can 
this still happen” and “are we involved in something like this”? These 
sensations tell of the politically constructed ideas and beliefs of the Western 
spectators, as they enlighten what Western spectators have been told about 
the wars, by the politicians and the military. The sensations caused by 
revelatory violent imagery reveal what the public is made to believe by 
contemporary war rhetoric. But the sensations also enlighten how the 
Western spectators want to believe that the contemporary wars waged by the 
West do not cause suffering and their practices do not include cruelty, killing, 
torture or pain.666 Even when we constantly hear in the news that people 
(civilians, soldiers and insurgents) are been killed and wounded in the course 
of war, the dominant discourse of the Western war on terror and the war 
fought by the international community is painted to be painless, somewhat 
humane, precise and clean. This makes the spectatorship of war easier to 
bare for the Western spectator.  
This is precisely what the strategic communication imagery of the 
coalition war effort— and the ISAF Flickr images—are built to do. The images 
are meant to give—from the military operation’s point of view—a desirable 
image of the operation. They are designed to influence the audiences of the 
coalition countries, so that they see the operation in a desirable light. The 
spectators are reassured that pain and brutality are not a part of the topical 
war. In addition, the official imagery is designed to fight the conflicting 
revelatory visual information and to make it look exceptional. Thus, it seems 
                                                
665 Mentioned earlier in this chapter.  
666 Sontag, 2004; Butler 2009, 62–100. see also Dauphinee, 2007, 139–155. 
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that often the exposures of brutal images of war, with regards to Western 
military conduct, are thought and framed as abnormities and as exceptions 
from the norm of humane war. The brutality of war expressed by these 
revelatory images is thought of as deviations from the normal humane 
conduct and guidelines of war waged in the name of humanity. Thus, the 
atrocities are blamed on the brutal individuals and are regarded as acts of 
disturbed persons, as acts not belonging to the logic and nature of the topical 
Western wars.667 Killing, brutality and the violent madness of war have 
become something that does not to fit in to the frames of today’s war fought 
by the international community.  
When decoding the non-violent nature of the ISAF operation painted by 
the visual representations, we have to go back to the figure of the 
humanitarian soldier. When compared with historical photographs that have 
been used to visualize and report war668, the humanitarian soldier-figure 
circulating in ISAF pictures clearly breaks the accustomed visual norm of a 
traditional soldier. Unlike the ISAF soldier, traditionally soldiers pictured in 
war imagery have habitually been pictured not only wounded, shocked, 
devastated, disfigured but also as fighting. Traditionally soldiers have been 
expected to fight, to participate in downright military action, and use the 
weapons they carry. Furthermore, soldiers have been commonly expected to 
encounter opposition and, to put it bluntly, act like a warriors.669 But as we 
have seen looking at the ISAF Flickr imagery, ISAF soldiers are not foremost 
presented as fighters; although they have the firepower, they do not exercise 
or release their capacity. The role of the humanitarian soldier seems to be 
preventing the soldier figures of the ISAF strategic communication images 
from acting like traditional warriors. Thus ISAF soldiers are muscular and 
armed figures that look like soldiers but unlike their historical counterparts 
they are expected to patch things up, be nurturing and humane, rather than 
to fight, destroy or kill. 
 When the traditional role of soldiers as active and often violent fighters 
are compared to the humane depiction of the ISAF operation and the 
violence painted invisible by the ISAF images, highly contradictory roles for 
the soldier of today are constructed. Cynthia Weber writes about this 
“identity crisis of the soldier” in her book Imagining America at war. She 
describes how American soldiers, taking part in the Bosnia operation (in the 
early stage of the humanitarian war) in the 1990s, felt frustrated and even 
ashamed due to their new role. The soldiers felt that the mission in Bosnia 
was not a “real mission” and the war was not a “real war”. There was not 
enough action, too much waiting around and, furthermore, the enemy was 
not usually visible or even precisely defined.670  
                                                
667 See, Sontag, 2004. 
668 See for instance chapter 2.  
669 Weber, 2006, 57–61; See also Jantunen & Kotilainen, 2014.  
670 Weber, 2006, 57–61. 
287
Humanitarian Soldiers, Colonialized Others and Invisible Enemies: Visual Strategic 
Communication Narratives of the Afghan War 
 288 
This crisis of the contemporary soldiership is likewise visible in the ISAF 
imagery. The same phenomena is also articulated, for example, in the 2010 
Danish documentary Armadillo, which illuminates the Afghan war from the 
point of view of western ISAF soldiers. This documentary follows the life of 
Danish ISAF soldiers serving in Afghanistan. The soldiers serving in 
Helmand province are craving participation in the “real action”, instead of 
just patrolling, talking to the locals and waiting around at the base camp. The 
soldiers clearly state that they want action – firefights and real war, as well 
as extreme experiences that one cannot have in a normal life living in a 
secure Nordic state.671 Handing out stuffed animals or sweets to children, 
chatting with the locals, drinking tea, securing, patrolling and acting as 
armed humanitarians does not seem to be what Western soldiers expect from 
their war experience. Warfare has changed, and the everyday tasks and status 
of the soldier has altered. Along with this transformation, the identity of the 
soldier seems to have been somewhat lost. The humanitarian soldier figure 
seems to point to the identity crisis being endured by Western soldiers. This 
crisis has originated due to the topical frames and justifications of war, as 
well as the changed spirit and new conduct of today’s warfare. On one hand, 
soldiers are expected to be strong and tough, do their job and overcome their 
enemy, but on the other, they have to be presented (from the point of view of 
military strategic communication and the justifications of the operation) as 
humane and in a strictly non-violent visual form.672  
In addition, the transformation of the soldier figure also tells a powerful 
story to the audiences of the pictures and domestic followers of the war 
effort. The portrayal of the soldiers as humanitarian helpers, as friendly, 
unintimidating and non-violent figures, leads the audience to think and feel 
that the reality of the war is non-violent, and thus palatable, and morally 
unquestionable. Therefore, the reception of the Armadillo documentary in 
Denmark—as well as in Finland673 —tells a revealing story of the clash of the 
traditional soldier and the (at least to some extent strategic communication-
built) new expectations that the larger populations have, especially in 
European countries, about humane spirit and the conduct of war. The North 
European audiences of Armadillo were shocked, disturbed and surprised 
about the violent nature and rough operational mode of the Danish soldiers 
revealed by the film. Pictures of Danes shooting people to death (and 
laughing while doing it), participating in firefights and getting hit by real 
bullets firmly opened the eyes of the audience in the Nordic countries. The 
European audience had not, it seems, pictured the Afghan war looking like 
this. Lively discussions on the desirability of participation in such an 
                                                
671 Armadillo, 2010: http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1640680/ ;  
672 For more on the crisis of the 21st century soldiership, see:  Jantunen&Kotilainen, 2014.  
673 For more on the Finnish reception of the film Armadillo, see: Kotilainen, Noora: 
Tyttökoulumiina, erillissotateesi ja vientidemokratian rajat. The blog of The Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs.; Kotilainen, Noora: Afganistanin sodan Pojan kasvot, Ulkopolitiikka, 
4/2010. 
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operation surged in Denmark after the launch of the film.674  As soldiers are 
trained to fight, use their arms and take part in military action; however it 
seems that the frames of justifications and the presentation of today’s war 
have created a situation in which the ISAF soldiers were not expected—
namely by the by the domestic audiences—to release their violent potential. 
The invisibility of battle and aggression, and the tendency of leaving 
physical military activity, violence and fighting visually unaddressed 
throughout the ISAF imagery, seems to point to the coalition ‘brute force 
impotence’. The inhibition of releasing the ultimate physical military power, 
visualized by the unseen aspects war of the ISAF imagery, can be seen as 
troublesome also for the carrying out of the ISAF operation itself. The ability 
and power to use force is there but the humane spirit, the justifications of the 
operation and expectations bestowed on the ISAF operation prevent and 
inhibit the use of power. By not showing the ISAF personnel fighting or 
actively ‘releasing his/her fire power’, and thanks to the vast number of 
images picturing the soldiers in humanitarian action and spirit, the ISAF 
images create a narrative whereby the coalition soldier is not first and 
foremost seen as a fighter, and the operation not as a violent war. But as the 
imagery concurrently associates violence and pain solely with the enemy, the 
imagery of the ISAF revealingly visualizes the Western frames of 
representing and apprehending contemporary wars and military 
engagements.  
5.5 CONCLUSIONS: THE MILITARY FRAMES OF 
REPRESENTING CONTEMPORARY WESTERN WAR 
The ISAF strategic communication imagery on Flickr, addressed in this 
chapter visually sketches a manifold depiction of the operation in 
Afghanistan at a critical time (namely during 2008-2011) of the operation. 
The images produced and presented by the ISAF describe the operation 
according to its official objectives and present the coalition presence and 
work in the area in a positive, humane light. Thus, the ISAF Flickr images 
can be viewed as the official imagery of the operation and the 
Western/international coalition waged war. The images work in order to win 
over the hearts and minds of the intended audiences according to the 
paradigms and spirit of the time. War is a serious business: it takes lives and 
it takes morals, will and money. In order to persuade the then-contemporary 
Western publics to see the operation as meaningful and to persuade the 
audience to be willing to take part in the long-dragged out, costly and morally 
heavy military operation, serious justifications were needed. To address the 
audience in adequate ways, the strategic stories needed to be drawn 
                                                
674 On the societal discussion the documentary aroused in Denmark; see: Armadillo: The 
Afghanistan war documentary that shocked Denmark, The Guardian, June 3, 2010; 
Tappakaa ne kaikki, Voima, 8/2010. 
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according to the predominant acceptable frames, mindsets, values 
predominant in Western international politics, as well as the aspirations of 
the perceivers—and therefore they tell about the audience—and moreover 
they unveil how the audience wants to perceive itself. The visual stories and 
narratives of the strategic communication had to be drawn according to the 
to the essence, roles, features and character in which the intended audiences 
want to see and perceive themselves as participants in a war, as members of 
the international community and as inhabitants of this global world.  And, on 
the other hand, by not addressing some things, the imagery also tell a story of 
what the target audience does not want to identify itself with.  
Narratives of the justifications and objectives of the war, designed to 
influence public opinion are not constructed out of thin air. They are 
expressions of widely shared thinking which is constructed and molded by 
the predominant world order, global power politics and the dominant 
military machine. Thus, the images reveal the aspirations, worldviews, values 
and identity of the audience, but moreover unveil aspects of the 
humanitarian political identity of the West. Thus the imagery of ISAF reveals 
and visualizes some of the central paradigms of the world politics of recent 
years; they tell about the structures, trends and currents of topical global 
politics, international relations paradigms and the evolution of war and 
military concepts. Novelties such as “War on Terror”, “Pre-emptive warfare” 
and “Humanitarian war”, as well as concepts prominent in today’s world 
politics such as military-humanitarian interventions, have also left their 
mark on these visual representations of war of the 2010s. Concurrently the 
addressing of the images also reveals the topical route to catharsis offered by 
the images. At this staging at the humanitarian tragedy theater the suffering 
and distress of the Afghan people is suggested to be relived, the security of 
the surrounding world ensured and the humane order to be maintained by 
the multinational military operation; thus the route to catharsis offered to 
the (Western) spectator is supporting the operation, and (democratic) 
consenting to the continuation of it.  
The figure of the humanitarian ISAF soldier most prominent and 
apparent in the imagery illustrates the current warfare, its justifications, the 
topical world order and the humanitarian paradigm widely used in the recent 
global governance efforts of the Western powers and the international 
coalition. The gentle figure of the humanitarian soldier can be seen as a 
corporal manifestation and a symbol of the healing hand of the international 
community at work on a practical level in today’s global crisis zones, failed 
states and the developing world. The figure describes and makes visible the 
international humanitarian order prominent in the contemporary (Western 
lead) world politics and global order. The humane and helpful, non-violent 
humanitarian soldier figures seem a-political and veils the operation in an 
altruistic and non-violent guise. With the help of the visual humanitarian 
soldier figure, the operation appears to be a humanitarian aid, development 
and reconstruction project conducted by the strong and responsible 
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international community, in order to benefit the local people of the war-
stricken area. The narrative of the strong but humanitarian and helpful, a-
political international community helping the weak Afghans is aimed at 
addressing the intended audiences to see the operation in a positive light. 
The figure helps to present the international coalitions attendance in the 
area, drawn according to the contemporary humane and human rights-
driven zeitgeist pivotal in Western international politics and the public life of 
the Western sphere. 
However, the images also bring into sight narratives beyond the official 
justifications and intended strategic narratives. When looked at more closely, 
the imagery also contains unintended content that gives away subliminal 
ways of apprehending and perceiving the world, and therefore sheds light on 
the Western ways of seeing ourselves and the Others of this global world. 
Thus, the ISAF imagery also produces a flip side to the image of the strong, 
humanitarian and civilized ISAF soldier figure. The visual presentation of the 
operation—handled by the strong, modern, humane and mostly Western 
coalition troops juxtaposed with picturing the local actors and populations—
illustrates many meaningful narratives. The visual disposition and the 
messages embedded in the images present the ISAF troops, almost without 
exception, in a dominating and stronger status compared with the local 
actors. Showing the locals as weaker and less developed, and in a subordinate 
position, but as the happy, cooperating and content subjects of the 
international coalition’s help, coerces the audience into supporting what 
seems to be an eminently needed mission. This works to justify the ISAF 
operation as a development and modernization project aimed at helping the 
unanimously willing, welcoming and grateful Afghan people. The 
representational mode of the ISAF Flickr images also present the operation 
as a precondition to development, and thus presents the war as a necessary 
requirement for bettering the lives of the local people in distress. Picturing 
the operation as a development and modernization project can also be seen 
to de-politicize the military operation, and to guise the power political aims 
of the operation in an easily supportable and humane costume. 
Such picturing also creates other meaningful juxtapositions between the 
coalition actors, representing the international coalition, and the local 
Afghans in the images. The Afghans represent the populations of the 
developing world, the failed states, Islamic societies and the weakened others 
of the global world governed by the West and the international community. 
When picturing the Western actors as the strong, civilizing, dominating and 
humane builders of Afghan society, the images place the local Afghans as the 
“others” —the weak, underdeveloped and child-like. Thus the images create 
the two main characters of the humanitarian story: the humanitarian helper 
and the weak helped, the full-fledged humans and the weakened subhumans 
reduced in their humanity. Recurrently placing the coalition troops and the 
Western way of life above the locals creates a strong position of Western 
coalition predominance over the traditional way of life, and constitutes 
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narratives of the underdeveloped and weak others. In these narratives, 
constructed by the images, the differences in visual appearance, clothing and 
material culture are noteworthy. 
What comes out of this arrangement of visual representation is a strong 
tendency of imposing Western or modern ideals, value systems and cultural 
practices on the Afghans as the others. This kind of visual picturing 
resembles the age-old Orientalizing and colonial picturing of the culturally 
different other; and thus modernization, development and civilizing the 
others reflected in the images can be seen to be violent, compelling and 
colonializing practices. This is very visible, for instance, in the visual 
descriptions of emancipated Afghan women. The images of emancipated 
Afghan women place the modern, Western-style freed woman as the norm of 
gender equality and shows Afghan women, unveiled by the coalition 
modernization effort, as a justifying and legitimizing instrument for the 
military operation.  
Moreover, as some topics and matters are extensively and in signifying 
ways addressed in the imagery, concurrently other issues are left 
unaddressed, covered indirectly or not noted/visualized at all. The topics and 
sides of the operation left unaddressed also constitute signifying narratives, 
as they communicate and draw visible the representational frames of today’s 
war being waged by the international community. Matters framed out of the 
imagery guide the viewers to focus, imagine and to ignore, and thus they 
construct the frames of representability through which the war and the ISAF 
operation is understood. The figure of the enemy explicitly pictured is non-
existent in the imagery. But the depersonalized opponent and the viciousness 
of the enemy are presented through images of his brutal arms, violated local 
bodies and the destroyed material culture left in his wake. At the same time, 
the conduct and actions of the ISAF soldiers are pictured in a completely 
nonviolent way; and ISAF soldiers are never seen participating in combat, 
causing destruction or suffering, nor are the soldiers themselves ever 
pictured in pain. The division of picturing pain and vulnerability in images of 
corporal pain also separates the Western individuals and the bodies of the 
locals into differing stratums of humanity: as the suffering of ISAF bodies is 
non-representable due to the honor of the full-pledged individual, as on the 
other hand the suffering body of an Afghan can be visually shown in order to 
illustrate the war and the violence of the insurgent adversary. 
As coalition aggression is never visually shown, the spirit, identity and 
status of the soldiers also begin to resemble that of the non-violent 
humanitarian. When juxtaposed with the images of the destruction and the 
pain that the enemy causes, the whole ISAF operation is subsequently 
painted as a non-violent and humane action. The physical pain, customary 
violent conduct war and aggression are removed from ISAF’s conduct, and 
placed solely on the enemy other. The ISAF images also illustrate how the 
wars waged by the West and the international community can be shown, 
articulated and justified in today’s political surroundings. The images quite 
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firmly reflect the official justifications and the political marketing speech of 
the operation, and are very much drawn according to the lines of the 
prevailing Western common sense of good and bad, decent and indecent, 
honorable and dishonorable within the Western international politics. By not 
addressing some points of war, the images also paint a picture of what the 
brave new war does not include; just as the images are used to humanitarize 
war, they are also used to demonize it. Thus, the images also produce two 
conflicting sides: the civilized non-violent international community and the 
brutal and violent, local insurgent, which approaches the figure of the evil, 
inhuman. As the inhuman is taken out of the self by not addressing some 
themes, it is subsumed into the other—the insurgent. 
When looking at the extensive ISAF imagery and the narratives it 
produces, one cannot help but wonder if the eventually quite black and white, 
emotionally, culturally and politically- driven juxtaposition of good and evil 
suffices to convince the intended audiences of the humanitarian, non-violent, 
kind and clean coalition war? Does the humanitarization narrative of 
contemporary war have the power to persuade the audience? Is it believable 
enough? Does the absolute invisibility of coalition-caused pain and 
aggression, and the presentation of the coalition soldiers as next to 
inviolable, cause a narrative gap when compared with the concurrent 
everyday news of fallen ISAF soldiers and civilian casualties? Can the ISAF 
visual narrative of humane, clean, hi-tech war without mistakes, pain and 
suffering, be producing disillusionment when reflected against the reality on 
the ground and the news mediated from the war theater? 
Undeniably, war has always been—and is still today—a grievous business 
that takes lives, destroys, and causes pain and terror. Softening it up with up-
to-date explanations and humane images does not abolish the deviance 
embedded in the phenomena. Thus, what is to be borne in mind when 
looking at the images of today’s war is that there has never been a war that 
was not reasoned as a just and a necessary war; it is only the justifying 
narratives and the legitimizing components that vary according to time. 
What is remarkable in these images that tell the story of the Western waged 
war of the recent years is that they draw the topical narratives used in current 
military strategic communication out into open, and visibly shed light on the 
frames of seeing and presenting war in today’s public eye. By looking at and 
analyzing the images, it is possible to learn what kind of authorization and 
legitimization has been recently needed and used for war in order to win over 
the hearts and minds of mostly Western audiences. By iconologically and 
contextually reading the images—their addressing, framings, themes, 
stories—the narratives recently used to politically mobilize, calm down and 
convince the Western spectators can be detected and learned about.  
The images also communicate some of the common Western ways of 
perceiving ourselves and the others of this global world. In other words, the 
images of war that are designed to address the Western spectators, speak 
more about the evolution of Western values, mindsets and the current 
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political paradigms essential within the topical world order, than they talk 
about the situation in Afghanistan or the changes in wars waged by the West.  
By looking at the images depicting the Afghan operation mandated by the 
UN–and fought by the international coalition and led by NATO—we can 
potentially learn about the predominant Western ways of perceiving the 
world, we might learn about the ideologies and political constructions that 
shape Western views and influence thinking on deep and sometimes 
unconscious levels. However, I am afraid that we do not learn much about 
the reality of the operation, the situation on the ground at the time, the war 
experiences of the local people, or the still ongoing humanitarian distress in 
Afghanistan. 
 
********************************************* 
The ISAF operation was completed in the end of 2014, and the responsibility 
of the security of the area was handed out to the local forces. A new NATO-
led mission Resolute Support mission (RSM) was launched from the start of 
the 2015. In 2015 still some 12 000 personnel members of the NATO and 
partnering nations remain in the area. Their tasks are to provide further 
training, advice and assistance to the local Afghan security institutions. 
Despite of 13 years of Western led war on terror in Afghanistan, the Taliban 
still rules some areas, and the situation remains highly contested after nearly 
40 years of conflict in the country. After the thinning out and especially after 
the end of the ISAF mission, the eyes of the surrounding world have turned 
away from Afghanistan, and concentrated into hotter topical war zones and 
crisis areas of Ukraine and namely Syria, and the cruel terror of ISIS. The 
question what will happen in Afghanistan when the remaining troops are 
withdrawn and the attention of the world is concentrated on more topical 
(and for the West strategically at the time more important) crisis, remains 
unanswered.  
The ISAF strategic communication imagery forms a distinctive act at the 
visual theater of humanity. ISAF images contain visual themes that perhaps 
are quite uncustomary for war imageries, especially when reflected against 
historically prevalent modes of representing war. Nevertheless, the ISAF 
imagery illustrates how contemporary war is topically presented in 
humanitarian light in order to effect the public perceptions of war, and by 
doing so these images illustratively point out the narrative frames and visual 
arrangements seen appropriate by authorities to describe contemporary 
Western war. They show what is framed in, as well as out of the 
humanitarian war practices and the concept of the Western waged war, when 
presented for Western spectators. The ISAF images mostly concentrate on 
depicting the human and the subhuman figures of the humanitarian story on 
many levels and contexts. But leaves the evil others visually undetermined, 
not pictured and unseen. In turn, in the following chapter 6 Picturing the 
inhuman evil enemies—the dark side of the humanitarian narrative, this 
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third antagonist figure elemental for the humanitarian (visual) story then 
becomes to play the lead role at the stage of the visual humanitarian theater.  
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6 PICTURING THE INHUMAN EVIL ENEMIES 
– THE DARK SIDE OF THE WESTERN 
HUMANITARIAN NARRATIVE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION: PICTURING THE EVIL—
PICTURING THE VIRTOUS 
Humanitarian imagery—also in the context of the contemporary 
humanitarian world politics—typically portrays helpless, innocent and feeble 
victims of atrocity, war and catastrophe.  And, on the other hand, the brave, 
powerful and humane (usually Western) characters set to protect and save 
the sufferers. These two central characters of the humanitarian story—the 
weak and infant like subhumans, objects of humanitarian help and 
interventions, and the most often Western, full fledged heroic humans—are 
familiar from the visual representations of humanitarian organizations, the 
(news)media, as well as more directly political representations depicting 
wars and upheavals. These figures have also been essentially in view in the 
previous chapters of this work.  
But, in addition to these two main characters, also a third figure is 
essential for the humanitarian story:  the evil inhuman, afflicting suffering 
and causing chaos.675 The evil has been implicitly present in humanitarian 
visual representations throughout history, but as we have seen in the 
previous chapters of this work, the third evil character in humanitarian 
contexts is typically portrayed through distress and bodily suffering of its 
victims. Yet sometimes also the evil takes a corporal human form. Visual 
representations of the antagonist other have been central in political 
contexts, especially in times of conflict, throughout history. In modern 
Western history (visual) orientalist representations of foreign Eastern 
barbarians, propagandist representations of immoral and racially inferior 
Jews, as well as greedy and bloodthirsty capitalists, and on the other hand 
ungodly and violent Bolsheviks, not to mention iconized demonic leader 
figures such as Hitler or Stalin, serve as examples of enemy images known by 
all in the Western sphere. Distinctive visual features, underlining the 
difference between us (the good) and the evil others are salient in building up 
of the enemy figures.   The enemy other—essentially different from us—is 
constituent for identity formation, a sense of cohesion of the self. In extreme 
situations the enemy takes a form of the evil enemy, whom is ultimately 
different from us. The binary division of the enemy other and the in-group 
us, divides the world into starkly contradictory poles, and forms politics into 
a morality play of the virtuous good forces against the ultimate evil. In the 
                                                
675 As was discussed in chapters 2 and 3.  Douzinas, 2007, 66-78; see also Malkki,1996 ; Butler, 
2009, 63-100.  
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extreme case the evil represents everything we are not—something we must 
fight and destroy for the good to prevail. Thus, in times of conflict the figure 
of the enemy is substantial in rationalizing and legitimating confrontations, 
violent politics and wars.676  
The third evil character is also essential for the functionality of the 
humanitarian narrative: in order there to be (political) humanitarianism, 
there must also be crisis, suffering—and the guilty inhuman party inflicting 
the calamities. Opposing the evil is a central rationalization of 
humanitarianly rationalized (military) operations and interventions. As 
representations of the enemy are essential for humanitarian visual 
communication—yet rarely addressed in the context of humanitarian 
imagery—I shall in this chapter analyze how have the recent evil others 
opposed to our good have been presented, pictured, described and 
manifested within contemporary Western politics/political speech and media 
publicity. And, thus I shall also furthermore open up how the evil has been 
dealt with within the Western international politics during the recent years.  
Within the recent Western international politics the role of the enemy has 
been typically granted to non-Western authoritarian leaders of foreign, 
conflict prone and chaotic crisis areas, as well as to modern global terrorist 
figures. The topical Western enemy has most commonly been presented in 
the figure of a corrupt foreign leader unbinding to the international (human 
rights) norms, causing human suffering and distress by oppressing local 
citizens and threatening the international order. In the West such enemy 
figures have been typically presented as posing a threat to the Western 
humane political aspirations, ‘Western values’, Western way of life, as well as 
global security, stability and humane norms held sacred of the ‘international 
community’. In the recent decades and years—within the frame of Western 
world politics and political imagery—the leading most-wanted anti-hero evil 
advisories have been among others the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, head of 
the international terrorist organization Al Qaeda Osama bin-Laden and 
colonel Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. Much circulated and popular visual 
spectacles of the contemporary enemies of the West—and of humanity at 
large—imposingly bring the third key figure—the evil—at the stage of the 
humanitarian theater.  
In this chapter I shall trace the popular visual as well as textual 
representations presenting and describing the contemporary Western 
enemies—Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi and Osama bin Laden—
within Western publicity.  Furthermore, I shall take into account the Western 
international political rhetoric and statements concerning these evil 
                                                
676 On binary representations of us and them, enemy images, as well as of (political) evil, see:  Harle, 
Vilho: An Enemy with Thousand Faces. The Tradition of the Other in Western Political Thought and 
History, Praeger, Westport, 2000; Harle,Vilho: Hyvä, Paha, Ystävä, Vihollinen. Rauhan- ja 
konfliktin tutkimuslaitos, tutkimuksia 44, Rauhankirjallisuuden edistämisseura, Helsinki, 1991; Hall, 
Stuart: The Spectacle of The ‘Other’. In Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying 
Practises.Hall, Stuart (Ed.), Sage, London, 1997. Bernstein, Richard: Radical Evil. A philosophical 
interrogation. Polity, 2002. Burke,2001; Said, Edward: Orientalism. Penguin classics, London, 2003 
(1978); Vuorinen, Marja&Kotilainen, Noora: Introduction, in Binaries in Battle, 2014.  
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characters during the recent decades and years. My interest here is not on 
commenting on the evil and inhuman deeds of these infamous political 
leaders, nor do I aim at taking a moral stand in regards to their actions, let 
alone wish to act as the “devil’s advocate”. What I shall do is to map out and 
analyze contextually and with the iconology frame the visual (as well as 
rhetoric) construction, substance and presentation practices of these evil 
figureheads: and to thus to draw out into open the contemporary Western 
visual enemy narratives. Therefore, I shall firstly sketch out into open how 
the enemy narratives of Osama bin-Laden, Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam 
Hussein have been constructed within the Western politics and media over 
the years. By mapping out the historical construction of the enemy figures 
the nature of these representations as narratives tied to prevalent political 
fluctuations and the political appropriateness and functionality of the enemy 
figures become visible. Moreover, similar patterns by which the enemies of 
the West have been constructed can be detected, and shared (visual) features 
and characteristics of all of the three antagonists narratives emerge. After 
mapping out each of the visual enemy narratives and their historical 
formation, I shall briefly introduce what is meant by evil in modern Western 
political thought and reflect the character of contemporary evil enemies 
against this backdrop. After this, the punishment and degradation narratives 
of Saddam Hussein, Osama bin-Laden and Muammar Gaddafi are analyzed 
in the context of the (visual) politics of the contemporary Western 
humanitarian politics. By analyzing and unveiling the visual features and 
patterns of assembly of these spectacles a more profound comprehension of 
the ethos of Western humanitarianly framed politics during recent decades 
and years shall be traced.  
Therefore, consequently, as this chapter deals with the third key figure 
acting on the stage of the contemporary humanitarian theater—the inhuman 
evil—it also concurrently deals with the opposite of the inhuman evil; the 
humane good Western self. Thus, in addition to mapping out the features of 
representing the contemporary evil in Western political imagination, I seek 
to drill into the core of the topical ethos of Western humanitarian world 
politics, and the contemporary Western political identity, which are built 
upon the notion of the Western self as essentially good, moral, global 
humanitarian savior. Thus, I claim that—despite of their exceptionally grim 
and bloody nature—the spectacular visual enemy and punishment narratives 
of the infamous foreign leaders address their viewers according to the 
ideological Western humanitarian frame, and therefore revealingly visualize 
the ethos and moral character of contemporary Western international 
politics infused by humanitarian ethos. Thus, in addition to unveiling the 
features and qualities in which the evil is contemporarily pictured within the 
Western frame, these representations tell a profound story of the presenters 
and spectators of the representations, as well as of the political environment 
that has shaped them.  
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6.2 THE POLITICAL VISUAL SPECTACLES OF THE 
CONTEMPORARY WESTERN ENEMIES  
History is abundant with well-known (visual) representations of political 
enemies. Historical enemy images are often easily detected as simplifying 
caricatures, political and cultural in their nature. Enemy images often draw 
from visually distinctive stereotypes, and every so often also contain 
propagandist contents or are at least forcefully biased.677 We can quite easily 
distinguish black-and-white historical enemy images as purpose-oriented 
representations, built on political premises in order to further political goals.  
Such examples are familiar especially from times of conflict and war: The 
Third Reich offensive images of dirty, greedy and immoral Jews from the 
1930s and 40s or the belligerent representations of Eastern barbarians from 
colonial times. Moreover, political leaders of rivalry regimes—most famously 
figures such as Adolf Hitler or Josif Stalin—have served as key characters 
that embody and methonymize the absolutely evil nature of their political 
project. As we often comprehend, historical representations of the evil 
advisories typically tell more about their disseminators and the political 
systems and the zeitgeist that have given birth to them, than of the objects 
pictured and described.  But, stereotypical enemy images are not a 
phenomenon of the past, but surround us on daily bases.678 However, topical 
political enemy imageries often are not so easily detected, analyzed and 
critically examined. Although contemporary spectators habitually encounter 
manifold descriptions of the contemporary antagonist of Western politics—
forcefully othered from ‘us’ often by measures quite familiar from the past—
yet such contemporary representations are relatively rarely reflected against 
their historical predecessors. The political and cultural messages embedded 
in them are not often keenly critically assessed, their totalizing nature nor 
their political foundations and present day political utilization is not 
normally deconstructed or their totalizing nature clearly pointed out. 
Like earlier in history, also today’s (international) politics often revolve 
around conflicts, divisions, exclusions and inclusions that are commonly 
manifested by binary representations. As human rights and an overall 
humane ethos have during the recent decades become to forcefully determine 
Western politics and way of life, visually striking imagery describing evil 
enemies of the contemporary humane international order have extensively 
circulated in the Western political publicity and featured in media 
presentations. And just like in the past, also today the threat to security, 
civilization and humanity—our way of life—has often taken a visual human 
form. During the past decades the well-known and influential visual figures 
of Muammar Gaddafi, Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein have all in 
                                                
677 Hall, Stuart: The Spectacle of The ‘Other’. In Representation: Cultural Representations 
and Signifying Practices, 1997; Burke, 2001 123-135.  
678 Ibid.  
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their own turns served as the contemporary embodiments of the external evil 
opposed to the Western good.  
Since the creation, circulation and construction of the figures of Saddam 
Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi and Osama bin-Laden have been at least 
twofold—downright political as well as widely popularized and circulated by 
the mainstream media—also my analytical take on the contemporary enemy 
narratives is twofold.   I shall firstly trace both the Western political rhetoric 
describing these antagonists, and secondly track the influential; much 
circulated and reiterated visual media representations presenting the 
infamous enemies of the West and humanity. In outlining the rhetorical and 
visual historical formation of the enemies I shall pay attention to stages of 
heightened conflict between the Western powers and the antagonists (states) 
of the West. The visual form of the enemies is traced through front-page 
illustrations and other much used and circulated visual material describing 
the political opponents. I see that, by frequent media use, circulation, as well 
as high standing and political references popular visual descriptions of the 
Western enemies have formed into thick images that are not only iconic, but 
serve as representations that multimodally describe their objects, as well as 
encapsulate and reveal ideological positioning, political perceptions and 
objectives of their era and presenter, as well as spectators.  
Key thick images that have been widely used in picturing the enemy 
figures are compiled into collage illustrations. These illustrations (Gaddafi 
6.1, 6.2&6.3, Hussein 6.4, 6.5&6.6 and bin Laden 6.7 679) describe the 
different phases of the visual enmity construction, and also aim at giving an 
outline of the visual features in which the enemies have been presented, and 
treated in the Western media. These illustrations consist of the key images by 
which the 1.) threat and the power, 2.) the hunt and incarceration, 3.) 
punishment and alleviation (killing) of the enemies have been described and 
represented in the popular Western media representations. Firstly the 
illustrations display images of these Western enemies when they were firstly 
introduced to the Western audiences, as well as include images of the 
antagonist leaders at the height of their power.  Secondly the illustrations 
show the enemies at times in which they were, in the West considered as 
acute threats to the Western regime, global security and humanity more 
broadly. And finally, the illustrations show images picturing the humiliation, 
degradation and finally annihilation and death of these enemies.  These 
collages visually exhibit the key images constructing the visual arrangement 
of Western enemies as presented in the Western publicity, as well as indicate 
the shared features of all of the three recent visual narratives of Western 
enemies.  
                                                
679 Bin Laden’s visual construction in the Western publicity was somewhat different from the 
abundantly visualized Hussein and Gaddafi. Therefore there is only one illustration picturing all the 
stages of his visual enemy formation. Nevertheless, all of the stages of the enemy narrative may be 
detected in this illustration 6.7.  
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6.2.1 THE POLITICAL MIGRATION OF THE FIGURE OF MUAMMAR 
GADDAFI: FROM THE “MAD DOG OF MIDDLE-EAST” INTO A 
POPULAR SIGHT ON THE FLOOR OF AN INDUSTRIAL 
FREEZER 
Muammar Gaddafi (1942 -2011) ruled Libya from the late 1960s almost all 
the way to his violent death in August 2011. Gaddafi can be seen as an 
archetype of a modern Arab terrorist figure, an eccentric foreign enemy of 
Western values and politics. The political visual figure of Gaddafi was 
extensively and for a long time built up in the Western political imagination. 
Vast amounts of images familiarized Western audiences with the visual 
figure of colonel Gaddafi for over more than forty past years. Therefore the 
figure of Muammar Gaddafi—the historical migration of the figure and the 
representational style of it swiftly changing according to political 
preconditions—reveals some of the central features, themes and methods 
recently utilized in the construction of the enemy in Western publicity. 
 
When Gaddafi was Cute 
Gaddafi pierced the Western publicity and political speech already in the late 
1960s as a young and rebellious Arab military leader. Images of young 
Gaddafi appeared frequently in Western media in the 1960s and 70s. But 
interestingly, regardless of his stubborn and fierce reputation as an Arab-
nationalist and an anti-colonial leader, popular Western media 
representations of the time, seem to picture him in rather compliant terms 
and in somewhat positive light. Young colonel Gaddafi was frequently 
pictured smiling, communicating with other politicians and members of the 
local high society. Gaddafi was mostly photographed wearing Western style 
suits, or standing vigorously and nobly in his flashy military uniform. In the 
early Western media representations he was frequently referred to as a 
“freedom fighter” and visually framed as a somewhat charismatic, even 
handsome—yet often quite militaristic—figure representing the new political 
whiffs of his era. A Life photo gallery (August 2011) entitled “When Gaddafi 
was cute” presents early images of Gaddafi presented in Western media. The 
text accompanying the collection of famous photos from the early Gaddafi 
era marks:  “Muammar Abu Minyar al-Gaddafi wasn’t always the lopsided, 
loopy, lunatic leader that he is today. In fact, in 1969, when he led a bloodless 
coup and overthrew King Idris, the 27-year-old Gaddafi was downright 
handsome.”680  What is noteworthy is that early on in Western 
representations, Gaddafi’s peculiar conceptions of democracy, his ties with 
terrorist organizations and socialistic political ideas were generally 
overlooked. At the time—in the 1960s and 70s—the Libyan leader did not 
                                                
680 Visual Western media representations of young Gaddafi, see illustration 6.1 and Muammar 
Gaddafi: a life in pictures, Guardian, February, 2.2011:; Colonel Gaddafi: Rise and fall, BBC, 
October, 20.201 ;When Gaddafi was cute, Life Magazine:; Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, 1942-
2011, An Erratic Leader, Brutal and Defiant to the End, The New York Times, October, 
20.2011.  
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pose an acute threat to the Western international political ends, and his 
public image in the West followed the political streak of the time. (See 
illustration 6.1) 
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The Mad Dog of Middle East: The Most Dangerous Man in the World 
A vivid transition in the (visual) character of Gaddafi took place in the 
Ronald Reagan era, in the early 1980s. The rise of US right wing politics and 
the simultaneous political turmoil in the Arab countries heaved the figure of 
‘Arab terrorist’ into the Western public consciousness. Political Islam and the 
Arab states became acutely threatening and politically significant for the 
United States and the Western blog after the Iranian revolution in 1979.681 
This wider turn in the international political climate also transformed 
Gaddafi’s character in the Western political publicity: the freedom fighter 
figure of Gaddafi was swiftly turned into an Islamic fundamentalist, 
vigorously hating the West and the humane and democratic Western 
values.682 As the rhetorical and textual accounts of Gaddafi transformed, so 
did visual images of him. This turn is vividly visualized by Newsweek cover 
from July 1981, in which the Libyan leader was nominated as “the most 
dangerous man in the world”. The front cover pictures Gaddafi as a 
threatening militaristic specter hovering over a desert landscape, illustrated 
along with oil drilling rigs and men wearing shemagh scarfs fiercely firing 
Kalashnikovs towards the spectator.683 In the 1980s the altered visual 
representations picturing Gaddafi can be seen to have gathered strong 
culturally othering and orientalizing features:  the landscapes, visual 
references to militarism and violence, and stereotypical representations 
picturing for example style of dress associated with foreign culture and 
(violent) Arab-nationalism, such as the feroucious gunmen in their shemaghs 
pictured with camels on the background.684 (See Illustration 6.2) 
Gaddafi’s anti-Israelism, support to Palestine and terrorist organizations 
such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Libya’s alignment with the Soviet 
Union and his plan to set up a federation of Arab and Muslim states of North 
Africa were seen as hostile to Western and particularly US international 
interests. This further escalated the relations of Libya and the Western 
powers. Particularly after the April 1986 disco bombing in West Berlin killing 
3 and injuring 230, among which several US soldiers—which was linked to 
Gaddafi’s regime—the relationship of the Western nations, namely US and 
Britain, and Libya further escalated. Later the same month the German 
bomb assault resulted in US bombing Libya. At the time of the heated 
conflict Gaddafi was in the West presented as an erratic enemy of the free 
world, nominated the “public enemy number one” and named by president 
                                                
681 Said, Edward: Covering Islam. How the Media and the Experts determine how we see the rest of 
the world. Vintage, London, 1997 (1981), 1-35.  
682 The President’s News Conference, April 9, 1986, The American Presidency Project:  
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=37105 
683 See illustration 6.2. Other magazine covers of Gaddafi from the earlier and latter times, see: Check 
Out 3 Decades Of Muammar Qadaffi Magazine Covers, Business Insider, March 21, 2011.  
684  Said, 2003 (1978).  
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Reagan in his famous speech in early 1986 as “the Mad Dog of Middle-east 
“.685  
At the time of a heightened conflict between the West (namely United 
States and later Britain) and Libya, Gaddafi was comprised as the archetype 
of an orientalist terrorist not only by rhetorical but also visual means. As the 
conflict intensified, the somewhat noble, even handsomely smiling Gaddafi 
was replaced with a grim looking military man, glaring viciously from the 
front pages of Western papers. Cover of the Time Magazine from April 21st 
1986 displays a drawing of an angry and defiant looking Gaddafi, and the 
headline proclaims: “Target Gaddafi” (see illustration 6.2).686  Gaddafi was 
first and foremost visually depicted as threatening, angry, defiant and strong. 
Furthermore, in visual terms he was depicted as divergent from the Western 
standards, as his violent and despotic character was emphasized. Vocally 
terming Gaddafi as “mad”, also influenced the way in which he was visually 
pictured in rather insane postures.687 After the Berlin Disco-bombing also 
UN placed economic sanctions over Libya, and Gaddafi’s regime became the 
leading international pariah-state of its time.   At the latest after the 
Lockerbie bombing—downing of a Pan Am flight 103 over the Scottish town 
of Lockerbie in 1988 killing nearly 300 hundred people— Gaddafi became to 
represent the ultimate enemy, the embodiment of inhuman in Western 
public imaginary. Gaddafi’s mental stability was often questioned, and he 
was hereafter mainly presented as an Eastern irrational despot, exploding 
passenger airplanes, collaborating with other terrorists, threatening global 
security and aiming at compromising the humane Western values.  
                                                
685 See: Harle, 1991, 130; Listen to the Reagan’s ”Mad dog speech”: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5dqn9Hwf-H0 
686 http://content.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19860421,00.html 
687  See the illustration 6.2.  
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The Politically Volatile Image of Gaddafi: Transformation from the 
“Mad Dog” into Co-operating Oriental Weirdo—and Again into Re-
elected Western Enemy Number One 
The isolated and trade embargo ridden Gaddafi was from the 1980s 
onwards predominantly pictured in the West in an irrational, dangerous 
and West hating antagonist figure all the way up until the 1990s. As the 
West then differently prioritized its global threats, gradually the relations of 
Libya and the Western blog eased up, and Gaddafi was after the Cold War 
replaced by more topical political enemy figures. In the “the War on 
Terror”-era Gaddafi started to co-operate with Western powers. Political 
relations with Britain and the United States were revitalized and trade 
embargoes lifted. Gaddafi and his regime accepted responsibility for some 
of its past crimes, such as the Lockerbie bombing. Libya also worked 
together with the Western states in antiterrorism, and was for example 
helpful in banking flows of asylum seekers from North Africa to (Southern) 
Europe.688 And concurrently, from the early 2000s onwards, changed also 
the visual appearance of Gaddafi in Western representations.  
As Gaddafi was now politically appropriate and even useful for the 
Western powers—someone who the West could work with to further common 
strategic goals—Western leaders were at the time frequently pictured in 
publicity along with the Libyan leader, formerly deemed as the number one 
enemy of the West. Western media displayed images of Gaddafi shaking 
hands and hugging with British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Italian president 
Silvio Berlusconi and US president Barak Obama. He was also regularly 
pictured taking part in international summits along with other world 
leaders.689 Nevertheless, Gaddafi remained somewhat distinctly presented: 
he was in Western media openly ridiculed because of his physical 
appearance, often pictured in ways that may be seen as orientalizing and 
presented even as a laughable, peculiar Bedouin figure.  He was called “last of 
the Buffoon dictators”, his bizarre clothing and eccentric habits—like the 
Bedouin tent he stayed while travelling abroad—were regularly ridiculed. 690 
Although Gaddafi was after the pariah phase included in the international co-
operation, the visual figure of Gaddafi in the Western publicity can be termed 
                                                
688 Martinez, 2007, 43-60; EU keen to strike deal with Muammar Gaddafi on immigration. The 
Guardian, September 1, 2010. ; Seeberg, Peter:  The Arab Uprisings and the EU's Migration 
Policies—The Cases of Egypt, Libya, and Syria, Democracy and Security, Vol.9/ 1-2, 2013, pp. 157-
176.; Italy's Bad Romance: How Berlusconi Went Gaga for Gaddafi. The Time:  
689 See Illustration 6.2 . Tony Blair's six secret visits to Col Gaddafi. The Telegraph, September 
24, 2011:; Britain’s alliance with Libya turns sour as Gaddafi cracks Down,  The Guardian, February 19, 
2011. ; Obama: Gaddafi Must Leave Now. The Time, February 27. 2011.; G8 Summit in 
L’Aguila, Family Photo, Wikimedia Commons:  
690 Gaddafi Fashion, the emperor had some crazy clothes. The Time. ; Colonel Gaddafi: 
The last of the Buffoon dictators, The BBC news magazine, 28. October, 2011; Muammar 
Gaddafi and his Travelling Tent. The Guardian, 23 September, 2009.  
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as the freak of the 2000s high-level international politics rather an equal 
partner.691 (See Illustration 6.2) 
The unrest of the Arab Spring uprisings spread to Libya in early 2011. The 
new sudden political turn erased the figure of the peculiar but co-operating 
fool from the Western publicity, and heaved the figure of eccentric and nearly 
insane “Mad Dog of Middle East” again into limelight. As local Libyans began 
to openly protest against their undemocratic leader, concurrently Western 
countries suddenly turned their stance on him and vocally demanded that 
Gaddafi—they just had had close strategic co-operation with—must “leave 
now”. 692 At this time, Western media was abundant with representations 
picturing the Libyan leader desperately clinging to power and presenting the 
weakening leader in a nearly mad light.  One of the visual peculiarities of the 
time was a video aired on the Libyan national TV February 22th, showing 
Gaddafi sitting in a car in Tripoli posing with an umbrella, giving a short but 
very strange speech, while the anti-regime demonstrations speeded up 
around the country. The video clip was much re-circulated and debated in 
the Western media, and the visual appearance of Gaddafi was widely 
ridiculed. 693 (See illustration 6.2) 
Eventually, the turmoil in Libya lead to a point in which an international 
NATO-led military intervention to Libya was realized. March 17th a United 
Nations Security Council resolution 1973 was adopted, authorizing a no-fly 
zone over Libya, resting on the principle of Responsibility to Protect (used 
for the first time in history).694 Soon after the resolution, United States, 
Britain and France, along with their European and Arab allies, began a 
bombing campaign legitimized by the protection of the civilian population of 
Libya, and aimed at forcing Muammar Gaddafi out of power. Finally, in late 
August 2011 the defiant man, who had ruled Libya for more than 40 years, 
was forced out of power and the capital city Tripoli, and into hiding. When 
the conflict between Libyan regime and the West again intensified, Gaddafi 
was now again pictured as a defiant evil leader unlawfully clinging to power 
and suppressing his people. Additionally, picturing Gaddafi as mentally 
unstable, weird and laughable served a central position in the way the re-
elected enemy of the West was presented in the new political situation.695 
(See illustration 6.2)  
                                                
691 On the politics of ridiculing and making foreign leaders of adversary regimes as laughable see: 
Särmä, Saara: Junk Feminism and Nuclear Wannabes - Collaging Parodies of Iran and North 
Korea. University of Tampere, Academic dissertation, 2014.  
692Obama says Muammar Gaddafi must “leave now “. The Huffington Post, 1st March2011:  
Libyan Rebels Win backing of US, EU as Qaddafi says “my people love me”. Bloomberg, 
February 27. 2011.  
693 Video deconstructed: Gaddafi loses control of his umbrella and his country. The 
Times, February 22 2011: See the “Umbrella video”: Muammar Gaddafi appears on Libyan 
television . The Telegraph, 22. February, 2011.  
694 Un Security Council Resolution 1973/2011 ; About responsibility to protect: UN World 
Summit Outcome 2005 document: (138-140: Responsibility to protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity)   
695Obama says Muammar Gaddafi must “leave now “. The Huffington Post, March 1. 2011. ; 
Libyan Rebels Win backing of US. ,EU as Qaddafi says “my people love me”. Bloomberg, 
27.Feb. 2011.  
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Presenting the enemy as irrational, strange and mentally unstable are 
central visual measures, commonly used in order to fortify the difference 
between us and them, and to present the opponent in an irrational light and 
to show political advisories as the evil opposed to the virtuosity of the self. 
Furthermore, ridiculing the opponent is a method regularly used in 
diminishing the power and credibility of political opponents.696 The sudden 
change in the public image of Gaddafi in the West can also be seen to prepare 
ground for a more open confrontation. The picturing of Gaddafi after the 
braking of the Arab Spring unrest shows how the public image of Gaddafi in 
the Western publicity closely follows the political posture between the West 
and the Libyan regime.  
 
The Bloody Spectacle of the Defeated Leader: Gaddafi Captured, 
Mugged, Shot to Death and Placed on Display on a Freezer Floor 
Another massive turn in the visual presentation of Gaddafi took place 
October 20th 2011, when Libyan rebel fighters found the overridden leader 
hiding in a culvert in the Libyan town of Sirte. After he was found, the 
wounded ex-leader was battered by angry rebel-minded crowd, and soon 
after killed by a shot in the head. Local people on the spot, watching the 
events as they unfolded, recorded the bloody and ultra-violent, chaotic last 
minutes of the ex-leader with cellphone cameras. These brutal images, which 
swiftly circulated in social media present Gaddafi humiliated, physically 
punished, mutilated and almost joyfully killed by an angry mob. All of the 
sudden, the strong man of Libya was seen as a weak old man, stripped of 
power and put on his knees by the people he formerly oppressed.  Images 
presenting rebel fighters and locals celebrating the death of the ex-leader 
were, along with the mutilation and death images, a leading way to illustrate 
the capture and fall of the dictator in the Western media.697 (See illustration 
6.3) 
The bloody visual spectacle of Gaddafi didn’t end in his violent death. 
After his death, his corpse was first moved to city of Mistrata for medical 
examination. After this, the Libyan authorities decided to keep the body for a 
few days and place it on public display, in order to “make sure that everybody 
knows he is dead”, as the Libyan Oil Minister Ali Tarhouni told the 
Reuters.698 The body of the ex-leader was thus moved into an industrial 
freezer, where locals could come and see the body. Gaddafi’s body, lying in a 
cooled meat storage room, became a popular attraction; people rowed to get 
in to see and photograph the body of their ex-oppressor. Along with the 
mutilation and kill images of Gaddafi, these chillingly peculiar trophy images 
were also extensively circulated in Western publicity. The violent act of 
killing and the marred body of Gaddafi became global spectacles mainly 
                                                
696 Särmä, 2014.  
697 Violent End to an Era as Qaddafi Dies in Libya, New York Times, October 20.2011. ; 
Muammar Gaddafi is Dead, says Libyan PM. The Guardian, October 20, 2011; Gaddafi’s 
death- who pulled the trigger. The Reuters, October 20.2011.  
698 Row over Muammar Gaddafi’s body delays burial plans. BBC, 21.10.2011. 
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photographed by the locals, widely circulated in social media and extensively 
displayed also by the Western mainstream media.699  (See illustration 6.3) 
Gaddafi’s death and the brutal images presenting the events linked to the 
final fall of the feared ex-leader were extensively in view in Western media. 
Extremely graphic and brutal images of the battered and dead Gaddafi were 
seen throughout mainstream media the days following the event 
(predominantly on 20/21st of October 2011). Norms of ethical representation 
or regard for the dignity of the object (individual) of the images (discussed in 
more length in the earlier chapters 2 and 4 of this study) were not much 
contemplated when publicizing and circulating of the bloody images of 
Gaddafi. This was perhaps partly due to the local and social media origin of 
majority of the images (more on this theme, see chapter 7). On the contrary 
to considerations of “taste and decency” in running the imagery, Western 
news outlets eagerly transformed the predominantly local (and social media) 
originating and exceptionally brutal images presenting Gaddafi’s violent 
death into news stories and flashy headlines with culturally domesticated, 
(Western) twists. These brutal images also made their way into arresting 
front cover illustrations. Routinely images of Libyan crowds battering the ex-
leader 700 and close ups of the already dead Gaddafi lying on the floor of the 
industrial freezer 701 as well as images of the sewage pipe he was found in, 
along images of the cheering local crowds surrounding the site702 illustrated 
the event in the Western media. Habitually the images were presented along 
with bloodthirsty captions, such as: “No Mercy for a merciless tyrant” (The 
Daily Telegraph), “For Gaddafi, a bloody end in Libya” (The Washington 
Post) “Gaddafi gunned down in a sewer. A murdering Rat gets his just 
deserts” (Daily Express) , “A mad dog in life, but a cowering rat in his last, 
brutal moments” (Metro),  “Khadafy killed by a Yankee fan”(New York Post) 
and  “Gaddafi killed by bullet in the head. That’s for Lockerbie. And for 
Yvonne Fletcher. And IRA Semtex victims” (The Sun) circulated widely in the 
Western publicity a day after his death. 703 (See Illustration 6.3)  
Correspondingly to the ethos of the media representations high-level 
Western leaders widely addressed the final defeat of Gaddafi positively in 
their proclamations and framed it as representing the ethos of democracy 
and freedom, and moreover presented the death of the ex-leader in a rather 
jubilant ethos. President Obama phrased Gaddafi’s death as marking “... a 
momentous day in the dark history of Libya. The Dark shadow of tyranny has 
                                                
699 Row over Muammar Gaddafi’s body delays burial plans. BBC, 21.10.2011. ; Muammar 
Gadhafi’s “Trophy” Body on show in Mistrata meat store. The Guardian, October 22.2011.  
700 The covers of the 21st October of the Metro, The Independent, the Finnish tabloid Iltasanomat, 
The Washington Post, Daily news, Daily Mail, The Guardian and New York Times among 
many others pictured Gaddafi mishandled by Libyan Crowds. See Illustration 6.3.   
701 The Covers of The 21st October  by Daily Telegraph, The Sun, The New York Post, The 
International Herald Tribune, The Irish Independent, The Daily Mirror among others 
published the event by showing the bloody body of dead Gaddafi. See Illustration 6.3 
702 21st October Metro, The New York Times, The Sidney Morning Herald and The 
Washington Post among others displayed images of the jubilant crowds and the final hiding place of 
Gaddafi. See Illustration 6.3 
703 See Illustration 6.3.  
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been lifted”.704 Accordingly, the British Prime minister David Cameron 
commented the killing of Gaddafi as a day to reminisce all Gaddafi’s victims, 
Libyans as well as British: ”those who died in connection with the Pan Am 
flight over Lockerbie, to Yvonne Fletcher in a London street, and obviously 
all the victims of IRA terrorism who died through their use of Libyan 
Semtex”. He also stated that the death of Gaddafi enables Libya to build a 
stronger and more democratic future, and announced his pride on the role 
Britain played in the process of ousting Gaddafi.705 In these Western 
proclamations the crowds that killed Gaddafi were presented and 
presumed—and perhaps hoped—to represent the whiffs of Western-style 
democracy or at least a somewhat Western-minded orientation, regardless of 
the fact that the brutal act of killing was clearly unlawful, conducted by the 
rationale of revengeful violent mob justice, rather than following principles 
of rule of law, fair trial, democracy or humane values. 
Thus ended the long journey of the strong man of Libya and the enemy of 
the West, in a highly brutal visual spectacle; a killing joyfully welcomed by 
the Western political leaders, media and public. The bloody spectacle of 
violent images—revolving around bodily weakness, corporal dimension of the 
suffering and defeat of the ex-leader—was a central way of marking the end 
of his era and power also in Western publicity. Gaddafi in his last moments 
was presented as a weak and cowardly, dirty and disgraceful, and his final 
smallness was exemplified by exceptionally bloody visual means.  The 
revengeful, joyous qualities and ridiculing features in narratives describing 
the defeat of the political enemy in Western publicity are apparent. What is 
interesting in the context of prevalent Western humanitarian world political 
ethos is that the Western leaders as well as the Western mainstream media 
framed the bloody and brutal death of Gaddafi—conducted unlawfully by a 
mob of locals—as a momentous day for democracy, freedom and humanity. 
The violent death of the ex-leader was first and foremost presented as a 
positive, joyful occasion marking a triumph of a more humane order. The 
way in which the death of Gaddafi was presented in Western publicity 
composes a violent and openly revengeful punishment narrative, which in 
many ways contradict the overall humanitarian ethos habitually (publically) 
associated with Western international politics.   
                                                
704 Remarks by the President on the death of Muammar Qaddafi. The White House, office of 
the press secretary, October 20, 2011; Obama hails the death of Muammar Gaddafi as a 
foreign policy success. The Guardian, 20 October, 2011.   
705 Gaddafi Death hailed by David Cameron. The Independent, 20th October, 2011.    
 
311
Picturing the Inhuman Evil Enemies – the Dark Side of the Western Humanitarian Narrative 
 ????
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
????????????
 
312
 313 
6.2.2 WESTERN REPRESENTATIONS OF SADDAM HUSSEIN: 
FROM THE REINCARNATION OF HITLER TO AN OLD WEAK 
MAN PUBLICALLY HANGED 
The history of Saddam Hussein (1937-2006) as the number one enemy of the 
of the United States and the ‘free world’ goes back to the times of the end of 
the Cold War and the Persian Gulf War (1990–1991). Just a few years before 
the Gulf War Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, was generally considered 
as an ally of the US. Since Iraq was at the time fighting a war against 
Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran (1980-1988), the timely archenemy of the US. The 
end of the Cold War marked a change in the world order; and as new threats 
arose, rose also the need for novel enemy figures.  At the turn of the decade 
the conflict between the US and Iraq intensified, and likewise ascended the 
dark image of Saddam Hussein as a brutal and evil Eastern undemocratic 
leader, threatening both local security and global stability, as well as the 
‘Western way of life’.706 The political migration of Saddam Hussein’s figure 
pinpoints many central features in the Western construction of political 
enemy images and poignantly indicates the visual styles in which enmity and 
inhumanity has recently been illustrated in Western publicity.  
 
The Cruel Inhuman Oppressor vs. the Moral Guardians of the 
Humane World Order 
In the 1990’s political rhetoric of the US, Saddam Hussein was presented as 
the “new Hitler”, who needed to be stopped by the civilized world, in order to 
prevent horrible historical catastrophes (The Second World War/Holocaust) 
from recurring. Saddam Hussein was repeatedly referred to as an 
embodiment of evil, breaking all civilized principles and norms set by the 
international community. Especially at the time of the Gulf War (1990-1991) 
Western political rhetoric describing Hussein gathered strongly moralistic 
tone and biblical binary spirit: Hussein was presented as an epitome of the 
eternal evil, as Kuwait was granted the role of the innocent victim tormented 
by the dark forces. Moreover, United States was portrayed as the moral actor, 
savior, who had to intervene in the situation in order for the “right order” to 
be restored. In the rhetoric of the US the Persian Gulf War was framed as a 
war against Saddam Hussein, not the Iraqi people. It was destined to be a 
“war without casualties”, surgical war, that was targeted only at removing 
“the sick tissue” of the Iraqi society –meaning Saddam and his regime.707  
At the time images of the “the Most Dangerous Man in the World” (this 
time Hussein, not Gaddafi) extensively circulated in Western publicity. 
Hussein was visually most often pictured as militaristic, defiant, threatening 
and as a strong leader, usually wearing a military uniform.  Visual 
representations circulating in the Western publicity presented Hussein in a 
                                                
706 Harle, 2000, 98-102, Harle, 1991, 133-137 
707 Harle, 2000, 98-102, Harle, 1991, 133-137; Macarthur 1992, 37-77; Baudrillard, 1995.  See 
also chapter 2.4, which discusses the Gulf War.  
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somewhat deranged visual figure.708 At the time of the Gulf War the visual 
figure of Saddam Hussein followed the textual and rhetorical narrative of the 
US. Hussein was constructed exclusively as the evil, and the Western war 
against him as humanitarian, morally justified and bloodless. But as soon as 
the conflict between US and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq dissipated from the 
highest political agenda of United States, so did trail away the enormously 
visible enemy figure of Saddam Hussein from the Western publicity, only to 
be resurrected again years later. (See illustration 6.4)   
The image of Saddam as a mad, dangerous and evil man initially built in 
the 1990s, was again seen politically relevant and heaved back into the 
limelight before the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Before the invasion, president 
George W. Bush actively prepared atmosphere suitable for an open conflict 
by rhetorical means. In his State of the Union address January 29th 2002, 
Bush included Iraq in his list of the states constituting “the Axis of Evil”. 
Bush referred to the Iraqi regime as “hiding something from the civilized 
world”, and accused the Saddam regime of possessing biological, chemical 
and nuclear weapons.709 Later, spring 2003, allegations of stockpiled 
weapons of mass destruction (which later turned out implausible), as well as 
alleged ties to terrorist networks and claims of human rights violations were 
central in justifying and legitimizing the escalation of the conflict.710 Just 
before the March invasion president Bush referred to Saddam Hussein as 
being a threat to “the security of free nations”, “danger to his neighbors”, “a 
sponsor of terrorism”, “a cruel, cruel oppressor of the Iraqi people”,” being 
capable of any crime and without mercy and without shame”. Bush called 
Hussein “a mass murderer”, and referred to him as “possessing weapons of 
mass murder” and stated that “we must not permit his crimes to reach across 
the world”.711  Upon announcing the invasion to Iraq March 19th, President 
Bush referred to Saddam Hussein as “an enemy who has no regard for 
conventions of war or rules of morality”.  He announced the operation as an 
effort to protect civilians from harm, and to defend “our freedom” and to 
“bring freedom to others”. The 2003 war was framed as an operation to 
disarm Iraq, to free its people (from under Saddam Hussein and his regime) 
and to defend the world from grave danger posed by Saddam Hussein.712  
News of the invasion was in the West most often accompanied by an image of 
Saddam Hussein talking to media, as he rejected the March 17th US 
ultimatum to give up power. In this image Hussein appears defiant, 
determinant and strong, and unlike usually after the 1990’s Gulf War, he was 
                                                
708 Western media images of Saddam Hussein from the times of the 1990’s Gulf War are included in 
the Illustration 6.4.  See for example: US News, Cover “The Most Dangerous Man in the World”, June 
4, 1990. ; The Time cover September, 10, 1990”Playing Cat and Mouse”.  
709 The President’s state of the Union Address, White House, office of the press secretary, 
January 29. 2002. 
710 President Bush Addresses the Nation, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, March 
19t. 2003.   
711 President Bush: Monday “Moment of Truth” for World on Iraq.  The White House, Office 
of Press Secretary. March 16, 2003.   
712 President Bush Addresses the Nation, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, March 
19th2003. 
314
 315 
again seen wearing a military uniform.713 Strength, militaristic and thus 
violent nature of the advisory were emphasized in the pre-invasion Western 
public visual image of Hussein. (Illustration 6.4.) 
In the rhetoric of President Bush also the new Iraq war became to be 
framed as an operation of the good against the evil; as a humanitarian 
endeavor to protect human lives and freedom from the evil tyranny of 
Saddam. As the opponent (Hussein) was recurrently at the time of the 
conflict presented in the form of a strong and evil biblical enemy, and 
juxtaposed with its binary opponent—good, virtuous Western self, guardian 
of sacred humane values—the American rhetoric describing the motivations 
of the war and Hussein contains strong moralistic as well as religious 
features.  
                                                
713 Bush Orders start of war on Iraq; Missiles apparently miss Hussein. The New York Times, 
March 20. From the archive, 19 March 2003: Suddenly, the Iraq war is very real, The 
Guardian, March 19, 2003. This image of Saddam Hussein giving his speech is included in the 
illustration 6.5.  
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The Toppling of Saddam: Capture and Degradation of the Ex-leader 
The US led invasion of Iraq started March 20th 2003. After about three weeks 
the allied coalition forces reached the capital city Baghdad and the Iraqi 
government collapsed. Saddam Hussein was ousted of Baghdad, and he 
disappeared.  In the absence of the head of the regime—forced out of the 
capital and into hiding—the fall of the Saddam Regime was marked by a 
flashy and strongly symbolic, metaphoric visual spectacle, orchestrated by 
the Americans. At the Firdos Square in central Baghdad—right outside of a 
hotel where international journalist covering the war conveniently dwelled—
local Iraqis with the help of American soldiers knocked down a massive 
statue of Saddam Hussein. Before the statue was toppled, an American 
soldier climbed up the statue to place an American flag over its face (later it 
was replaced with a pre-Gulf War Iraqi flag). Debris was thrown at the statue, 
and finally, after about two hours of trying, the statue was finally was pulled 
to the ground by an American military vehicle.  After the fall of the statue 
local Iraqis celebrated the symbolic fall of the ex-leader by hitting the statue 
with their shoes, and later dragging the decapitated head of the monument 
through the streets of the Baghdad.  
The metaphoric event mimicking the defeat of Saddam’s tyranny was 
widely broadcasted in worldwide media in iconic visual images. (See 
illustration 6.5) By vastly circulating the images of the act, the symbolic fall 
of Saddam Hussein was produced into a prominent media spectacle. In 
Western and especially in the American media the event was often framed as 
a crucial moment in the history of Iraq. Toppling of the statue of Saddam was 
manifested as showing the Iraqi people taking the power on to their own 
hands after the long oppression of the corrupt leader, and the act was 
paralleled with victorious and epoch-making moments such as the fall of 
Berlin Wall or toppling of the Lenin statues in Eastern Europe after the Cold 
War. Furthermore the event was commonly presented as marking the victory 
of coalition forces in Iraq, as well as publicized as an emblem of the Iraqi 
people welcoming the Western invasion as a liberation.714 In the context of 
the construction of the Western enemy image of Saddam Hussein, the 
toppling and desecrating of the statue of the ex-leader can also be seen as 
marking a symbolical destruction and stripping of power and neutralization 
of authority of Saddam Hussein and his regime.  
After the fall of Baghdad, the disappeared Saddam Hussein was placed 
highest on the US list of most wanted Iraqis. For months he was nowhere to 
be found and did not make media appearances, other than publicizing a few 
audiotapes in which he vowed that his people supported him and opposed his 
                                                
714 About the toppling of the statue and its media representations see: Famy, Shahira: “They took it 
down”. Exploring the determinants of Visual reporting in the Toppling of Saddam Hussein’s statue in 
National and International Newspapers. Mass Communication and Society, 10/2, 2007, 143-170. ; 
Aday, Sean, Cluverius, John& Livingston, Steven: As Goes the Statue, So Goes the War: The 
Emergence of the Victory Frame in Television Coverage of the Iraq War. Journal of Broadcasting& 
electronic Media, 49/3, 2005, 314- 331.  
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exile from power.715 Finally, December 13th 2003 in the course of an 
American operation Red Dawn Hussein was found, hiding in a hole in the 
ground at a farm house near Iraqi town of Tikrit. Next day President Bush 
announced the capture of Saddam Hussein in a televised speech. Bush 
described the operation leading to his arrest “a hunt”.  He declared the 
capture of the ex-dictator to mark the “end of a dark and painful era”, and 
“the end of the road for him, and all who bullied and killed in his name”. 716 
Upon the capture also the leaders of France and Germany cheered the event 
as great moment, as British Prime Minister Tony Blair announced the 
capture to “remove the shadow” over Iraq. 717  
Also the visual representations of Saddam Hussein in the Western 
publicity took a strong visual turn after his capture. 14th of December 2003 a 
press conference was held in Baghdad, in which Paul Bremer, the top US 
Administrator in Iraq, officially announced the capture of Hussein. A 
multitude of US Army images and videos of Hussein’s capture were 
presented at the conference. An image of the capture became widely spread 
in Western media. The composition of this US military image shows the act 
of arresting Saddam Hussein and states the dictator’s fall from power in an 
emblematic way: a dirty, bearded, old and feeble looking fugitive ex-dictator, 
with his eyes closed is pushed against the ground by a strong, armed and able 
bodied US soldier. In this illustrative image, Hussein is surrounded by at 
least four other US soldiers, pointing their guns at the captive. Along with 
this viral capturing image, also other US army images were eagerly circulated 
in the Western publicity. These images for example exhibit the dirty and 
modest surroundings of the site of the capture as well as showcase the 
untidy, squat-like hiding place of Saddam. Another image type going viral in 
the media after the capture of Saddam, were close-up images depicting the 
bearded captive and vividly exhibiting him in his vulnerable and threadbare 
physical condition.  The freshly captured ex-dictator going through a medical 
examination, conducted by a Western military doctor, as well as images of 
Hussein’s long hair and ears been inspected, along with an image with the ex-
dictator with his mouth open for examination, were countlessly reiterated 
across Western media. These images released by the US officials strongly 
visually signify the degeneration of Hussein from a ruler to a fugitive, and 
poignantly mark his road from power to defeat. 718 (See Illustrations 6.5 & 
6.6)  
Along with the degrading and highly metaphorical images describing the 
fall of the tyrant, also textual remarks of the event clearly aimed at the same 
punishing and degrading effect. Commander of US forces, Lieutenant 
                                                
715 Listen to the “Saddam Tapes” as Guardian podcasts.  Iraq: The Saddam Tapes. The Guardian.   
716 President Bush Address the Nation on the Capture of Saddam Hussein, the White 
House, Office of the Press secretary, December 14, 2003.  
717 Saddam Hussein Captured, The Guardian, December 14, 2003; The Capture of Hussein: 
Ex-dictator Hussein caught in a makeshift hide-out, Bush says ”dark era” for Iraqis is 
over. The New York Times,  December 15, 2003.  
718 See the images for example here: Saddam’s capture. CBS news.  
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General Ricardo Sanchez announced that Hussein offered no resistance 
upon the capture, and phrased that he was “caught like a rat”. Consequently, 
the Western media echoed the epic choice of worlds of Lieutenant Sanchez 
broadly.719 Along with the “like a rat” phrase going viral in Western media, 
images of the captured and bearded, weary looking ex-leader the next day 
entered the front cover news often with refrains such as “We got him”720, “We 
bag the bum”721, “Saddam the Prisoner” 722 and “the Tyrant is now a 
prisoner”723. (See Illustration 6.5) 
Therefore it maybe said, that Hussein’s fall from power was visually 
underlined with exhibiting his “rat like” detention moment, highlighting his 
cowardly character and showing him in a feeble and defeated physical figure. 
The moment of the Western victory was as well marked by widely circulating 
images showing Hussein been subjugated to what can be seen as a 
humiliating and degrading public health inspection. Along with images 
emphasizing the weakness, high age, cowardly nature and perhaps (at least 
supposed) sickness of Hussein, also visual references to dirtiness and anti-
hygienic nature of the captive ex-leader were extenuated by the capture as 
well as the medical examination images. All of these qualities underlined by 
the visual representations of Hussein are much used, typical and traditional 
characteristics of picturing the enemy as dirty, deranged and evil—and thus 
divergent from the good, strong and healthy us.724 Hussein’s public treatment 
in images as well as in the worlds of authorities can fairly be argued to 
comprise a humiliating, propagandist punishment narrative, by which the 
defeat of the enemy and the victory of the Western ethos are amplified and 
signified.  
                                                
719 Saddam  Hussein “Caught Like a Rat”, U.S Commander says. U.S Department of 
Defense, December, 14, 2003; Saddam “Caught like a Rat” in a hole:   CNN, December 15, 2003. 
; Saddam Captured “like a rat” in raid, Foxnews, December 14, 2003.  
720 National Post, The Denver Post, December 14 2003.  
721 Daily News,  14 December, 2003. (See illustration) 
722 The Guardian, 14 December, 2003.  
723 The Independent, 15 December, 2003.  
724 (Visual) features of the enemy are often associated with dirtiness, sickness and weakness. See Hall, 
The Spectacle of The ‘Other’, 1997.  
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The Tyrant in His Pants 
The degrading public visual exhibition of the detainee Hussein in Western 
publicity did not end in the moments instantly following his capture. In May 
2005, two newspapers The Sun and New York Post—both owned by the 
infamous British newspaper mogul Rupert Murdoch—ran an image of 
detained Saddam Hussein wearing nothing but his underpants on their front 
covers. The cover stories presenting the images were titled “The Tyrant in his 
Pants” (the Sun) and “The Butcher of Sagdad. Inside Saddam’s Prison Cell” 
(The New York Post). These news stories exhibit an image of Hussein in his 
prison cell, wearing only white briefs. Other photos included in the story of 
The Sun show Hussein carrying out other private chores in his prison cell: 
sleeping and washing his clothes. (See illustration 6.5) The Sun announced 
that the images were handed to the media house by anonymous US military 
sources. The paper(s) stated, that the images were released by the officials in 
order to show Hussein as an “ageing and humble old man”, and wishing that 
presenting the ex-leader in his fragile, bare condition would burst the leader-
myth of Saddam.  Presenting the feared ex-despot in such images was thus 
hoped to give a blow to the Iraqi resistance. In other words, according to the 
media house, the images were published in a pursuit to positively influence 
the Western war effort in Iraq. The United States government vocally 
repudiated the claims, and denied the handing out of the images. US officials 
condemned the publication of the images by stating that the release of the 
images was a “Clear violation of Department of Defense directives and 
possibly Geneva Convention guidelines for the humane treatment of detained 
individuals”. 725 
It is interesting and noteworthy how Pentagon explicated the difference 
between the images released in 2003 by the US officials upon the capture of 
Saddam—the “spider hole” and medical examination images—in comparison 
to the 2005 underwear images by The Sun. US officials explained that 
releasing the capture images in 2003 was not a violation of the Geneva 
Conventions, because the images were important in demonstrating to the 
(Iraqi) people that Saddam really was in custody. Then again, the release of 
the 2005 incarceration underpants-images was seen as offending, against 
laws of war and humane treatment of prisoners of war.726 But, visually 
judging and thinking of the content, as well as the contextual representation, 
signification and (Western) media uses of the images of detained Hussein in 
2003 and the 2005 prison images, no clear difference can be detected. 
Moreover, in both cases releasing the images was a stated as advocating a 
positive strategic influence on the Western war effort in Iraq. Thus, no 
explicit distinction between the motives of publishing the images of 2003 
and 2005, difference in what the images actually present, how they present it 
                                                
725 Military Officials in Iraq Condemn Release of Saddam Photos. U.S Department of 
Defense, 20 May, 2005; Pentagon Vows to probe Saddam photos. CNN.com, 21May, 2005. ; 
Saddam Underwear photos anger US. BBCnews,20 May, 2005.  
726 Pentagon Vows to probe Saddam photos. CNN.com, 21May, 2005.  
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and what they state in their uses is clear. Both of the visual spectacles show 
the detainee in a similar light, the message and use of the images is 
somewhat convergent and the narrative they create of Hussein as a dirty, 
weak and mundane figure, stripped of power and showing him visually 
humiliated seem consistent.  Both the 2003 and 2005 images create a 
comparable narrative of a weakened ex-despot, a humiliated, defeated man, 
brought to his knees by strong (humanitarizing) Western (minded) forces. 
Thus, the difference in the reaction of US officials to the images seems 
actually to be more about the illegal obtainment of the images, rather than on 
the narrative they convoy.727  
 
The Trial, the Sentence and the Spectacle of the Public Hanging 
After 3 years in custody, November 6th 2006 Saddam Hussein was sentenced 
to death by hanging for crimes against humanity by an Iraqi special tribunal. 
At the trial Hussein spoke fiercely, refused to stand up when the verdict was 
read and after hearing the sentence, was told to have shouted in protest: 
“God Is great!”, ”Long live Iraq” and “Down with the traitors”.728 Right after 
the verdict had been read, US President Bush welcomed the death sentence 
as a milestone in the democratization and freeing of Iraq, “replacing the rule 
of a tyrant, with rule of law”. He called the verdict “a major achievement for 
Iraq’s young democracy”.729 Conversely to the political leader of the US, the 
European Union, among many other (Western) international actors 
dissented with the capital punishment as a method of justice, and urged Iraq 
not to carry out the death sentence.730  
Images of Saddam Hussein at the trial were widely circulated in the 
mainstream publicity of the Western sphere. At the time of the trial Western 
media recurrently indicated Hussein as acting aggressively, “shouting” and 
resisting. The trial images show Hussein wearing a dark suit and a white 
shirt, talking intensely and judging by his bodily gestures, acting in a defiant 
way. It is noteworthy when thinking of the fluctuating visual representations 
of Hussein, that at the time of his trial, he was pictured very differently 
compared to the representations from the times of his capture and 
imprisonment, in which he was chiefly pictured as compliant and weak, 
almost willingly subjugated to the Western rule. The visual character of a 
strong and defiant leader figure of Saddam Hussein, familiar from the years 
prior to his arrest, was brought back in defining the nature of the accused, at 
the time when he was sentenced for his crimes in the starkest of ways. It 
seems that the defiant, strong and responsible figure of the evil Saddam 
                                                
727 Pictures of Saddam Hussein in his underpants could spell trouble for News 
Corporation, The Telegraph, November, 19 2012; Laptop 'destroyed to hide story' behind 
Saddam Hussein underpants picture , The Guardian, 3 December 2012.  
728 Saddam Hussein is sentenced to Death. New York Times, November 5, 2006.  
729 President’s statement on the Saddam Hussein Verdict. The White House, Office of the 
Press secretary, November 5, 2006.   
730 Mixed world reaction to death penalty for Hussein. CNN, November 5. 2006. ;  In quotes: 
Reaction to Saddam’s Sentence. BBC News, December, 27.200. ; Hussein sentenced to 
Hang, November 5. 2006, The Guardian.  
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Hussein was politically useful and suitable again at the time of his trial. 731 
(See illustration 6.6) 
December 30th 2006, at Camp Justice in Iraq, Saddam Hussein was 
executed by hanging. As most of the Western leaders were still in adverse on 
the death penalty, US president George W. Bush declared the execution as 
“an important milestone on Iraq’s course to becoming a democracy that can 
govern, sustain and defend itself, and be an ally in the war on terror”. 732 An 
official about one minute long non-audio film of the execution and of the 
about-to-die- Saddam was openly distributed among Iraqi officials and Iraqi 
news outlets. The video shows Hussein on the gallows with his executioners 
and with the noose around his neck. These images do not show the actual 
hanging or the dead body of the executed, but the situation is stopped before 
the actual climax of the act, Hussein’s death. Notwithstanding the Western 
disagreement on the desirability on the death penalty of the ex-leader, these 
images of Hussein’s final defeat—showing the ex-leader with a noose around 
his neck—were commonly featured on front pages of Western media.733 The 
Western mainstream news media also from time to time distributed the 
dramatic pre-hanging images with bloodthirsty accompanying captions such 
as “Saddam Hanged. Iraq Butcher sent to hell” and “Death on Camera. Dawn 
in Baghdad. A tyrant meets his richly derived end. A billion people see his 
last moments. Was this a good day for civilization”. (See illustration 6.6) 734  
In addition to the official footage of Saddam Hussein at the gallows, a 
person present at the execution—supposedly an Iraqi official—filmed the 
entire event with a cell phone camera without authorization. This film (with 
audio) was shot from below the gallows. This footage shows Hussein 
plunging into his death as the trapdoors opened, and crowds present at the 
event can be heard shouting abusive remarks. Again the actual hanging was 
not shown, but on this video the lifeless corpse of Hussein was displayed in 
close up images.  The video soon went viral on the Internet. Later the day of 
the execution, the video was shown by al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya —and soon 
after also featured by many Western media outlets.735  Human rights activists 
and many others condemned showing the last moments of the defeated ex-
leader and the circulation of the video was widely criticized as violating 
                                                
731Saddam Hussein is sentenced to Death. New York Times, November 5. 2006. Opinion split 
over Saddam Decision, the Telegraph, November 5, 2006. Trial image of the defiant Hussein is 
included in the illustration 6.6.  
732 Bush: Execution is a milestone. The Guardian,   December 30, 2006:. Dictator Who Ruled 
Iraq With Violence Is Hanged for Crimes Against Humanity, New York Times, December, 
30,2006.  
733 Saddam Executed, The Guardian, December 30, 2006. ; Saddam Hussein Executed in Iraq, 
BBC, December 30, 2006. ; Saddam Hussein executed with “fear in his face”. CNN, December, 
29, 2006: Dictator Who Ruled Iraq With Violence Is Hanged for Crimes Against 
Humanity, New York Times, December, 30,2006. ; See also, Zelizer, 2010, 293-303.  
734 The covers of the Sun, December 30, 2006 and The Mail on Sunday, December 31, 2006. See 
illustration 6.6 
735 The full video of the execution can still be found in the Internet:  Youtube, Liveleak and several 
other sources.  
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human dignity.736 Consequently, many news corporations decided not to run 
the unauthorized video showing the actual hanging.  However, regardless of 
the criticism the unauthorized images gathered, some Western news agencies 
also displayed brutal images of the corpse of Saddam. For example an image 
showing the ex-leader in a body bag after the execution was widely circulated 
the Western media.737  Moreover, as the unauthorized video, its moral 
dilemmas—and the abusive remarks of the executioners heard on the 
unauthorized video—were widely discussed in the Western publicity, 
consequently the visibility of the video was actually amplified.  
In her book About to Die, Barbie Zelizer has done through research on the 
uses of the Saddam’s execution images by the Western media. She indicates 
that although the images of the execution were much used in the Western 
media, showing the images of last moments and the dead body Hussein was 
widely criticized from many quarters, including media consumers. The 
display of the brutal images was commonly seen as appalling, distasteful and 
even propagandist.738 In comparison to the capturing images of Saddam and 
for example the mishandling and death images of Muammar Gaddafi, it thus 
seems that the images of Saddam Hussein were treated differently both in 
Western politics as well as in Western media. His death was not as openly 
cheered by the international community, as was his capture three years 
earlier, and the hanging did not ultimately comprise such a bloodstained and 
revengeful spectacle as for example the sudden and violent death of Gaddafi 
did a few years later.  Zelizer explains the criticism that media presentation 
Saddam’s last moments gathered by the war weary Western atmosphere at 
the particular moment in time. In addition to the serious doubts on the 
Western war effort in Iraq at the moment, also the trial of Saddam and his 
death sentence were vastly criticized. Moreover she sees that also the 
previously expectable moment of the hanging influenced the more cautious, 
and perhaps less aggressive reaction to the handling of the hanging news: the 
media had time to contemplate on how to run the execution in a more 
“dignified” manner.739  
As the hanging as well as the trial of Hussein gathered wide criticism, also 
President Bush appraised the hanging in retrospect. A year later the 
enthusiasm of President Bush’s views on the killing had changed into 
pessimism, as he said the execution should have been carried out in a more 
dignified manner and referred to it as resembling a “revenge killing”.740 
Nevertheless, the execution of Saddam Hussein entered the consciousness of 
the Western public as a highly visual spectacle, in which the evil ex-leader 
was, for the last time, punished for his sins in flashy and iconic ways, which 
                                                
736 See: Cottle, 2009, 5; Zelizer, 2010, 293-303. Iraq to investigate the filming of Saddam’s 
execution. The Guardian, January 2,  2007. 
737 See for example:  Life and death of the dictator, Photo gallery.  The Washington Post.  
738 Zelizer, Barbie: About to Die. How News images move the public.  Oxford University Press, 
2010, 293-300.  
739 Zelizer, 2010, 293- 295.  
740 Bush says death of Saddam like revenge killing. The Telegraph, January 17, 2007.  
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can be seen as marking an exception of the overall humanitarian norms 
relating to images of death in contemporary Western media and publicity. 
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6.2.3 OSAMA BIN LADEN: THE (IN)VISIBLE FACES OF THE WEST 
HATING TERRORIST LEADER 
The visual figure of Osama bin Laden (1957-2011) was hoisted into the 
awareness of the wide surrounding world at latest after the 2001 9/11 terror 
attacks. Osama bin Laden, a Saudi Arabian born son of a billionaire 
Mohammad bin Awad bin Laden, joined the Mujahedeen’s in the late 1970s 
to fight the Soviet occupiers in Afghanistan.  At the time, as he was fighting 
the Soviet occupiers, he was on the same side of the front with the Western 
block. After the Afghan war, in 1988 bin Laden founded Al-Qaeda. In the 
1990’s Al Qaeda evolved into a global loosely tied terrorist network, which 
provided bin Laden a route to globally agitate his West-hating ideology. Bin 
Laden’s organization supported like-minded groups, moved money and 
weapons, trained soldiers and spread his word effectively and globally. One 
of Al-Qaeda’s major alliances was the Taliban in Afghanistan.  Bin Laden 
helped the Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan, and the Taliban provided 
bin Laden a refuge and a base to wage his global “holy war”. In 1996 US 
officials nominated bin Laden as “one of the most significant financial 
supporter of Islamic extremism in the world”. Following the 1998 US 
embassy bombings in Kenia and Tanzania he was placed on the FBI’s list of 
most wanted terrorists. Nevertheless bin Laden still at this point remained 
quite unknown to the wider Western public—until the Twin Towers came 
down in New York 11th of September 2001. Thereafter the iconic figure of a 
bearded bin Laden—wearing a white turban and a white gown or a 
camouflage combat jacket, often posing with a Kalashnikov—became 
cemented as the archetype of modern, agile global terrorist figure, the 
perpetrator of the 9/11 attacks and the number one Western enemy of the age 
of the “war on terror”. 741 
 
The Most Wanted Face of the War on Terror 
Soon after the devastation of the September 11th terror attacks, the terrorist 
network al-Qaeda—taking asylum in Afghanistan—and primarily its leader 
figure Osama bin Laden were identified as the prime suspects guilty of the 
attacks. President George W. Bush officially named bin Laden as the primary 
suspect only a few days after the attacks.  Osama bin Laden was overnight 
elevated into the gallery of extreme evil in the American and Western 
imagination. The news of the suspected perpetrator was habitually 
accompanied with images of bearded, calm and confident looking bin Laden 
dressed in his characteristic white turban. The mysterious man previously 
scarcely known by larger publics made his way into the company of iconized 
past dictators. (See illustration 6.7) President Bush added that it was not 
solely the main man who was responsible for the attacks, but phrased: “we 
are talking about those who fed them, those who housed them, those who 
harbor terrorists”. Bush further proclaimed “We find those who did it (the 
                                                
741 The Most Wanted Face of Terrorism. The New York Times, May 2, 2011.  
327
Picturing the Inhuman Evil Enemies – the Dark Side of the Western Humanitarian Narrative 
 328 
attack) we will smoke them out of their holes, we will get them running and 
bring them to justice”. When asked “do you want bin Laden dead?”, Bush 
paraphrased “I want him—I want justice. … there’s an old poster out West, as 
I recall, that said: Wanted: Dead or alive.” 742 The President’s reference to the 
old frontier posters of most wanted criminals was soon followed by a flood of 
visual memes picturing bin Laden in the Wild West poster style and 
consequently also illustrations in newspaper and magazine covers pictured 
him alike with the common criminals of past times. (See illustration 6.7) 
After the 9/11, Osama bin Laden was—much like Saddam Hussein and to 
some extent also Muammar Gaddafi—likened with historical evil men such 
as Hitler and Stalin. The figure of bin Laden acted as a concrete icon that 
made it easier to comprehensively pin point the agony caused by the brutal 
acts of novel, agile global terrorism on one man: A corporal figure of the 
enemy. The threatening and scary, hard to catch and comprehend agile 
terrorism needed a human face, and the orientalized face of Osama bin 
Laden served the purpose perfectly. The face of Osama bin Laden offered the 
shocked Western world something concrete—a corporal enemy, an 
embodiment of evil—whom seemed possible to fight and conquer. The 
rhetoric as well as visual descriptions painted Osama bin Laden as the 
ultimate evil, inhuman character causing suffering and threatening the 
“Western way of life”. In the rhetoric of President Bush the evil opponent 
prepared fertile ground for an armed conflict and the figure of the evil Osama 
bin Laden was essential in preparing the minds of the public and legitimizing 
the Afghan war. Soon after the terror attacks President Bush was authorized 
to use "all necessary and appropriate force" in retaliation.743 Consequently 
war in Afghanistan started less than a month after the terror attacks. October 
7th 2001 the United States and Britain launched powerful air strikes on 
Afghanistan in order to destroy the suspected terrorist training camps of al 
Qaeda and bin Laden, and to target the Taliban government.  
As was pointed out in chapter 5, when looked through Western strategic 
communication images of the Afghan War, the enemy often remained 
invisible and without a human figure. In these images the enemy was visually 
referred to only by the devastation caused (wounded bodies, weapons, 
wreaked buildings and infrastructure). 744 But the overall fight to conquer 
Islamist terrorism after the 9/11, on the contrary, can be seen as very visual 
in its nature. And namely concentrated on the visual figure of Osama bin 
Laden as the leader of the terrorist organization al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden 
was visually persistently present to the Western public all the way from the 
9/11 until his capture in 2011, and beyond. His face became familiar to all 
                                                
742 The Most Wanted Face of Terrorism. The New York Times, May 2, 2011: Bush confirms 
Bin Laden is Prime suspect. The Guardian, September, 15, 2001. ; THE PRESIDENT; Bin 
Laden Is Wanted in Attacks, 'Dead or Alive,' President Says, September 18, 2001, the New 
York Times. See the video of president Bush´s speech: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YFgn4EaCGQA 
743 Ibid. 
744 See previous chapter 5.  
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media followers throughout the world, as references to him in political 
connections, were transformed into visual representations by the 
mainstream media.  
Although after the Afghan War broke, bin Laden was nowhere to be 
found, and was suspected hiding somewhere in the Afghani or Pakistani 
mountains, he nevertheless made several public video appearances and 
delivered audio speeches that were aired globally, primarily by the Qatar 
based media company Al Jazeera. As Al Jazeera aired the manifestos of bin 
Laden, sent to them as audio-and videotapes by al Qaeda—the fierce 
speeches of bin Laden made it to the headlines of the worldwide media. Al 
Jazeera was forcefully criticized particularly in the United States for allowing 
bin Laden to voice his arguments and air his manifestos worldwide.745 
Regardless of the fact that many Western news outlets choose not to run the 
tapes because of political reasons, these outings nevertheless gathered 
international recognition and hoisted heated discussion, and made the news 
and headlines also in the Western sphere.  And consequently the words—and 
the intimidating face of the fugitive terrorist leader—spread around the 
world. In relation to the video talks of Bin Laden, the Western media 
customarily pictured Osama bin Laden posing with his famous Kalashnikov, 
against mountain-like background or in self-made like studio surroundings. 
In these visual representations the terrorist leader was pictured strong and 
defiant, often looking straight at the camera, while delivering his fierce 
messages, criticizing the United States and encouraging jihad. All in all, there 
was not much variation in the way Osama bin Laden was pictured during the 
time he was denounced as the number one enemy of the West and hunted by 
the Western forces: the calm bearded face was established as the figurehead 
of modern terrorism and the number one target of the “war on terror”. (See 
illustration 6.7)  
                                                
745  El-Nawawy, Mohammed & Iskandar, Adel:.Al-Jazeera: The Story Of The Network That Is 
Rattling Governments And Redefining Modern Journalism. Westview Press, Cambridge, 2003, 175-
184.; Cottle, 2008.   
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Serving Justice by Killing 
A turn in the public visual figure and the chase after the most wanted man 
took place almost 10 years after the 9/11 disasters. On May 2nd 2011, 
approximately an hour after midnight local Pakistani time, a small team of 
US Navy Seals raided a compound in a Pakistani town of Abbottabad. During 
the course of the CIA led operation “Neptune Spear”, Osama bin Laden was 
reported captured and killed. The Western world cheerfully welcomed the 
news of the death of the evil opponent.  
Late in the evening of May 2nd President Obama announced that the 
United States had killed Osama Bin Laden. Obama started his speech by 
emotional narration of the lost American lives in the 9/11 attacks. He 
referred to bin Laden as a mass murderer of thousands of innocent men, 
women and children. He phrased that as bin Laden was “committed to killing 
innocents in our country and around the globe”, and that the United States 
was impelled to go to war against bin Laden, his organization and ideology he 
represented in order “to protect our citizens, our friends and our allies”. In 
his speech Obama told that shortly after taking office, he had told Leon 
Panetta—the head of CIA—to make the killing or capture of bin Laden the top 
priority in the war against al Qaeda. Thus, Obama praised the death of bin 
Laden marking “the most significant achievement to date” in the American 
war on terrorism. The story of the killing of bin Laden was paraphrased by 
president Obama as a story of the American people’s “pursuit of prosperity”, 
commitment “to stand up for their values abroad”, and “sacrifices to make 
the world a better place”.  Obama nominated the act of killing bin Laden first 
and foremost as serving justice:  “his demise should be welcomed by all who 
believed in peace and human dignity”.  When describing the effect of the 
violent death of the opponent, The president paraphrased “justice has been 
done”. President named the operation as an endeavor of a small group of 
skillful elite men, and underlined the spirit of the operation as heroic. He 
stressed that the operation was intended to be limited and targeted in its 
scope, and further added that the extraordinarily courageous team of 
American soldiers took special care to avoid civilian casualties.746  
In describing the effect and ethos of the killing of bin Laden, other 
Western leaders widely followed the rhetoric of president Obama. John 
Kerry, chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, voiced the death 
to mark a watershed in the “war on terror”, yet added that that the 10 year 
“manhunt was in search of justice not revenge”.  The British Prime Minister 
David Cameron marked the death as a “massive step forward” in the fight 
against terrorism, and added that the death of bin Laden will bring “great 
relief to people across the world”. Also the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 
Netanyahu stated, that the killing is a “resounding triumph for justice, 
freedom and the values shared by all democratic nations fighting shoulder to 
shoulder in determination against terrorism”. Likewise, the Finnish Prime 
                                                
746 Remarks by the President on Osama Bin Laden: Osama Bin Laden Dead, The White House, 
May 2. 2011.  
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Minister Alexander Stubb stated that after the killing of bin Laden the world 
became a safer place. 747 Thus, the death of the terrorist leader was all around 
the Western sphere signified as a triumph of justice, victory of freedom, 
democracy and security. 
In the official US story bin Laden was told to have died after a brief 
firefight, and his body was told to have been taken into the custody of 
Americans, and buried at sea within hours of the death, according to Muslim 
tradition.748 Images of the captured bin Laden or his dead body were never 
released. The operation Neptune Spear meant a significant shift also in the 
visual descriptions of bin Laden.  Although no images of the actual death of 
bin Laden were released, his death and capture in the Western publicity can 
nevertheless be termed very visual. Western papers habitually marked the 
end of the terrorist leader with showy cover illustrations and flashy 
headlines.  And although the iconic image of bin Laden in his white turban 
was again at the center of these representations, the meanings and 
significations associated and linked with the familiar facial image 
significantly altered. The familiar image of bin Laden was accompanied with 
tabloid headlines such as: “Rot in Hell!” (The Daily News, May 2nd), Got 
Him! Vengeance at last! US nails the Bastard.” (New York Post, May 2nd), 
“He died covering behind his wife” (The Daily Telegraph) and “Bin Bagged” 
(The Sun), “A Coward to the End.  The mastermind of 9/11 used his wife as a 
human shield.” (The Daily express). Revengeful and jubilant welcoming of 
the death news was not only fostered by the yellow press, but was common 
also among the more seriously orientated news outlets. The New York Times 
front page of May 2nd declared: “Bin Laden killed by US forces in Pakistan, 
Obama says, declaring justice has been done.” Correspondingly announced 
The Washington Post (“Justice has been Done. US forces kill Osama bin 
Laden”) as well as The Times (“Justice has been done”). The Guardian ran 
the news by printing: “US gets its man—but how could he hide so long?”  A 
way of picturing the demise of the enemy was also pictured with a classic 
visual symbol marking death in photography: placing a red cross over the 
image of bin Laden (The Time749.) (See illustration 6.7) 
These representations widely circulating in the Western media added a 
strong scent of revengefulness and gratifying feel to the act of killing the 
enemy. As justice been served by killing was throughout Western media and 
political contexts strongly emphasized, also the cowardly nature of bin Laden 
was reiterated in the media representations. His last moments were 
presented as disgraceful, and revealing of his true nature. The victory of the 
West—and the US—was the central message of these representations. Killing 
the enemy was openly celebrated and joyfulness of the act was expressed, 
                                                
747 Osma bin Laden death welcomed by David Cameron, The Guardian, May 2. 2011. ; Stubb: 
Maailma on astetta turvallisempi paikka. Yle News, May 2. 2011.  
748 Remarks by the President on Osama Bin Laden: Osama Bin Laden Dead, The White House, 
May 2. 2011.  
749 The cover of the Time special issue, May 2011.  The Time has used the same symbolic red cross 
crossing over diseased dictators for decades, including Adolf Hitler in the issue of  May 7th 1945.  
332
 333 
both in the yellow press as well as in the political proclamations, as well the 
more serious media. The story of the killing of bin Laden took a form of a 
traditional morality story, rich in religious features (just as was the case with 
Hussein and Gaddafi). The act of killing was presented as a victorious act of 
(Western) heroes defeating an (non-Western) evil villain.  The act as marking 
the fulfillment of justice was crucial for the story: restoring the right order of 
things was seen to be attained by killing the evil.  
 
The (In)visible Death of Osama Bin Laden 
Although—unlike in the cases of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi—
no images of the actual capture, killing, or the (dead) body of bin Laden were 
released, the killing of Osama bin Laden can be said to have created a 
widespread and influential visual spectacle. The events on the night when 
Osama bin Laden met his destiny have been predominantly told from the 
viewpoint of the US and drawing from the information told by the US 
officials. The visual material presented of the event in public, has been solidly 
controlled by the US intelligence. When looking at how the capture and the 
news of Osama bin Laden killing were visualized in the Western media it 
becomes very lucid is that these visual arrangements were largely about 
making visible and invisible. 750  
The absence of the ‘kill image’ was a subject of heated discussion in the 
West. President Obama told that he did not want to release the post-mortem 
images (indicating that such images existed, and that he, among others had 
seen them). Obama said to CBS: “It is important to make sure that very 
graphic photos of someone who was shot in the head are not floating around 
as an incitement to additional violence or as a propaganda tool”, and added, 
“We don’t trot out this stuff as trophies.” The president added that the 
graphic nature of the images could have also created national security 
risks.751 Heated talk about the absence of the post-mortem photograph 
followed. Some felt an urgent need to see the images or even demanded the 
presentation of pictorial evidence of the events and of the defeated body of 
the evildoer. The age-old idea of the evidence function of grim post-mortem 
photographs was at the heart of this discussion. The fact that the pictures 
were not seen for some meant that something was hidden, and the absence of 
visual proof raised suspicion of the act really taking place. The absence of the 
images was thus also fertile ground for conspiracy theories. Moreover, what 
was discussed in relation to the missing images was (government) 
censorship.752  
                                                
750 Priya Dixit writes much about this in her article: Dixit, Priya: Decolonializing visuality in security 
studies: Reflections on the death of Osama bin Laden. Critical Studies on Security, 2:3, 2014, 337-351, 
341.  
751 Obama: I won´t release bin Laden death photos. CBS News. May 5, 2011: ; Members of 
the Congress see bin Laden Photos: CNN, May 12, 2011.  
752 for topical discussion on the subject see:  
Campbell, David: Thinking images v. 16: Osama bin Laden and the Pictorial Staging of Politics. 
May 6, 2001:  
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Furthermore, to add the mysteriousness revolving around the death of bin 
Laden, US troops were told to have buried the body of bin Laden at sea later 
the same day, after the body had been inspected and identified by officials in 
Afghanistan. Thus there was no tangible—corporal or visual—proof of the 
events really taking place as they were told by the authorities. President 
Obama told that the officials decided to keep the whereabouts of the last 
resting place of bin Laden unidentifiable, because they wanted to prevent it 
from becoming a site of pilgrimage.753 The whole event—due to what was 
seen as missing visual evidence of the actual killing (an image of the body of 
the enemy)—remained somewhat mysterious and filled with unanswered 
questions.  As The BagNews—a news outlet specializing in visual politics and 
analysis of news photographs—put it, the message seemed to be: “We can’t 
show you what ultimately happens, but we’ll tell you what we think you 
should know”. 754  Thus, the representations of the event was forcefully 
controlled and governed by US officials, who up to a large extent, had the 
power to determine what was seen of the event, what was not see, and how 
we saw it.  
In absence of (official) images755 of the actual killing or the dead body of 
Osama bin Laden, several other ways of visualizing the defeat of the enemy 
followed in the Western media publicity.  The story of bin Laden’s demise 
was habitually illustrated by images of the “compound”, or the house, where 
the terrorist leader had supposedly spent his last years—and where he was 
finally captured and killed.756 Images of the house were displayed in many 
news outlets. Among these images also extremely graphic images of the 
bloody corpses of “unidentified” men killed in the operation were seen. 
Although the operation was termed by the US as “surgical raid by a small 
team designed to minimize collateral damage”, four civilians present in the 
compound (in addition to bin Laden), were killed in the operation. Images of 
the bystander victims lying in puddles of their own blood were openly 
exhibited and circulated. These victims were sparsely mentioned in the 
official narrative of the events. But the images of the aftermath of the raid in 
the compound show in a crude and a corporal way the human toll of the 
brave and heroic “surgical operation”.757 According to Reuters, a Pakistani 
official sent these graphic images to them, and the images have been 
generally regarded as authentic. 758  
                                                                                                                                     
;Brook, Pete:  Bin Laden, Bin dying. Prison Phtography,May 4, 2011 ; The deeper Price of 
censorship: White house nixes phot of bin Laden’s body. The Bagnews, May 4, 2011 ;Why 
death photos matter. Colberg, Jörg, The Wall Street Journal, May 4, 2011.  
753 Obama: I won´t release bin Laden death photos 
754 The deeper Price of censorship: White house nixes phot of bin Laden´s body. 
755 By official I mean that there were instantly massive amounts of fake images and images claiming to 
present the dead body of OBL circulating in the internet, but no images released by officials, or images 
confirmed genuine.  
756 See the photos : Exclusive: Inside the Compound Where Osama bin Laden was killed.  
ABC News.  
757 See for instance: Dixit, 2014, 341.  
758 See for example: Osama bin Laden compound in Abbottabad –in pictures. The Guardian, 
May 4, 2011 ; Inside bin Laden´s compound. Reuters, May 4, 2011.  
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The core story told by the compound images in their use by the Western 
media was, on one hand, the reality-effect given by the images describing and 
showing the actual place of the events.  These images were presented so that 
they seemed to give some concreteness to the otherwise feebly visually 
documented event of the killing. Thus they functioned as enhancing the 
believability to the act of killing really taking place as it was told by the US 
officials. This seemed to be important especially in absence of the proof effect 
endowed by post-mortem images. But, on the other hand, they also offered 
the Western spectating world a scenery into the previously unseen, secret life 
of Osama bin Laden: A voyeuristic view to the everyday life of the mythical 
fugitive terrorist leader. Images of the medicine and foodstuff kept in the 
house, as well as of the wardrobes of the inhabitants were exhibited and 
explained in detail in Western media. Furthermore, the bedroom of Osama 
bin Laden was exhibited in images for the Western viewers. The message 
these images seem to be the everydayness and banality (of the 
house/lifestyle) of the number one terrorist: his unmade messy bed, the trash 
left behind by the feared ex-leader and the overall intimate everyday 
surroundings where bin Laden and his family dwelled. (see illustration 6.7) 
A taste of ridicule and revengefulness, as well as an aspect of stripping the 
power of the defeated leader can be detected in the way the images of the 
intimate everyday scenes were presented. Showing “how they lived” —the 
everydayness, dirtiness and the messiness of the house (gone through a 
violent raid by a special force operation) —were then, in the news language 
and the visual arrangements, associated with the moral character of the 
enemy (and his close ones). A story of bin Laden’s porn collection found from 
the compound was ran by many Western media outlets, and tabloids ran 
images of the terrorist leader watching porn in his hideaway, in attempts to 
underline his corrupt moral character.759  Underlining of the mundane 
everydayness strips the power as well as tames the formerly feared leader —
makes him at last just a person, someone who can be killed and defeated, 
someone needs not to be feared anymore. In this respect these images 
resemble the way in which Saddam Hussein’s hiding place was presented in 
the Western media after his capture: The visual representation of the 
“spiderhole” he was found hiding in, as well as the small dirty house he 
dwelled and its interior. Traits of this same function can be also detected in 
the culvert and freezer images of Gaddafi. Thus, it seems that publically and 
visually showing the intimate details of the opponents personal life is a form 
of punishment; it diminishes, contains a sense of ridicule, and functions as a 
form of making the enemy less threatening. Showing the everyday banality, 
smallness and corporal humanness of the (formerly feared) enemy is a visual 
practice of taking the leadership away and neutralizing the iconic enemy—
making the enemy obsolete in a highly visual and metaphorical manner.  
                                                
759 Osama bin Laden’s pornography stash to remain under wraps, US decides. Guardian, 
May 20, 2015. ; Cover of New York Post, May 14, 2011. See illustration 6.7. 
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In addition to the compound images the event of the killing of bin Laden, 
was furthermore marked by another interesting visual spectacle.  When the 
news of the killing of bin Laden broke, openly cheerful public demonstrations 
were seen in the streets of many Western countries.  Namely in US crowds 
gathered in the streets to celebrate the death of bin Laden. Images of these 
events were habitually used to illustrate the news of the death of bin Laden in 
the Western media, and such images were collected into photo-galleries in 
prominent Western news outlets. These images presented boisterous 
Westerners carrying US flags, as well as posters mocking and ridiculing 
Osama—and sometimes cheering Obama. The celebrations following the kill 
resembled the hubris of jubilant parties after victorious sport events, added 
with political revengeful, bloodthirsty tones. (see illustration 6.7) These 
openly bloodthirsty demonstrations were in the Western mainstream media 
quite seldom met with critical tones of voices, but rather presented as normal 
and understandable behavior in such an occasion.760 Even though the 
jubilant crowds celebrating the death of the (national) enemy are hard to 
apprehend as something else than macabre shows of people taking joy out of 
a bloody revenge. And thus, despite the fact the death of the enemy was in 
official statements and political rhetoric aspired to be framed as not being a 
revenge of the 9/11 bloodshed, the public outburst of joy revealed the 
vengeful and violent ethos bubbling under. For a brief moment the death of a 
single man (being an influential terrorist leader and an iconic evil 
“mastermind”) became to symbolize victory of the West—US in front—over 
modern Islamist terrorism and the evil which was seen as threatening the 
“Western way of life”. The celebrations on the streets can be seen as 
simulation of winning a postmodern war—one that does not end in a truce or 
an official peace treaty.  But, at the same time these macabre public 
outbursts, relishing on death and violence, collide and contradict the 
humanitarian and humane ethos much reiterated in the Western political 
speech and public proclamations.  
Yet another widely used way of visualizing the event is noteworthy:  the 
photographs of the ‘Situation Room’ of the White House. These images, 
taken and released by the US government, picture the highest US military 
and foreign policy leaders watching what was told to be visual material of 
operation Neptune Spear. 761  Publishing the images can be seen as one way 
of attempting to verify the events really taking place as described by the 
officials, and pursuit in giving an impression of openness and transparency. 
Or then, they can be seen as telling of tendentious political framing: an 
attempt of molding of the public understanding of the events and skillfully 
governing the view of the spectators into the event of the killing. The most 
used, circulated and discussed of these images picture the Situation Room 
                                                
760 Celebrating the death of Osama bin Laden: Reactions and celebrations across the globe in 
pictures., The Telegraph, 2011.; Celebarting bin Laden´s death: Ugly perhaps but only 
human.  Carey, Benedict, The New York Times, May 5, 2011.  
761 President Obama monitors the bin Laden mission. The Times (Images by Pete Souza/ The 
White House), 2011.  
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filled with people, intensively looking at something on a screen in front of 
them. The photo has been taken from in front, from the right side of the 
room, showing several serious men - among them President Obama, Head of 
CIA Leon Panetta, Vice President Joe Biden and National Security Adviser 
Tom Donilon - and two women; an unidentified/unnamed (at least in the 
caption of the image) woman standing on the background, away from the 
table, surrounded by men taller to her, struggling to see the screen, and on 
the foreground the Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. As being told, 
at the moment of taking of the image, the members of the national security 
team were “receiving an update on the mission”.  (See illustration 6.7) 
The intent of releasing the image series can be seen to be giving an 
impression of the leaders of the US firmly following and being in control of 
the crucial events taking place on the other side of the globe. But what also 
draws attention to the series of images, as used in the media, was that the 
spectators of these images actually have no way of knowing what the people 
in the images were looking at. To quote Pete Brook, what the security officials 
in the images were actually looking at might be “murders in progress… or 
waiting nervously for the screen to boot up”762.  The spectators of these 
images have no way of knowing. 763 (see illustration 6.7)  
Another aspect that hoisted discussion over the Situation Room images in 
the West was a detail in one of the images: Hillary Clinton, looking firmly 
and seriously at the screen, and covering her mouth with her hand. Her 
bodily gesture—a classic, feminine shocked pose—separates her from the 
other (male) spectators, whom are pictured as serious and calmly 
concentrating on what they see. This photo raised a lot of public discussion, 
namely because of Clinton’s bodily gesture, supposedly brought on by seeing 
the killing of bin Laden or some other violent events live from the compound. 
Clinton herself has told, that she can’t recall what she saw or was thinking at 
the moment the picture was taken, and that she was probably sneezing due to 
her allergies. But what is noteworthy is the selection of this particular frame 
as one of the images released on global display. Why was this particular 
photograph presenting the female leader in an emotional character and a 
vulnerable light in front of violent event, —as compared to her male 
colleagues pictured as cool and in control—released (undoubtedly 
premeditatedly) by the US government to narrate the event? One cannot help 
acknowledging Clinton’s gesture, and thinking of it as postulating that she is 
(because of her gender) shocked and amazed when seeing and visually 
witnessing the (corporal, perhaps, violent) consequences of her own 
orders..764 This preference seems to speak about the gendered norms of 
visually depicting female (leaders). 765 
                                                
762 Brook, 2011.  
763 Later it was actually learned that at the time of the actual raid into the compound, at a critical 
moment there was a  break in the transmission, and thus the actual killing in real time was told not be 
available for distant spectators. See: Dixit, 2014 
764 Hillary Clinton reaction in Osama bin Laden situation Room photo finally 
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Moreover, in addition to the clearly gendered picturing of even the 
highest female leaders, what is perhaps more noteworthy in the Situation 
Room images in the context of the enemy narratives is that the high ranking 
officials and political leaders of US—making decisions on the operation and 
ultimately on the destiny of bin Laden—are pictured as spectators, sitting 
comfortably in a room, thousands of kilometers away from the site of the 
actual operation. The remoteness from the actual dirty killing, distances the 
actual primus motors of the act from the violence, and places them in the 
audience, as spectators of “the awe and horror” they ultimately ordered and 
orchestrated themselves. The picture suggests and highlights that the killing 
and the bloodshed is happening somewhere else, outside the power and 
influence of the individuals pictured in the images. The (gendered) bodily 
gesture of Hillary Clinton works to further fortify the impressions of distance 
and irresponsibility of the leaders given by the picturing. 766 
6.3 THE SHARED FEATURES OF THE ENEMY 
NARRATIVES  
All three recent spectacular cases of Western enemies, their construction 
and visual presentation in the Western publicity entail distinct and unique 
characters that are interesting in themselves and in their particular 
contexts, time and place. They all, in their singular and individual features 
tell interesting stories also in the context of Western humanitarian world 
politics. But, what makes them further intriguing and even more worth of 
critical inspection are their shared features. First of all, presentations of the 
Western enemies in Western publicity share a functional and practical 
foundation, which is based on the political situation at hand. Secondly, the 
presentations of the three central enemies seem to entail coordinated stages 
and features of representation, which comprise a rather coherent narrative. 
The common structural political basis, as well as shared narrative and visual 
features of the three visual enemy narratives, is the subject of the following 
subchapters.  
6.3.1 POLITICALLY APPROPRIATE ENEMY SPECTACLES: THE 
INTERPLAY OF POLITICS AND MEDIA IN CONSTRUCTING THE 
ENEMIES 
Following the historical formation of the three central recent contemporary 
enemy narratives it is clear, that each of the enemy spectacles have in their 
time been politically appropriate, convenient and useful from the Western 
                                                                                                                                     
5, 2011. ; Campbell, David: Thinking images v. 16: Osama bin Laden and the Pictorial Staging of 
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765 Dixit, 2014, 342-343.  
766 See: Jantunen, 2013, 145-166.  
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perspective. The spectacles of Osama bin Laden, Muammar Gaddafi and 
Saddam Hussein in Western publicity have been built on political premises 
of their time, according to prevalent needs, in order to serve political ends. 
The recent Western representations of political opponents have fluxed, 
changed and gathered stronger tones and the frequency of their presentation 
has accelerated according to political needs and circumstances; just like 
enemy imageries have always done all through the course of history.767 In 
other words, the evil figures of foreign leaders have emerged and 
strengthened accordingly to political fluctuations and their emergence, 
development and construction has in each case been politically appropriate 
and functional from the point of view of Western (namely US) international 
political aspirations and strategic positions. Thus the representations can be 
also termed as propagandist in their features as well as uses.  
The threat of the contemporary enemies and the regimes they represent 
has firstly been vigorously build up in Western political speech—official 
political statements and proclamations of high-level Western leaders. After 
their initial outlining in downright political contexts, the enemy figures have 
been consequently solidified within the mainstream media through their 
repeated circulation. They have flown from the upper level political rhetoric 
and use into popular much circulated representations within the mainstream 
media, and by their frequent representation and repetition formed into thick 
images well-known and influential in the Western sphere. The markedly 
convergent ethos and features of the enemy imageries in political contexts, as 
well as in the representations of the media, reveal the close ties between 
political power, predominant cultural and political elite mindset, and the 
predominant popular media representations.768   
The connections between politics and media have been extensively 
discussed and documented in social sciences, communications and war and 
media studies (and also touched upon in the previous chapters of this work). 
Generally, the mainstream media can be seen as functioning as a part of the 
ideological machinery of a given cultural and political sphere; and thus 
media representations often reveal and reflect the dominant political and 
ideological ethos prominent in the given time, place, cultural and political 
surroundings. Without taking into account the direct propaganda efforts or 
government restrictions imposed on media in times of conflicts and war, it 
has been found recurrently in research that, clearly the predominant 
governmental politics also indirectly influence (national) media in its 
mediation of information. In liberal democracies the connections between 
media and political elite consensus have been reported to fortify namely in 
times of conflict and war. In times of crisis and (military) conflicts the media 
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seems to direct by its representations of political issues into the direction of 
elite consensus, and the mainstream media’s outings and general line have 
even been often seen even as succumbing to military cheerleading and 
overtly patriotic representations.769 When scrutinizing the representations of 
the recent Western political opponents and leaders of rivalry regimes it 
becomes clear that the Western media has acted as a force multiplier for the 
politically constructed and convenient enemy images, initially created in 
high-level political contexts and speech. The circulation of the enemy 
representations within the mainstream media has amplified the predominant 
ideological paradigms and dominant politically appropriate interpretations 
of the Western enemies—as well as notions of the virtuous nature of Western 
politics—that have been first and foremost built on the then prevailing 
(foreign) political premises.  
Furthermore, contemporarily news media occupies a key terrain in 
which—particularly in times of war and conflict—the battle for hearts and 
minds of domestic populations is fought. Therefore, news media does not 
only communicate or mediate events of war, but also work to shape the 
conceptions of large public on war/politics, and thus also influence the 
course and conduct of crisis/war. Nowadays war, as well as sentiments about 
war and enmity, are communicated through media spectacles, which are 
entered into the course and conduct of war via media (as well as political 
rhetoric, which also habitually becomes mediated and circulated through 
news media) and thus, war is not only communicated by news media, but 
also becomes conducted in and through it.770 Therefore, I see that the 
representations of the Western enemies within the Western mainstream 
media are not only a part of the constructions of today’s Western political 
identity and ethos, but also furthermore, they are powerful political weapons, 
used to legitimate, rationalize and justify political acts; even wars and 
military operations. 
The treatment Colonel Gaddafi got in the British media at the time of his 
defeat is emblematic of this phenomenon—the close relations between 
media, culture, history political power and elite opinion—sketched above. 
Although the bloody, revengeful and brutal, yet jubilant presentations 
informing the public of the fall of Gaddafi were widespread throughout 
Western publicity, it seems that British media, in comparison to other 
Western media outlets, was perhaps blood thirstiest in its representation. 
The cover of The Sun (21st of October, 2011, See Illustration 6.3), 
metonymizes the British media’s treatment of the bloodstained death of the 
dictator in an emblematical way. The Sun features two brutal images of 
mugged and bloody Gaddafi at his last moments alive and accompanies them 
with a text “Gaddafi killed by bullet in the head. That’s for Lockerbie. And for 
Yvonne Fletcher. And IRA Semtex victims”.   For the British audience the text 
ties the image into British history of the past decades in an easily 
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understandable and digestible, familiar form. The text justifies and glorifies 
the brutal act of killing by referring to historical, nationally important and 
traumatic crimes of Gaddafi, well-known and remembered in Britain. The 
justification of killing Gaddafi is associated to the Lockerbie bombing, British 
victims of Irish National Army terror attacks where explosive substance 
Semtex provided by Libyan regime was used, and killing of a British police 
officer Yvonne Fletcher in 1984 by Libyan nationalists.771 The ferocious 
presentations of the British media can be seen as a result of political and 
historical reasons, and the traumatic relations of Britain and the Gaddafi 
regime. But the media’s presentation of the event, and its justifications, 
actually closely follow the worlds of the highest political elite—Prime 
Minister Cameron. Since the themes—Lockerbie, IRA Semtex and Yvonne 
Fletcher—were also precisely the refrains that Cameron took up in his 
comments concerning the killing of Gaddafi.772  
The cover of The Sun vividly illustrates how media representations load 
historical, cultural and political content into images.773 A picture taken by 
amateur (mobile phone) photographer—most likely a Libyan civilian or a 
rebellion fighter—in 2011, is swiftly connected into a traumatic historical 
event, which are easily understandable for the British audience: the pain and 
suffering caused by the terror attack in Lockerbie in the 1980s. For the Brits 
(and for Western spectators) the Lockerbie reference politicizes the image in 
a familiar way, and the text also points to the feeling of violent retaliation and 
justice served by killing Gaddafi. The killing of Gaddafi thus appears as a 
revenge for his past bad deeds, and appears as a deserved destiny for the 
brutal leader. There is a bloodthirsty, revengeful tinge in the representations, 
which justifies the brutal handling of Gaddafi through the familiar, 
(nationalistic) political references to the traumatic history. The message of 
The Sun cover moreover ties the revenge and payback theme neatly and 
topically to the British involvement in the Libyan humanitarianly justified 
operation Unified Protector. The representation can also be read in the 
context of the politics of the actual moment, as Britain took part in the 
humanitarianly justified bombing campaigns, which forced Gaddafi out 
Tripoli, and which eventually lead to his death. The choice of the image and 
text are those of the paper, but the influence of (national) politics on the 
                                                
771 Lockerbie bombing, explosive substance Semtex was provided by Gaddafi to Irish National Army 
(IRA) and the death of Yvonne Fletcher can be seen as the three major and traumatic  incidents of 
1980’s, by which the British public remember the Gaddafi regime, and its brutality.  IRA used Semtex 
provided by Gaddafi in several disastrous terror attacks. Gaddafi regime admitted its guilt of providing 
Semtex in 2010.  The Lockerbie event – a passenger aircraft -Pan Am flight 103 - exploded in air over 
the town of Lockerbie in Scotland. The aircraft was exploded by Libyan nationalists (terrorists) in 
1988. All passengers on the flight were killed, plus 11 local residents by the debris of the plane hitting 
ground. Gaddafi regime accepted responsibility of the event in 2003. Yvonne Fletcher was a British 
police officer, who was killed in line of duty in a demonstration outside of the Libyan embassy in 1984. 
His death was central in Margaret Thatcher’s decision allowing Ronal Reagan to launch a bombing 
campaign against Gaddafi’s Libya in 1986. The Libyan government took responsibility of her death in 
1999.  
772 Gaddafi Death hailed by David Cameron, The Independent, 20 October .  
773 Barthes, 1977, 25-27, 39; Butler, 2009, 63-65. 
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representation is obvious.  Especially so, as the cover illustration follows the 
public political proclamation made by the Prime Minister, and thus closely 
follows political elite interpretation of the events. 
Regardless of the fact that the text and the image were selected by the 
newspaper, the influence of high level governmental politics, ideological and 
political stand point for the formation of the message are clear. Additionally, 
the influence of the message of this politically produced narrative on public 
opinion, national and cultural attitudes, and finally for the topical British 
national politics in relation to Libya cannot be separated from each other. 
Furthermore, besides implicitly cheerleading the topical military campaign, 
the representation of The Sun participates in governmental politics and takes 
part in the propagandist ‘information struggle’ per se, as it explains and 
works to justify the interventionist actions of Brits in the crisis, along with 
presenting the killing of Gaddafi by forces ally to the Brits as not only 
victorious, but as heroic, virtuous and serving justice. Furthermore, the 
influence of the constellation of image and text in the cover illustration—and 
the ethos they together create—draws from public sentiments and cultural 
positioning, at the same time constructing them. What this example of the 
representation of Gaddafi vividly tells is, how (national) politics and media 
representations cannot be separated from each other, but intertwines, 
interconnect and interact in multitude of ways.  
6.3.2 THE NARRATIVE STAGES OF PICTURING THE ENEMY: THE 
THREAT, THE HUNT, THE CATCH AND THE PUNISHMENT  
By following the visual presentations of the recent enemy figures in Western 
publicity it becomes evident that the ways in which the enemies of the West 
are framed, described and visually treated contains shared content and 
features. The treatment and stories of the enemies form patterns, which 
create a somewhat consistent narrative of the contemporary evil in the 
context of Western international politics. In the following I shall summarize 
how the recent enemy narratives have been constructed and assembled, and 
what kind of narrative and visual features they entail, as well as contemplate 
on what the shared narrative features tell of the contemporary spectacle of 
the Western enemy, as well as of the ethos of Western international politics 
of our time.  
 
The Strong Orientalist, Evil Enemies of the Virtuous Humanitarian 
West 
Binary juxtaposition—and representations—of us and the other are at the 
root of all human thinking. The other is needed to construct self-identity. 
Realizing and understanding us, and in defining ourselves—as individuals 
and as groups and regimes—a sense of who and what we are, and on the 
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other hand what we are not, is vital.774 Representations of enemies can be 
seen as such representations, necessary for identity formation, political 
coherence and unity. Thus, just like the in-group ‘us’, also the ultimate other 
needs to be constructed, again and again. Especially in times of conflict, the 
enemy—the opponent of us—is needed for inner cohesion and a sense of a 
mission.  
All three iconic enemy figureheads of our time have been at first—in the 
early stages of building the enemy images, when they punctured the Western 
publicity in times of acute crisis—without exception presented as to be 
strong, threatening and vigorous. They have been framed as being able to 
harm not only their own people, neighboring states or the West, but the 
humankind and humanity in its entirety.775 The early images of Hussein, 
Gaddafi and bin Laden all build on sentiments of threat and visual traits of 
strength.  The destructive force of Hussein, Gaddafi and bin Laden was 
emphasized both in rhetoric and visual means by highlighting masculinity, 
aggressiveness, and militaristic features. Often the enemy characters of the 
West opposing leaders were built up by using strong othering visual means, 
such as orientalizing elements. This can be seen in the textual framings of the 
enemies, as well as in the images of all of the tyrants, in the form of physical 
appearance, clothing as well as physical cultural surroundings in which they 
are pictured. The topical enemy figures—Arab leaders and Muslim 
terrorists—can be seen to for a significant degree to build on the age-old 
stereotypical orientalist caricatures of the backward, anti-modern, barbaric, 
aggressive and expansive, cruel and threatening Eastern others familiar from 
historical Western representations.776 
Moreover, concurrently with presenting the opponents of the Western 
order, way of life and values in features underlining their strength, the 
enemies have also been presented as immoral, somewhat pervert, irrational, 
insane, and sometimes animal-like. Visual features pointing to the 
derangement of the leaders have fortified rhetorical framings pointing to the 
insanity of the enemies (such as the mad dog of Middle-East).  Nominating 
the opponent as insane and mad are age-old methods of picturing the 
opponent as the absolute enemy. The strong juxtaposition of the non-
Western irrational evil and rational and virtuous Western good is elementary 
for these representations. In an ultimate form, the thus other becomes 
established in a figure of evil enemy; as something totally divergent from us, 
as an eternal ultimate enemy, which needs to be destroyed for the good to 
prevail. Suggesting that the opponents are mad and irrational, is also 
suggesting that have no rational reasons, root causes nor motives for their 
bloody actions; it is stating that they are just pure deranged evil. 
                                                
774 Harle, 2010. 10-12;Kotilainen& Vuorinen, 2014.  
775 See for example: Remarks by the President upon Arrival. Office of the Press Secretary, The 
White House, September 16, 2001. ; Remarks by the President on Osama Bin Laden: Osama 
Bin Laden Dead, The White House, May 2. 2011. ; President Bush Addresses the Nation, The 
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, March 19t. 2003.   
776 Said, 2003 (1978).  
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Furthermore, framing the actions of the opponents as purely evil and insane 
exposes how the purposes and causes behind terrorism or violent politics are 
not understood, or at least not wanted to be addressed. This tells of a 
tendency in the Western political rhetoric, where the actions of political 
opponents are not presented as stemming from neither ideology nor societal 
or global political root causes, but proposed as actions of the evil. 777   
Emblematic of this is how President Bush referred to the 9/11 attacks as 
actions of the evil. He framed the contemporary evil as a new form, a 
contemporary incarnation of the eternal evil, a mutation, which has to be 
fought with novel methods. 778  President Bush went as far as calling the fight 
to conquer the evil “a crusade”.779  The characterization of Bush is 
emblematic for (traditional) Western framings of the evil.  The enemy figures 
have thus, in addition to orientalizing elements, gathered devilish qualities 
and the narratives have entailed strong religious (Christian) streaks. The 
religious traits in the representation of the enemies have presented the 
contemporary opponents as embodiments of the biblical eternal evil, which 
the Western powers (and the political and cultural sphere) must oppose, and 
finally to destroy, in order for the right order to be restored and the good to 
prevail. Thus the fight to overcome the opponent has in each case become 
framed as a classic Christian fight of the “sons of light” over the “forces of 
darkness”, in blatantly biblical terms.780 It seems, that at times of heightened 
conflict it politically functional to present the opponent in totalizing or 
outright biased and propagandist manners; not only as strong and 
threatening characters restoring to evil political maxims, but in the form of 
the eternal, ultimate evil enemy of the essentially virtuous West. A war 
rationalized as fight to conquer the archfiend is strong argument in preparing 
fertile ground for escalation of conflict, gathering public support for counter 
actions, as well as legitimizing full-blown war. All means possible need to be 
harnessed to defeat the ultimate evil enemies.  
Historically, black-and-white representations of evil enemies have been 
useful in legitimating aggressive behavior, and in justifying the necessity of 
escalation of a conflict and war, as well as to explain the sacrifices and 
suffering produced by the fight.781 When looking at the construction and uses 
of the enemy representations during our era, it becomes evident this still is 
their function. The recent enemy imageries and their construction can be 
                                                
777 Wolfe, Alan: Political Evil. What is it and how to combat it. Vintage Books, New York, 
2011.; Ignatieff, Michael:  How To Learn the Language of Evil, the Slate,  26. 
September, 2011.  
778 “This is a new kind of — a new kind of evil. … we've never seen this kind of evil before.  But the evil-
doers have never seen the American people in action before, either—and they're about to find out.” 
Remarks by the President upon Arrival. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, 
September 16, 2001.  
779 Bush phrased: “This crusade, this war on terrorism is going to take a while.”: Remarks by the 
President Upon Arrival. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, September 16, 2001.  
780 See for example: Harle, Vilho: European Roots of Dualism and its alternatives in International 
Relations. In European Values in International Relations. Harle, Vilho (ed.), Pinter, London, 
1990, 1-14; Said, 2003(1978) 3-35.; Harle, 1991, 25-32.  
781 Ibid.  
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seen as topical versions of an age-old Western tradition of binary thinking, 
central for Western tradition of political thought and identity formation. In 
this way, the figures of Osama bin Laden, Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam 
Hussein can be seen as contemporary reincarnations of the eternal evil 
enemy (of the West).  
 
The Hunt to Capture the Evil and to Restore the Western Order 
After the first representational stage, during which the political opponents of 
the Western politics were presented as threatening, strong, and in mad and 
in demonic features, a second phase—the manhunt—has in each case 
followed. Manhunts, military operations and wars—the war on terror and 
namely the Afghan war (2001-2014), as well as the Iraq war (2003-2010) and 
the operation Unified Protector in Libya (2011)—have all been framed and 
legitimized as humanitarian in their motives and nature. But moreover these 
operations have been rationalized by the necessity of ousting demonic 
leaders out of power—and existence. Ousting the bad leaders of the conflict 
areas and capturing them have been in each case been high among the many 
ambitious objectives of the operations. Annihilating the evil figureheads has 
been asserted to restore a more humane order, to solve the problems of these 
conflict prone areas, to end the enmity between the West and the target areas 
of military operations. The operations targeted to oust most wanted figures 
out of power have also been rhetorically framed as hunts.  The objective has 
been in each of the cases to “smoke them out of their holes”, into the 
daylight, “bring to justice” or to force them “out of power”—and finally to 
destroy them.  782   
At the time of launching of the operations the visual representational style 
as well as the political rhetoric describing the enemies has presented the 
leaders on the other hand as deranged, but still capable of apocalyptic deeds; 
as strong, threatening and capricious. Catching these evil and strong 
figureheads has been among the most imposing, visible, spectacular and 
popularly appealing features of the military operations. Framing these 
operations as fights against devilish enemies has in each case been 
essential—and effectively used in motivating and legitimating usage of 
extreme counter actions.  Presenting the military operations as endeavors to 
capture and destroy the evil is appealing to the public, as it has simplified the 
often complicated, messy operations and long dragged wars. Framing these 
operations as fights of the sons of light chasing the devil off of this world not 
only simplifies, but also promotes and sells the operations for home fronts 
and large masses in an easily digestible, culturally resonating and familiar 
ways. Demonizing the opponent (and particularly the leader figure) and 
framing the fight as an inevitable sacred battle in order to conquer the 
eternal enemy gives not only certainty, but a sense of these operations as 
                                                
782 President Urges Readiness and Patience. The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. 
September 15, 2001; President Bush Addresses the Nation, The White House, Office of the Press 
Secretary, March 19 2003; Obama: Gaddafi Must Leave Now. The Time, February 27. 2011.  
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missions that cannot be avoided nor disentangled without extreme actions 
and sacrifices. The strong evil figureheads have been essential for the recent 
Western military operations, their rationalization, legitimization and public 
support.  
In the representations of the hunt-stage an interesting shared feature is 
prevalent: restoring by historical analogies. In demonizing the recent foreign 
political opponents—in addition to referring to the Satan—historical 
references pointing to infamous past dictators have been commonplace.  
Framing the topical corrupt and violent foreign leaders as reincarnations 
Hitler or likening them with some other historical leader figure whom have 
caused substantial terror and suffering beyond comprehension, has been a 
recurring method.783 Even if historical analogies may sometimes be eye-
opening and even instructive, they usually are on the contrary misleading. 
Historical analogies are more often used as simplifying caricatures rather 
than instructive insights into solving the problems of the present situation.  
As Alan Wolfe states in his book Political Evil: “Everything is what it is, not 
another thing. Unfitting historical analogies are more hurtful than fruitful. 
They steer attention away from the present situation and the politics behind 
it, by referring to historical horrors. This directs the attention away from a 
possibility of understanding the situation at hand.”784 Moreover, reciting past 
atrocities, as Barbie Zelizer reminds us, works to forget the contemporary 
ones. The injustices and horrors of today are bad enough as they are, and 
contrasting them with historical predecessors also works to undermine the 
possibilities of taking into account—or even trying to solve—the political 
preconditions that have created the violent political actions, phenomena and 
ideologies at hand.785  
But, first and foremost, likening the contemporary rivalry leaders with 
their demonized and iconized historical predecessors’ works emphasizes 
their strong and threatening nature, and suggests that they need to be 
stopped at any price before the history repeats itself. Likening Saddam 
Hussein with Hitler says: if we don’t stop him now with relentless force, we 
will shortly have a new Holocaust in our hands. This, if anything, is a 
powerful rhetorical plea, an unjust and a dishonest one perhaps, but 
powerful and well fitted for intensifying the conflict, as well as preparing for 
conflict and motivating military action. Furthermore, it places the Western 
forces in the position of the heroic past defenders of good moral order and 
humanity. The strong evil must be destroyed, and the right moral order has 
to be restored by ‘us’: this is the idea reiterated all over again at the phase 
when the evil enemies have been hunted. The idea in each case of the enemy 
hunts has been, that conquering the evil leader leads to restoring the right 
order. President Bush announced the operation to catch Saddam Hussein as 
an effort to protect civilians from harm, and to defend “our freedom” and to 
                                                
783 Harle, 1991, 132-133.  
784 Wolfe, 2011, 15. 
785 Zelizer, 1998, 202- 239 
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“bring freedom to others”.786  As he also framed the hunt to catch bin Laden 
saying: “I want him—I want justice”.787 A conception that a state of a right, 
somewhat natural moral order —justice and freedom, guarded by the West—
exists, infiltrates the Western political rhetoric describing the endeavors to 
capture the opponents. This mythical status of the right (Western) order is 
not explicitly explained, but recurrently implicitly surfaces between the lines. 
But what comes apparent is that the Western forces are the ones guarding 
the light, justice and humane moral order.788  
Furthermore, framing the manhunts as the key to the right order and for a 
better future reveals a simplistic and a naïve way of thinking—but one, which 
is easily sellable and publically appealing in its simplicity. In this thinking 
destroying the symbol, will destroy what made it in the first place. As all the 
bad deeds of a regime or a terrorist networks are personified in the iconized 
corporal figureheads, restoring the right order seems to follow when the 
enemy figures are eliminated.   This style of presenting the hottest topical 
global crisis situations simplifies the political and societal root causes and 
historical circumstances that have created political extremism (such as 
Islamic terrorism) and violent regimes (such as Gaddafi’s Libya and 
Hussein’s Iraq) and does not even strife to understand the politics behind 
ruthless regimes and political violence. Nevertheless, the most extreme 
representations from the times of the manhunts suggest, that chaos will end 
and all problems of the most severe global conflict areas would be solved 
when a person is captured—or even better yet, decapitated.  
 
The Evil Gets His Punishment—And the Western Good Prevails 
Following the first two phases, a final third stage in each of the cases 
followed: the capture, (physical) punishment, public ridicule and eventually 
physical annihilation of the evil enemies. The bearded and weary looking 
Saddam Hussein was found in his messy hiding place. He was captured by 
strong American soldiers and was at the time of his capture referred to as a 
“rat”. He was publically placed under medical examinations, and 
incarcerated. Later he was sentenced to death. His hanging was visualized in 
worldwide publicity and his death was celebrated as a triumph of humanity 
and global security. The overridden Muammar Gaddafi was found hiding in a 
culvert, and violently mishandled by an angry mob, then shot to death. His 
last moments as a feeble old man stripped of power and dignity were 
exhibited in detailed imagery, and later images of his battered bloody corpse 
were circulated widely in the Western media.  His extermination was openly 
celebrated in the West as marking a brighter future. Osama bin Laden was 
found hiding in a compound, he was shot to death by heroic Western 
soldiers, and he was told to have acted in a cowardly manner at the time of 
                                                
786 President Bush Addresses the Nation, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, March 
19 2003. 
787  The Most Wanted Face of Terrorism. The New York Times, May 2, 2011.  
788 Harle, 1991, 123-136.  
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his death. The media circulated images of his messy hiding place, and his 
death was openly celebrated in the West as a victory of justice, security and 
as a triumph of (humane) Western politics.  
As the evil enemies of the West were in the representations of the first two 
stages presented as threatening and strong, the representational style of the 
third and final stage underline the weakness, cowardly and mundane 
character of the captured enemies. At the time of their capture visual features 
pointing to oldness, weakness, dirtiness and impotence, even perverted 
nature of the ex-leaders were strongly and visually emphasized. The 
characteristics the evil enemies were pictured in signify their ultimate loss of 
power. Hussein was described “hiding like a rat”, pictured as pushed literally 
and symbolically down to the ground by his strong capturers. His weak and 
dirty physical appearance was showcased in a flood of images. (See 
Illustration 6.6)  Gaddafi’s fall from power was illustrated by picturing his 
disgraceful hiding place (the sewage pipe), visually showcasing his bloody 
and anguished face and later his lifeless battered corpse, as well as pointing 
to his cowardly nature (he was told to have behaved fearfully and yelled 
“don’t shoot”) in the hands of his killers. (See illustration 6.3) The old, 
outdated terrorist leader bin Laden was told to have hide behind his wife and 
acting like a craven in his last moments at his untidy and mundane hiding 
place. (See illustration 6.7) In each of the cases a shared sense of 
diminishing, shaming and ridicule produced by visual representations is 
strongly apparent.  
Presenting these ex-leaders as cowardly weakened rats works to show 
them as outdated characters of yesterday, who need not to be feared 
anymore. Showing them as corporally weak, morally dubious and fearful 
marks the stripping off of their power. Their fall from power and smallness 
(as such, as well as in relation to the strength and able (-bodiedness) of the 
capturers) was underlined by their physical weakness and by ridiculing them 
of their fearful behavior and inglorious actions at the time of their 
capture/killing. One aspect of the ridicule dimension of the narratives is 
showing the ex-leaders in their mundane corporality, as “normal” vulnerable, 
corporal human beings stripped of power and dreaded (evil) strength. 
Showing the ex-dictators as weak, feeble and corporally vulnerable makes 
them seem defeatable, and removes their mythical diabolic evil potency. 
Ridiculing and shaming can be seen as a strategy of neutralizing the strength 
of the enemies that was built in the representations of the earlier narrative 
stages, but also as a method of presenting and highlighting one’s own 
strength and power.  
Thus, the tendency of picturing the defeated enemies as weak and 
impotent is used to emphasize the strength and virtuosity of the self. The 
(American) capturers of Saddam Hussein were presented as strong, able-
bodied and well-equipped modern operators—and juxtaposed with the old 
feeble captive their strength was even more highlighted. After his capture 
Hussein was subjected to medical examinations. The widely circulated 
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images of the medical procedures can be seen as a metaphoric hygienizing 
act, in which the defeated dirty leader is placed under modern norms of 
cleansing medicalization, and fair yet forceful Western discipline. The 
submissive corporality of the weakened Hussein, shown in a multitude of US 
Army images, also marked his subordination before the overwhelming 
Western practices he had formerly fulminated. (See illustrations 6.5) 
Likewise, the US elite soldiers storming the compound of bin Laden were 
pictured as modern and effective, and compared with the mundane and 
modest dwelling place of the defeated terrorist leader they seemed even more 
technically advanced and strong. The courageous and heroic nature of the 
Navy Seals was further highlighted by the reported cowardly behavior of bin 
Laden. The modern hi-tech strength of the Americans was further fortified by 
visually showcasing his relatively low-profile last hiding place and its 
everydayness. (See illustration 6.7) Gaddafi’s fall from power was epitomized 
by showing him at the mercy of the anger of the violent mob of citizens he 
formerly ruthlessly ruled. The brave new order of Libya was represented by 
the (at least at the moment seemingly Western-minded) crowds, which 
violently killed their former leader. Strength of the self (and in the case of 
Gaddafi, relevant supposedly likeminded groups) builds confidence in the 
victory of the Western ‘us’ and like-minded forces over the evil.789 (See 
illustration 6.3) 
Bringing the evildoers into justice by capturing, physically violating and 
finally killing them was in each case presented as a legitimate and morally 
right punishment for their evil deeds. Thus the violent behavior of the 
Western (and like-minded, ally) actors and the violent physical annihilation 
of the evil were of the—paradoxically—in each case presented as 
humanitarian acts. All around the Western world, the deaths of the Western 
enemies were hailed as triumphs of humanity and the Western humanitarian 
political order. The visual juxtaposition of the orientalist, visually apparent 
non-Western evil leaders in their weakness and their good and strong 
Western captures also create strong global political and cultural hierarchies. 
Metaphorically the punishment narratives of the three evil enemies can be 
seen to point to and signify the victory of the Western (political) sphere over 
its non-Western evil (but ultimately weak) adversaries.  
In each case the capturing and seizing operations of the enemies have 
been questionable in their lawfulness and equitableness, or at least in their 
morality. The treatment of Saddam Hussein while incarceration was 
questionable. Presenting images of the convict in his underpants raised 
questions of violations of the rights of prisoners of war.  As well as did the 
lawfulness of his trial. Furthermore, presenting the footage of his hanging 
was widely seen as inappropriate, if not wrongful. Later on, even the US 
President himself detected traits of a “revenge killing” in the annihilation of 
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Hussein.790 The fate of Muammar Gaddafi in the hands of the angry mob 
hardly reflects the highest standards of (Western style) legal praxis. Mugging 
an old man to death and publically exhibiting his earthy remains would 
under normal preconditions be undoubtedly reacted to as somewhat 
disgraceful.  Similarly the operation Neptune Spear to capture bin Laden has 
been subsequently criticized of its unlawful, questionable traits. Critics have 
even called it an operation in which US Special Forces stormed a residential 
building in the middle of the night in a foreign country, and courageously 
killed an old feeble unarmed man in his bedroom and along with some 
civilian bystanders. 791 But, nevertheless, in the cases of the evil enemies, 
these acts, at the brink of lawfulness and moral, were widely and 
predominantly presented in the Western publicity as heroic, serving justice 
and as humanitarian achievements representing the victory of the Western 
values.  
What is perhaps the most striking shared feature in the punishment 
narratives of the enemies is the strong sensation of bloody retaliation and 
open joyfulness of a kill.  In each case the reception of the capture or kill 
news was cheerful in the Western publicity. The reactions of Western leaders 
as well as the media, and in some extent also the reactions of large publics, to 
the death news were openly cheerful and celebrational. High-level Western 
leaders nominated the bloody ends of the defeated enemies as marking a 
better tomorrow and a more humane world, framing the physical 
annihilation of humans as triumphs of the Western values.792 Mainstream 
media presented the killings openly as retaliations, marking them sometimes 
even in extremely brutal revengeful ways.793 In some cases Western citizens 
even joined to express their joy of the brutal acts in public celebrations.794 It 
may be argued that Westerners commonly frown upon revengeful and brutal 
actions of non-Westerners. Vigilantism, brutal violence, justice delivered by 
mobs, disregard for the rights of prisoners of war, half-baked and dubious 
legal proceedings, openly revengeful political acts and joyfulness at the 
                                                
790 See: Military Officials in Iraq Condemn Release of Saddam Photos. U.S Department of 
Defense, 20 May, 2005; Pentagon Vows to probe Saddam photos. CNN.com, 21May, 2005. ; 
Saddam Underwear photos anger US. BBCnews,20 May, 2005. ; Mixed world reaction to 
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793 See illustrations 6.3, 6.6 & 6.7.  
794 See illustrations 6.3& 6.7.  
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expense of the misfortune and death of others are frequently criticized within 
the Western politics and publicity, when perpetrated by others. But in the 
case of the evil enemies, the majority of Western politicians and mainstream 
media welcomed all this without much critical voices. The reactions the 
punishment narratives generated were in the Western publicity sometimes 
explained as inherent to human nature, and reasoned as natural and quite 
understandable in situations such as these.795 Admittedly, such reactions are 
common, at least in the context of conflict, war and intense enmity. But the 
openly joyful and even bloodthirsty ethos of the punishment narratives, 
when contrasted with the predominant ethos of Western international 
political legitimation and ’brand’ vowing in the name of universal human 
rights and undeniable human worth and dignity, and regard for the rule of 
law, are remarkable—and starkly contradictory.  
As pointed out recurrently throughout this study, images of violence and 
atrocity swiftly flow from one context into another; they are ambivalent in 
their messages, and gather their meanings only in their contextual uses. As 
images presenting the pain of others are in the context of humanitarianism 
most typically met with solidary emotions and seen as arousing the will to 
help and to alleviate the visually encountered distress, on the other hand 
images presenting the pain and violent treatment of the enemy may 
sometimes function in quite the opposite way. An image presenting the peril 
of the enemy— for example in the context of war or a violence ideology such 
as racism—are sometimes met in revengeful and joyful manners. As 
discussed in the chapter 2, sometimes images of defeated enemies can be 
comprehended and considered as trophy images. Trophy images 
metaphorically present the victorious hunter and the defeated prey. Such 
images in the human context can be seen to be the images of racial lynchings, 
a couple of decades ago in the US, or the torture images from the Abu Ghraib 
prison, which have in their initial locus and uses have been considered as 
mementos—regardless of all their bloodiness and brutality—seen as picturing 
heroic moments that should be memorized and openly promoted.796 The 
images of Osama bin Laden, and especially Saddam Hussein and Muammar 
Gaddafi, resemble and may be regarded as such trophy imageries: brutal 
images of the fall of the enemy, proudly shown, eagerly circulated and 
revengefully celebrated.  
Moreover the bloody punishment spectacles visually exhibit and reveal 
the violence intrinsic to the Western humanitarian world politics, as they 
show the dark side of our virtuously branded political actions. Celebrating 
and taking joy out of the brutal deaths of ones adversaries hardly reflects the 
common humane principles held sacred within the international community 
and commonly associated with the Western international politics. Thus the 
                                                
795 Celebarting bin Laden´s death: Ugly perhaps but only human.  Carey, Benedict, The 
New York Times, May 5, 2011.  
796 This was the case with the racial lynching images in their original context, as well as often images of 
fallen defeated opponent soldiers in war situations. See chapter 2. And Sontag, 2003.  
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reactions and practices associated with the annihilation of the contemporary 
enemies seem to discredit the humane conventions often stated as 
undeniable and universal, and to break the humanitarian norm of the 
Western international politics. The exceptions of the norms were made 
possible by framing the figureheads of the adversary regimes and opposing 
political forces as inhuman evil.  
6.4 THE INHUMAN EVIL IN THE CONTEXT OF 
HUMANITARIAN WORLD POLITICS  
Outlining the nature of the opponents as evil has been essential for the 
construction and functionality of the Western political enemy narratives. The 
character of the contemporary enemies as evil has enabled the brutal 
treatment of the enemies and legitimized the norm bending brutal 
punishment practices, which can be seen as exceptional in the context of the 
generally humanitarianly-framed Western politics.  But what is evil, how 
does one become evil, and how may evil be dealt with? And what is the status 
and position of inhuman evil within the contemporary Western 
humanitarian world politics?  
6.4.1 WHAT IS EVIL?  
Hannah Arendt declared the “problem of evil” as the fundamental question 
of postwar intellectual life in Europe.797 The problem of evil in Western 
modern thinking has been scrutinized quite a lot, yet it is clear that no 
definite answers can ever be drawn of this fundamental theme. As evil is 
perennial, it also constantly takes new forms and gathers new 
manifestations.  Framing the contemporary enemies as reincarnations of the 
ultimate evil, that need to be destroyed, even though it means resorting to 
brutal or even clearly illegal acts and requires bending the humane rules that 
the international community and the Western powers themselves have 
deemed universal and undeniable, imposingly brings the problem of evil in at 
the center of the stage of contemporary humanitarian theater.  
Alan Wolfe differentiates between evil in general and political evil. 
Anyone can resort to evil maxims, and do evil deeds. Common criminals and 
insane people habitually commit murders and other immoral evil crimes. 
These are not usually political acts, they are done out of greed, jealously, 
anger, for profit, co-incidence, or because of mental disorders and insanity. 
Political evil is different.  Usually the politically motivated evil acts are done 
for a somewhat understandable, somehow rational yet amoral reasons, such 
as lust for power or determination to terminate ones enemy. Destroying ones 
enemy, someone who is seen as rivalry, dangerous for ones goals or 
                                                
797 Cited in Bernstein,2002, 11.  (Arendt, Hannah: Nightmare and Flight, in Arendt, Hannah: 
Essays in Understanding, 1930-1945. Ed. Kohn, Jerome, Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1994, 134)  
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threatening—as immoral as it may be—can be seen as humanely 
understandable. This is political evil.798 
The Nazi extermination camps meant a change in the thinking on evil. 
Arendt, shocked and awed by the Holocaust, wrote about absolute or radical 
evil. She claims (as many of her contemporaries including Emmanuel 
Levinas and Hans Jonas for example) that after Auschwitz evil needed to be 
thought and approached in a new manner.799 Arendt describes the new form 
of evil the Nazi concentration camp system unveiled (or introduced) as 
absolute, because it cannot anymore be deducted from humanely 
comprehensible motives. This radical evil has, according to Arendt, nothing 
to do with human vices, such as selfishness, lust for power or other humanely 
understandable “sinful” motives. Rather it aims at destroying the very 
concept of human. This is absolute or radical evil for Arendt.800  
Following these formulations, the crimes of Osama bin Laden, Saddam 
Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, as heinous and terrible they were, cannot be 
labeled or understood as radical evil. The actions of these men were horrific, 
many innocent people died, and countless lives were destroyed, but these 
deeds were, at least to large extent done for political reasons. Al Qaeda and 
bin Laden saw the attack on the Twin Towers as political (religious) acts and 
as means in promoting their Islamist political cause. Hussein killed Kurds 
because he saw them as threatening for his political projects and invaded 
Kuwait for political strategic ends. Gaddafi was involved in the terrorist 
activities because of his cause to what he saw as anticolonial action, and he 
ruthlessly ruled his people as a side project of building and upholding what 
he saw as a desirable political regime. These reasons can be seen (and should 
be seen) as condemnable, intolerable and horrific, but they are not the works 
of radical, absolute evil as described by Arendt. Rather the evil deeds of the 
contemporary Western enemies seem to belong to the register of political 
evil.  
Thus, even though bin Laden, Gaddafi and Hussein have been often in the 
Western political representations framed as the ultimate evil enemies and 
described as “new Hitlers” threatening the very concept of humanity, the 
motives behind their actions can be seen as political, and in this sense (in 
their undeniable horrific nature) at some level understandable in the context 
of the (violent) political goals these regimes/leaders/organizations have 
strived towards. The horrible actions of these evil men make sense in their 
contexts, even though they are evil, immoral and intolerable. Framing them 
as irrational, insane or motivated purely by radical evil (aiming to destroy 
humanity as such) is failing to see the (purpose of) politics of others. If we do 
not tolerate acts of political violence, it does not mean that they are senseless 
and insane; they nevertheless usually still are political. Genocide, terrorism 
and ethnic cleansing are most often politically motivated, and thus political 
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799 Bernstein, 2002, 163-165.  
800 Bernstein, 2002, 205-207.  
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evils. But so is restoring to immoral means—such as torturing of prisoners of 
war—in the fight against the evil.  
All in all, evil, by definition is often understood as the opposite of good. 
This binary division is essential for our understanding of the world. The 
enemy narratives binarily contrast the evil of political adversaries with 
goodness and virtue of the Western self. The juxtaposition of good (humane, 
humanitarian) and the evil (inhuman, immoral) is essential for the 
sensibleness and functionality humanitarian narrative. As discussed earlier 
in this study, suffering caused by something evil (or ‘sublime’ natural 
disasters, beyond comprehension and control) is an essential precondition 
for the appearance of humanitarianism (emotions such as compassion and 
acts targeted to alleviate the pain and distress). Thus both sides of the coin—
evil and virtuous, bad and good—are essential for the humanitarian 
discourse— and for humanitarian politics.  
In addition to the humanitarian frame, traditionally this binary division is 
apparent in Western religious (Christian) thinking, in which the evil takes the 
form of a supernatural foe—the devil—that needs to be destroyed for the 
good to prevail.801 This religiously colored dimension is saliently apparent in 
the recent punishment narratives. Religious framings transforming 
contemporary politics into fight between “the sons of light and the sons of 
darkness” are apparent in the Western representations of its opponents and 
the acts to counter them. Features of classical religiously motivated fight of 
good and evil are clearly evident especially in American political rhetoric, in 
which references to for example crusade surface from time to time.802 As 
global (state) humanitarianism is historically in many ways intermingled 
with (Christian) religion, the topical humanitarian political system of the 
international community claims neutrality, partiality and secular ethos, and 
tends to fade out any religiously driven motives. Similarly—regardless of the 
evident religious traits—Western international politics is generally is framed 
as leaning mostly not to religious but rather secular values of humanity; 
protection of humanity and human right as secular values, guarded by 
humans themselves.803 If the thought of Westerners as the sacred bearers of 
the godly light is dismissed (as it is in the official discourse), and the political 
acts of the Westerners are measured on purely mundane and secular scale, 
then, how can bad and good, virtuous and evil be told apart from another, in 
the context of the (humanitarian) world politics?  
Immanuel Kant approached the question of evil from the point of view of 
volition, or will (willkür). Willkür can be determined as the capability to 
choose between alternatives; free choice.  And thus, for Kant our capability to 
be good or evil is a matter volition, choice. He defines religion and the God 
out of morality, and places human beings as fully accountable and 
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802 See for instance: Remarks by the President Upon Arrival. The White House, Office of the 
Press Secretary, September 16, 2001.  
803 See chapter 2.2. 
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responsible for actions they do as free moral agents. Thus, resorting to evil 
stems from a free choice, and human beings are accountable for the good or 
evil maxims they choose to adopt. Therefore, according to Kant, there are no 
original sins, nor moral goodness, not dark forces or the works of the devil, 
but all bad and virtuous deeds originate from free will. There are just 
humans, making moral, or amoral choices.804 Therefore, also how the evil is 
dealt with—what is done to it in the context of politics—is also a matter of 
free choice, not guarding the divine virtue by inevitable means.  
When looking at the recent Western political narratives of its enemies, 
and the ways to deal with political evil, consideration of these Kantian 
aspects—fundamental for Western secular philosophical considerations of 
morality, evil and virtue—are nowhere to be found. On the contrary, the 
Western counter actions—ridiculing, physically punishing, killing 
(sometimes under foggy circumstance), and taking joy and celebrating the 
death of the enemy—are presented as virtuous not because of their standing 
as actions normatively seen as virtuous, but because of who has carried them 
out. In Western political speech and representations concerning the 
treatment of the contemporary enemies it is implicitly stated over and over 
again, in a multitude of rhetorical ways, that the Western actions and the 
West are good and moral regardless of what course of action is chosen. As 
then, the actions of the opponent—the evil—tend to appear as immoral as 
such. In other words, the West or the self, in this thinking, is seen as being 
moral and virtuous in essence, no matter how it chooses to act. As the enemy 
other, on the other hand, is judged by the essence of its actions and its 
assumed essential evil nature.  
6.4.2 THE FUNCTIONALITY OF (RELIGIOUS) INHUMAN EVIL FOR 
THE WESTERN HUMANITARIAN NARRATIVE/POLITICS 
If we follow Kant, what makes evil is restoring to amoral resources: choosing 
to act in an immoral—evil—way. Although the punishment and annihilation 
of the recent enemies have been in the West presented as virtuous acts 
restoring the right moral order, it can be fairly said that in normal 
circumstances acts such as these would not be perceived as legitimate or 
lawful, or morally desirable. These acts and their appropriation are made 
possible by systematic construction of fierce imageries of the enemies, and 
legitimized by the recurrent usage of humanitarianly as well as religiously 
colored references, language and metaphors of the opposing inhuman evil, 
and the divine role of the West in upholding the “right moral order”. By 
framing the opponent as diabolic, inhuman, absolute evil, the Western 
counteractions are made to seem as adequate, even virtuous. In this thinking 
all means necessary are allowed in the fight against the “forces of the dark 
side”, and even the bloodiest of actions by the sons of light in this fight are 
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not seen as immoral. The secular humane norms of the international 
community may be bent in the case of the foreign opponents framed as 
absolute evil. By presenting the opposing political regimes and forces as 
inhumanely evil, places them outside of the normal humanitarian political 
domain, into the domain of religiously colored morality play.  
Thus—paradoxically—it seems that the religiously colored discourse is 
essential for the functionality of the Western humanitarian international 
political narrative. The basic humanitarian story in the context of Western 
politics entails the good moral (Westerners) ‘human figure’, which sets to 
alleviate the suffering of others.  Another central character of the story then 
is the victim, often presented as innocent and helpless sufferer of tragic 
fortune and inhuman crimes—the ‘subhuman’. These characters are familiar 
from the previous chapters of this study. The enemy narratives poignantly 
bring the third character of the humanitarian story on the stage: the 
‘inhuman’, evil, which causes the suffering of the ‘subhumans’ and motivates 
the ‘humans’ to act for the betterment of humanity.805 As was discussed 
earlier in chapters 3&4, the suffering subhumans are often regarded as 
humans somewhat reduced in their humanity (in relation to the Western full-
fledged humans). The enemy narratives then show how the evil inhuman 
enemies are regarded as non-human.  
Framing the third antagonist character as radically evil—and thus 
in/nonhuman—actually places the enemy outside of the realm of humanity, 
and thus enables its inhumane treatment. The inhuman—although it is 
central for the functionality of the humanitarian narrative and politics—is 
something that does not belong to the realm of (protectable) humanity. 
Because of its absolute religious evil nature, the evil enemy is not entitled to 
the privileges of being human: rights and dignity entitled with the status of 
human, and neither humane juridical treatment, nor pity or compassion. The 
absolute evil may be may be treated as a non-human (in some regards in very 
similar way as non-human animals, whom are not seen as having juridical 
rights nor the right to live associated with humanness).  The inhumanity 
(stemming from the absolute evil nature of the enemies) enables and 
legitimizes the bloody and revengeful exceptions to the humanitarian norm, 
and allows the bending of the rules of humanitarian politics. The punishment 
narratives of Gaddafi, Hussein and bin Laden unveil a story that breaks the 
coherence of the typical humane narrative in a revealing way, and thus shows 
how the totalizing religious dimension evident in the enemy narratives is 
actually essential for the functionality of the humanitarian story in the 
context of the contemporary Western international politics.  
Framing the political opponents as religious evil—rather than as 
opponents that resort to immoral resources by free choice, guided by some 
sort of evil rationality—enables the violent counteractions and the brutal 
treatment of the enemies, which would otherwise seem immoral or at least 
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ethically dubious. Additionally, the inhumanity of the opponent makes the 
counteractions seem as virtuous acts targeted to protect the greater divine 
good. Thus, the punishment narratives effectively unveil the deep-rooted 
religious base essential for the topical Western humanitarian world politics. 
Even though contemporary Western international politics are most often 
understood (and publically framed) as non-religious and rather based on 
secular values of undeniable universal humanity, the connections of religion 
and traits of Christianity in association to humanitarianism are not all that 
far-fetched. Western humanitarian paradigm undeniably has religious, as 
well as imperialistic and colonial roots—as was discussed in chapter 2.—
although they often nowadays effectively repudiated and hidden in Western 
political humanitarian rhetoric. Particularly there is no denying the close 
historical links between Western global humanitarianism and (missionary) 
Christian religion. The punishment narratives reveal this deep, religious level 
of the humanitarian logic and theatrical arrangement, as they are so strongly 
founded on the binary juxtaposition of ‘our’ essential goodness and the 
eternal evil the advisories.  As humanitarianism has contemporarily become 
to locate a more central position in Western political and public life, 
humanitarianism may be seen to appear as a contemporary Western civil 
religion. In this sense, humanitarianism acts as a myth (in Barthean 
sense),806 which serves to legitimate and naturalize political actions and 
foster a sense of cohesion; it functions as social glue that helps to bind “the 
West” together under a common denominator. 807 The Western sense of 
ourselves in the field of international politics stems from the (civil) religion 
driven belief that the political West is an essentially good, humanitarian actor 
representing the God on earth, no matter what maxims it may adopt.  
As visualized suffering of others is commonly seen (and targeted) in 
humanitarian contexts to arouse the empathy and will to help of the 
spectating audience, the recent enemy narratives show how visualized 
despair and suffering of the evil enemies is targeted and intended rather to 
arouse the will of the spectating audience to punish, ridicule and destroy. 
And despite of the controversy, this binary division and contradiction can be 
seen to be evident and essential in the functionality of the Western 
humanitarian world politics of today.  The style of appealing of these visual 
spectacles is not to plea for humanitarian intervention, protection of life or 
salvation of the weakened sufferers. Rather the representations urge and 
legitimize the destruction of the lives, which were framed as not only evil, but 
as inhuman (non-human), non-respectable lives that need not to be 
protected. The narratives and the treatment of the evil inhuman is not one 
that is based on empathy or pity, but on retaliation and legitimation of use of 
power and violence. Thus, in this staging at the humanitarian theater, the 
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catharsis of the spectating audience in not achieved by alleviating the pain of 
others, but by killing and destroying the enemy, presented as in/nonhuman. 
The spectators of these tragedy plays are prepared for revengeful spectacles, 
and the cathartic state is achieved not by solidary emotions and 
humanitarian actions, but by revengeful ethos and violent destruction of the 
devilish inhuman. Therefore the enemy narratives unveil the concealed 
violence of the Western humanitarian narrative. Furthermore, these episodes 
of evil not only legitimate the Western use of power against inhuman 
figureheads and political adversaries, but they are utilized to lower the 
threshold for open armed conflict, they are intended to rationalize the high 
cost of Western militarized strategic political ends, and furthermore also 
excuse the ‘West’ of actually acting—choosing to act—in an evil way. The 
strategic capability of the inhuman evil advisories within humanitarianly-
framed international politics is great.  
Thus, in addition to being politically and strategically functional, as well 
as publically appealing and culturally familiar, the recent enemy narratives 
reveal the dark side of the contemporary Western humanitarian narrative: 
Framing the Western self and Western actions as absolutely and essentially 
good, and on the other hand picturing the opponents as the ultimate 
inhuman evil leads us to—and allows us to—act in an evil way. Fighting evil 
with evil (amoral) tools inevitably leads to committing “lesser evils”808 —
resorting to (even if in lesser measures) the same evil maxims as the 
opponent. The problem of dealing with the opponents (evil) within the 
humanitarianly-framed Western politics is an acute one. This dilemma was 
also present in the previous chapter 5, when the visual strategic branding 
efforts of the Afghan war were dealt with. As Western democracies fight 
terrorism and other viscous political forces globally, they are restrained by 
their own (and international community’s) definitions of (relatively) violence 
free, humanitarian politics. The proposition that political life of Western 
democracies should be free from violence, secrecy, borderline practices and 
violations of (human) rights, posits restrictions on the measurements that 
the Western democracies may use in the fight to counter the ‘evil’, without 
compromising the values that the West itself pronounces to protecting. As 
international human rights conventions state, even the enemies have rights, 
but as the enemy narratives clearly show, in the case of the absolute evil, 
these ideals tend to be systematically compromised. 809  
Within the contemporary international politics Western enemies become 
enemies of the Western humane order because of their inhuman acts—
violence, threat to (human) security, terrorism, unlawful acts that oppose 
international humanitarian conventions—acts that in the context of the 
humanitarian politics are seen as threatening the universal values of 
humanity.  But as fighting terrorism and global political evils often requires 
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use of force and habitually leads to resorting to somewhat morally 
questionable measures, then the Western counteractions cannot be judged 
on the scale of indivisible absolutes. This thinking—leaning to exception of 
the indispensable humane norms in the face of radical evil—can be detected 
also in acts of torturing the prisoners of war in the Western prisons during 
the “War on Terror”. Exceptions of the (secular) humane norms compromise 
the universal and indispensable status of humanity and human rights, on 
which the Western values and politics for a large part are build upon.810 In 
legitimizing these exceptions is where the religious dimension of evil 
becomes convenient, if not necessary. The religious dimension—blatantly in 
view in the enemy and punishment narratives—gives an absolution for 
resorting to morally dubious maxims, renounced by the Western powers 
themselves. The religious dimension of the enemy narratives may seem 
politically functional in times of conflict and restoring to the religious 
maxims might well serve its purpose in addressing the Western publics 
(because of its historical and cultural resonance), but it nevertheless breaks 
the coherence of the secular humanitarian politics of Western democracies 
and exposes that the system of rights, foundational for Western (world) 
politics, is not a system of indivisible absolutes.  
As the idea of absolute evil enemies replaces the principles of 
humanitarian politics with totalizing morality arrangements, it also fades out 
the politics from politics. Framing the political enemies as insanely evil and 
seeing the Western self as essentially virtuous, may seem to justify the 
borderline actions. But it concurrently it leads to failure of seeing the politics 
of the others—and of the self.  This is not only biased and dishonest, but it 
moreover does not help to resolve political problems that usually give birth to 
political evils in the first place. Fighting evil with (lesser) evil leaves 
untouched the underlying political structures and root causes that cause 
violence and terror to begin with.811 Furthermore, the religious evil 
transforms politics into a morality play of good vs. the evil, but in secular 
world of people also “the good self” as it takes up the tools of the evil, is 
contaminated.  
Then, how should evil be dealt with? As Wolfe points out, fighting evil 
with evil contaminates, but fighting politics with politics does not.812 There is 
no coercion to restore to evil maxims in fighting for a more just world.  
Following Kant, adopting evil maxims is a matter of free choice. Moreover, in 
the context of the politics of Western democracies—wowing in the name of 
universal humanity and human worth—adopting violent and inhumane 
maxims is furthermore is a choice that compromises these self proclaimed 
ideas. Politics, even the violent acts of opposing political regimes, would be 
better off seen as politics, and reacted to in political ways, rather than 
revengefully twisting politics into black and white apocalyptic morality 
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arrangements, in which all means imaginable are seen as legitimate and 
adequate. As Theodor Adorno phrases: “Violence in the name of civilization 
reveals its own barbarism, even as it justifies its own violence by presuming 
the barbaric subhumanity of the other against whom that violence is 
waged”.813 Thus, furthermore, the ways in which the opponents of the West 
are treated, show in a pungent and paradoxical manner what succumbing to 
evil maxims leads to, and what abandoning the ideals of absolute human 
right looks like. Thus, paradoxically the religiously colored, revengeful, 
violent and totalizing Western enemy narratives ultimately highlight the 
importance and necessity of upholding the universal principles of human 
worth, protection of life and unalienable rights of all living creatures.  
6.5 CONCLUSION:  THE DARK SIDE OF THE 
HUMANITARIAN NARRATIVE 
The recent popular political narratives of Western enemies—Muammar 
Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden—are revealing 
representations that offer interestingly divergent viewpoints into the visuality 
of contemporary Western international politics. These enemy narratives 
bring the third central character of the humanitarian story —the inhuman 
evil—into the center of the stage of the visual humanitarian theater. Biased, 
even propagandist representations of enemies, rivalry powers and political 
opponents have been central at times of conflict and confrontation 
throughout history. Such representations are often simplistic, stereotypical 
and propagandist in their nature, they are built on political premises in order 
to further political goals.  The enemy figures of Gaddafi, Hussein and bin 
Laden are the contemporary manifestations of such age-old (political) enemy 
imageries. The contemporary visual narratives of these enemies illustrate 
what the contemporary political evil from the Western point of view looks 
like. The enemy figures explain the actions of the self (the West); they are 
building blocks of the Western political identity, they bring a sense of 
coherence into the minds of Western citizens midst political upheaval, 
threatening terrorism and conflict. Furthermore, they function as social glue, 
giving a face to the political forces opposing the political and cultural in-
group ‘us’.  
Mapping out of the representations of the recent enemies in Western 
politics and media publicity, unveils how their visual and rhetoric 
assemblage share notable common features. The (visual) narrative 
construction and the (visual) narrative phases in the representation of the 
recent Western enemies have been strikingly similar. Initially the enemy 
figures have been introduced to the Western audiences concurrently with the 
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escalation of the conflict between the Western powers and their rivalries 
represented by Hussein, Gaddafi and bin Laden. Construction of the enemy 
figures has intensified in accord with the international conflicts: 
representations of these men have had their highest public standing in times 
of heightened conflict and preparation of military solutions between the 
Western powers and these rivalry regimes/actors. From downright political 
contexts the representations of the enemy figures have flown into much used 
and circulated mainstream media representations. The (visual) enmity 
representations of the dangerous West-hating evil enemies have forcefully 
pierced the Western publicity, and formed into thick images known by all 
media consumers and followers of politics in the Western sphere.   
In the first narrative phase each the enemies were presented as the 
number one enemy of the Western powers; as strong, capable of threatening 
security and ‘the Western values” and framed an intrinsically evil and 
demonic in their nature. The visual features constructing the West hating 
enemies and “most dangerous men in the world” have been stereotypical and 
often starkly culturally othering, Orientalizing and demonizing.  The binary, 
black-and-white morality positioning of the West and its enemies has in each 
case been strict. These three men have all in their time served as the 
reincarnations of the eternal evil on earth, which the humanitarian Western 
forces must fight in order for the good to prevail. The second narrative 
stage—the manhunt—in each case followed. During this stage the madness, 
irrationality and evil nature of the enemies has been highlighted; their bad 
deeds have been widely publicized and condemned. The importance of their 
annihilation for upholding global security and Western moral order—and the 
humanitarian international order in wider terms—has been emphasized in 
public statements as well as in media representations. In the third and last 
narrative stage, the enemies have all been caught, punished and destroyed by 
Western or Western-minded forces. The forces conquering these evil 
figureheads have been presented as strong, potent and virtuous, as the 
defeated men have been portrayed as weak, morally dubious and weary. 
Their (physical) punishment, ridicule and annihilation have been presented 
as marking the triumph of civilization and of the right Western moral order 
within the international system. The downfalls and violent destinies of the 
ex-leaders permeated the Western front-page media. Their death was openly 
celebrated in the media, among high-level Western political decision makers, 
as also the Western citizens openly revengefully indulged in these violent 
punishment narratives.   
Furthermore, in addition to the shared visual and narrative content, what 
is relevant and revealing is the political appropriateness and timeliness of 
these narratives. The narratives of the enemies were reiterated both in the 
proclamations of Western political decision makers as well as the Western 
mainstream media in accord. Their public appeal and visibility in popular 
mainstream media has been wide and infiltrating. These politically 
constructed narratives have functioned as much circulated and influential 
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spectacles, which have influenced and constructed the imagination and 
perception of Western publics on world politics and the global world.  They 
have been functional in propping up the humanitarian Western political 
identity.  Additionally they have had a direct effect on decision making on 
heavy weight political acts. These spectacular enemy images have had their 
position in rationalizing for use of force and legitimizing recent 
interventionist military operations and wars. The building up of enemy 
images and the political uses of enemy narratives has in each case been 
strategically functional, and it is clear how they have been built upon political 
premises, and are compiled and circulated in order to serve political ends. 
The political enemy images have by their frequent uses been formed into 
widely spread and influential common truths that have been rarely publically 
questioned or criticized. The essentially evil nature of the Western 
antagonist—constructed in the frequent public circulation—has thus 
absolved the morally questionable and brutal acts of the Western (minded) 
forces used in the course of fighting the evil advisories.  Enemy narratives 
showing the political opponent as inhumanely evil have been useful, 
functional and strategically practical in the context of the contemporary 
Western international politics.  
But dealing with the inhuman evil also reveals some central and intrinsic 
features of the Western humanitarianly-framed political thinking out into the 
open and visible. As Western political representations have typically striven 
to present Western political actions and their ethos as non-violent and 
humane as possible (as seen in the previous chapters 5 of this work), the 
enemy narratives make a pungent exception. In dealing with the evil enemies 
even morally dubious, openly violent, brutal and revengeful acts and ethos 
are seen as appropriate and legitimate. What has allowed the blatant and 
public braking of the humanitarian norms is framing the enemies as 
reincarnations of the ultimate, biblical, inhuman evil enemy. The evil enemy 
is seen to represent everything that the West is not; the evil enemy is the flip 
side of the good self. Moreover, as the enemy is inhuman—placed outside of 
the realm of humanity, and thus conceived as the non-human—it may be 
addressed and treated as a non-human object that is not entitled with the 
rights and privileges associated with humanness. The inhuman may thus be 
dealt with by inhuman means. In addition to this, the religiousness and the 
juxtaposition of the essentially good self and the essentially evil opponents 
allows and works to legitimize the fierce and revengeful Western 
counteractions and overall violent ethos revolving around the enemies, which 
brakes the secular humanitarian norms the West itself proclaims to stand to 
defend. 
Consequently, the enemy and punishment narratives interestingly reveal 
the often reneounced religious root of the Western humanitarianized 
political narrative, and bring out into the open the Christian ethos embedded 
deep in Western foreign political thinking. The enemy narratives give away 
how the humanitarian narrative, contemporarily central in Western 
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international political thinking, actually for a large part relies and builds 
upon these religion driven black-and-white binary arrangements of good and 
bad, virtuous and evil. Additionally, dealing with the enemy reveals, how 
Western privilege, revengefulness and binary understanding of the world are 
actually intrinsic for the Western political humanitarian narrative, and its 
functionality in times of conflict.  Thus, the enemy spectacles reveal the rigid 
Western perspective on the global hierarchy in the context of ethics and 
morality. The enemy spectacles give away how the actions of the West are (in 
Western representations and imagination) considered as essentially good, no 
matter of the acts, while the morality of the actions of its opponents are 
scaled on much more sensitive scale. The narratives show how the 
presupposed Western privilege is to be able to break the humanitarian and 
human rights norms it stands to defend, when fighting the political forces 
that threaten its interests and security.  
The framing of the opponents as incarnations of the ultimate evil leads to 
apprehending politics in a form of a morality play, in which the good are 
against the evil, and in which all tools may be used in the fight to conquer the 
evil. This arrangement does not solely break the secular ethos and the legal 
norms guiding of the contemporary international relations set by the 
international community, but moreover fighting the evil opponents exposes 
how the West tends to resort to evil tools and maxims: fighting evil with evil 
contaminates, and more over compromises the humane principles the West 
has set out to protect. Therefore, the Western narratives of its enemies and 
enemy imageries tells not only of the identity politics of the West, the nor the 
intrinsic violence of the political humanitarian narrative, but they moreover 
show what happens when we put aside the universal principles of humanity 
and human rights. In their own exceptionally brute visual way, these 
spectacles tell of the necessity of safeguarding the principles of universality of 
human rights and human worth, as they show the downfall of the universal 
humanitarian ethics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
363
A Social Media Effect? Syrian Chemical Attack Images in Mainstream Media and International 
Politics 
 364 
7 A SOCIAL MEDIA EFFECT? SYRIAN 
CHEMICAL ATTACK IMAGES IN 
MAINSTREAM MEDIA AND 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION: THE POWER OF SUFFERING 
IMAGES IN THE ERA OF SOCIAL MEDIA MEDIATION  
The use of social media—namely amateur video and photograph—has been 
saluted as revolutionizing (visual) mediation of crisis and the image on 
contemporary war. The Arab uprisings of 2011—or “the Arab Spring”—were 
commonly entitled social media or Twitter-revolutions, in which user-
generated and relatively institution free flow of (visual) material mediating 
enfolding events was seen distinctive. Likewise the importance of social 
media has been highlighted in regards to the Syrian war (2012- ), which has 
been referred to as the most social media mediated conflict in history. A large 
part of what the surrounding world knows (and feels) about the Syrian 
conflict is through locally produced visual content mediated via/ originating 
in social media. Social media enabled swift, affordable for all, hard to control, 
mediation of namely amateur images have been widely seen as changing or 
even revolutionizing the documentation and mediation of violent events, 
crisis and wars. And thus social media has been hailed as an emblem of 
emancipation and democratization of global crisis communication.814  
The use of social media-technology has enabled populations of repressive 
regimes and crisis areas to voice first hand testimonials on evolving events. 
The novelty has provided a forum to rapidly and comprehensively mediate 
eyewitness accounts into the awareness of the wider spectating world. Thus it 
has been commonly hoped, that the relatively free information flows enabled 
by social media mediation could and would alter the view of the surrounding 
spectating world into the suffering of distant crisis areas. Social media based 
                                                
814 Joseph, Sarah: Social Media, Political Change, and Human Rights. Boston College 
International and Comparative Law Review, 35 /1, 2012, 145-188; Liberation Technology: Social 
Media and the struggle for Democracy. Eds: Diamond, Larry & Plattner, Marc F, ed. John Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, 2012; Rane, Halim & Salem, Sumra: Social Media, Social Movements 
and the Diffusion of ideas in the Arab Uprisings. Journal of International Communication, 18:1, 2012, 
97-111; Axford, Barrie: Talk About a Revolution: Social Media and the MENA Uprisings. 
Globalizations, 8:5, 2011, 681-686; Lynch, Marc, Freelon, Deen & Aday, Sean: Syria’s Socially 
Mediated Civil War. United States Institute of Peace, 2014; Watching Syria’s War. Images and 
Videos on the continuing conflict in Syria. New York Times Project; Shirky, Clay: The 
Political power of Social Media. Technology, Public sphere and Political change. Foreign Affairs, 
Jan/Feb 2011, 28-29; Khatib, Lina: Image Politics in Middle East: The role of Visual in Political 
Struggle. I.B. Tauris, London, 2013; Pantti, Mervi & Anden-Papadopoulos, Kari: Amateur 
Images and Global news. Intellect, Bristol, 2011. Harb, Zahera: Arab Revolutions and the Social 
Media Effect. M/C Journal, vol. 14. 2/2011. Pantti, Mervi. Seeing and Not Seeing the Syrian Crisis: 
New Visibility and the Visual Framing of the Syrian Conflict in Seven Newspapers and their Online 
Editions. JOMEC Journal 4, 2013, 1-22.  
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(visual) meditation has thus been celebrated as an emblem of 
democratization of information, and hailed as a liberation technology.815 But 
also the potential of social media technology’s utilization for “evil” has been 
acknowledged. The infamous visual strategy of the Islamic State (ISIS)—
worldwide circulation of ultra-violent imagery of beheadings and cruel 
mutilations, causing fear and terror as well as functioning as unusual 
recruitment material for the organization—significantly relies on social 
media. Visual mediation strategy of ISIS has significantly altered how visual 
political utilization graphic imagery at the age of social media is perceived.816 
Despite of the ‘evil potential’ of social media image flows and the efficient 
utilization of the novel medium also by terrorists groups, until recent years a 
widely addressed expectation (or perhaps hope) has been, that the use of 
social media would act as a positive dynamic force in the mediation of topical 
crisis, and act as a method of “breaking down the walls that close us of from 
one another “ 817.  A common idea of social media images as somewhat 
“authentic”, produced by locals and amateurs, has been seen to eradicate the 
barriers of distance between the distant sufferers and the surrounding 
spectators, and to allow a more direct and compassioned relation between 
the distant spectators and the suffering, also on the level of international 
community. Also in international political settings the expectation has been 
that, because of the more direct method of crisis image mediation, the 
surrounding world as a whole would take action at face of grievances of 
others in more powerful manners.818  I see the contemporarily articulated 
belief in the potency of social media as contemporary articulation of the age 
old, technology driven belief on the compassionate and revelatory political 
power of images of suffering. This “causality optimism” was also discussed in 
chapter 2. 
Because of extensive use of amateur images disseminated via social media 
the Syrian war has been recurrently referred to as a war documented like no 
other. An equivalent number of digital, user-generated images has hardly 
been mediated from any previous war. As the amount of atrocious images of 
the Syrian war was already immense, in the wee hours of the 21st of August 
2013 the war took an even more dramatic turn. In a matter of hours a 
massive amount of graphic eyewitness images from the Ghouta suburb of 
Damascus, describing what appeared to be a chemical weapons attack, 
flooded the digital sphere.  The information of the alleged gas strikes—killing 
hundreds of civilians—first surfaced via local social media accounts, and 
                                                
815  Liberation Technology, 2012; Joseph, 2012; Rane&Sumra, 2012.   
816 Hassan, Hassan& Weiss, Michael: ISIS. Inside the army of Terror. Regan Arts, New York, 
2015. 
817 French foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner in his speech May 2010, as cited in Calingaert, 
Daniel : Challenges for international Policy, in Liberation Technology, 2012, (157- 171), 157.   
818 Joseph, 2012; Liberation Technology, 2012;  Syria’s Socially Mediated Civil War, 
2014.; Watching Syria’s War. Images and Videos on the continuing conflict in Syria. 
New York Times Project, Pantti & Anden-Papadoupoulos: 2011, 13; Watching Syria´s War. 
Images and Videos on the continuing conflict in Syria. New York Times Project.  
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namely through visual accounts of the events. In just a few hours, over a 
thousand visual accounts describing the event were found online.819 The 
horrific images of dead and suffering Syrians were swiftly seen and 
acknowledged throughout the spectating world. The atrocious images were 
highly visible in the Western mainstream media, and extensively influenced 
the construction of the Western perception of the situation and the events of 
the night in Syria.820 These images also forcefully entered the Western 
political debate, in which they were habitually seen and framed as proof of 
the guild of the al-Assad regime for the chemical assault and furthermore 
deployed as legitimation for the planned Western military operation against 
the Assad regime.  
 The social media images of the Ghouta chemical attack and its 
heartwrenching human toll, the framings and significations of the images in 
mainstream media and their uses in international politics comprise a distinct 
and a revelatory act at the visual humanitarian tragedy theater. This act 
sheds light on the status, utilization, functions and political framings of 
images of suffering in a contemporary setting. The storyline involves all of 
the main characters of the humanitarian theatrical setting: the humane, good 
and moral force (the West), the Evil inhuman (Syrian regime) and the 
sufferers, the objects of the humanitarian/evil actions, mostly pictured as 
corporal and pictured as passive “subhumans”.  
This chapter takes up the case of the images of Syrian chemical attack, in 
order to examine the contemporarily articulated social media effect. First I 
shall shed light on the historical formation of the notions on the revelatory 
images of suffering and international political reactions into the suffering of 
crisis areas, and then place the recently articulated social media effect into a 
historical context. In the contemporary digitalized world, images swiftly flow 
from one context to another, gathering new uses, meanings and significations 
along the way. Thus, I will also pay attention to image flows at the era of 
social media: the meanings the images gathered while flowing from the local 
social media level into the global level. I analyze the signification processes of 
the social media originating images within (international level) mainstream 
media’s journalistic remediation. I investigate how the images were 
presented within the (Western) mainstream media and analyze how they 
were named and framed in their new contexts. I shall also trace how some 
images and stories became to signify and define the situation in Syria for the 
Western spectators. In addition—due to the distinctive difference on the 
Russian and Western attitudes and foreign political standing on the Syrian 
                                                
819 Syria Conflict: Chemical Weapons Blamed as Hundreds Reported Killed. The 
Guardian, 22.8 2013; Government Assessment of the Syrian Government´s Use of Chemical 
Weapons on August 21.2013.  The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 30.08.2013.  
820 In this chapter I mostly concentrate on the Western mainstream media: news outlets of well-
known news corporations, much read and referred to in the Western cultural and political sphere. But 
in addition to these, and for the sake of comparison in the contested regard towards the Syrian war 
between the west and Russia, I will also make a brief inquiry to the use of the social media images 
produced of the gas strike in the predominant Russian media channels; Ria Novosti, Itar-Tass and 
Interfax.  
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situation—I have also made a comparative inquiry to the Russian 
mainstream media, and the utilization and framing of the Ghouta attack 
images gathered in the Russian mainstream media. Secondly, I observe how 
the images telling of the suffering of the Syrian people devolved into the 
international political debate on Syria. I examine how the images were 
referred to and used in political argumentation and rhetoric rationalizing and 
legitimating the Western response to the situation—namely the planned 
targeted military operation against the Syrian leader al-Assad. In the light of 
the Syrian case, I shall pay attention to the novelties that the use of amateur 
images and visual social media mediation potentially have on the 
conventional practices of representing distant suffering and investigate the 
contemporary causality claim. At the end of the chapter I shall draw 
conclusions on whether the use of social media and amateur images 
contemporarily possess an amplified power in transforming the ways in 
which the spectating world sees and reacts to the suffering of distant others.   
 
7.2 THE SOCIAL MEDIA EFFECT AND FLOWING 
IMAGES 
As was argued in the chapter 2, a notion that seeing more crisis imagery, or 
encountering the pain of others more directly via visual images, would allow 
us to care more, and thus lead to amplified reactions towards the suffering of 
others, has long roots in history. At least since the Enlightenment era 
onwards, it has been commonly argued that once the distant spectators have 
an ability to see what catastrophes and distant wars do to human beings, and 
to witness the horrors and human right violations in a visual form, the 
surrounding world—or humanity itself—would unite, realize its shared fate 
and precariousness, and moreover work to put an end to the atrocities. There 
is a steep belief that the negative epiphany of apprehension of a common 
humanity is for a large part based on encountering visual images showing the 
pain of another human.821 Historically it seems that the mediation of visual 
images of pain has undeniably been central in the formation and 
development of the human rights and humanitarianism discourse. Probably 
most often in this context the example constituted by the uses and effects of 
the Holocaust images is referred to. The sentiments that these influential 
images aroused, as well as implications they have had for the 
institutionalization of human rights paradigms, vividly demonstrate the 
central standing of atrocity images in the formation of our understanding of 
humanity and the need to protect it.822 Thus, perhaps quite paradoxically, 
horrific images revealing the suffering of others have been widely seen as 
                                                
821 See Chapter 2, and for example Sliwinski, 2011, 81.  
822 See chapter 2; Sliwinski, 2011; Zelizer, 1998; Linfield, 2012; Boltanski,1999; Picturing 
atrocity, 2012.; Halttunen, 1995;  Burke, 1757 ; Smith, 1759.  
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building blocks of (global) compassion, institutionalization of the concepts of 
protection of humanity and perhaps even a better world.823  
This notion has been again brought to the contemporary setting due to the 
novel means of image mediation enabled by use of swift social media 
technology. I argue that the historically formed causal idea on the relations of 
seeing more, caring more and reacting more forcefully, is also at the core of 
the contemporary hope invested on the social media in altering our view—
and perhaps even also our response—towards the suffering of others.  
7.2.1 THE SOCIAL MEDIA EFFECT OF SUFFERING IMAGES  
As was discussed in the chapter 2., the close ties between visually meditated 
pain, humanitarian collective responses to distant suffering and novelties of 
mediation resources come very clear in the 1900th century milieu. Up-to-date 
mediation means were effectively utilized in order to pass the horror story of 
the Nazi extermination camps to the contemporary spectating audiences. The 
sweeping display of Holocaust images through renewed photojournalism, 
newspapers, picture magazines, books and film had an immense effect on the 
view of the spectating Western audiences on the Nazi regime, but moreover 
on the apprehension of the fragility of life and the need for its protection. The 
images of the unimaginable destruction of the Holocaust functioned as proof 
of the downfall of humanity, and thus had an immense effect on construction 
of the human rights discourse of the 20th century. 824  
Later on, in the 1970s the Vietnam War syndrome—the televised Vietnam 
War images revealing the suffering of Vietnamese people and the brutal 
conduct of Western warfare—has been claimed to have a massive influence 
on the Western anti-war sentiments in the 1970s.  The commonly reiterated 
notion has been that the visual evidence of human suffering midst the war, 
mediated through television, not only mobilized disapproving public 
sentiments towards the war, but also influenced the political process of US, 
and ultimately lead to the US withdrawal from the war.825 This belief of the 
efficiency and influence of televised war images on foreign policy has been 
widely debated both in research and in public discourse. Nevertheless, for 
example Daniel Hallin as well as Chomsky and Hermann have concluded, 
that the effect of the images mediated through a novel mediation platform 
has been highly exaggerated, or even false. Researchers have pointed out, 
that the presentation of the images of war in US media actually followed an 
established elite view of the war, rather than led it. This is to say, that the 
images surfaced in the media because the national elite was already war 
weary and disappointed of the war, or even opposed to the continuation of it. 
                                                
823 See Chapters 2.2.5 & 2.4.4; Sliwinski, 2011, 4-5.; and for example, Hallin, 1989 (1986); 
Picturing atrocity, 2012, 12-13 ;  Cottle, 2009, 128-131.  
824 Zelizer: 1998; Sliwinski: 2011, 83-110; Arendt, 1949; Arendt 2004 (1951); Arendt, Hannah: 
An image of Hell.  In Essays of Understanding 1939-1954,  1994.  See also Chapter 2.3.1.  
825 See chapter, 2. 3.4. and for example: Hallin, 1989 (1986); Griffiths, Philip, J: Vietnam Inc. 
Phaidon Press, New York. 2005, (1971). 
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Thus, Hallin argues that the presentation of the images and visual mediation 
techniques did not change the prevalent public (or elite) sentiments towards 
the war, but actually trailed them. 826 Nevertheless, the Vietnam War 
syndrome and the idea of the potency of suffering images in effecting 
political processes seems to be cemented in the public consciousness as well 
as the mindset of governmental and military actors. And thus the ‘Vietnam 
lessons’ have been noted to create a persistent influence on how the 
presentation images of Western war and Western war inflicted suffering in 
the media are nowadays even more tightly controlled.827  
Later, from the early 1990’s onwards, the CNN effect has been extensively 
discussed, both in public as well as academic discourse.  The CNN effect 
paradigm that emerged in the post-Cold War era was inspired by the novel 
news mediation by resources of satellite technology and got fueled by the 
news reporting of the Persian Gulf War. The CNN, a 1980 founded 
independent US news corporation, was the first news agency that strongly 
relied on live reportage straight from global crisis areas. CNN was thus often 
hailed as an emblem of change in the relations of crisis reporting and 
international politics.  The CNN effect thesis suggests that witnessing foreign 
conflicts by means of real time, live reportage from the crisis areas would 
powerfully affect public opinion, create sentimental outrage in the distant 
spectators and bolster public condemnation of atrocities. The often reiterated 
idea of the CNN effect theory is that (global) international televised news 
coverage from crisis zones—and especially crude images of war inflicted 
suffering—would not only influence public opinion, but pressure political 
leaders to react more promptly and forcefully to war crimes, atrocities and 
human rights violations, often by (military) interventionist means.828 
Nevertheless, many scholars have seen the CNN effect in more moderate or 
even critical terms, and viewed media’s role in foreign relations more as a 
strategic enabler of political involvement and intervention. For example 
Pierce Robinson argues, that media reportage of humanitarian suffering can 
be rather seen as an enabler of interventionist policy—or even a political tool, 
a powerful source of legitimation—rather than a force pressuring and forcing 
policy makers to act against their will or interests. Many other researchers on 
the issue more or less agree with this view.829 Despite of this, the “CNN 
myth” still habitually surfaces in public notions, and the causal claim on the 
power of images at its core seems to live on, although it has been rather 
effectively burst in research.830 
                                                
826  Hallin, 1986; Chomsky & Herman 2002 (1988).  
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More lately, new media’s and social media’s effect on the way in which 
information is mediated in and from conflict zones has been widely 
discussed. Philip Seib describes the contemporary effect of new media and 
social media on the transformation of mediation of information (of 
international conflicts) as the Al Jazeera effect. He claims that the traditional 
ways of shaping global politics have been superseded by the influence of new 
media: satellite technology, Internet, the blogosphere and “other high-tech 
tools”. Despite of the phrase Al-Jazeera effect, the claim is not just about Al-
Jazeera—the Qatar based broadcasting company—per se, but Seib rather 
describes how new media and social media have the power to create new 
relationships and structures both in local level politics and identity 
formation, as well as to influence international politics. Al-Jazeera here, 
functions as a metaphor for a wider paradigm of new media’s influence on 
global affairs. The claim is that the multifarious novelties within the 
communications systems and media would forcefully challenge the 
hegemony of the prominent Western media houses in global communication, 
and bring out not only a more multivoiced global media but have an effect on 
global politics, create challenges for those who govern and opportunities for 
those who want to voice their concerns (especially populations of non-
democratic, repressive regimes).  As Seib phrases it, the media is no longer 
just the media, but has larger popular base than ever before, and as a result, 
has unprecedented impact on international politics. He moreover adds that 
these potentialities may be used both as tools for conflict as well as 
instruments for peace.831 
Even more enthusiastically and optimistically the revolutionizing political 
force of new media and social media has been labelled as a technology that 
has a vast potency of not only mobilizing the citizens of authoritarian regimes 
but also as liberating them from under the yoke of ruling undemocratic 
regimes. For example in the book Liberation Technology the efficiency of 
social media in the struggle for democracy and freedom of expression is 
exposed from a multitude of perspectives.  And the potency of social media 
(Flickr, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter etc.) particularly for the inhabitants of 
politically “repressive regimes” and crisis zones of the (non-Western world) 
is in the book presented as a positive passage to political mobilization, a 
revolutionary route of mediating grievances world wide out of the reach of 
authoritarian control—and ultimately a medium of “liberation”.832 The logic 
of (political) communication especially in authoritarian states has undeniably 
                                                
831 Seib, Philip: The Al Jazeera Effect: How the New Global Media Are Reshaping World Politics, 
Potomac Books, Washington DC, 2008. The discussion (in the West) on the Al Jazeera effect has 
arguably been also due to the  geographical, cultural and political standing of the now leading global 
news corporation, than solely conditional of a novel technical application in mediating news. Al 
Jazeera as a broadcaster located in the global south, and mediating news from a global south/Muslim 
perspective.  Already this can be seen as a significant change in the mediation of information 
previously dominated by Western based media companies. See also: Seib, Philip: Real-time 
diplomacy: Politics and power in the Social media era. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2012 (also 
includes a More cynical note on how policy makers (of repressive regimes) might make use of social 
media to advance their political interests).  
832 Liberation Technology, 2012.  
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been challenged by the new mediation means offered by the new media and 
social media techniques. The restricted and state owned news agencies of 
authoritarian states do not anymore hold the local monopoly of information 
mediation. The revolutionizing force of social media most often refers to 
information mediation as a means of political mobilization on the local level. 
The local effect of social media accounts surfaced into an intensified 
discussion especially at the time of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings. Today 
citizens of crisis zones are not only perceived as receivers of filtered 
information, but are seen to act as active producers and mediators of even 
critical anti-regime information, in a relatively institution free mediation 
environment.833  
This line of optimistic thinking is quite often detectable in Western public 
discussion on the potency of the new media in revolutionizing the mediation 
of information, and the paradigm of social media revolution is also from time 
to time heaved up in Western political discussion on the upheavals of global 
crisis zones. Habitually (Western) policy makers have been saluting the novel 
ways of mediation (from crisis zones) as emblems of democracy, also 
effecting foreign policy and enforcing more humanitarian world politics. In 
her speech 2010 the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton hailed the spread 
of “information networks” (meaning the use of Internet and social media) as 
the “new nervous system for our planet”. In her speech she more over took 
up the foreign political potency of the new mediation technologies—feature 
familiar from the Vietnam War syndrome and the CNN effect discussions—as 
she highlighted the importance of social media in “making the governments 
more accountable”. Similarly, the same year French foreign Minister 
Bernard Kouchner hailed the promise of new communications technology as 
“the most fantastic means of breaking down the walls that close us of from 
one another”. Kouchner’s (a well-known humanitarian and a founding 
member of the Doctors Without Borders organization834) reference to 
breaking down of the barriers dividing humans globally, can be read as a 
strong appeal, pointing to bridging the global empathy gap between the 
sufferers of this world, and the ones spectating the suffering of the global less 
fortunate.  The relations of the populations of the non-Western repressive 
regimes and their undemocratic leaders is sometimes, for example in the 
book Liberation Technology,  in a quite simplifying way presented in a form, 
in which the repressive and undemocratic regimes strive to control the free 
mediation of information, as the activist using social media are presented as 
fighting for democracy, freedom of expression and the freedom of the 
internet. Concurrently, Liberation Technology tends to celebrate the role of 
the Western democratic states in this process quite unambiguously as the 
global guardians of Internet freedom and as political enablers liberating 
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834 See Chapter 2.  
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technological novelties within these “repressive regimes”, the political 
opponents of the Western regimes, such as China, Iran—and Syria.835  
This optimistic postulation of the revolutionizing ability of social media 
(crisis) mediation is not only fostered within (Western) academic, public or 
political discussions highlighting the positive Western influence on global 
freedom of expression. It is also detectable at the local, grass roots level at the 
crisis zones, among the net activists and opposing actors of topical conflicts.  
The use of social media in mediating war imagery is a strategic asset for the 
local populations/rebel groups in the course of contemporary warfare, 
utilized not only locally, but employed in multifarious ways in the fight over 
the hearts and minds of the surrounding world. The effective dissemination 
and strategic use of terrifying images by the ISIS serves as a poignant 
example of this phenomenon.836 The motive of local actors of crisis zones to 
upload crude images of war on social media, has been to rapidly mediate 
information, to inform the wider surrounding world of the immediate events 
in conflict areas, and thus also to influence public notions, political 
conceptions, and perhaps even foreign political decision making regarding 
these areas. This has also been the case with disseminating crude social 
media imagery of human suffering from the topical war wrenched areas, such 
as Syria where external journalists are scarce. International media houses 
have become to more and more rely on local social media sources as 
providers of (visual) material and mediators of information. Consequently 
the social media information mediation of topical crisis areas has become 
more and more organized and systematic, and external players have also 
often funded dissemination of information.837  
Local producers of social media content rely on the messages they 
generate to have influence the battle they fight—and moreover effect the 
overall notions the wider spectating world have of their fight. In line with this 
notion, Jamal Flitani—Syrian social media rebel activist who posted Ghouta 
gas attack images into the social media—told an Associated Press (AP) 
journalist that he became aware of the power of his posts, when he saw his 
images used by international news corporations, and moreover cited by the 
intelligence service of the United States as a proof of the tragic events of 21st 
of August taking place. Later Flitani has been running an opposition media 
center in Douma, Syria.838  This further implies that there exists, also among 
the information producers of the local level, an expectation that revelatory 
war images not only mediate information from crisis zones, but have power 
                                                
835  See for instance: Liberation Technology, 2012, 157-171.  
836 On social media, ISIS uses modern cultural images to spread anti-modern values. 
September 24, 2015, Brookings.    
837  Syria’s Civil War plays out on Social Media. The Huffington Post ,19.10.2013; Syria’s 
Socially Mediated Civil War. Lynch, Marc, Freelon, Deen& Aday, Sean. Peaceworks, United States 
Institute for Peace, 2014; Syria Activists record all they can for history’s sake. October, 
24.2012, Los Angeles Times.  
838  Syria’s Civil War plays out on Social Media. 19. October, 2013, The Huffington Post.  
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to influence external action and foreign political decisions in reference to 
topical crisis.  
All in all, the recent discussion on the dynamic power and effects of the 
social media enabled mediation clearly is a topical manifestation of a 
historically thriving way of thinking on the novel mediation technologies and 
the emotional power of images in international political settings; a successor 
of the former discussions of the Vietnam War Syndrome and the CNN effect.  
7.2.2 THE MORE WE SEE THE MORE WE CARE? TECHNOLOGY 
DRIVEN CAUSALITY OPTIMISM  
An overview of the recent discussions dealing with the novel fortified 
effectiveness of crisis imagery on public sentiments and (Western) foreign 
policy, shows that there are two interrelated grounding presumptions 
embedded in the discourses. First of all, profound technology optimism 
seems to be grounded in the (Western) thinking on the power of new 
technology and namely the (foreign political) power of the novel ways of 
visual mediation. Mediation of distant crisis (visually) and reacting to them 
has historically evolved hand in hand not only with the predominant 
mindset, political preconditions, but particularly with technological 
development. Johanna Neuman argues that this optimism seems to be 
reasserted time and time again in the course of technical evolvement in 
(visual) mediation. In her book Lights, Camera, War: Is Media Technology 
Driving International Politics? she places the CNN-effect into a broad 
historical context of technical communication innovations, which have 
altered the way in which knowledge of the distant suffering has been 
mediated from crisis zones for the awareness of wider audiences. She states 
that each technological innovation has in its time raised hopes that it could 
strip power from the elites, bestow it to the public, expand democracy and 
eventually make the world a more just place. May it be the “Gutenberg 
revolution”, the invention of photography and its effect on emotions towards 
distant others, invention of film creating a global village or the more recent 
inventions of TV and satellite technology, contemporaries seem to have 
recurrently firmly believed that technological novelties in the field of visual 
mediation would have the power to change the relations between the ruled 
and the rulers, as well as the safe spectators and the distant sufferers. 839 This 
thinking is clearly detectable also in contemporary discourses on the Al-
Jazeera effect, social media “Liberation technologies” and the overall 
optimism on the effect of social media images on bridging the empathy gap 
between the sufferers and the spectators.   
In addition to the technology-optimism, there are certain additional 
significant similarities in the Vietnam War Syndrome, the CNN-Effect, as 
well as the overall topical reformatory optimism of visual social media 
                                                
839  Neuman, 1996.  
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mediation in restoring compassionate relations and political change. In the 
discussions on the power of mediated visual images on policy, especially in 
the more recent 20th and 21st century settings, a highly causal way of thinking 
thrives. Following this causal logic, it has been repeatedly argued that 
revelatory media representations of human suffering—and especially crisis 
images—would lead to heightened sense of (global) obligation towards the 
suffering of others. This has been, especially in the more contemporary 
settings, seen to lead to the political process of foreign (humanitarian) 
intervention. The effect has been usually understood to manifest itself in a 
three-stage process. Roughly, in the first stage, encountering images of 
distant suffering via a novel mediation technique, has been seen to 
efficiently, promptly and directly hoist the suffering of others into the 
attention of wide spectating (Western) audiences. Secondly, new mediation 
techniques are habitually thought of as enabling a more empathetic relation 
and thus public reaction to the suffering of others, and thus seen as creating 
an emotional public spectacle, and ultimately a cry for action. In the third 
stage, the emotional public outcry (of the citizens of Western democratic 
regimes) is then seen to influence, press, or even force the (Western) policy 
makers to more forcefully react to the situations causing human suffering. In 
the recent decades—in the post-Cold War era, dominated by Western 
humanitarian world politics—most often the instances referred to as “forceful 
reactions”, have been (Western) humanitarian military interventions into 
mostly non-Western conflict areas.840 
Thus there is a widely reiterated notion on the relation between the 
nature and amount of images and reactions, added with the belief that a 
novel medium creates a different relationship between the sufferers and the 
spectators, which then furthermore produces political action. This produces a 
technology driven causal claim. The technology optimism on visual crisis 
mediation ties up with the age-old idea ‘If only people would know, they 
would act’.841  I argue that this decades old belief is topically renewed in the 
discussion on effect of social media: today an effect, much parallel to the 
Vietnam War syndrome and the CNN-effect, is widely articulated. This 
debate can be located to exist in academic discussion and among media 
practitioners, as well as among local populations of crisis areas and parties of 
current military conflicts utilizing social media. Moreover it is detectable 
among (Western) foreign policy makers. I call this recent discourse the social 
media effect, and place it in the continuum of a historically formed way of 
thinking and perceiving the altering (and liberating) effect of crisis and war 
images on global imagination, empathy and international politics. The social 
media effect is an up-to-date variation of a historically prevalent optimistic 
and causal discourse accounting the influence of technology in mediating 
image of suffering and global imagination.  
                                                
840 Gilboa, 2005. 
841 Cohen, 2001, 185.  
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7.2.3 IMAGE FLOWS IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA ERA 
The Syrian war has been titled history’s most socially mediated war, 
especially in terms of (graphic) imagery. But as said, August 21st 2013, the 
visual mediation of the Syrian war took a dramatic turn.  At about 2.30 in the 
morning, images depicting what seemed to be a chemical weapons attack—
killing hundreds, mostly civilians—in the Ghouta area, suburbs of Damascus 
started to flow into social media. Chaotic videos and images of people 
convulsing, gasping for breath and foaming from the mouth, as well as 
images of rows of dead civilians—among which a lot of small children—first 
surfaced via social media accounts of local civilians, medical and 
humanitarian workers and opposition sources. In just a few hours there were 
thousands of graphic and horrific visual accounts of the event to be found 
online.842  (See illustration 7.1)  
The social media originating images and videos were habitually shaky, 
hasty and shot in the middle of the disarray of the evolving events. The 
images were usually added meaning with information on the place, time, and 
account of the events. As the attack took place in a mostly rebel held 
territory843, every so often the texts accompanying the images also pointed to 
the responsibility of the President al-Assad’s regime for the attacks. In their 
primary use the intent of the local social media accounts was most commonly 
to document the enfolding events. They were targeted to inform the local 
sphere of the events. But the intent of their mediation also expands from this 
local affect. The intent was also to inform the wider surrounding world of the 
atrocity. The opposition activists posting the videos and images online, most 
certainly hoped—in line with the predominant thinking of the effects of 
images of suffering—that the crude images would rouse international 
outrage, work to delegitimize the Syrian regime in the eyes of the 
surrounding world, as well as to make the surrounding world bear witness to 
the horrific events.844  
And, as the Western spectators woke up to the morning of 21st of August 
2013 and opened their web browsers or newspapers, they encountered a 
horrific view from Syria. But what is remarkable and important to bear in 
mind here is that although the attack was at first reported, documented and 
mediated through the social media accounts and reports of the locals, the 
majority of the more distant spectating world—in this study namely the 
Western as well as the Russian public—first encountered the news of the 
attack and the images of the horrific events through more conventional news 
media, e.g. mainstream media; as news items produced and reframed by the 
                                                
842 Syria Conflict: Chemical Weapons Blamed, as Hundreds Reported Killed. The 
Guardian, 22.08.2013; Syria crisis: Rebels claim hundreds killed in government chemical 
weapons attack - Wednesday 21 August. The Guardian, 21.08.2013; Government 
Assessment of the Syrian Government’s use of Chemical Weapons August 21, 2013. The 
White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 30.08.2013. 
843  At the time Ghouta was predominantly in the control of anti-regime rebels, namely groups that 
identified them selves as belonging to the Free Syrian Army.  
844  Syria’s socially mediated civil war, 2014, 8-10 
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prominent (local) news corporations. Thus, the faces and bodies of the 
victims were often encountered through images shot by locals, but 
nevertheless predominantly remediated for the view of the more distant 
spectators by habitual (local/global) news agencies, and mainstream medias 
broadcasting. And thus, the social media originating imagery became an 
important source of visual raw material for the more conventional 
mainstream media in reporting the events worldwide.845  
Thus, while social media mediation is today often labeled as a powerful 
means of (globally) distributing images and messages of war, when assessing 
the force and the namely the messages of social media images, it must be 
regarded, that sporadic local accounts still nevertheless do not have the 
power to mediate consistent crisis information on a wider—let alone global—
scale. Today the utilization of social media images of crisis situations is an 
increasingly important news production tool for the more conventional 
mainstream media—and likewise the mainstream media is an important 
force multiplier and circulation enhancer for the local producers of crisis 
social media content. As majority of the wider, international audience do not 
actively follow Syrian civilian or rebel social media sources, but rather lean to 
geographically, culturally and also politically positioned mainstream news 
producers. Thus, permeating the mainstream media’s news agenda and 
inclusion into their broadcasting is an important support factor for locally 
produced (visual) social media content, which allows social media activist’s 
messages to spread.846  And circulate these images did. They were widely and 
extensively used by the prominent Western news outlets (along with content 
produced by big and influential media houses and news corporations them 
selves), gathered into vast image galleries, accompanied by cautions of 
graphic, potentially disturbing images.847  
Thus, as social media techniques enable information mediation by 
amateurs on a local level, it moreover enables the utilization of the locally 
produced (visual) material on a more global level. The heightened use of 
locally produced, social media originating material by the more conventional 
mainstream news producers is the reality of crisis news production today. 
                                                
845 The shares, re-shares and circulation of the images in the wider social media milieu also have an 
impact on how the conceptions and framings of the images are constructed. But I here discount from 
my analysis the circulation of the images by individual (Western) social media users and concentrate 
on the use of the images in more conventional mass media channels.  
 846  See for instance: Syria’s Socially Mediated Civil War, 2014, 7-12.  
847   See collections of images (social media originating as well as images of the events produced by 
prominent news corporations them selves) used in the Western media: Syria: Slaughter of the 
innocents as children among over 1,000 civilians gassed to death.  The Mirror, 22.08.2013; 
Syria´s Darkest Day? Opposition Blames Assad as up to 1300 killed in “poison gas 
attacks”, The Independent, 22.8.2013; Syrian Rebels report Chemical attack, The New York 
Times, 21.08.2013; Video Shows Victims of Suspected Syrian Chemical Attack, The Lede 
Blog, New York Times, 21.08.2013; Syria: Footage shows horrific aftermath of alleged gas 
attacks- video. The Guardian, 21.08.2013; First on CNN: Videos show glimpse into evidence 
for Syria intervention, CNN, 08.09.2013; In Shock, Survivor of Attack Says, 'I'm Alive', 
New York Times Project, Watching Syria’s War; Syyrian Punaiset Viivat. Helsingin Sanomat, 
22.08.2013; Syria's darkest hour: Hundreds of children's bodies piled high after nerve 
gas attack near Damascus leaves up to 1,300 dead, The Daily Mail, 22.08.2013.  
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The more conventional media frequently relies on locally produced footage of 
immediate events, especially in reporting and picturing events rapidly 
evolving in turmoil crisis areas, where international journalists are often 
scarce. This has been the case namely in the war wrenched Syria, a country 
that was ranked “the most dangerous place in the world for journalist” by the 
Committee to protect Journalists in 2013. 848   The relationship of local social 
media content producers (hoping for their messages to spread widely) and 
mainstream media news content producers is a symbiotic one: For the 
messages of social media to spread expansively and gain global attention they 
need to be taken up and harnessed by the more conventional, influential 
(global and local) news outlets, and for the mainstream news production of 
foreign event to be efficient, cutting edge and up-to-date, the media houses 
need to keep up with the local social media sources of crisis areas and war 
zones.  
As (global) mainstream media has become to more heavily rely on locally 
produced (visual) material, it has been commonly stated among (Western) 
journalists and media researchers, that the use of amateur images and local 
material provide a novel and more intimate reporting of crisis, producing 
amplified feelings and reactions towards distant suffering. Likewise, in 
popular conceptions, amateur images are often understood as somewhat 
objective accounts and entitled as “authentic”, and even perceived as 
convoying the events “as they really were” at the spot of events. Whereas, on 
the other hand, it has been warned, that the reliance on locally produced 
material may produce a risk of recirculating potentially partial, misleading 
and perhaps politically motivated narratives originating from local accounts. 
Thus, researchers have cautioned, that use of social media material might 
create “a dangerous illusion of unmediated information flows”.849 To prevent 
biased or even false locally produced material to flow worldwide, journalists 
and news corporations have resorted to sophisticated protocols to verify 
particular videos and images.  Mass media agencies use verification services 
such as the Stroyful850 to check the authenticity of the content. But deeper 
structural bias perhaps embedded in the messages and images may 
nevertheless be hard to identify by such measures. But consequently, quite 
paradoxically, in part the use of verification services has also led to a 
situation in which some content producers familiar to journalists have been 
established as trustworthy, and thus the number of material producers has 
narrowed down. It is warned that a selective reliance on these particular 
producers is likely to grow in the future.851  Moreover, as Mervi Pantti has 
                                                
848  Syria’s Civil War Plays out on Social Media. October 19, 2013, The Huffington Post;  For 
News From Syrian Battleground, a Reliance on Social Media. 30, August, 2013, the New 
York Times; Pantti & Anden-Papadopoulos, 2011, 10-15; Committee to Protect Journalists: 
Syria, The most Dangerous Place for Journalist.  
849  Syria’s Socially Mediated Civil War, 2014, 7-12. Pantti & Anden-Papadopoulos: 2011, 
13; Cottle, 2009.  
850  see:  Storyful- The world’s first Social News Agency: http://storyful.com/ 
851 Syria’s Socially Mediated Civil War, 2014; David Campbell: Thinking Images: Syria, 
social media and photojournalism. 26.4.2011.  
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shown in relation to the Western media’s (visual) mediation of the Syrian 
war (2012/early 2013 before the chemical attack) majority of the images 
(more than 80% of the imagery with source provided) used to picture the 
Syrian crisis was actually produced by the big Western news agencies (AP, 
AFP and Reuters).852 
Nevertheless, the utilization of visual social media footage is 
contemporarily prevalent in mass media broadcasting of topical crisis. 
Mainstream media recirculates the social media content—especially war 
images—in their own broadcasting, and sometimes even present the locally 
produced images as their own material.853 This reliance of mass media on 
local sources most certainly has an effect on how, and through what kind of 
footage, the global crisis of today are mediated for the sight of the wider 
spectating world. But in practice, I argue, the power of culturally, 
geographically and politically segmented mainstream news media as the 
primary new producer (for large masses) still for a large part remains. 
Moreover, the more conventional mainstream media still functions as a 
gatekeeper for the social media information to spread. For local events and 
crisis to register as newsworthy and to gain global importance and concern, 
the amateur accounts need to be transformed into global media events, in the 
remediation processes of the more conventional mainstream media. 
Furthermore, the mass media filters and selects certain “newsworthy” events 
and suitable images to be used in its own journalistic remediation, out of the 
massive body of socially mediated raw material. The deployment of the 
selected messages by mainstream media enables the flow of sporadic social 
media content worldwide, and renders the social media images the attention 
of the wider audiences. However, the preconditions of remediation also 
narrow and constrict as well as culturally and politically contextualize and 
(re)frame the social media content, its messages and signification.854 As real 
life events and politics create texts and images, these are—even still at the age 
of the social media—transformed into widespread news stories in the 
processes of news production, shaped by the dominant news agendas and 
selection practices of prominent mainstream media outlets. Furthermore, 
news production and news media itself can be perceived as a part of the 
ideological machinery of a given cultural and political sphere, as has been 
discussed in chapters 2, 3 and 6. 855 
Furthermore, visual images create a special material, extremely liable for 
cultural and political contextual framings and re-framings. As Roland 
Barthes, Susan Sontag and Judith Butler suggest, images show, but cannot 
                                                
852 Pantti, 2013, 9. 
853  Campbell, David: Thinking Images v.15: Syria, Social Media and photojournalism. Visual 
storytelling, Creative practise and criticism -blog.  April 26.2011 ; Pantti, 2013  
854 Cottle, Simon: Global Crisis Reporting: Journalism in Global Age. McGraw Hill, Open 
University Press, 2009; Pantti & Anden-Papadopoulos: 2011, 13. ; Syria’s Socially Mediated 
Civil War, 2014, 7-11. ; Pantti, 2013 
855 See for example: Hall, Stuart: A world at one with itself. In The manufacture of News. A 
Reader. Cohen, Stanley & Young, Jock (eds.), Sage, Beverly Hills, 1973; Chomsky& Hermann, 1988. 
Cottle, 2009, 111-114; Cottle, 2006, 75-99 
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articulate. Even the most atrocious and shocking of images are, according to 
this view, mute. And thus, contemporarily, at the age of even more frantic 
global mediation, the meanings and messages of images are produced in 
their political and cultural environments, according to the contextual and 
discursive settings, through various uses, naming, framing and circulation.856 
Captions, positioning, uses of the same image in different settings and 
circulation—flows of images—produce new meanings and create messages 
perhaps greatly differing from the “original” function of the image. 
Circulation and presentation, positioning and selection of the images 
displayed in the mainstream media’s journalistic remediation create further 
messages for the images.  
Therefore I claim that social media images, in the contemporary situation 
still, to a large extent, cannot escape the framings and meaning production 
mechanisms of geographically, culturally and politically positioned—
sometimes even biased—more conventional mainstream media. Thus, the 
meanings of these images are created in the realm of political, where silent 
images of suffering and atrocity constantly flow gathering different meanings 
and messages in uses and reuses. Especially images of suffering and 
atrocity—as an influential and highly emotional image genre—essentially 
address their viewers according to historically, politically and culturally 
constructed conventions. Cultural, customary conventions in picturing 
atrocity, well-known iconic images and historical references further construct 
the meanings and readings of the images.857 But as today amateur produced 
social media images of crisis are increasingly important material through 
which also the spectators of (Western) mainstream media confront distant 
suffering, the ways in which the mainstream media deploys, utilizes, frames 
and signifies the material is of utter most importance when critically 
assessing the power and uses of social media images and their (international 
political) framings in the contemporary setting. Thus, what I set to analyze in 
the subsequent pages of this chapter is the remediation and flows of the 
social media originating images, and thus aim to find out how Western (as 
well as Russian) spectators confronted the Ghouta images through 
mainstream medias remediation. The social media originating images of the 
Ghouta chemical weapons attack, their uses in the (Western) mainstream 
media and international politics offers a case, through which both the 
technology optimism idea, as well as the causality claim produced by the 
recent discourse on the political effectiveness and functions of crisis and 
suffering images may be scrutinized in a contemporary setting. 
 
                                                
856   Sontag, 2003; Butler, 2009, 63-100; Barthes, 2000 (1957), 109- 159. See also chapter 2.  
857  On Iconic images and historical references see: Campbell, 2002B, 146-150, 159-160; Sliwinski: 
2011, 111-138; Zelizer: 1998, 202- 239.See also Chapters 2.3.2 & 2.4.4.  
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7.3 SOCIAL MEDIA IMAGES IN MAINSTREAM MEDIA: 
CONTEXTUAL MEANING PRODUCTION  
This chapter monitors the uses of the images of the Syrian gas attack within 
well-known and influential Western mainstream media outlets.858 Through 
the analysis on the utilizations and framing of the images in the more 
conventional media, I aim to shed light on the processes of meaning creation 
of citizen created images and to thus deconstruct and understand the current 
flows of social media images in wider (political) setting. 
The surrounding world is strongly divided in its posture, gaze and 
understanding on the Syrian war. Reclining to what was previously stated on 
the images flows and contextual meaning production, same images and 
events tend to be framed, contextualized and thus appear very differently 
when presented to distinct recipient audiences. That is, mute images gather 
different meanings and framings in different political and cultural settings, 
also at the social media era. Therefore, in addition to the inquiry to the uses 
of these images in Western media, I shall also make a brief and limited 
inquest into Russian media and the uses and framings the gas strike images 
gathered there. This is done in order to compare the Western mainstream 
media’s use of the Syria gas strike images with that of the Russian media, and 
thus the aim is at detecting the cultural/political differences in the display of 
the same visualized event in different settings. 
After the August 2013 chemical attack also social media outputs of the 
Syrian regime—especially the Instagram account of the president Bashar al-
Assad—were extensively addressed and referred to in the Western news 
media. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the meaning creation 
procedure and discursive flows of contemporary social media images I shall 
also analyze the meanings and significations the Syrian regimes social media 
accounts gathered in Western media.  
7.3.1 IMAGES OF THE GHOUTA CHEMICAL ATTACK IN WESTERN 
MAINSTREAM MEDIA 
Soon after the Damascus events, horrific images started to massively 
circulate in Western media. Picture galleries displaying graphic images 
appeared at the front pages of prominent news outlets.859 Although the news 
                                                
858  This study is for the most part targeted on the uses and flows of the images in the following 2 to 3 
weeks from the actual event.  For this was the time when the atrocious images were vastly circulated, 
became to be well known and were referred recurrently in political settings. This was also the 
timeframe within which the international political solution to the Ghouta crisis was formulated.  
859  See collections of images used in the Western media: Syria: Slaughter of the innocents as 
children among over 1,000 civilians gassed to death.  The Mirror, August, 22. 2013; Syria´s 
Darkest Day? Opposition Blames Assad as up to 1300 killed in “poison gas attacks”, The 
Independent, August 22. 2013; Syrian Rebels report Chemical attack, The New York Times, 
August 21. 2013; Video Shows Victims of Suspected Syrian Chemical Attack, The Lede Blog, 
New York Times, August, 21. 2013 ; Syria: Footage shows horrific aftermath of alleged gas 
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of the Ghouta events originally broke and quickly spread in the social media 
milieu and via locally produces imagery, social media originating imagery 
was not the only means of illustrating the story for the wider spectating 
public. In addition to the local social media images,  (Western) mainstream 
media also widely used visual material produced by them selves/their own 
sources. Habitually photos taken and produced by professional 
photographers working for big and influential news corporations, such as the 
Reuters and Associated Press (AP) were also used in illustrating the news. 
Although it was commonly mentioned in the news texts, that the news first 
emerged in the social media, images depicting the events in the mainstream 
media, were perhaps surprisingly often produced by the big Western media 
houses. The two types of images were used alongside in the Western 
reporting of the event. This seems to be a contemporary standard procedure 
of (Western) mainstream media.860 
In the recirculation of Western mainstream media the social media 
originating images (as well as the widely used visual content produced by 
influential (Western) news/image agencies themselves) formed into new 
shapes: Western representations and significations depicting the atrocity 
became established. The typical image types deployed by Western media in 
describing the event were the silent and blunt images showing endless rows 
of dead civilians and children laying on concrete floors, rooms full of dead 
bodies covered with sheets, and mass graves into which the victims were 
piled.  (See Illustration 7.2) Another prominent type of images in Western 
media were the chaotic images shot in the midst of the bedlam of the events: 
survivors of the attack being treated, convulsing, foaming, screaming or 
                                                                                                                                     
attacks- video. The Guardian, August 21.2013; First on CNN: Videos show glimpse into 
evidence for Syria intervention, CNN, September 8, 2013; In Shock, Survivor of Attack 
Says, 'I'm Alive', New York Times Project, Watching Syria’s War; Syyrian Punaiset Viivat. 
Helsingin Sanomat, August 22.2013; Syria's darkest hour: Hundreds of children's bodies 
piled high after nerve gas attack near Damascus leaves up to 1,300 dead, The Daily Mail, 
August 22.2013 ; Haglund vakuuttui al-Assadin syyllisyydestä kaasuiskuun. September 7 , 
2013, Helsingin Sanomat: Järkyttävät kuvat ja videot : Satoja lapsia ja naisia kuollut 
kaasuiskussa Syyriassa? August 22, 2013,Iltasanomat ; Syria’s Darkest hour: Hundreds of 
Children’s bodies piled high after a nerve gas attack neat Damascus leaves up to 1,300 
dead. August 22, 2013, World observer online.   
860  As Mervi Pantti writes, Western media (in 2102/2013) primarily used images they received from 
news agencies. Some images distributed by news agencies were identified as non-professional – with 
labels such as ‘amateur,’ ‘opposition,’ and ‘activist’. Pantti, 2013, 9. This also seems to be the case with 
the Damascus August 21st attack.  
Despite of the massive amount of social media imagery of the attack, it is still often easier and faster for 
media houses to use image content produced by big international image agencies, which they have 
subscribed to and are accustomed to use for visual content.  Often the news of the Ghouta attack in 
Western media was titled, named and framed in the Western media so that the reader easily got the 
impression that the images convoying the information were social media originating (rebel images), 
even if the images illustrating the story (at least partially) were cited to for example Reuters or AP. (See 
for example Syria: Footage shows horrific aftermath of alleged gas attacks- video. The 
Guardian, 21.08.2013. ; Syrian Rebels report Chemical attack, The New York Times, August 
21.2013.) 
On the uses of social media originating images alongside with visual material produced by influential, 
more conventional image/new producers and image agencies, see for example: Pantti, 2013; 
Encyclopedia of social media and politics. Kerric, Harvey (ed.) Sage, London, 2014, 30 -31.  
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nearly lifeless victims of the chemicals. Often these images picture also small 
children exposed to the poison gas. (See illustration 7.1 861) 
Within the circulation in the Western media apparatus the images of the 
attack gathered various framings. Furthermore, the circulation and repetitive 
framings of the images created recurring, somewhat solid themes. These 
recurring themes of representation were: 1.) the massive scale of suffering 
and unlawful slaughter of innocent civilians, and the barbarism of the use of 
chemical weapons, 2.) use of gas as war crime and the event as a crime 
against humanity, and 3.) the testimonial power of the atrocious (amateur) 
images, seen as proofing of the guilt of the al-Assad regime. (Illustrations 7.1 
& 7.2) 
The images used by mainstream Western media highlighted the amount 
of the victims – rooms full of bodies and the mass graves – but also the fact 
that the victims seemed to be civilians, even habitually children. This can be 
seen as underlining the Syrian war as a civil war, raging midst of the society 
and in cities inhabited by civilians. Besides the civilian status and vast 
quantity of victims, the images strongly brought forth the nature of 
gas/chemicals as a weapon. Before the Ghouta attack, the Syrian civil war 
had already claimed the lives of nearly 100 000 people. It was the out of the 
ordinary, spectacular and imposing event and the massive amount of horrific 
images produced of it that brought the suffering of the inhabitants of 
Damascus to everyone’s sight. Moreover, it was particularly the use of an 
illegal chemical weapon—dreaded poison gas—that created the 
newsworthiness of the event, and lead to the massive use of the images in the 
Western media. 
What was clearly eminent in the images was that chemical substances do 
not pick their victims; poison gas kills everything on its way—young and old, 
men and women, civilians as well as soldiers. The suffering inflicted by the 
poison gas was visually brought forth by showing the symptoms of the 
victims on a medical level: convulsions, bluish skin color, foaming from 
mouth and nose, close ups on running eyes, as well as the oxygen masks on 
the faces of unconscious victims that otherwise seem physically uninjured 
point to and demonstrate that illegal chemical weapons were used. The use 
and arrangement of the images in the Western news firmly emphasized the 
nature of gas as a weapon. 
The use of chemical weapons is forbidden in the international treaties, 
which have been committed to and signed by the majority of the 
international community.862 One of the reasons why the use of chemical 
weapons is deprecated illegal and seen so strongly off limits is that the use of 
these arms of mass destruction bear a horrific reputation. The strong 
condemnation of chemical arms can also be seen to be linked with their 
                                                
861  The collage illustration 7.1 gives a view to the types of images that were prominently used in the 
(global) mainstream media after the attack. 
862 Convention on Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. Geneva, September 3 1992.  
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appalling visual history; the iconic images of the battle of Ypres of the First 
World War, the gas chambers of the 1940s Jewish genocide and horrific 
silent images of the Kurd town of Halabja gassed by Saddam Hussein in 
1988.863 The ways in which the audience perceives and reacts to the images 
of suffering strongly builds on historical references, which add meanings to 
the images. The historical references, contextualization and positioning of 
the images in Western media associated the Damascus atrocity with the 
previous, iconized and morally strongly condemned historical horrors.864  
In addition to the emphasis on the (corporal) effects of the use of gas as a 
weapon, the Western media recurrently referred to the attack as a war crime, 
a violation of international norms and rules of warfare. In Western publicity 
the act was also repeatedly referred to as a crime against humanity.865 
Protection of humanity and the human rights frame, in which the gas attack 
was in many respects presented in Western media, is significant addressing 
to the Western spectator. As protection of humanity and safeguarding human 
rights—the humanitarian paradigm—functions as a frame within which the 
legitimacy of international political actors and states are today, to a large 
extent, weight by in the global hierarchy, framing the act as crimes against 
humanity is remarkable.866 As argued earlier, the values and principles of 
protection of humanity and civilian populations are widely held sacred by the 
Western public. Thus the use of the illegal chemical weapon and the attack 
on the civilians appeared as an attack against humanitarian ethos of the 
Western lead international order, as well as violation of the values commonly 
held sacred by the international community. Thus, the Ghouta events were 
presented in the Western publicity as something out of the ordinary brutal; 
as a spectacular case of suffering seen distinct from the “normal” suffering 
caused by (the Syrian) war.  
Another central theme in the Western media’s framing of the images was 
the guilt of the al-Assad regime for the attack. Although, at least at first there 
was no legal proof that the Assad’s regime was behind the attack, strong 
speculation on the guilt was immediately raised in the Western media. Some 
Western headlines straight away named al-Assad regime guilty of the 
attack.867 Only about a week after the attacks the government of the United 
States released a report—strongly building on the social media accounts—of 
                                                
863 Compassion Fatigue About Syria… Already? Moeller, Susan. Huffington Post, August, 28, 
2013; Hiltermann, Jost: A poisonous affair: America, Iraq and the Gassing of Halabja. Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2007. 
864  See chapter 2; Käpylä & Kennedy, 2014; Campbell, 2002, b; Malkki, 1996.  
865  Syrian Chemical Weapons Attack a War Crime, Says EU. The Guardian, September, 
07.2013; Remarks on Syria, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Seoul (Republic of Korea), 
August 26, 2013, Ban Ki-Moons Speeches; Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation 
on Syria. White House, Office of the Press Secretary. September, 10.2013.   
866  Aaltola, 2009.  
867 See for instance: Syria: Slaughter of the innocents as children among over 1,000 
civilians gassed to death.  The Mirror, August, 22.2013; Syria´s Darkest Day? Opposition 
Blames Assad as up to 1300 killed in “poison gas attacks. The Independent, August ,22.103; 
First on CNN: Videos show glimpse into evidence for Syria intervention, CNN, September, 
08.2013.  
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the attacks, in which president Bashar al-Assad’s regime was named 
guilty.868 Early September president Obama showed 13 amateur videos and 
images of the event verified by the US intelligence to the US Congress. 
Reclining to the images he reasoned for a military attack against the al-Assad 
regime. 869 These images, selected out of the massive amount of images—
chosen by political premises, within political processes—were soon taken up 
and vastly circulated by the Western media. Thus these images ended up 
describing the situation and the guilt of the Syrian administration for the 
attack, and consequently directed and governed the Western view on the 
event. 
At the time of the attack the Western political climate and public opinion 
was readily auspicious to see al-Assad’s regime as illegal, guilty of the overall 
bloodshed in Syrian and responsible for the chemical attack. Even before the 
attack of August 21st, the al-Assad regime has been predominantly seen in the 
West as guilty for the bloody war—and as the opponent of the West. Although 
the Western powers—namely the United States and the United Kingdom—
were not at the time officially participating in the conflict, they unofficially 
financially supported, and even armed the opposition forces. 870 At the time 
of the attacks, the Damascus area was mainly in the hands of the opposition 
forces and namely groups that identify themselves as belonging to the Free 
Syrian Army, an opposition coalition the west was supporting. Thus, the 
guilt of al-Assad strongly brought forward by the Western media in its 
reporting and use of the images is not surprising, but rather suits the 
predominant notions very well. Thus the arrangements of the horrific images 
describing the suffering of the civilians worked to strengthen pre-existing 
notions on the war in the West, and the extensive circulation and framings of 
the images in the Western median merely reinforced the notions of the illegal 
and brutal rule of al-Assad.  
As discussed earlier, particularly in chapter 5, the autocrat rules and 
dictators of the chaotic and conflict prone global crisis areas are commonly 
perceived and presented in the predominant Western imagination as the 
(inhuman) opponents; enemies of Western values, such as democracy, 
freedom and human rights. In contrast, Western countries are framed as the 
guardians of these humane values. In the public imagination, and also the 
political rhetoric of Western powers, the West as well acts as the discipliner—
of these evil foreign rulers and regimes, unbinding to the sacred 
humanitarian principles. By emphasizing the use of gas, naming the act as a 
                                                
868 Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on 
August 21, 2013. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, August.30.2013.  
869  Government Assessment of the Syrian Government´s Use of Chemical Weapons 
August 21, 2013; First on CNN: Videos show glimpse into evidence for Syria 
intervention, CNN, September 8, 2013.  
870  Human Rights and Democracy Report 2012 – Syria. Press release, Gov UK, January, 
20.2014; U.S. Considers Resuming Nonlethal Aid to Syrian Opposition. The New York 
Times, January, 09.2014: US to Provide Extra $195 Million in Aid to Syrian Rebels. Voice of 
America, August, 07.2013; U.S. to send small arms, ammo to Syrian rebels. CNN, June, 
14.2013.  
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crime against humanity and positing al-Assad as the undemocratic and cruel 
perpetrator killing his own countrymen—and children—Western media 
representations of the attack addressed the media spectators in powerful 
ways. In the Western popular imaginary, the attack of August 21st, at the 
latest, enclosed Bashar al-Assad into the contemporary political rogue 
gallery, into the company of Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden and 
Muammar Gaddafi—as an enemy of humanity.871  
The uses, arrangements and contextualization of the gas strike images in 
Western media added strong politically and discursively constructed 
messages into the images. The event was referred to, named and added 
meaning in the Western media in manners that forcefully froze the image of 
the events in Damascus in the Western imaginary. The media treatment of 
the gas strikes structured and governed the Western public opinion on what 
happened in Syria that night, and built notions on how to react to the 
situation. What is noteworthy, when thinking about the power of amateur 
images and social media mediation in altering our view on distant suffering 
is, how the Western media for the most part presented the events in manners 
which well suited the preexisting dominant Western preconceptions of the 
situation in Syria.  
 
 
                                                
871  See chapter 5 of this work.  
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7.3.2  THE HARSH AND AUTHENTIC SOCIAL MEDIA IMAGES  
The images published by the Western media were halting, hard to look at, 
harsh and brutal. Compared with the prevailing contemporary standards of 
professional journalistic crisis reporting these images, were perhaps out of 
the ordinary brutal, but they nevertheless forcefully permeated the Western 
media.872 The images frankly showed the faces of the victims, their agonizing 
last moments and death. Every so often there were warnings of disturbing 
and graphic images included in the image galleries circulating in the Western 
publicity. The display of the horrific images was often justified by the notion 
of responsibility to look. Looking the (amateur) images and thus witnessing 
the horror experienced by the victims, was in the Western media presented 
as empathetically engaging with the victims, and as a moral responsibility of 
the surrounding world.873 Behind this commonly used argument of the 
imperative of looking, lays the idea that by visually witnessing the suffering 
of others, the spectators would become emotionally affected, and would thus 
react to the suffering of others in a compassionate manner, and even make 
demands for a betterment of the situation. In the Western media the 
imperative of looking at the Syrian horror images was also rationalized by 
stating that these particular images will have an influence on the political 
reactions—even a military intervention—of the Western powers on the 
situation in Syria. Thus the imperative of looking was further highlighted 
with the argument, that these images may also have an impact on the 
political decision making directly affecting Western citizens, e.g. in a form of 
the planned Western military intervention.874 Hence, the Western public was 
to face the images because of their heavy moral, but also political character.  
In the past decades Western spectators have grown accustomed to seeing 
certain kind of images of crisis situations and war. The disposition and style 
of amateur images differ from the customary style of professional 
photographers working for the big, international image agencies and media 
houses, as well as the representation practices governing the visual 
communication and fund raising imagery of humanitarian organizations. The 
questions of ethically representing the suffering of others have been widely 
debated, both by scholars as well as by humanitarian practitioners. The well-
known iconic imagery of professional photographers, picturing distant crisis 
has been criticized for objectifying the sufferers, picturing them as distanced 
”others”, as well as estheticizing suffering, and even of voyeuristic or 
pornographic ethos in depicting the suffering of others. As discussed earlier, 
                                                
872 On the contemporary conventional uses of image of death in the Western media, see 
chapter 4 of this work. And on the circulation of graphic imagery in mainstream media 
due to social media: Posetti, Julie: Is Social Media to Blame for the Increase of Graphic Images 
in Media? Mediashift, August 8, 2014.  
873 See, for instance: Compassion Fatigue About Syria… Already? Moeller, Susan. Huffington 
Post, August 28,2013  
874  First on CNN: Videos show glimpse into evidence for Syria intervention, CNN, 
September 9th.2013; Warning Graphic Images: Obama administration releases 
Horrifying Footage of Nerve Gas Attacks in Syria. Ny Daily News, September, 9.2013.  
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the sufferers of crisis zones have been in past decades often pictured as 
helpless and passive childlike characters, de-historicized, de-personalized 
and reduced in humanity, often shown as Agambean bare life.875 Oftentimes, 
the suffering and death in these skillfully shot professional photographs is 
also quite paradoxically displayed as calm and tranquil, proficiently framed, 
composited, and aesthetically pleasing, even beautiful.876 As has been 
discussed in the former chapters (namely 2&4) of this study, the styles of 
professional picturing of distant suffering have changed hand in hand with 
the changes in the discourses and practices of humanitarian assistance, 
international politics, international human rights paradigms, discourses 
relating to the mainstream media’s mediation of distant wars and crisis, as 
well as technical development in the field of visual mediation.877  
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that many rules, regulations and 
gatekeepers guard the content and style of professional photographers, 
whereas, social media images of war and distress produced by amateurs are 
less regulated, and thus oftentimes in their visual features harsh, brutal and 
unaestheticized. Amateur and citizen photographers are not confined by the 
conventions of media houses, self-criticism of trained professionals or 
institutional ethical instructions. Moreover, amateur images are often out of 
focus, grainy and hurried, shot in the midst of the mayhem, they are lower in 
technical quality, less arranged and framed, aesthetically and ethically 
considered compared to the images of professionals. The low quality and the 
amateurish style make social media originating images appear unprocessed, 
authentic and more real. The visual appearance of the images and the idea of 
citizen-produced content add an impression of truth, spontaneity and 
objectivity to the images—a notion that these images are not tendentiously 
selected or positioned.878  Moreover, the origin of the photos in social media 
creates a tendency of seeing the images and their account as unprofessional, 
and thus more realistic, “unfiltered”879 and trustworthy eyewitness accounts, 
mediating events “as they really happened”.  
The reality effect of amateur images is furthermore amplified by their 
heightened drama power; they are often perceived as firsthand accounts of 
                                                
875 See Chapter 2.3.3;  Agamben, 1995. 
876 Moeller, 1999 ; Mannevuo, Mona: Reading the Faces of Hunger: Disturbing images of child 
malnutrition in the World Press Photo competition. European Journal of Cultural studies, 2013, 1-15; 
Käpylä & Kennedy: 2014; Kennedy, Dennis: Selling the Distant Other: Humanitarianism and 
imagery Ethical Dilammas of Humanitarian Action, The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 2009; 
Halttunen, 1995 ; Butler 2009, 69.  
877 For more on this topic, see for example chapters 2 and 4 of this work and for example: 
Chouliaraki, 2013; Cohen, 2001; Campbell: 2004; Code of conduct on Images and 
Messages. Concord, (The European NGO confederation for relief and development) October, 2006; 
Kennedy: 2009.  
878 See, Campbell, David, 2011 ; In amateurs we trust: Readers assessing non-
professional news photographs. Puustinen, Liina & Seppänen, Janne: 2011.  In Amateur Images 
and Global News, 2011.  
879  U.S. State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf about the rebel photos: ”We would encourage 
people to take a look at unfiltered photos of what's actually happening on the ground”: US 
Denounces Syrian president Bashar al-Assad´s “repulsive” Instagram site. ABC-news, 
September, 12.2013.  
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the people directly affected by the events—and in the case of the chemical 
attack perhaps taken by one of the potential victims of the atrocity. Because 
of their origin as local and amateur produced these images are seen to 
possess more authority in presenting the events. It seems, that the local 
amateurs, producing the images of the event has a wider ethical register to 
represent the pain of the victims—the likes of her—than an professional 
outsider documenters. Furthermore, professional photographers and 
reporters—outsiders—are often seen a detaching force, as local amateurs 
mediating enfolding events are commonly seen as presenting the events in a 
more real, intimate level, and thus also arousing more empathy in the 
spectators.880  
All this seems to relieve social media and amateur images of some of the 
ethical questions and conventional representation practices governing the 
representations of suffering and war. Due to this, amateur images of social 
media images are not ethically judged in the same manner as images 
produced by professionals, even when they are recirculated and utilized by 
the mainstream media. This has not only made it possible to show crude war 
images more easily in the mainstream media, but makes them appear more 
truthful and objective. On this level, the growing use of social media images 
by the mainstream media might significantly change how the surrounding 
world visually encounters distant atrocity and suffering.  
The assumption of authenticity and unprocessed, institution free, 
unpositioned information mediated by the social media accounts, lives on in 
the public imaginary, despite of the fact that also the communication of e.g. 
the Syrian rebels is increasingly systematic, organized and tendentious. 
According to journalistic sources, there are well-equipped media centers, 
specializing in social media communication also in the Syrian rebel held 
areas, which are often funded by external (Western) actors. This also goes for 
the (social media) communication of ISIS. Social media communication 
has—on all sides of the Syrian conflict—become an increasingly important 
part of the information fight targeted to strategically influence conceptions 
and attitudes of the surrounding world towards the situation in Syria. 881  
All in all, the utilization and framing of social media content and amateur 
images within mainstream media's journalistic remediation (and moreover 
framing images of war as amateur/social media imagery used by the 
mainstream media as originating from local sources) potentially creates a 
dangerous illusion of uncropped, unmediated and unfiltered information 
flows—problems that have been critically assessed by the research 
community. The notions of authenticity, unfiltered and uncropped images 
                                                
880 Williams, Andy, Wahl-Jorgensen, Karin & Wardle, Claire. More Real and Less 
Packaged: Audience Discourses on Amateur News Content and Their Effect on Journalism Practice. 
In:  Amateur Images and Global News, 2011, 197- 202.  
881 Syria’s Civil War Plays out on Social Media. The Huffington Post ,October, 19.2013; 
Syria´s digital war explodes on Social Media. CBC News, Your Community Blog, August, 29, 
2013; Wrong Message in Syria’s War Imagery. The National. May, 16.2013; Social Media: a 
Double edged Sword in Syria. Reuters, June, 13. 2011; The Role of Social Media in the 
Syrian Civil war. Media measurement. 
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are noteworthy and multifaceted. Information flows originating from local 
and amateur sources are in reality topically carefully selected, as local 
‘curation hubs’ contemporarily often play a gatekeeping role on the local 
level. Social media images and messages coming from local sources are 
generally designed to entail particular narratives.882 Moreover it seems that 
the idea of authenticity social media material is further more constructed and 
also utilized by the mainstream media in its news production. Even as a 
significant part of the imagery used by the Western mainstream media 
actually seemed to be produced by the prominent Western media houses, the 
news was often run by highlighting the effect of the social media and power 
of the local amateur images in mediating the events globally.883  Thus it 
seems, that when it comes to social media originating imagery there is a 
tendency to present images as unfiltered and spontaneous, although they 
have in reality been carefully selected out of a mass of images, deployed, 
circulated and reframed by the mainstream media. Thus the mainstream 
media tends to name and signify social media originating imagery as 
unselected and objective eyewitness accounts, which show the situation “as it 
really was”. The illusion of the “reality effect” also obscures the contextual, 
ideological and political framings and meanings added to the images when 
circulated and recirculated by the mainstream media. Thus, the reality effect 
associated with the amateur social media images is actually at least partially 
created and deployed by the (Western) mainstream news media, while 
framing its news content drawing from the social media as objective and 
mirroring the reality.884 These effects of social media images and their 
utilization in the mainstream media are noteworthy, and have a great 
potentiality to alter crisis meditation and the view of the surrounding world 
on the suffering of distant others, but on the whole, in ways quite different 
from what has been suggested within the discourses hailing social media as a 
revolutionizing force in (visual) crisis mediation.  
What is furthermore remarkable and perhaps emblematic for the 
groundbreaking effect of social media on visual arrangements in regards to 
crisis/suffering, unveiled by the Ghouta case, is that that the majority of the 
victims seen in the images were either minors or men.  In the prevailing 
predominant Western humanitarian imagery it has been customary to 
portray distant suffering essentially by displaying the suffering bodies of 
women and children. It has tended to be rather unusual to portray the male 
victims in humanitarian contexts in order to raise compassion in the 
spectators. The prevailing phenomenon has been explained with the more 
appealing or “selling” nature of images of victimized women and children. 
Suffering children and women can be seen to represent fragility and 
                                                
882 Syria’s socially mediated civil war, 2014, 8-12 
883 See Pantti, 2013.  
884  See: Barthes, Roland: The Rustle of Language. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1989, 
141-149; Williams et al: 2011, 203-206 ; Pantti, 2013.  
The idea of authenticity also links up with the use of the social media images as legal proof, a theme I 
will get back in more length in the chapter 7.4 
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innocence, as well as future and hope. Furthermore, these groups have been 
culturally seen as minors, as groups placed under patronizing, ward and 
protection, as powerless, and as weaker than men. Also women and children 
have been seen, in reference to men, as less political and thus more 
auspicious to arouse empathy.  Displaying the suffering bodies of male 
victims—who could by their physical appearance and age be categorized as 
soldiers—has thus not been seen as appealing or representable in the context 
of arousing humanitarian emotions, such as compassion, pity and will to 
help. 885  
In this respect the Syrian images make an exception: in these images men, 
even young able-bodied men, seem to be (compared to the customary view) 
overrepresented among the victims. Adult females on the other hand are 
extraordinarily scarce among the victims. This is to say, that even though 
there most probably were women among the victims, photos of the female 
victims have not been extensively posted to the social media, and 
consequently images of female victims were absent from the majority of the 
representations published by the Western media as well. The images as 
produced by local amateurs and originating in social media certainly have an 
effect on the matter. The infrequent representation of women among the 
victims has been explained by local cultural and religious conventions. Local 
opposition sources have explained that images female victims were not 
published due to reasons linked with (religious driven) honor and respect.886 
The invisibility of female victims and the overt visibility of male victims in 
the Ghouta case is nevertheless exceptional. This anomalous feature, 
debatably brought about by the novel procedures social media amateur 
representation, may possibly point to altering of the Western established 
gendered conventions of representing suffering and affect the ways in which 
the suffering of the world is seen in the future.  
7.3.3 MENDACIOUS IMAGES OF THE EVIL LEADER: THE SOCIAL 
MEDIA IMAGES OF AL-ASSAD REGIME IN THE WESTERN 
MEDIA 
?
Wars and conflicts always appear different when observed and rationalized 
from different angles. This comes apparent when comparing the rebel 
communication concerning the chemical attack (as well as the Western 
mainstream media framings) with that of the al-Assad regime. Most of the 
social media accounts of the locals and the communication of opposition 
forces named the al-Assad regime responsible for the attacks. Also the 
Western mainstream media and Western political leaders generally complied 
                                                
885  On the gendered conventions of representing suffering see for example: Boltanski: 1999; 
Moeller: 1999; Chouliaraki, 2006 ; Malkki, 1996. See also chapter 4 of this study.  
886  Images of Death in Syria, but No Proof of Chemical Attack. New York Times, August, 
21.2013. 
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with this perception. On the other hand there were also differing tones of 
voices:  the Syrian administration backing president al-Assad, and the Syrian 
official media channels, disputed the use of chemical weapons, and accused 
the “terrorists”— i.e. the opposition—of the attack.887 
In addition to forceful censorship Syria has within the recent years been 
reported as one of the most dangerous areas in the world for journalists and 
civilians using Internet as a political communication tool, ranking 176th of 
179 countries according to Press Freedom Index. According to the 
organization Committee to Protect Journalists, 21 journalists were killed in 
Syria in 2013— more than in any other conflict zone in the world at the time. 
888  At the time the al-Assad regime also strived to control Internet 
communication in the area, by habitually blocking international news sites, 
shutting down dissident sites, and by attempts to black out Internet in the 
country.889 The conventional official Syrian communication apparatus was in 
the situation of 2013 firmly in the control of the al-Assad regime. The state 
news agency Sana, big newspaper houses, prominent radio and television 
stations all promulgated the opinions of the al-Assad regime. The standpoint 
of the al-Assad regime simply put was that the terrorists—i.e. the 
multifarious opposition forces—were threatening the legal government of the 
state, and that the administration was waging a legitimate and limited war 
against these ‘terrorists’. Civil war was not mentioned in the “official” 
news.890  
Also the Syrian government uses Internet and social media in order to 
proclaim its view on the war. At the time when the horrific rebel images of 
the Ghouta gas attack spread around the world, al-Assad used social media 
channels—such as the government Instagram account “the Syrian 
Presidency”, opened earlier summer 2013—to display calm and serene 
images of the Syrian everyday life. The presidents Instagram account mainly 
exhibits the president, government officials and president’s inner circle—
especially the first lady Asma al-Assad—taking care of their everyday tasks, 
attending to charity work and other peaceful day-to-day political 
responsibilities.891 After the Ghouta chemical disaster, these images—and 
namely the stark contrast that these images form vis-à-vis the horrific images 
of the Damascus victims—induced the Instagram communication of al-Assad 
into the limelight of the Western mainstream media. No images were 
uploaded into the Syrian Presidency account from the day of the attacks. But 
                                                
887 Foreign Ministry: Allegations of armed forces using toxic gas in Damascus 
countryside untrue. Sana, August 21.2013.  
888 2013 World Press Freedom Index: Dashed Hopes After Spring. Journalists without 
Borders; Järjestö: 52 Toimittajaa tapettu työnsä takia tänä vuonna. Helsingin Sanomat, 
December, 18.2013.  The difficult situation of communication and journalistic work in the area has also 
been the reason why social media communication has been so widely used, referred to and depended 
on also by international media, in order to gain knowledge information from the area.  
889 Syria Profile. January 30.2014. BBC News; Syria Conflict: Internet Blackout Continues.  
The Guardian, November, 30.2012; Social Media: a Double Edged Sword in Syria. Reuters, 
13.06 2011.  
890 Sana, Syria’s news agency.  
891 Syrian Presidency, Instagram.  
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the images from days prior and subsequent to the day of the attack present 
stories of Syrians awarded at the Russian science Olympics 892, images of 
political meetings attended by president al-Assad893 and introduce a 
statement he made to the French newspaper Le Figaro, in which he 
proclaims: “I belong to the Syrian people; I defend their interests and 
independence and will not succumb to external pressure.”894 What hoisted 
al-Assad's Instagram into a news item in Western publicity were images 
showing the president himself saluting cheering crowds and depicting the 
everyday life of the war torn country as overtly tranquil, sunny and serene. 
Images presenting the president’s wife attending to charity work, smiling, 
dressed in expensive Western style designer clothing, dispensing food and 
toys to children in need, visiting hospitals and comforting disabled children 
heaved strong outrage in Western publicity.895 After the chemical attack the 
Syrian president’s Instagram account of was widely addressed in the Western 
media, and mainly faced with disgust and dismay. A headline by the 
Guardian pronounced Assad’s Instagram account showing “the banality of 
evil”.  By making a reference to the well know phrase of Hannah Arendt—
and the title of the 1961 book Eichmann in Jerusalem: a Report on the 
Banality of Evil 896 she wrote on the trial of Adolf Eichmann, architect of the 
Final Solution, convicted and later executed—strong cultural connotations 
are added.897 The juxtaposition forms a strong connotation between the 
monstrosity of al-Assad and his regime, and the inhuman aspirations of the 
Nazi regime strongly seen in the Western cultural sphere as the emblem of 
utmost horror.  
The attempts of the al-Assad regime to exhibit its actions humanely and 
to brand itself in a positive light through the social media outlet did not 
convince the Western media. On the contrary, the Assad regime’s attempts to 
polish its reputation was seen as an indication of the malevolent, deranged, 
                                                
892 Syrian Presidency, Instagram. August 18, 2013. (Caption: ”Syria's 2 Bronze Medals in 
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account showcases Mrs Assad's fantasy world 'of tending to her people' as, in reality, 
nation disintegrates. The Daily Mail, September 5, 2013: Syria posts first lady Asma al-
Assad’s good deeds on Instagram. The Washington Post, September 7 , 2013; After Instagram 
smiles, Asma al-Assad becomes ‘lady in black’. Al Arabiya English, September 2, 2013; Asma 
al-Assad, Syrian President Bashar's Wife Uses Instagram to Showcase Charity Work. 
The Huffington Post, September 5, 2013; Bashar al-Assad's Surreal Instagram Feed. A close 
and uncomfortable look at the Assad family, while they are not killing Syrian civilians. 
The National Journal, September 5, 2013.  
896 Arendt, Hannah: Eichmann in Jerusalem: a Report on the Banality of Evil. Penguin, The 
Viking Press, New York, 1963.  
897 The Syrian presidency's Instagram account shows the banality of evil.  
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absurd and inconceivable nature of his administration and rule, and the 
messages turned against their intent (in the West). US Department of State 
spokesperson Marie Harf denounced that the way the Assad regime is using 
the serene and pretty Instagram images to “gloss over the brutality and 
suffering it’s causing” is repulsive, and called it as a “despicable media stunt”. 
She added that the Instagram images are ignoring the horrible atrocities in 
Syria, and encouraged people to take a look at the “unfiltered photos of 
what’s actually happening in the ground”—referring to the rebel gas attack 
images.898 The repulsion and outrage over the Instagram photos can be seen 
to stem from the contrast they provoked compared with the rebel social 
media images seen as “unfiltered” and conveying the truth in the 
predominant Western publicity. Thus, the images presented by the al-Assad 
regime were actually often juxtaposed with the opposition social media 
images. The social media representations of the al-Assad regime were—in 
contrast to the rebel images—not apprehended and perceived by the Western 
media as amateur images, conveying the situation as it is, but rather as 
arranged, biased and strategically planned PR presentations—thus seen 
incredible and even false. 
It is interesting (and paradoxical) how al-Assad’s sunny images, 
exhibiting the peaceful everyday life of Syria and the humane conducts of the 
al-Assad regime, resemble—in style and substance—the public relations 
images that the Western powers have presented on their actions in the recent 
wars.  Al-Assad images strangely and strongly resemble for instance Flickr 
images presented by the multinational NATO led operation (International 
security assistance force, ISAF) in Afghanistan discussed and analyzed in 
chapter 5 of this work.899 Both are depicting normal day-to-day routines and 
official meetings, charity work as well as encounters with the local 
inhabitants. Both emphasize the humanitarian ethos and nature of the 
actions, and in both the war raging just around the corner seems to be far 
away. What connects these two groups of social media images is, that both 
strife to present the actions of their presenters in a war and conflict area as 
humane and well organized. Both can be seen as strategic communication 
900 efforts, designed to address their target audiences—in these cases the 
namely allies and “friends”—in order to get them to support the goals and see 
the actions of the presenter as legitimate. In both cases, the strategic 
communication seems to be designed to strategically convey messages of 
humanitarian and legitimate actions, by presenting rather polished, 
                                                
898  US Denounces Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s “repulsive” Instagram site. ABC-
news, September, 12, 2013. 
899  See chapter 5 of this study.  
900 By strategic communication I mean –following the definition of NATO and the US Department of 
defense – as an effort to disseminate information of operations, activities and objectives. In addition to 
this, the goal of strategic communication is to influence the perceptions, attitudes, conceptions, well as 
actions of the target audience. The objective is to insure the target audience on the rightfulness of the 
view and interpretation of the communicator/actor, as well as the legitimacy of their action. Strategic 
communication aims to win over the hearts and minds of the target audiences, and to get them to 
support their goals. See, chapter 5 and for example: Principles of strategic communication. US 
Department of Defense, August 2008.  
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humanitarianly arranged images from conflict zones. 901 Thus, quite 
paradoxically the ISAF Flickr images and the Instagram images of the al-
Assad regime can be seen to have shared functions and objectives, as well as 
shared representation styles.  
The shared content of the visual strategic reputation governing attempts—
of these two very distinct actors—gives away shared messages, as well as 
mutual problems and weaknesses that the social media milieu may pose for 
institutional or governmental users. Visual social media mediation of wars 
and crises is habitually thought of as a spontaneous means of the 
rebel/opposition and civilian actors. Attempts of institutional and 
governmental actors to use social media to promote their goals and actions 
easily seem as tediously constructed and premeditated. They seem less 
proactive, more reactive and conscious image building endeavors. Thus they 
verge the borders of calculated dissemination of biased, or even false 
information: propaganda. The atrocious social media images of the rebel 
sources solidified as the iconic and truthful account of the events in Syria in 
the Western publicity—and contrastingly, the polished, strategically built 
images of al-Assad turned the Western perception perhaps even more to the 
negative side than they formerly were.     
7.3.4 A COMPARATIVE GAZE: CHEMICAL ATTACK REPORTAGE IN 
THE RUSSIAN MEDIA 
?
Political climate and attitudes towards the war undisputedly influenced the 
ways in which images were used and signified in Western media. But when 
reading and interpreting the position as well as the meanings the Ghouta 
attack images gathered in the use of the Western mainstream media, it is 
noteworthy to remember, that the surrounding world was (and when writing 
this even more so still is) strongly divided and biased in its notions and 
stances on the Syrian situation. The West at the time strongly positioned 
against the al-Assad regime, and at the time supported the moderate rebels 
(namely the Free Syrian Army). On the other hand Russia, along with Iran, 
China and some others, have intensely supported al-Assad. The political 
standing inevitably influences the media treatment of the war:  what 
generates a spectacle in the Western sphere may not have even been seen as 
newsworthy in other parts of the world. This is why—in order to provide a 
contrast and reference point to the Ghouta gas attack spectacle in the 
Western media—I shall in the following paragraphs conduct a brief overview 
on the visibility and use of Syrian chemical attack images in the Russian 
media. I shall monitor the use of the images and occurrence of the event in 
                                                
901  See chapter 5.  
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the Russian media outlets Ria Novosti, Itar-Tass and Interfax902 in late 
August 2013.903 
Ria Novosti—a government-own Russian news agency, specializing on 
foreign news904 —mainly displayed two reoccurring images (images of the 
Reuters) and one video-clip originating from social media in broadcasting 
news on the Ghouta gas attack. The video is harsh in its nature: it shows the 
chaos and suffering caused by the chemical weapons strike, and displays the 
medical procedures in order to help the victims. The two recurring images 
both show a child victim of the attack, pictured most probably in a location 
where the victims of the attack were collected and treated. The other shows a 
close-up of a weeping little boy, sitting on a blanket, and the other image 
depicts a small boy in the foreground and other victims behind him.  
Although these images do, in their visual enunciation, bring forth the 
suffering of civilians brought about by most likely chemical substance, in the 
news text the images are not addressed. In contrast to the significations that 
similar (and partly even the same) images gathered in the Western media, 
within the arrangements of Ria Novosti the images first and foremost appear 
to be illustrative. The amount of the images produced of the event, their 
origin as civilian created testimonials, the suffering they demonstrate or their 
status as legal proof, or the moral imperative of intervention and action 
brought by the witnessing the suffering of the Syrian people is not addressed 
or highlighted within the Russian news contexts.905   
In covering the Syrian gas strike, Itar-Tass—a government owned official 
main news outlet 906—did not at all use images of suffering Syrians to 
describe the Ghouta events. The news concerning the Damascus events were 
illustrated by using images of well-known and influential international 
actors, such as Barack Obama, Angela Merkel, Vladimir Putin, Sergei 
Lavrov, Bashar al-Assad and Ban ki-Moon.907 By disregarding the social 
                                                
902  See the Internet sites of Ria Novosti; Itar-Tass; Interfax.  
903  In the chapter concerning the Russian  media,  I was kindly assisted by senior research fellow 
Katri Pynnöniemi from The EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood and Russia–research program of the 
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, and post-doctoral researcher Katja Lehtisaari, specializing 
in  Journalism in Russia at the Aleksanteri Institute, Helsinki. I thank you both dearly for your Russian 
expertise and help with the language. I also want to thank Julia Bethwaite for transliterating the 
Russian sources for me.  
904  This information can be found on the website of the news outlet: http://ria.ru/  
905 Posledstviya predpolagayemoy himicheskoy ataki v Sirii. S'yemka ochevidtsa. Ria 
Novosti, August 21, 2013; MID Velikobritanii prizyvayet proinspektirovat' mesto 
himataki v Sirii, Ria Novosti, August 21, 2013; SB OON trebuyet obespechit' pomoshch' 
postradavshim ot himoruzhiya v Sirii, Ria Novosti, August 22, 2013; Kitay prizyvayet 
vozderzhivat’sya ot prezhdevremennyh vyvodov po Sirii, Ria Novosti, August 23, 2013; 
Prezident Izrailya prizval mir iz"yat' iz Sirii vse himoruzhiye, Ria Novosti, August 25, 2013; 
Velikobritaniya schitayet, chto dokazatel'stva himatak v Sirii unichtozheny. Ria Novosti, 
August 25, 2013; Frantsiya vystupayet za zhestkiy otvet na himataku v Sirii, Ria 
Novosti, August 26, 2013; SMI: v Iordaniyu tayno vyvezeny biomaterialy zhertv 
vozmozhnoy himataki, Ria Novosti, August 27, 2013; Prikaz o himatake pod Damaskom 
mog otdat' mladshiy brat Asada, Ria Novosti, August 27, 2013.  
906  This information can be found on the website of the news outlet: http://itar-tass.com/ 
907 Belyy dom: Prezident SShA v blizhaysheye vremya vystupit s zayavleniyem po 
Sirii, Itar-Tass August 31, 2013; Konflikt v Sirii dolzhen byt' uregulirovan mirnym putem - 
Pan Gi Mun. Itar-Tass, August, 29, 2013; MID RF: Zayavleniya o gotovnosti SShA 
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media images showing the atrocity and its humane toll, and by employing the 
images of high-level political actors, the broadcasting seems to signify the 
Ghouta events as crisis on the level of international relations, rather than as a 
humanitarian catastrophe. Consequently, the brutality of the event fades into 
the background. Itar-Tass also for example recurrently illustrated the news of 
the Ghouta event by combat images and images of the ruins of war, as well as 
an image of a weapon inspector in his work in the area, but images depicting 
the actual August gas assault were to be completely missing from their 
broadcasting of the event in late August.908  
Overall, the use of the social media images in the coverage of Ria Novosti 
and Itar-Tass was very scanty, compared to that of the Western media. The 
news agencies mainly approached the event through the UN weapons 
inspection operation, by contemplating on the guilty party of the strike (the 
opposition, the al-Assad regime, or the brother of al-Assad909). Quoting the 
broadcastings of the Western news outlets and comments of international 
high-level political leaders of the world also mirrored the event in the 
governmental Russian media. What is remarkable here is that predominantly 
the images that shocked the Western world did not at all surface in the 
coverage of the event in Russia. Therefore in another political and cultural 
surrounding, the event did not appear as an emergency or as a great humane 
tragedy, as it did in the Western broadcasting.  Moreover, it is interesting 
how the official posture of Russia and Russian politicians on the situation did 
not surface in the early news. Only about a week after the attacks—27th of 
August—Ria Novosti reported that Moscow had warned the Western 
coalition of intervening in the Syrian situation by military means.910 It is 
significant that despite of the fact that Russia at the time openly supporting 
the al-Assad regime, and economically and militarily reinforced his war-
effort, in the reporting of Ria Novosti and Itar –Tass, Russia was portrayed 
as a neutral by-stander in the Syrian situation.  
In contrast, to the government linked agencies, Interfax—a privately 
owned news agency, which highlights its independent nature and co-
operation with Western media houses such as Bloomberg 911 —widely used 
the shocking images of pain, familiar from the Western news in its reporting 
of the event. Interfax also exhibited an image gallery—resembling the 
Western style arrangements—widely displaying the horrific images of the 
                                                                                                                                     
vmeshat'sya v siriyskiy konflikt vosprinyaty v Moskve s glubokoy trevogoy. Itar-Tass, 
August, 26, 2013; Germaniya primet konkretnyye shagi v otnoshenii Sirii posle otsenki so 
storony mirovogo soobshchestva - Angela Merkel', Itar-Tass, August 28, 2013.   
908 Spetssluzhby Sirii: Primeneniye himoruzhiya stalo by "politicheskim 
samoubiystvom", Itar-Tass, August 22, 2013; OON: inspektory zavershili sbor ulik v Sirii, 
Itar-Tass, August 30, 2013.   
909 Prikaz o himatake pod Damaskom mog otdat' mladshiy brat Asada, Ria Novosti, 
August 28, 2013.  
910 SMI: v Iordaniyu tayno vyvezeny biomaterialy zhertv vozmozhnoy himataki, Ria 
Novosti, August 27, 2013.  
911  This information can be found on the website of the news outlet: http://www.interfax.ru/.  
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attack. The images were also referred to in the news text as exposing the 
character of the atrocious event. Thus, the suffering of the victims was seen 
and presented as newsworthy in the broadcasting of Interfax. 912 Overall, the 
reporting of Interfax seemed multi-voiced compared to the other two 
Russian news agencies, and relatively resembled that of its Western 
counterparts.913  
In the Russian context, the ownership background and the news agencies 
relations to the government are remarkable. The differences between Itar-
Tass, Ria Novosti and then again Interfax in the broadcasting, arrangements 
and signification the Syrian events can largely be explained by the ties to the 
Russian regime and political power. But furthermore, the overview into the 
Russian media reveals how disunited the surrounding world is when it comes 
to the Syrian conflict. The images that produced a visible spectacle in the 
Western publicity did not receive any publicity in the state controlled and 
owned predominant Russian media. This difference demonstrates how even 
the most atrocious of images need to be hoisted into news items, and how the 
surrounding culture, politics, ideology and overall societally predominant 
ethos and ambiance define what kind of meanings and signification (social 
media) images gather in their use by the local mainstream media. 
Newsworthiness is a contextual as well as an ideological matter. The 
comparative gaze into the Russian utilizations and arrangements of the 
images fortify the argument that also in the age of the social media images 
predominantly remain mute, their political significance and importance is 
added and constructed in the ideological apparatus of the (mainstream) 
media.  
7.3.5 CONTEXTUAL SIGNIFICATION OF IMAGES IN THE AGE OF 
SOCIAL MEDIA  
The massive flood of social media images describing the gas attack revealed 
significant new information on the reality of the Syrian war. The notable 
visibility and status the images gathered in the use of the prominent Western 
media was ensued partly because of the critical new information they 
convoyed. Partly their high standing in the use of the Western media can also 
be explained by the fact that they fitted into the already existing, dominant 
Western impressions and conceptions of the situation in Syria. Conversely, 
the negative reception the Instagram images of the president al-Assad 
received in the Western publicly articulates the same phenomena. The 
polished images highlighting the humanity of al-Assad, did not fit the frame 
                                                
912  Ot himicheskoy ataki v Sirii pogibli sotni lyudey, Interfax August 21.2013;Situatsiya v 
Sirii, Interfax, August 26,2013;  Turtsiya prizyvayet razobrat'sya s Siriyey, Interfax, August 
22,2013; Rossiya ne sobirayetsya voyevat' za Siriyu, Interfax, August 26,2013;  Ot 
himicheskoy ataki v Sirii pogibli sotni lyudey, Interfax, August 21, 2013.  
 
399
A Social Media Effect? Syrian Chemical Attack Images in Mainstream Media and International 
Politics 
 400 
the West generally has on his regime and the war in Syria.914 This point is 
further strengthened, considering how the images that stirred up an 
influential spectacle in the West were quite differently signified Russian 
context, in which they did not gather much public attention.  
Thus, the newsworthiness of a social media originating imagery cannot 
solely be explained by its believability, authenticity or the revelatory force it 
possesses. Rather, the status and visibility of also social media imagery in the 
use of mainstream media is determined by the dominant mindset of the 
recipient audience, cultural and political orientation of the context of 
presentation. The power and significance of an image—still at the age of 
amateur war images and “social media revolution”—is mainly constructed 
according to contextual surroundings.  The status, level of use and 
significance of an image is reliant on whether or not it resonates with the 
receipts outlooks, preexisting culturally prevalent conceptions and overall 
political atmosphere.  
The inquiry into the uses of Syrian social media images—by both the 
Western and Russian mainstream media—demonstrates how also the social 
media accounts of contemporary crisis mainly function as raw material for 
the mainstream media and its meaning creation processes. The mainstream 
media still today functions as the gatekeeper, which classifies names and 
frames the material according to its own (politicized) logic and principles. 
Moreover, the mainstream media also has the power to decide to which 
degree it chooses to use and exhibit the material, that is, to determine 
whether or not an event becomes visible on large scale within a local context 
or furthermore if it forms into a spectacular global event. This phenomenon 
is clearly observable in the very diverse level utilization of visual material of 
the Ghouta event by the Western media in comparison to the Russian media. 
The inquiry to the Syrian case unveils contemporary patterns of (social 
media) image flows, and demonstrates what happens to the mute images of 
atrocity while they flow from one context into another within media.  
What is noteworthy when critically assessing the optimistic notion on the 
revolutionary capabilities of the social media and amateur images, is that 
social media images of war and crisis have, after all, a rather limited potential 
to change the ways in which distant suffering is encountered in wider 
representational contexts of the international mainstream media apparatus. 
Despite the insistent claim on the revolutionary power of social media and 
amateur images in changing our view into the suffering of others, it may be 
argued that large scale, global, user generated communication in reality still 
does not exist, regardless of the new digital technologies and social media 
which might in a technical sense render it possible. Messages and images 
that achieve any sort of notable audiences—on a global scale—are even today 
most often percolated in the many levels of meaning creation, signification 
and political meaning making while they rapidly flow from a context to 
                                                
914  See: Butler: 2009, 63-100. 
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another. Even without going to the problematic of selected flows of images 
already on the “ground level”—the local gatekeepers and organized hubs of 
social media messages at the level of the crisis zones—it seems clear, in the 
current situation that the social media images cannot in most cases escape 
the cultural and political signification, meaning creation processes and fixed 
news agendas produced in and by the mainstream media. The hopeful 
assessments on the power of amateur images in altering the global mediation 
of distant suffering, as well as the potency of amateur images in narrowing 
the distance between the sufferers and the spectators—seem to be overly 
optimistic, and leaves the political dimension of international crisis 
meditation and ideological logic of the media machinery rather unaddressed. 
This is why we need to be mindful of the causal social media revolution 
claim. 
In addition to the uses and reuses of the images in different (mainstream) 
media, the meanings, as well as the significations and the status, capacity and 
power of the images are also defined in their openly political contexts of 
utilization. How and to what extent crisis images are taken up in high level 
political speech, prominent proclamations and how they are used in political 
rhetoric, legitimation and even international level decision making delineate 
not only the messages, but also the power and influence they may have on a 
very real political level. In the following subchapter, I shall take a look at the 
uses of the amateur war images in the level of international politics, and 
namely within interventionist discourse of Western humanitarian world 
politics.  
7.4 IMAGES OF THE GHOUTA CHEMICAL ATTACK IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
Soon after the Ghouta attack the atrocious images ascended into a significant 
status within (Western) international political debate. Images showing the 
horror of Syrian civilians were used in explaining political reactions to the 
situation in Syria, and were extensively utilized in political argumentation 
and rhetoric of Western leaders.  The horror images were widely seen as 
evidence proving the guilt of president al-Assad over the attack, and they also 
became a reference often employed in legitimizing Western actions into the 
situation, e.g. the planned Western military operation against the al-Assad 
regime. The performative force attained by these atrocity images became 
visible in their uses on the high international level. Sometimes images do not 
only show, but also do things.  
In his speech 26th of August 2013, the Secretary General of the United 
Nations (UN), Ban Ki-moon, referred strongly to the images picturing the 
outcomes of the attack, while appealing to the international community to 
act on the Syrian situation: “We have all seen the horrifying images on our 
television screens and through social media. Clearly this was a major and 
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terrible incident. We owe it to the families of the victims to act.” 915 The next 
day, 27th of August Samantha Power, The United States Ambassador to UN 
Tweeted: “Haunting images of entire families dead in their beds. Verdict is 
clear: Assad has used CWs [Chemical Weapons] against civilians in violation 
of int'l [International] norm.” 916 Both of these statements assert the status of 
(social media) images as references convoying the “truth of what really 
happened”. They stress the need to act on the situation promptly. Moreover 
the images are practically presented as legal proof of the terrible occasion, 
pointing out the perpetrator, al-Assad.  
Already months before the Ghouta attacks there was widespread 
anticipation on the threat of the use of chemical weapons in Syria. In March 
2013 UN appointed an investigation—headed by a Swedish scientist Åke 
Sellström —to probe the allegations of the use chemical weapons in the area. 
At the time Ban Ki-moon stated that one of the purposes of the international 
investigation on the matter was to remind that the use of chemical weapons 
is a crime against humanity and strongly condemned by the international 
community.917 Moreover, a year before the Ghouta attack in August 2012, 
president Obama stated in his speech, that use of chemical weapons in Syria 
(by the al-Assad regime) would draw a red line, after which the US politics 
would take a dramatic turn in respect to Syria, and after which a US military 
intervention into Syrian would most likely ensue.918 
The use of chemical weapons is clearly against international, widely 
acknowledged norms and conventions.919 Also the public typically morally 
condemns it.  The United Nations that monitors the adherence to these 
international norms and laws of war, was swift in condemning the incident. 
The Western powers, United States in the front, have in recent decades 
outlined their international standing through the paradigms of safeguarding 
human rights, humanitarian norms, protection of humanity and explained 
their international military operations by humanitarian objectives and 
rhetoric.920 The ethos prevalent within the international community as well 
as the Western humanitarian orientation contrasted with the immense 
civilian suffering, violation of international norms banning the use chemical 
                                                
915  Remarks on Syria, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, Seoul (Republic of Korea), 26 
August 2013, Ban Ki-Moons Speeches. 
916   Power’s tweet accessed  in David Campbell’s Blog “Visual storytelling: creative practice and 
criticism”. Syria and the power of images. August 27.2013. 
917  Ibid; Ban appoints Swedish scientist to lead probe into alleged chemical weapons 
use in Syria. UN News Center, 26.03.2013.  
918 Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps. The White House, Office of 
the Press Secretary, August 20. 2012.  
919 See for example: Convention on Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. Geneva, 3 September 
1992. (Syria has not engaged the convention.)   
920  See chapter 2. On the humanitarian world politics, the contemporary Western lead world 
political system, within which Western interventionist politics legitimized by humanitarian means has 
become central, see: Aaltola: 2009; Barnett, Michael N. The international Humanitarian order. 
Security and governance series, Routledge, Oxon, 2010; Douzinas, Costas. Human Rights and 
Empire. The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism. Routledge-Cavendish, New York, 2007; 
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weapons. This contradiction combined with the Western dominant political 
positioning in regards to the Syrian and preexisting anticipation of the use of 
chemical weapons in the area by al-Assad, all resulted in widespread 
condemnation of the event by the Western states as well as the international 
community. And thus the Ghouta events, the guilt of al-Assad and the 
atrocious images were heaved into a heated discussion on the international 
high-level. 
7.4.1 IMAGES AS PROOF: THE PERPETRATOR BECOMES VISUAL   
For decades or even for centuries, one of the central functions of meditated 
images of distant suffering has been to enable distant spectators to bear 
witness to the suffering of others inflicted by violent politics, wars and 
catastrophes. Violent images do not only show and unveil suffering which 
would otherwise remain outside of the view of distant spectators; they 
moreover commonly act as proof of violence taking place—habitually images 
have even been utilized juridical as testimonials of crimes of war. Thus 
atrocious images of suffering often also point to the cause of suffering—the 
perpetrator.921 In line with this tradition, visual images of the events of 
August 21st were within the international political discussion concerning the 
Syrian situation swiftly referred to as offering (legal) proof of not just the 
suffering of humans, but of the use of chemical weapons, and moreover the 
offender guilty of the events. 
The Western powers quickly assembled reports analyzing and 
investigating the event. These reports were built on intelligence information, 
accounts of the local medical workers, as well as amateur/social media 
images of locals.922  Britain was first to release its report, on 29th of August, 
only about a week of the events. The report concluded that most probably al-
Assad and his regime were behind the attack.923 The next day, United States 
released its assessment on the events, the use of chemical weapons as well as 
the perpetrator. The report used as its core evidence more than hundred 
videos and thousands of amateur images shot in the area at the time of the 
attack and right after it. The report stated that the massive amount of coaxial 
footage proved that the event enfolded as stated by the images (and Syrian 
opposition sources). It maintained that it was by no means possible to 
fabricate this magnitude of images. Also in an US assessment, the guilt was 
pinned on al-Assad.924 The French government's assessment was very much 
                                                
921 See chapter 2 and for instance:  Sontag, 2003; Zelizer, 1998; Sliwinski, 2011, Butler, 2009; 
Moeller, 2013. 
922 Nämä todisteet vakuuttivat puolustusministerit. Helsingin Sanomat, 07.09.2013. In 
addition to the French, British and US, also Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy for the European Union, condemned the attack as violation of 
international law, and as a war crime. Speech by HRVP Catherine Ashton on Syria. European 
Commission - SPEECH/13/688. September, 11.2013. Press Releases Database, Europa, EU.  
923   Syria: Reposted Chemical Weapons Use. Joint intelligence organization, August 29. 2013.  
924  Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on 
August 21, 2013. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, August.30.2013.  
403
A Social Media Effect? Syrian Chemical Attack Images in Mainstream Media and International 
Politics 
 404 
alike with the previous in method and conclusions.925 Consequently, the 
locally produced amateur images habitually mediated via social media, 
became to function as plausible proof of not only the advancement of the 
events and the human toll of the attack, but also the offender perpetrating 
them.  
The way in which the Western powers used the visual amateur footage in 
their reports as proof is noteworthy.  There is a common stubborn and 
persistent perception of photographs as transparent records of the real. Thus 
photographic images have for long served a function of guaranteeing the 
objectivity and authenticity of news reporting, as well as served a political 
and juridical proof function.926 It seems that the proof function and status of 
the images as records of the real in the case of the Ghouta events was 
fortified by the nature of the visual records as amateur images. Photographs 
produced by amateurs seemed, also in political contexts, to gather a higher 
status of trustworthiness and believability than images of professionals.  
Behind this notion lays, again the idea of amateur images authentic: shot on 
the spot, locally produced, unframed, somewhat objective, eyewitness 
accounts of enfolding events.927 The popular notion of photographic amateur 
images as “picturing the events as they really happened”, is apparent in the 
Western reports investigating the Ghouta events. The notion of authenticity 
is in the reports effectively used in a highly political manner. What is 
furthermore significant in the Western political utilization of the amateur 
images in the reports is that, in addition to the suffering and the victims that 
appear in the images on a blatant level, the images the perpetrator of the 
atrocious event becomes figured visible. Consequently, the evil character of 
al-Assad—something that is not visible apparent in the images—was through 
the political use of the images, added into their signification.  
Following the Damascus attacks of 21st August 2013, the UN appointed a 
mission to investigate whether chemical weapons were uses in the area. The 
UN report on the events was released on the 16th of September, about two 
weeks after the political assessments of the Western powers. The report 
showed that a chemical substance—sarin gas—was used in the area that day. 
The UN report was not to investigate the perpetrator of the event.928 
                                                
925   French Report Concludes Syria Regime used  Chemical Weapons, CBS News, 
September,  02. 2013; Syria/Syrian chemical programme– National executive summary 
of declassified intelligence. Paris, September 3, 2013. It is stated in the report that based on the 
visual footage of the event the severity and scope of the event was calculated: Based on a methodical 
technical analysis of 47 original video tapes of the August 21 events, a first counting of the victims, 
area by area, has been carried out. Based on just this set of videos, no less than 281 death casualties 
have been recorded, located in the East Ghouta (Ain Tarma, Douma, Erbin, Jobar, Kfar Batna, Qas 
Alaa, Zamalka) and West Ghouta (Mudamiyat Sham).  
926  This was the case perhaps most renownedly with the Holocaust images, see chapter 2.3.1.&2.3.2.  
927  On the (belief on)authenticity and trustworthiness of amateur photographs see for example: 
Audience Discourses on amateur news content and their Effects on Journalism Practices.  & In 
Amateurs we Trust: Readers assessing Non-Professional News photographs. In Pantti & Anden-
Papadoupoulous: 2011. 
928  United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weapons 
in the Syrian Arab Republic. Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the 
Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013. UN, Hague, 13.09.2013. 
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Nevertheless, regardless of the silence of the UN on the matter, the verdict 
seemed to be clear in the perception of the Western world. Strongly resting 
on the amateur images of the event, president al-Assad was solidified as 
guilty of the atrocious crime against his people, not only in political settings, 
but moreover the dominant public imaginary of the Western sphere.  
7.4.2 THESE HORRIBLE IMAGES DEMAND US TO ACT – IMAGES 
OF THE GAS ATTACK LEGITIMIZING AN INTERNATIONAL 
INTERVENTION  
In addition to the proof function, the images of local origin were abundantly 
referred to in international political speech surrounding the Syrian situation, 
and namely utilized in describing the Western political reaction to the use of 
chemical weapons. Thus, the images played an important role in constructing 
the (Western) perceptions of the event, as well as shaped the political 
decision making processes concerning the situation in Syria. Soon after the 
event, the Western coalition (United States, France and Britain in front) 
started to plan a targeted military intervention into Syria, in order to deter 
and punish the al-Assad regime, seen as responsible of the massacre.929  Even 
though the planned military operation did not eventually take place, the 
status and use of the images in rationalization, argumentation and 
legitimization of the military intervention was significant.  
President Obama aligned in his speech on Syria, delivered on 9th of 
September, that the use of poison gas—which was undoubtedly carried out by 
the al-Assad regime—was not just a violation of international law, and did 
not only jeopardize the authority of the international ban on the use of 
chemical weapons, but was moreover a violation of a universally shared sense 
of the “sacredness of humanity”. He stated that the use of chemical weapons 
profoundly altered the US assessment of the situation and its stance on the 
Syrian war. Obama argued that after the use of chemical weapons, al-Assad 
did not just pose a threat to the Syrians and the security of the nearby areas, 
but also a comprised a concrete threat to the national security of the United 
States and the peacefulness of the whole world. The images describing the 
attack were conspicuously on display throughout the president’s speech. In 
the rhetoric of Obama the thousands of “sickening” images—shot with cell 
phones and mediated through social media—demonstrate in an unforgettable 
and a horrible way what really happened in Syria the night of the attack. 
Obama warned that the world should not forget what they have seen, and 
turn a blind eye on the images, for that is what the dictators committing such 
atrocities want.  He pleaded the members of the Congress and citizens of the 
United States to view the images of dying Syrian children, and to then ask 
themselves whether they want to live in a world that allows carnages of this 
                                                
929   Syria Crisis: UK and US finalise plans for military strikes. 28.08.2013, The Guardian; 
Obama set for limited strike to Syria, as British vote no. 29.08.2013, New York Times. 
Länsimaat valmistelevat täsmäiskua Syyriaan. August, 28.2013, Helsingin Sanomat.   
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kind to happen. Obama reasoned and legitimized the planned military 
operation by making a reference to the images of children “writhing in pain 
and going still on a cold hospital floor”. In Obama's words, these images 
show that “sometimes resolutions and statements of condemnation are 
simply not enough”. 930  
In early September President Obama also showed images of the Syrian 
suffering to the members of the Congress. He exhibited 13 amateur images, 
verified and authenticated by the US intelligence, in order to get the congress 
to back the military intervention into Syria. As said earlier, these key images 
also extensively circulated by the Western mainstream media, were soon 
established as iconic images, portraying the agony of the Syrians brought 
about by the ruthless use chemical weapons.931 Because of the red line—
speech, delivered a year before the Ghouta attack—in which the president 
stated that the use of chemical weapons would result in a hardening US 
stance and a possible military operation in to Syria—also the credibility of the 
president was in line.932 By reclining to the horrific images, their testimonial 
power and by effectively utilizing the emotional and proof power of the 
images, Obama strived to summon the Congress behind him, to back the 
planned military operation.  
In his statements on Syria, Obama also recurrently referred to the 
iconized horrific historical events, in which chemical weapons have been 
used; e.g. the First World War and the Holocaust. He explained that because 
of the deviant nature of gas—a substance killing everything on its way, 
soldiers and infants alike—the civilized world has worked for decades to ban 
these weapons of mass destruction. 933 The references to Holocaust and the 
memorable historical events of the usage of gas, remind the Western 
spectator of the horrendous images from the gas chambers of the Nazi 
concentration camps, which have been in the Western public imaginary 
established as the ultimate representations of utmost suffering. The 
Holocaust can be seen as the ultimate visually iconized crime against 
humanity; the ground zero from which the contemporary institutionalized 
protection of humanity and universal human rights aspirations have their 
base at.934 By using historical references, the events in Syria and the 
photographs produced of them, were connotatively associated with 
commonly condemned horrific events of the 1910s and 1940s, and the 
                                                
930 Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria. White House, Office of the 
Press Secretary, 10.09.2013.   
931 Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on 
August 21, 2013. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, August.30.2013; First on CNN: 
Videos show Glimpse into evidence for Syria intervention. CNN News, September, 8.2013; 
Obama's shocking case for attacking Syria: Gruesome series of videos taken in 
aftermath of gas attacks that White House is using in closed-door briefings to persuade 
lawmakers to back US strikes. The Daily Mail, September, 07.2013.  
932  Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps. The White House, Office of 
the Press Secretary.August, 20. 2012.   
933 Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria. The White House, Office of 
the Press Secretary, September.09.2013. 
934 Sliwinski, 2011, 83-110; Zelizer, 1998. 
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culturally well-known, iconized pictures produced of these atrocities. The 
events of the 21st of August in Syria were, by using historical references, 
added to the grim list of the atrocities that should never have happened.  
As discussed in the context of this study, contemporary images of horror 
and suffering are commonly read and compared to historical representations, 
and today’s atrocities habitually refer to the past ones. Historical references 
to past events established as crimes against humanity, amplify the force of 
the appeal, and fortify the emotional power of the images. 935 The 
combination of the historical references and the emphasis on amateur 
images mediated via social media technology—enabling us to see distant 
atrocities as they happen—intensify the idea that the contemporary 
international community (or the West) has the moral duty to prevent the 
horrors, reminding us of the past calamities from happening again. In the 
Western cultural sphere, the reference to the Holocaust, amplifies the notion 
of “never again”.936 References to past atrocities function as a cultural 
resonance background, which amplifies the emotional message of the 
images, but also adds new meanings to them. In the rhetoric of president 
Obama, the notion that we—the human kind and the international 
community, aware of the current atrocity—cannot just stand by, look and do 
nothing about it, recurred. Obama framed the images as showing the horrors 
of the Syrian people as indicating a situation, in which the surrounding world 
has to intervene into in order to make the suffering and instability stop, and 
to prevent future use of chemical weapons. 937  
US president Obama was not the only Western head of state politically 
utilizing the emotional power of the atrocity images. Also, the Secretary of 
State John Kerry similarly aligned in support of military action at the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Syria, 3th of September, as he 
stated that this was: “not the time for armchair isolationism. This is not the 
time to be spectators to slaughter. Neither our country or our conscience can 
afford the cost of silence”. He added: “We have spoken up against 
unspeakable horror many times in the past”.  And further pleaded: “Now we 
must stand up and act”. 938 In his speech on Syria on the 26th of August Kerry 
also made a strong reference to the “gutwrenching” scenery of the images of 
the event:  
                                                
935 See Chapters 2 & 4; Campbell, 2002, 142-172; Käpylä & Kennedy, 2014; Sliwinski, 2011, 83-
110; Zelizer: 1998 
936  See: Campbell: 2002, 158-160 Zelizer: 1998, 2.  
937  Statement by the President on Syria. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 
August, 31. 2013; Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria. The White 
House, Office of the Press Secretary, September, 10.2013; Text of a Letter from the President to 
the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate. The White 
House, Office of the Press Secretary, August 31, 2013; Syria Crisis: Obama wins backing for military 
strike. BBC News, 03.09.2013; Obama lines up key support in Congress for Syria attack. Los Angeles Times, 
September 3, 2013.  
938  Kerry, Hagel and Dempsey testify at Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing 
on Syria. Full transcript. The Washington Post, September 3, 2013.  
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 Last night after speaking with foreign ministers from around the world 
about the gravity of this situation, I went back and I watched the videos, the 
videos that anybody can watch in the social media, and I watched them one 
more gutwrenching time. It is really hard to express in words the human 
suffering that they lay out before us. As a father, I can’t get the image out of 
my head of a man who held up his dead child, wailing while chaos swirled 
around him.  939 
 
Likewise, the French president François Hollande and the British Prime 
Minister David Cameron appealed in favor of a targeted military operation, 
rationalizing the operation on the grounds of the horrific scenery the 
amateur images of the event and its aftermath presented. David Cameron 
resulted strongly to the emotional power of the images in reasoning why a 
military intervention was necessary. He stressed that the members of the 
Parliament whom had not previously seen the images should force 
themselves to do so. Cameron claimed that the images bare such a horrible 
statement that after seeing them the atrocity would never fade from the 
memory. 940  In this way the images were presented as telling something 
otherwise unimaginable, something that must be seen in order to be able to 
apprehend the situation and its severity.  Again the nature of the images as 
locally produces amateur images—shot on the spot, in the midst of the hurt 
and mayhem of the events, by local people, potential victims—was in the 
statements of the Western leaders worked to stress the acuteness of the 
situation, and the need to act promptly on it. The increased drama of 
amateur images amplifies their emotional impact; looking at them is like 
looking at the situation evolving through the eyes of those directly affected by 
the events. The hasty, shaky and brutal amateur style of the images was 
stated as showing “what actually happened in Syria”. Moreover the personal 
tone of the political commentators, presenting themselves as shocked 
spectators and witnesses: Kerry looking at the images on his free time, after 
hours of work, at home, as a father and Cameron as someone who was 
personally nearly traumatized, unable to forget the visually encountered 
scenery—further adds the emotional appeal and drama power of the 
images.941 Seeing and witnessing the event via the dramatic visual proof 
framed as authentic was in the statements of the Western leaders seen to 
bring about a responsibility to act on the situation. The images were 
perceived in the rhetoric of Western politicians as pushing about a moral 
imperative of action and intervention: these images and the suffering they 
                                                
939 Remarks on Syria. John Kerry, secretary of State, August 26, 2013.  
940  Syria – Excerpts from the interview given by François Hollande, President of the 
Republic, to the daily newspaper Le Monde. France Diplomatie, August.30.2013; Syria 
crisis: David Cameron says British military attack must be 'judgment call'. The 
Guardian, August, 29..2013; PM makes case for Syria Intervention. BBC, Democracy 
Live,August, 29.2013. ; See also: Saugmann-Andersen, Rune:  Remediating Security. A semiotic 
framework for analyzing hoe video speaks security.  PhD dissertation, Department of political 
science, University of Copenhagen, 2015, 8-10 
941  Audience discourses on Amateur News content and their effects on Journalistic practices. 199-
201; See also Saugmann-Andersen, 2015.  
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showed demanded to be seen, and moreover demanded action—and the right 
course of action was a humanitarian targeted military intervention of the 
Western powers. The notions, that one should face the images, not to turn 
ones gaze away from the “testimonial of the real” they presented, and that the 
images demanded a specific kind of (humanitarian) action from their 
(Western) spectators were spectacularly widely used in the political rhetoric. 
Western leaders were rigorous in defining the intervention in Syria 
different from the previous long stretched operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. It was stressed that there would not be boots on the ground, 
and that the operation would be a limited and surgically targeted, necessary 
in order to make the suffering stop and to prevent such attacks from 
happening again. It was deemed to be “a legal humanitarian intervention”, as 
Prime Minister Cameron described it.942 The idea that the intervention was 
necessary to carry out since it was the moral duty of the West to act in a 
(militarized) humanitarian manner and to protect the entire humanity from 
a terrible destiny, dramatically pictured by the horrific images, was repeated 
in the statements of Western leaders. Thus a notion of the imperative of 
action set by the images, familiar for example from the times of the CNN-
effect discussion943, was widely voiced in relation to the Syria images.  
7.4.3 IMAGES OF SUFFERING IN THE AGE OF HUMANITARIAN 
WORLD POLITICS: WITH WAR AGAINST WAR 
 
The rhetoric of the Western leaders added a humanitarian-interventionist 
ethos—essential of the contemporary Western international politics—into the 
images. The rhetoric used in the proclamations of Western leaders in 
justifying and rationalizing the military operation, explained that the horrors 
pictured could only be remedied by Western interventionist military-
humanitarian acts.  As the figure of the perpetrator was added to the images 
in the proof function, another figure was attached to them in rhetoric 
legitimizing the military operation: the figure of a moral Western savior, a 
humanitarian figure, who sets out to save the suffering victims from the 
amoral evildoers inflicting the pain. The righteous Western political actor 
was presented as acting according to the moral imperative set by the images, 
and pictured as using necessary, legal military force in order to protect 
humanity and to punish the evil villains, enemies of the human kind.  
When placed in a historical context of the uses and functions of images of 
atrocity, it is remarkable how the images of the Ghouta atrocity were in the 
                                                
942 Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Syria. The White House, Office of 
the Press Secretary, 10.09.2013; Syria crisis: David Cameron says British military attack 
must be 'judgment call'. The Guardian, 29.08.2013; PM makes case for Syria Intervention. 
BBC, Democracy Live, 29.08.2013; Syria – Excerpts from the interview given by François 
Hollande, President of the Republic, to the daily newspaper Le Monde. France Diplomatie, 
08.30.2013.  
943  See for instance: Gilboa, 2005, 28.  
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contemporary Western political setting and rhetorical use framed and 
utilized to legitimate a military solution to the situation. In the case of the 
Ghouta attack images of war-inflicted suffering were dominantly utilized—
seemingly quite paradoxically—to promote war as a resource to put end to 
violence. Historically, prominent notions on the effects of crude images of 
war have generally been rather divergent. Images unveiling war inflicted 
suffering and making visible the horrors brought about by war have, at least 
in the earlier 1900s historical contexts, been seen more often to have a 
contradictory effect.  
 The revelatory effect of gruesome images, quite the opposite of the 
contemporary logic, has historically been dominated by the idea, that visually 
unveiling the horrors of war, would work to posture the spectator to oppose 
war, and to direct the thoughts of the spectators towards notions preventing 
war, even pacifism. As an example of this orientation serves the pacifistic 
First World War pamphlet Krieg dem Kriege assembled by German activist 
Ernst Friedrich, discussed in chapter 2. Also the Holocaust images as well as 
the Vietnam War imagery can be seen as examples of such orientation. 
Nevertheless, images of suffering are extremely ambivalent and utilizable in 
multitudes of manners. Images of war and suffering civilians have also been 
commonly used to promote war or to rationalize military solutions also 
historically, especially in political rhetoric in times of crisis. 944 Rather, what 
this historical contextualization suggests is, that images of suffering are—
within recent Western international politics and in the era of humanitarian 
world politics and social media—habitually understood and framed quite 
differently than previously. Susan Sontag points to this phenomenon in 
Regarding the Pain of Others, while she discusses Virginia Woolf’s notions 
on pacifism and images of war in her 1938 essay Three Guineas, in relation to 
the post 9/11 setting. As Woolf at the time of the Spanish civil war writes on 
the atrocity images of the bombings of the town of Guernica, and makes a 
claim that these images can only bring about anti-war sentiments, and 
condemnation of war, Sontag in the post 9/11 raises the question weather 
anyone still today—even the pacifist—believe that war could/should be 
stopped. What today is settled for are attempts to bring the violators of the 
laws of war to justice, and to place other regulations to armed conflicts. 945  
Western waged humanitarian interventions to foreign conflicts causing 
civilian suffering are habitually today (in the West) seen as means of 
regulating war, not abolishing war.  
This notion of fighting foreign war-inflicted civilian suffering with the 
resources of Western lead humanitarian military interventions has, as 
discussed, become more frequent at least the 1990s onwards.946 And as war 
has become to be presented, framed and understood (in the West) as a 
                                                
944  See chapter 2.2.5.; Friedrich, 1924; see also Sontag: 2003. 
945 Sontag, 2003, 1-5 
946  See chapter 2.; Campbell, David. 2002.  
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humanitarian resource necessary to civilize global crisis areas, and as 
military interventions have become a widely accepted recourse in combatting 
distant human suffering; consequently the anti-war (even pacifistic) potential 
of images of suffering has lessened. Thus, as the Western leaders appealed to 
the Western public and politicians, and urged them to look at the images and 
bare witness to the suffering of the Syrians, while at the same time 
rationalizing a military involvement, consequently the arrangement of the 
images suggested that the humanitarian catharsis today may be attained by 
waging war. The political Western spectacle of the Ghouta chemical attack 
added ideological content and meanings to the images, such as the 
imperative of military humanitarian action and the spirit of military 
interventionism. Thus the utilization of the Ghouta images in Western 
political contexts mirrors the contemporary ethos and spirit of Western 
international politics, and forms a distinct act at the visual humanitarian 
theater, which poignantly reflects contemporary Western political framing 
and utilization of war images and prevalent notions on humanity and its 
protection at the contemporary era.  
7.4.4 FROM THE IMPERATIVE OF INTERVENTION TO A 
DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION 
Human suffering indicated by the Ghouta images was vigorously used in 
reasoning for the planned Western military operation headed by the US, 
France and Great Britain. Britain was widely expected to take part in the 
planned military operation. The British Parliament debated and voted on the 
participation on 29th of August. In his speech prior to the vote Prime 
Minister Cameron strongly appealed in favor of participation. He again built 
his argumentation strongly on the horrific scenery of the images of the 
attack. Cameron stressed that disregarding the imperative of intervention set 
by images was the most dangerous thing to do. He also carefully explained, 
that the planned military intervention was not like the pervious wars, but a 
targeted operation that was morally necessary in the situation. Nevertheless, 
the British parliament voted—quite surprisingly—against the British 
involvement.947  Up until the Syria vote Britain had participated in all of the 
major recent Western military-humanitarian operations, from Kosovo to 
Libya. The Syria vote made a historical exception to this policy. 948 The no-
vote was also most probably a deathblow to the execution of the whole 
operation. US and France were now basically left alone endorsing military 
solution, while the EU was entrusting a diplomatic solution949 and the 
                                                
947 House of Commons debate on Syria. Parliament of the UK, August, 30, 2013; British 
Parliament Votes Against Military Intervention In Syria. The Huffington Post, 29.08.2013.  
948 On the historical participation of Britain in western military deployments, see: Häkkinen, 
Teemu. The Royal Prerogative redefined: parliamentary debate on the role of the British Parliament 
in large-scale military deployments, 1982-2003. University of Jyväskylä, 2014. 
949 Speech by HRVP Catherine Ashton on Syria. European Commission - SPEECH/13/688, 
September 11, 2013. 
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opposing world political bloc—namely Russia and its allies—were forcefully 
against the operation.950  
A couple of weeks after the Damascus atrocity—and a week from the 
British no-vote— September 5th and 6th Russia hosted a G20 Summit in St 
Petersburg. The economy summit soon turned into a battlefield of different 
international political footings, divided along the lines of the global blogs 
supporting or against the al-Assad regime. China and Russia vocally voiced 
their opposition to the planned Western military involvement.951 Russian 
president Vladimir Putin argued, that the Western nations had no solid 
evidence on the guilt of president al-Assad, and no right to intervene 
militarily in to the situation of a sovereign state.952 The Western powers—as 
well as South Korea, Saudi Arabia and Japan among other nation taking an 
anti-al-Assad posture—signed a joint statement on Syria, in which they 
condemned the Syrian regime as responsible for the bloodshed in Damascus, 
and appealed for a strong international reaction to the situation. 953 At the 
time of the G20 summit the global political divisions surrounding the Syrian 
situation were tangible. Nevertheless, at the time of the summit, information 
on a diplomatic solution into the Syrian crisis, negotiated between Russia 
and the United States, surfaced.954  
Soon after the summit, the US Secretary of State John Kerry mentioned in 
his speech (September 9th in London) that if the Syrian government was to 
turn over its chemical weapons arsenal to the international community, the 
military operation could be refrained.955 The same day Russian Foreign 
Minister Sergei Lavrov followed Kerry’s statement.  Lavrov stated that if the 
military operation could be avoided by turning over the chemical weapons of 
Syria, Russia would start negotiating with the Syrian government, in order to 
get it to hand over its weapons to international community for elimination.956  
10th of September President Barack Obama mentioned in an interview, that 
he viewed the Russian proposal offering a possible solution to the 
situation.957 A diplomatic solution to the Syrian Chemical weapons crisis 
started to emerge. September 14th the United States and Russia published a 
joint proposal: Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons.958 
                                                
950 Vladimir Putin's News Conference Following the G20 Summit. St. Petersburg, September, 
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This framework was the base for the UN Security Council’s resolution 2118, 
on the disarmament and destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons, which 
was signed September 27th.959  The planned Western military solution to the 
Syrian crisis thus soon faded away, and was replaced with a diplomatic 
solution.  
This rather sudden turn is interesting when reflected against the political 
argumentation on the imperative of acting strongly and punishing the 
evildoer, based on the visual testimonials of the suffering of Syrians. The 
diplomatic solution, which basically solely meant al-Assad regime voluntarily 
handing out its remaining chemical weapons arsenal for elimination seems 
rather light, when compared with Western political arguments stressing 
severity of the security threat posed by the Syrian regime. High among the 
Western rationalization of the planned attack were also the need to punish 
and oust al-Assad out of power, and the monstrosity of the al-Assad regime 
illustrated by the images. Then, what explains this overnight turn from active 
warmongering to a diplomatic path?  
Recent Western military interventions rhetorically legitimized with the 
grand narrative of humanitarian war and Western imperative to act strongly 
on the evildoers, have not turned out exactly triumphant.  The low results 
and high costs—both economically and humanely—of previous military 
interventions undoubtedly had an impact on the outcome of the Syrian 
situation. The Western world seemed, at the particular moment in time, to be 
quite weary of interventionist wars, fought in the name of humanitarianism.  
The memory and disappointments produced by the long stretched wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq most probably had their influence on the democratic 
system of Britain rejecting the operation. The same phenomena may be seen 
to have been at work as well in the eagerness of president Obama finally 
submitting to a diplomatic solution.960 On the other hand, and on a more 
cynical note, one might say that perhaps political interests of the Western 
powers in Syria were not at the time strong enough to carry a potentially 
costly military solution. Regardless of amount of human suffering made 
visible by the images of the event, it seems that the overall situation in Syria 
was not in the West at the very moment politically scaled as severe enough—
the military involvement.  From the point of view of strategic interests of the 
Western powers, Syria was not seen as a necessary—in comparison to the 
previous cases, in which a military path was taken.  
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7.4.5 THE CAUSALITY EFFECT IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA ERA 
 
In the light of the Syrian case it seems that at the age of social media, 
amateur images of crisis are likely to gather wide visibility within 
mainstream media, to generate increasingly lively debate and to arouse 
strong tones of voices in international political contexts. Dramatic images of 
human suffering offer a powerful political tool, which can be emotionally 
effectively used in order to intensify political arguments and rationalize even 
heavy political decisions. But the case of the Ghouta attack images, within 
international political setting, also shows, how the humanitarianly drawn 
narrative of “imperative of intervention” strongly built upon images of 
human suffering can be swiftly put aside, when political realities acquire this. 
In this light, within the Western international geostrategic politics, referring 
to “authentic images of suffering impelling us to act” rather appears as tools 
of convenience, referred to when politically suitable, but put aside when 
strategically relevant. 961 
On grounds of the Syria-case, it seems—just like with the previous 
discussions on the causal force of crisis images, namely the Vietnam-
syndrome and the CNN-effect thesis—that also in the era of social media and 
amateur images the (causal) power of images of atrocity is highly debatable. 
The ability of crisis images to create media noteworthiness, political 
reactions and moreover actions, is still today subordinate many 
preconditions: the logic of the mainstream media’s journalistic remediation, 
prevalent ideological presumptions and preconditions of a given cultural and 
political sphere, political elite consensus, strategic interests—and calculated 
political will, rather than an “imperative of action” set by suffering and its 
visual records. 962  The visual spectacle of the Syrian gas attack in the 
Western media and politics, and finally the diplomatic international solution 
to the crisis suggest, that the dynamic power of social media and amateur 
images is after all very limited.  Just like for example the hope set on the 
CNN-effect in the 1990s, the political potency of atrocity images 
autonomously and somewhat causally creating (foreign) political action, still 
largely remains a myth.  
The technology driven causality optimism of images of atrocity in the age 
of social media, also creates a myth in a barthean sense. This causality myth 
naturalizes, conceals and depoliticizes the political nature of framings—as 
well as the mechanisms of gaining of visibility and noteworthiness—and 
political utilization of images within mass media and moreover within 
international politics. It seems that the ideological, culturally and politically 
segmented nature of the (still dominant) mass media and the strategic 
(geo)political interests of powerful world political players, are often short 
handedly taken into account in popular claims as well as research concerning 
the effects of crisis images at the era of social media technologies. The 
                                                
961  See: Robinson, 2002.   
962 See: Robinson: 2002; Hallin 1986; Cottle, 2009.  
414
 415 
technology optimism has in part led to a discourse, in which causality claims 
on the power and effect of social media crisis images are often made. The 
novel medium by which the message has been convoyed has thus perhaps 
attracted too much interest, as on the other hand, international power 
politics and ideological orientations determining our view on the world have 
perhaps been rather overlooked.963  
This is not to say, that images showing suffering would not produce highly 
visible spectacles, and arouse strong outrage (and just as in the age of CNN 
effect act as icons of outrage) and hoist public condemnation. In this way 
dramatic images undoubtedly have an effect, and most probably at the age of 
swift image mediation even an intensified effect. 964 Moreover, this is not to 
say, that images of suffering would not often be focally used in political 
rhetoric, as well as also the in legitimation of political decisions and actions, 
as they are. Images of crisis and suffering are strong tools in this sense, 
potential strategic enablers of even heavyweight political actions. Moreover 
the presumption on the authenticity of social media imagery was in the 
Ghouta case effectively politically utilized, and this is noteworthy.  But, I 
claim that foreign political actions—such as sanctions, military interventions 
or other heavy weight acts—are despite any changes in the information 
technology and media logic, still today dependent on cold power realities and 
political, strategic interests. Therefore, just as many researchers have stated 
in relation to the CNN effect, shocking images of human suffering in this 
sense, often are, par excellence, political and strategic tools. But they do not 
function on a causal logic.965 Therefore, resting on Susan Sontag’s argument, 
it seems that images may give push to actions and strengthen political 
reactions only if there is enough cultural, ideological and political resonance 
to prop their messages, and above all, if there is enough political power as 
well as geopolitical and economic interest involved to reinforce their 
account.966 This logic does not seem to have changed in the era of social 
media technologies and rabid digital image mediation. The case offered by 
the Syria chemical attack images seems to reassert the conception that 
visually witnessing even the most horrendous suffering does not 
automatically produce certain reactions. In this light the causality claim, 
according to which seeing more is supposed to lead to reacting more, seems 
quite invalid, also at the age of social media.  
Moreover, resting on the Ghouta case, I claim, that the growing amount of 
revelatory images contemporarily mediated through social media, does not 
automatically produce stronger reactions or bridge the emotional empathy 
gap between the spectators and the sufferers. My claim is not based so much 
on Susan Moeller’s Compassion fatigue-thesis on the exhausting effect of 
flooding suffering images967, but rather on Stanley Cohen’s idea of the 
                                                
963 See for example: Liberation Technology, 2012.  
964  See: Perlmutter: 1998, 28; Campbell, 2002,157-158. 
965  See: ibid; Sontag, 2003, Robinson: 2002.  
966  Sontag, 1977, 17; Sontag, 2003, 80-84. 
967  Moeller, 1999. 
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sociology of denial. As Cohen has noted in his seminal book States of Denial, 
even if there is something extremely terrible happening just around the 
corner, and we know about it, we humans habitually tend to wrap ourselves 
in a state of denial; calmly walk pass, and do nothing about the suffering of 
others. This, according to Cohen, actually takes place more often than not.  
Surrounded by horrors, we go on with our lives. Cohen sees this as a way to 
cope with a world filled with atrocities, especially in an era when we know so 
much about the crookedness of the globe we inhabit. Moreover, we get used 
to the state of things. Accustomed to the suffering of distant others, we might 
even lean to think that the prevalent state of affairs is how things simply are, 
and thus, actually even how they should be. This logic, according to Cohen, 
also expands from the level of individuals into the level of political actors, 
states and international politics. In this context action (to alleviate the 
suffering of others or to intervene) is often taken only when it seems 
inevitable for our own survival, absolutely de rigueur for our security or 
success.968  In the light of the Ghouta case, I am inclined to think that this is 
also the case with images of distant crises and human suffering in the era of 
social media. Thinking about the power of images in the social media era, it 
seems that the reliance on the causal political effect of growing number of 
images mediated through a novel technology, is highly optimistic, and 
potentially misleading. In the light of the history and the Syrian example, it 
seems, that technology is not able to change the human nature; the 
emotional and psychological build embedded deep in us. Perhaps we are 
inclined to stay in denial.  
On the other hand, and on a more positive note, the widely internalized 
optimistic belief in the ability of crisis imagery in generating heightened care 
for the suffering of others, thus building a better, more humane world, can be 
interpreted as a sign of humanity’s ongoing progress—or at least as an 
indication of a commonly shared will into that direction. This tradition of 
optimism can be traced back to the Enlightenment era, as Kant asked, 
already in 1798, “is the human race constantly progressing”, pointing to the 
heightened consideration of distress of distant others at the time.969 In this 
light, then, the persistent surfacing of the optimistic assertion on the power 
of atrocity images can be seen as an emblem of a persistent belief on the 
benevolent nature of the human kind.  
All in all, the milieu of social media crisis imagery comprises a distinct 
and an altered theatrical setting through which the suffering of distant others 
is mediated for the sight of the spectating world. The novel mediation 
technology and practices created by it, without a doubt, in many ways alter 
the ways in which we encounter the pain of others, but its capability of 
                                                
968  Cohen,2001.  
969  Kant, Immanuel: An Old Question raised again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing? 
In On history, eds. White Beck, L, Fackenheim, E, Anchor, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1963 (1798) 
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altering how the human mind works, and furthermore how foreign politics 
function still remains debatable.  
7.5 CONCLUSIONS: THE DEBATABLE SOCIAL MEDIA 
EFFECT 
This chapter set out to investigate whether a contemporarily notion on social 
media enabled unprecedentedly free information and image flows and the 
amateur images mediated from crisis zones, could and would alter the view 
of the surrounding world to distant suffering, and enable a more 
compassionate manner of action in order to put a stop to human suffering. In 
order to investigate this notion, the circulation, uses and significations of 
locally produced atrocity images from the August 21st 2013 Damascus gas 
attack were traced, firstly in Western mainstream media, briefly in the 
dominant Russian media and thirdly within international political 
argumentation.  
Images originating from local sources, produced by amateurs and swiftly 
mediated via social media channels, are often associated with attributes such 
as authenticity, and habitually perceived as unframed and un-cropped 
records of enfolding, evolving events, mediated with less control and 
authoritarian governance. Thus an optimistic notion on the altering, 
liberating, democratizing and even a revolutionizing effect of social media 
crisis images has contemporarily surfaced both in public discussion as well as 
in research. I argued, that from time to time in the course of history, notions 
on new technical means of (visual) mediation in enabling an altered view into 
the suffering of distant others have been raised. An idea that technological 
advancements in the field on visual mediation would result in building up of 
stronger solidarity bonds and, moreover, generating political action in order 
to more effectively alleviate the suffering of others, has been revived 
recurrently in the course of modern history. As examples of this technology 
driven causal optimism on the power of images serve among others the 
innovation of photography (early 1900th century), the effects of the Holocaust 
images (1940s), the so-called Vietnam War syndrome discussion  (1970s) and 
more latterly the CNN effect (1990s) as well as the Al-Jazeera effect (2000s). 
In this chapter, I placed the social media effect as a continuum in this 
historical saga as a topical manifestation of this historically formed thinking.  
By resting to the case of the Ghouta images, I argued, that although digital 
technology and social media theoretically enables even fragmented groups of 
crisis areas to voice their views and grievances worldwide, in reality for the 
sporadic images to circulate extensively into the attention of the wider global 
publics, they still today need to be harnessed by the more conventional 
mainstream news media. Conventional mainstream media still acts as a 
gatekeeper, which disseminates, selects and circulates the material provided 
417
A Social Media Effect? Syrian Chemical Attack Images in Mainstream Media and International 
Politics 
 418 
by the new media channels, according to its own culturally and politically 
formed principles.  
Soon after the Ghouta event, the amateur images produced from it were 
extensively used and circulated by the Western mainstream media.  In the 
processes of the Western mainstream media, the images of the Syrian gas 
strikes gathered various meanings and significations, which were culturally, 
ideologically and politically constructed. The images were widely seen as 
certifying the already prevalent notion of the monstrosity of the Syrian 
regime headed by president al-Assad. Within the framings of the Western 
media the horrific images were presented as telling a story of violation of 
international laws of war, of crimes against humanity and as well as revealing 
the perpetrator behind the attacks. The main mode of addressing of the 
images was the humanitarian and human rights paradigm, dominant in the 
contemporary Western international political and ideological landscape. The 
meanings the images gathered were largely constructed along the lines of the 
prevalent Western notions and standings on the Syrian war. Thus, the uses of 
the atrocity images in Western media also worked to reinforce the cultural 
and political posture of the Western sphere towards the situation.  
Correspondingly, the sugarcoated messages, which the president al-
Assad’s regime mediated through the social media channels, in order to 
promote a humane image of the regime and to paint a serene scenery of the 
everyday life in Syria, were negatively received in Western publicity.  
Circulating the tidied up images, was seen in the Western sphere as emblem 
of the deranged nature of the Assad regime, and thus the social media 
messages of al-Assad placed the regime into an even more despicable light in 
the Western view. On the other hand, the overview to the Russian media’s 
use of the Syrian atrocity images revealed, how little attention the images 
gathered in a different political and ideological sphere. In the Russian state 
owned mainstream publicity the gruesome images Were not used to 
determine the events in Syria, and were not commonly seen as proof of the 
guilt of al-Assad.  
Also in the age of social media and vastly circulating amateur images, the 
images remain mute; they show, but cannot articulate. Images are signified, 
their meaning and message are produced in the political and cultural 
environment of their presentation and reading, according to contextual and 
discursive settings, through various uses, naming, framing and circulation. 
The processes of meaning creation happens in the realm of political, where 
silent images of suffering and atrocity constantly flow gathering different 
meanings and messages in uses and reuses. Thus the notion of the potential 
of the amateur images and social media dramatically altering our scenery 
into the suffering of distant others seems highly debatable: we still mainly 
see things as we are, not as they are.  
On the other hand, the new practices of visual crisis mediation may 
potentially alter presentation conventions and styles of the imagery through 
which the surrounding world and its grievances are encountered. Images 
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produced by amateurs and local non-professionals—and topically extensively 
displayed in and by the mainstream media—differ in style, focus and framing 
from the crisis images taken by professionals working for large image 
agencies and media houses. The Western world has in the past decades 
grown accustomed to the conventions and style of professional crisis 
photographers, carefully selected and governed by many codes of taste, 
decency and representation. In the case of the Syrian gas attack images, for 
instance the proportionally high representation of men among the victims is 
noteworthy, when compared to the prevailing conventions on media images 
of professionals as well as visual representations of humanitarian 
organizations. Also notions of authenticity—an idea of amateur images 
capturing enfolding events “as they really were”—amplifies the status of 
images as (juridical) proof, may have an effect on our view to the crisis zones. 
Additionally the novel style of social media crisis imagery possibly also alters 
the style and scope of professional photography of crisis situations. In 
addition, the notions of authenticity, objectivity, the heightened proof 
function as well as amplified drama power associated with amateur images 
may be effectively utilized —and furthermore also constructed and fueled—by 
the mainstream media in its news production.  
The emotional force of the images of suffering was central in the 
international political debate surrounding the Ghouta chemical weapons 
attack. The out of the ordinary, sudden and visibly shocking event of the gas 
attack hoisted the event into a spectacle in Western politics. The clear 
violation of international norms banning the use of chemical weapons, the 
suspected crimes of war—or crimes against humanity—were central in the 
debate of the Western powers and the international community. The amateur 
images of social media were extensively used in the reports of Western 
governments investigating the event.  The images were seen to prove not only 
the events taking place in the Ghouta district and the use of gas as a weapon, 
but also the guilt of the al-Assad regime. Thus, in the proof utility of the 
images, in addition to the suffering victims, the guilty party —president al-
Assad—was embedded in the images.  
The images were further utilized in the Western political debate 
rationalizing the Western response to the situation in Syria. The origin of the 
images as amateur produced was utilized in Western political rhetoric in 
order to fortify their drama and testimonial power; and the notion that these 
images show “things as they really were” was repeatedly referred to in the 
rhetoric of the Western leaders.  In the rhetorical use of the Western leaders 
the images were also associated into the cavalcade of iconized historical 
images of condemned past atrocities, such as the Holocaust and the use of 
gas in the First World War. This further strengthened their drama power and 
emotional appeal. The images were moreover seen to pose a moral 
imperative of action, and the proper action was—within the predominant 
Western humanitarian paradigm—seen to be a targeted Western military 
intervention into the situation. The visual witnessing of the horrors of Syrian 
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civilians was in the Western political rhetoric effectively used in legitimizing 
a military operation. Visually encountering the horrendous suffering was 
seen to posit a moral duty for the West to punishing the evildoer(s) and to 
save the suffering humanity by the means of a military operation.  Thus, in 
the Western political use of the images, —in addition to the figures of 
suffering victims and the evil perpetrator—a third figure was added to them; 
that of the moral savior, the strong and responsible Western humanitarian 
“human”. This figure was presented as reacting to the images in a proper 
manner, and acting according to the moral imperative of intervention set by 
the suffering.  
What was noteworthy in the politically constructed addressing of the 
images, in regards to historical function of atrocity images, was that the 
Syrian images were seen to encourage a military solution to the situation. 
Earlier in history, images of suffering and atrocity have been commonly seen 
to encourage anti-military approaches, even pacifism. Within the Western 
frame of interventionist humanitarian world politics, the images were on the 
contrary, seen to promote a military solution as a means of ending violence. 
This further proves the argument that images gather their meanings and are 
signified within the ideological settings and political, discursive frames they 
are read and interpreted in. The spirit of the Western humanitarian politics 
and military interventionism was added to the amateur images of social 
media within the Western political utilization. 
In mid-September, 2013, less than a month after the gas attacks, the 
strong Western moral tones of voices demanding the military intervention on 
grounds of the immense suffering shown by the images, suddenly quieted 
down. The planned military operation was segued into a rather feeble 
diplomatic resolution outlined by the US and Russia. The Syrian chemical 
weapons crisis was resolved by a plan on international disarmament and 
destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons. The imperative of intervention 
set by the atrocious images was swiftly replaced by a politically more suitable 
diplomatic solution.  
What can be said in the light of the Syrian case about the ability of crisis 
amateur images in generating an altered or a heightened emotional 
participation, is that still today, images—no matter how terrible they are, who 
produces them or how they surface—do not automatically produce an 
outcome or seem to press interventionist decision making. The topical 
massive amounts of images mediated from the global crisis zones, may 
produce a spectacle of condemnation and give a push to political/military 
action, but only if there is enough political interest and will reinforcing their 
account. Amateur crisis images are effectively utilized and reframed within 
mainstream media's remediation, and they may function as central icons of 
outrage. Moreover they tend to be forcefully taken up and utilized in political 
rhetoric, and effectively utilized in political argumentation when they 
resonate with overall ideological premises and political strategic goals.  But 
the notion on the enforced power of amateur social media atrocity images in 
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altering our action on global crisis and distant suffering, looked at from the 
perspective of (global) mainstream media and international politics, remains 
highly debatable.  
 
****************************************** 
A Retrospect:  About a year after the Ghouta chemical weapons attack, an 
international coalition, with the US in front, intervened into the ever more 
contested situation of Iraq and Syria by military means. As a response to the 
growing influence of the Islamic State (ISIS) in Iraqi and Syrian territories, 
aerial bombings and other measures—much parallel to the ones planned in 
relation to the Ghouta chemical attack—have been deployed by the US and its 
allies. The operation has been rationalized by the threat the terrorist groups 
pose to the world peace at large, as well by the brutal acts of ISIS in the area 
and the protection of the civilians of the area from the barbaric offences of 
ISIS.   
Also in the case of ISIS and the intervention of the international coalition 
visual images mediated from the area played an important role. Horrible 
images of brutally killed Kurds, civilians and children, as well as images 
showcasing decapitated soldiers fighting against ISIS, permeated the 
Western view when the operation was discussed. ISIS has a distinct visual 
strategy, in which it seeks to underline its own barbarity by circulating 
ultraviolent imagery. ISIS has for example circulated imagery of 
decapitations of Western journalists captured in the area. These images have 
alarmed and shocked the surrounding world, and undoubtedly influenced 
the decision to act on the situation.  
September 2015, a year after the US led coalitions intervention; also 
Russia intervened into the Syrian war, as al-Assad regime pleaded for 
Russian help to fight the rebel groups and jihadi-terrorist in the area. At 
latest at this point, Syrian became a desolate world political battleground, in 
which the blood of the Syrian civilians fuels the chaotic conflict. Russia 
together with the al-Assad regime have in 2016 heavily bombed residential 
areas for example in the city Aleppo, killing hundreds if not thousands of 
civilians. Horrific images of the destroyed city and its suffering inhabitants 
have shocked the spectating world. But the international community has 
remained paralyzed in relation to the massacre carried out in Aleppo by 
Russians and the Syrian regime.  
When pondering on the power of atrocity imagery (amateur, local, social 
media mediated, as well as otherwise) within contemporary international 
politics, it may be said, in retrospective, that the images of the 2013 Syrian 
gas attack did not suffice to unite the spectating Western world in arms to 
fight the perils of humanity, nor have the images of the dying children of 
Aleppo in 2016. But the images of the ISIS brutality were actively utilized to 
legitimize the Western led action in the area. Looking at the steady flow of 
images of the atrocity taking place in Aleppo right now, makes painfully 
evident how images of suffering still—in the age of social media and swift 
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amateur image mediation—remain mere useful tools, utilized at convenience 
in international politics. No matter what horrors we visually encounter, what 
matters in the end at the level of international politics, are calculated political 
interests.  
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8 CONCLUSIONS: THE NECESSITY OF 
NON-WESTERN HAMARTIA FOR THE 
HUMANITARIAN HIERARCHY   
This study began with a perhaps somewhat laconic statement on the 
contemporary everydayness of mediated images telling of the suffering of 
others in the West. But as we have seen, spectatorship of images telling of the 
suffering of others is not exactly a new phenomenon. In the absence of a 
direct contact with the sufferer in the realm of politics of pity, as Arendt 
would put it,970 mediated visual representations of suffering bodies have 
been seen to provide a profound and powerful route into comprehending the 
pain of distant others.  Already the Enlightenment thinkers saw visual record 
of a suffering body as the most forceful message: encountering a suffering 
body evokes a sense of sameness, empathy, solidarity and points to the need 
to protect humanity (life) form pain, calamity and abuses (of human rights) 
as it reminds one of the shared human condition—vulnerability and 
precariousness.971 Therefore, in this study I firstly analyzed the status, 
position and effects of visual images in the contexts of apprehension of a 
shared humanity, of the evolvement of the ideas of life worthy of protection 
and (international) humanitarian politics in the Western sphere from the 
mid eighteenth century onwards. 
By mapping out the modern history of visual humanitarian 
communication from the 1755 Lisbon earthquake onwards, through the uses 
of images of suffering and calamity within humanitarian connections, this 
study has shown how resorting to a visual strategy to make the distant 
spectators to recognize the shared vulnerability of (human) life, to 
sentimentally connect with the distress of others, and to arouse empathy and 
a will to alleviate the distress has been enduring over the centuries. It has 
become clear how visual images have served a focal role in bridging the 
moral gap between the suffering unfortunate and the safe distant on-lookers 
capable of alleviating the pain or even preventing suffering. The thesis has 
shown, as also Sliwinski describes,972 that the modern history of the 
evolution of ideas on humanity—i.e. the historical construction of 
conceptions on life worthy of protection and the efforts to protect humanity—
is a story of pain and terrible events, as well as of courageous campaigners 
trying to morally educate their audiences of the violations of the humanity of 
others, attempting to arouse their moral sentiments and conscience and to 
provide the distant spectators means to alleviate the suffering of others by 
using visual strategies.  By following the visual trail of calamity, war, and 
                                                
970 Arendt, 1990 (1963) , 85-89. 
971 Smith, (1759) 2007; see Halttunen, 1995, 304-308.  
972 Sliwinski, 2011.  
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atrocity the thesis has made the evolution of the ideas on the protection of 
human rights and on safeguarding humanity and the widening of the 
boundaries of what is perceived as life worthy of protection observable. It has 
been shown how during the nearly 300 hundred years of modern visual 
humanitarian communication the representational practices and 
arrangements of images of pain and crisis have reflected, as well as 
constructed, the predominant thinking on humanity, the perils it faces and 
the available means to protect life from these perils.  
But, as has become evident, the presentation of the images of pain, the 
visualizations of the pain of others and the spectatorship of such imagery is 
inherently troublesome. Visually exhibiting the most intimate moments of 
another person’s suffering involves disturbing elements and ethical 
dilemmas. These dilemmas become evident in the risk of stereotyping, 
simplifying and othering representations, in their almost pornographic 
features, of the studied representations of suffering. Moreover, the thesis has 
shown that the ethical dilemmas are not limited to representational 
characteristics, but visual images—and especially emotive visual images of 
suffering—are per se ambivalent in their readings, functions and meanings. 
That is, photographs of pain and horror may give rise to opposing responses: 
an image of death may arouse a cry for peace in one and bring about 
sensations of desperate sadness and horror in another, or the very same 
photograph may spell retaliation, incite more violence, or even arouse 
emotions of fulfillment and justice being served for the other, or images of 
atrocious events may simply leave the spectator numb and paralyzed.973  
Because images are mute, they are read and given meaning in their 
representational context, and their significations and messages are 
formulated by their arrangements.974 As has been pointed out, the swiftly 
flow from one context to another (especially in the contemporary times of 
frantic information mediation) leads to images gathering different framings, 
significations and meanings along the way. By including this ambivalent and 
unstoppable flowing nature of images of pain and suffering in the analysis I 
have revealed the way these images can and have been staged, contextually 
framed, named and signified, and hence politically utilized especially in 
times of conflict. The story of visual mediation of images of pain and conflict, 
as I have proposed in this book, is thus also a story of power, control and 
governance (of censorship and propaganda), of cultural framing, purposeful 
arrangement and political utilization.  
The historical chapter 2. already showed how the visual representation of 
pain and suffering (and their spectatorship) has rarely been neutral or 
coincidental, but rather inherently purpose orientated and strategic. The use 
of the theater metaphor has enabled me to demonstrate how the spectating 
audiences are placed as spectators of such hard to look at images, most often 
with deliberate, contextual intentions to influence, to morally educate, to 
                                                
973 See also for instance Sontag, 2003, 11-12. 
974 Barthes, 1977, 15-31. 
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arouse certain contextual preferred sentiments, judgments, reactions, and 
actions. The study into the history of visual humanitarian communication 
and uses of images in humanitarian settings demonstrates how the 
representational modes and the ways in which the images were arranged to 
address their viewers reflect the historical preconditions, predominant 
mindsets and the dominant ‘humanitarian spirit’ of the time and context of 
their presentation. That is, the plot of the humanitarian play follows a certain 
pattern, that of the classic Aristotelean tragedy. This was already evident in 
the era of the Enlightenment, but particularly in the contemporary era the 
humanitarian play, the narrative or the unconscious beliefs underlying the 
plot, requires a certain stereotypical cast and certain simplicity, as the thesis 
showed. 
The historical chapter evidenced how emotion evoking visual 
representations of the Lisbon earthquake of 1755 enabled the then-
contemporary spectating audiences to imagine a shared vulnerable human 
family in need of protection. These images represented the dawn of the 
secular Enlightenment discourse on the protection of humanity, rights of the 
man, and cosmopolitan morality and they communicated strong sentiments 
and fostered messages of a shared human kind for the spectators of the era 
giving rise to the ascending concept of spectatorial sympathy and a thriving 
‘cult of sensibility.’975 As the chapter evidenced, later representations of 
suffering followed similar patterns and in their turn constructed the cultural 
discourses of Western humanitarianism.  One important later addition to 
this humanitarian discourse were the images produced of the liberated Nazi 
concentration camps that were predominantly signified in the Western 
political sphere as marking the downfall of humanity and the absolute evil 
nature of the Nazi regime, thus forming a plot of their own. These Holocaust 
images became the icons of the ‘never again’ paradigm; they were framed as 
the ground zero of humanity, which thrust the international community into 
formulating the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and into 
furthering the international institutionalization of the protection of 
humanity. As was asserted, this process of institutionalization demonstrated 
all the hallmarks of images of suffering being part of and being used for 
political purposes: Firstly, the Western readings of the images were partly 
politically formulated, as they also emphasized the nature of the Western 
forces as the winners of the war, and, secondly, they instituted a new moral 
compass for the world reflecting the predominant Western notions on 
humanity and the perils facing it in the post Second World War era. 
This process of institutionalization and increasing humanitarianism gave 
rise to optimist belief in the political power of images of suffering. In the 
1970s, the horrific images of suffering and human loss describing the 
Vietnam War were politically molded into another ‘never again’ message but 
this time for anti-war discourses. Yet, as I wrote, the theory regarding the 
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Vietnam War effect, asserting that images of suffering can alter the course of 
foreign policy, has been convincingly questioned, as the prevalent sentiments 
of the time (in the US in particular) had already turned against the 
continuation of the Vietnam War by the time.976 Thus, the history of 
humanitarian visual communication indicates that, rather than forcefully 
change politics, images of suffering and human right violations are more 
likely to be presented, arranged, intended to be read and signified along the 
lines of the contemporarily prevalent, appropriate contexts of feeling and 
attitude. And thus, as also Sontag asserts, in the light of the history I 
concluded that images of the pain of others cannot solely create a moral 
position, but that they often reinforce an existing one, and, thus, the framings 
of such imagery also reflect the topical preferred meanings and the 
humanitarian ethos of their time.977  
Yet, as the thesis showed, today the everyday life of Western publics is 
unparalleledly abundant with visual records telling of dramatic destinies and 
violent experiences of distant strangers. This is due to several parallel 
singularities. First of all, novelties in the media sphere—such as ever more 
frantic mediation tempo and global flows of images, induced by, for instance, 
digital technology and the growing use of social media—bring the tragedies of 
distant others increasingly vigorously under the sight of safe (Western) 
onlookers. Secondly, the recent strengthening of the status of 
humanitarianism within the international sphere and its gradual rise from 
the margins of the international politics into a central paradigm determining 
the international community has made humanitarianism a vital source of 
legitimacy in the present world order to the degree that I have discussed this 
phenomena in terms of Western humanitarian world politics. 978 The 
intensified visibility of foreign suffering and need of help of distant others is, 
thus, increasingly and intentionally infiltrating the Western sphere due to the 
heightened role of human rights and humanitarian issues within the 
contemporary Western international political agenda and its legitimization.  
At the focus of this study was to analyze the visual practices that 
constitute namely the Western spectatorship and Western spectator of 
suffering. And thus I set out to analyze the practices that through visual 
representations of suffering, war and conflict constitute, produce and 
reproduce conceptions of international politics, the West and the Rest and 
hierarchies of humanity.  I asserted that images of suffering and pain, 
presented with in the humanitarian frame, are not only central to the 
functionality of the humanitarian ideology and discourse but also to 
contemporary Western international politics. I showed how 
humanitarianism functions as a hierarchical global political system, whilst 
also being a rather comprehensive mindset that strongly determines how 
people living within the Western cultural and political sphere perceive the 
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world around them, their own position as well as the position of the others in 
the global world: a forceful and infiltrating (unconscious) ideology.979 Images 
of suffering and pain presented with in the humanitarian frame are central 
for the functionality of the humanitarian ideology and discourse, as they 
interpellate their (Western) spectators and are intended to address their 
viewers according to the discursive ideological preconditions of the context of 
their presentation.  
Importantly, I proposed that, beyond humanitarian organizational actors 
and the (mainstream) media, in the recent decades and especially in the 
humanitarized international political frame, the role of the directly political—
governmental and military—actors in this regard has become increasingly 
critical, and perhaps under acknowledged. Today these actors habitually 
produce and circulate imagery of crisis situations, showcase their actions, 
and/or regulate the visual material of wars and crisis, as well as push some 
imageries into becoming well-known (media) spectacles by referring to them 
in political connections.  
In order to evidence this claim, the thesis showed how, concurrently with 
the rise of the Western humanitarian interventionist military actions in the 
1990s, the picturing of war and crisis in which the Western powers have 
played a part in, has significantly altered and that this change is linked to the 
humanitarian nature of contemporary international politics. Chapter 3 
demonstrated how the picturing of the Gulf War spelled a chance in the 
visual image of Western war. The imagery of the Gulf War was not only 
strictly controlled by governmental actors, but also for a large part produced, 
and circulated by them. The Gulf War was presented with a new visual style, 
centering on technology and the surgical nature of the Western warfare. The 
political intentions and governance behind this change are evident in the way 
the journalistic reportage of the war was effectively controlled by new means, 
such as the pool system. Part of these governmental efforts of controlling 
imagery served a theatrical purpose. To maintain the goodness and the purity 
of the morally superior Western savior, the pain induced by the Western war 
on the local populations of the operational area was effectively hidden, as was 
also the loss and injury of the Western soldiers participating in the war. The 
restrictions placed on publishing images of the coffins of deceased US 
soldiers returning to the Dover Air Force Base serve as an example of the 
governmental governance of the seeability of war induced suffering. This new 
type of a ‘cult of sensibility’ that is both sensitive to Western loss and 
vulnerability as well as the reluctant to show the suffering inflicted by 
Western warfare on the inhabitants of the crisis areas serve to create a sterile 
and surgical imagery of contemporary wars that is linked, if not almost 
necessitated, by a play scripted along the lines of liberal humanitarianism980 
in the era of the dawn of the new ‘humanitarian wars.’   
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This study has shown how the seed of this novel type of visual control and 
governance of Western wars—first sowed in the 1980s Western military 
interventions of Granada, Panama and the Falkland Islands, and later further 
developed in the 1990s Gulf War—have been effectively refined to a new level 
in the era of War on Terror and the humanitarian wars of the 2000s. Today it 
is habitual for Western governmental and military actors to produce and 
circulate imagery describing global crises and wars, and to control, govern, 
and frame war imagery. Restrictions on visual mediation of Western wars—
such as the embedding system of war journalist and photographers reporting 
Western military operations—have grown stricter, and, thus, despite of the 
even more frantic media environment, the imagery of Western war in 
popular publicity/mainstream media of the Western sphere is rather 
constricted and sanitized. The controlled nature of the Gulf War imagery can 
be perceived as a historical predecessor of the picturing of the war in 
Afghanistan.  
Chapter 5 showed how the ISAF images, showcasing the multinational 
operation in Afghanistan, present the coalition action in a humanitarian 
light, which much resemblances the way we are accustomed to picturing the 
developmental and humanitarian projects in non-Western areas. In the 
imagery of the ISAF, Western soldiers are presented in the visual figure of 
the humanitarian soldier, and the clean, precise and technologically 
advanced nature of the Western warfare is strongly visually underlined. 
These images do not show the violent side of the coalition operation, nor do 
they picture the suffering of the coalition soldiers induced by the warfare. 
Rather these images market the operation in an up-to-date humanitarian 
spirit, and they are aimed at legitimizing the operation as humane and 
necessary securitizing and civilizing project. The images are scripted to 
address the coalition populations through humane narratives widely 
accepted within the Western sphere. The contemporary phenomena of 
shying away from showing violence and suffering in Western war imagery 
can, thus, be seen as a product of humanitarization of Western warfare, and 
the increasing intermingle of politicized humanitarianism and Western 
global interventionist militarism. The scripting of the war play to be 
presented to Western audiences employs humanitarian discourses and it 
requires a certain form: the roles of the actors, the consequences of their 
actions need to be presented in an allegorical way that stays true to the 
classical roles of a tragedy play. 
Humanitarianism as such, and not merely as a mode of legitimizing wars, 
continues to play a part in contemporary international politics. But this mode 
of employing humanitarian imagery is not merely utilized by humanitarian 
organizations, but also Western governmental actors use visual 
representation describing natural catastrophes and epidemic sickness. As 
chapter 4 showed, imagery presenting Western military personnel in a 
humanitarian light were circulated by governmental actors (and also 
deployed by Western mainstream media) both at the time of the Haiti 2010 
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earthquake as well as the Ebola epidemic of 2014-2015. These images 
strongly juxtapose the non-Western weakness, suffering and sickness, with 
the militarized yet nurturing, civilizing and healing effect of the militarized 
humanitarian West. And thus I argued, the utilization of suffering imagery 
offers an emotive and effective route through which the humanitarian 
Western world order is contemporarily communicated. It can be questioned 
to what extent are such humanitarian military aid operations, which lack an 
actual military component, methods of plotting a future tragedy play, in 
which the Western military forces are again cast in the role of a savior. That 
is, to what extent are Western militaries used for purely humanitarian aims 
in order to strengthen a plot in which the Western military acts morally for 
the eyes of (non-)Western audiences.   
What is also notable in the recent Western governmental actors eagerness 
to circulate their own visual stories of their actions in global crisis zones, is 
that such tendentious, strategically and politically constructed imageries are 
not only inclined to influence the ways in which the Western spectators 
perceive the events, which the pictures describe, but in addition, these 
imageries are prone to influences the ways in which humanitarian action, as 
well as humanitarian imagery at large are apprehended by Western 
audiences. When war/militarism is framed and presented as a humanitarian 
recourse, the line between humanitarian (neutral/organizational) efforts and 
military operations gets blurred. Thus also (relatively) neutral humanitarian 
action, as well as the readings and significations of images presenting these 
actions are at risk of being affected and reacted to differently.  
Chapter 6 showed how the evil plays an important role in the Western 
humanitarian tragedy play and its plotting through visual images. The 
imageries building up the enemy narratives of the recent Western 
advisories—Osama bin Laden, Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein—
were, for a large part, produced by governmental actors. As active 
participants in script writing of the tragedy play, the Western mainstream 
media outlets habitually swiftly and eagerly utilized these imageries in their 
news production. Images picturing the toppling of the statue of Saddam 
Hussein at the Firdos Square in Baghdad—framed to signify the symbolic 
victory of the Western coalition in Iraq—quickly spread though out the 
Western media. Likewise the visually extremely symbolic imagery of the 
capture of Hussein and his medical examination while incarcerated, both 
produced by the US officials, became widespread and influential in Western 
mainstream media publicity. Likewise, the operation to capture and kill 
Osama bin Laden was thoroughly visualized through material produced and 
circulated by US governmental actors. These imageries tendentiously 
produced and strategically framed by directly political actors, constructed to 
illustrate the events purely from the point of view of the US official actors, 
reiterate the political narrative of the US practically becoming the only mode 
of visualizing the events in the Western mainstream media. Thus, these 
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politically motivated images forcefully shaped the interpretation of (Western) 
spectators of the operations.   
 Mainstream media can be perceived as a part of the political apparatus of 
the area, culture and regime that it functions in.981 The logic of picturing the 
punishment and capture narratives of the Western political adversaries 
unveils the connections of political elite, prevalent political ambiance and the 
mainstream media in shaping the popular conceptions on foreign politics in 
cahoots in the contemporary milieu. Western media acted as a force 
multiplier for the politically constructed and strategically convenient enemy 
images initially created in high-level political contexts and speeches. The 
analysis clearly shows that the circulation of the enemy representations 
within the mainstream media amplified the predominant ideological 
paradigms and dominant politically appropriate interpretations of the 
Western enemies—as well as the notions of the virtuous nature of Western 
politics—that were first and foremost built on political premises of the time.  
Control, governance, production and utilization of war and crisis imagery 
by governmental actors have, of course, been commonplace throughout 
history. But I claim that today influential Western political actors 
increasingly take up and refer to visual images of crisis and war in their 
speeches and proclamations regarding foreign crisis and international 
events. This visual referencing, I argue, is due to the increasingly central role 
of humanitarianism, human rights and Western interventionism in the 
international politics of the recent era. As discussion of the Ghouta chemical 
weapons attack in chapter 7 showed, by referring to images of suffering and 
abuses of human rights these actors bring the mentioned visual material into 
the wider political discussion expanding their public exposure, and, at the 
same time, frame the images in tendentious and strategic and political ways.  
This political motivation behind the way that the images of the Ghouta 
atrocity were used by the Western mainstream media and political elite 
became even clearer, when contrasted with those of the Russian political 
leaders and the Russian media. Firstly, the political choice behind 
interpreting these images, whether true or not, was revealed by the choice of 
the Russian mainstream media and political speeches that did not generally 
regard these images as spectacular or as pointing to the guilt of al-Assad. 
That is, both in the Western media and the Russian media these images were 
therefore signified and given meaning along the lines of the prevalent 
political context of their presentation. Thus, I argue that even today, in the 
age of citizen journalism, of relatively free, global and social media based 
mediation, the significations and contextual readings of images of crisis and 
wars are, for the most part, still largely signified by their regionally 
segregated, cultural and political surroundings.  
Secondly, the analysis of the treatment of the Ghouta attack also 
questioned the idea suggesting that, if the surrounding world, which is able 
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to help, only would see the suffering of others in more effective and direct 
ways, we would care more and would more forcefully react to the suffering of 
distant others and act to alleviate the suffering, which constantly surfaces 
when discussing the effects of suffering images.982 This causally formed 
optimistic belief in the political potency of crisis imagery has been 
reoccurring in the course of the evolution of the technological means of visual 
meditation.983 I called this effect ‘technologically driven causality optimism’. 
Yet, the case of the Ghouta images suggests that even though the surrounding 
world now would be (in theory and from the view point of technology) able to 
see all the calamites in nearly real-time, in reality we still encounter the 
world through the particular political and cultural frame and through images, 
which have been percolated through the mainstream media’s ideological 
machinery. Technology and new means of visual mediation have the 
potentiality to change a lot in many regards, but it seems that the visual 
communication enabled by the social media has not ultimately changed the 
way images of pain, crisis and war are still today, for the most part, 
contextualized, framed, arranged and politically and ideologically mediated 
for our awareness by the powers that be. I concluded that, the new 
technology does not have the power to revolutionize how the political and 
strategic bearings in a foreign political setting still speak louder than even the 
most horrendous images of pain, suffering and human loss.  
That is, what has remained rather constant is how the images of crisis, 
war and suffering are produced, arranged and framed, and by whom and 
with what intentions, and this constancy largely determines how we perceive 
the turbulent world surrounding us. In the contemporary situation in which 
governmental and military actors regularly, purposefully and strategically 
produce, circulate and frame such imagery, more attention and caution 
should be paid to the utilization of images of suffering by the political, 
governmental and military actors in international political settings. Although 
this work has predominantly centered on the Western framings and 
utilization of such images, more attention should likewise be paid to the non-
Western political framings of images of wars, crisis and suffering in 
international political settings. The West is not the only player in this ample 
and growingly influential field of visual politics of international 
(humanitarian) politics. Rather, for example, the Russian framings and 
utilization of images of crisis, war and suffering in the contemporary 
international political setting (as was briefly discussed in chapter 7) offer a 
very intriguing subject for analysis.  
Thus, whilst images of suffering create a hope or an optimism regarding 
their ability to change minds and impact on (humanitarian) politics, the 
thesis has shown that in reality the impact of images of suffering is curbed by 
the cultural context of their release and by the media and governmental 
actors mediating such images. The structure of a theatrical tragedy play 
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guides the script and the role division in disaster stories, not only because of 
the political will to tell simple stories, in which the West is a victorious savior, 
but also because of subconscious cultural assumptions. As the thesis showed, 
one of the key functions of the tragedy play is catharsis: an emotional healing 
release or an absolution from the vexing feelings aroused by visually 
witnessing the suffering of others. After being exposed to images telling of 
the violent or otherwise disturbing destinies of fellow humans, the spectator 
needs to be provided a route into feeling at ease with her/himself; a sensation 
of being good, easing the pain, acting morally, helping out—a cathartic 
release from the sentiments of pity, fear and guilt aroused by spectating the 
hardships of others. Without a passage to catharsis humanitarian imagery 
would only leave the spectators feeling miserable, even paralyzed. The ways 
in which humanitarian imagery suggest or provide routes to attain the 
catharsis reflects the coeval humanitarian ethos and function of the 
humanitarian system. As the history of visual images of pain in humanitarian 
conjunctions shows, the suggested routes to catharsis may come in the form 
of opposing the slave trade, boycotting products seen to cause suffering, 
becoming a pacifist, signing a petition, donating to relief aid, or becoming a 
sponsor of a Third World child.  
Importantly, as the analysis into the contemporary imageries, dealt with 
in chapters 5 and 7 in particular, indicated today consenting to, approving or 
supporting Western interventionist military actions in foreign areas is also 
suggested as a route to a contemporary humanitarian catharsis. The ISAF 
imagery on the war in Afghanistan presented the operation as a channel for a 
better life for the populations of the operational area and as a means of 
achieving a more secure and peaceful condition for the wider surrounding 
world. Thus, in their context, as images targeted to address the citizens of 
coalition member states, the catharsis they suggested was democratic 
consent to the operation: a will help the Afghans, to restore the right moral 
order, to safeguard security and to pave the road to a better world by the 
means of militarized humanitarianism. Likewise, in the rhetoric of the 
Western leaders (as well as to some degree also in the arrangements of the 
images in Western mainstream media), the images describing the suffering 
inflicted by the use of chemical weapons in Syria were framed as carrying 
moral imperative of visually confronting the horrors—and then, as a 
catharsis, consenting to a military intervention planned to oust al-Assad from 
power. Again, as with Afghanistan, a (targeted) military operation was 
rationalized as the route to alleviating the suffering of Syrians, forcing al-
Assad to stop his illegal warfare against his countrymen and providing 
security for the inhabitants of the neighboring countries, as well as the rest of 
the world.  
In the cases of the images of Afghanistan and Syria the route to catharsis 
was suggested to be attainable by supporting the humanitarian order, by 
propping up Western strength and international power and supporting the 
right of the Western powers to humanitarianly intervene in the affairs of 
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non-Western sovereign states and foreign areas. That is, war was suggested 
as the route to a better, more secure and humane world and marketed as a 
method of preventing war itself. This perhaps is not unique in the history of 
humanitarianism, since as Michael Barnett notes, some of the greatest 
crimes of the last few centuries have been carried out in the name of 
alleviating suffering and improving human welfare. In this way there is 
nothing particularly new or groundbreaking in justifying and claiming the 
necessity of the use of violence in order to protect lives from malevolent 
forces, or in humanitarian military intervention, as it is habitually called 
today. 984 Nevertheless (visually) framing Western war as a humanitarian 
medium tells a poignant story of the contemporary times, of the 
humanitarian politics of today as well as of the position of visual images in 
these militarized humanitarian settings. Therefore what is to be borne in 
mind, when looking at the images of today’s war, is that there has never been 
a war that was not rationalized as just and necessary; it is only the justifying 
narratives and the legitimizing components that vary according to time. 
Thus, the ability to read images, to identify their narratives, to detect their 
intentions and “to learn to see the frame that prevents us from seeing the 
frame that blinds us to what we see,”985 is urgently needed today.  
In addition to offering a route to the humanitarian catharsis, through 
consenting to or supporting humanitarianly rationalized and legitimized 
military operations, chapter 6 of this study showed how also catching, 
humiliating and finally killing the political enemies of the West has been 
presented as a route to a cathartic feeling of relief of restoring of the right 
moral, humanitarian order. In the cases of Osama bin Laden, Muammar 
Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein, neutralizing, defeating, humiliating and 
ultimately killing the foreign leaders opposing the humanitarian order were 
framed as humanitarian acts. Thus, paradoxically, the emotional cleansing 
and healing experience was in these cases achieved not by solidary emotions 
and actions customarily seen as humanitarian, but by celebrating the victory 
of the Western moral order and the death of these evil characters framed as 
inhuman, or even non-human. These, in many ways for humanitarian 
imagery exceptional visual spectacles unveil the concealed violence, 
embedded deep in the Western humanitarian political narrative.  
Supporting wars and celebrating the killing of the enemy were not, 
however, the only suggested or valid routes into the cathartic state by the 
images discussed. Also helping the weaker non-Westerners struggling with 
epidemic illness, aiding them to cope with the after effects of disastrous 
natural catastrophes (as was discussed in chapter 4), or securitizing areas in 
turmoil with the overwhelming, militarized Western power were suggested as 
the right way to act by some of the images presented in the contemporary 
frame. This was seen in the cases of the Haiti earthquake, the Western 
African Ebola epidemic. This addressing was also present in the imageries 
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describing terrorism in Africa, as well as the ISAF Afghanistan images. But 
consenting to the militarized helping endeavors was not the only passage to 
catharsis suggested by these imageries: also containing threats such as 
epidemic illness, terrorism, chaos and flows of migration in the areas of their 
origin, and preventing the trouble from spreading from the non-Western 
sphere into the Western sphere can be seen to have been the cathartic 
message of the images. This was evident in the imagery of the ‘compassionate 
invasion’ of Haiti, as well as in the imagery of the European refugee crisis 
discussed in chapter 4. In these cases containment was manifested in the 
form of efforts in halting migration flows and containing the human masses 
and complicating their moving and crossing of the political boundaries of 
humanity—in other words preventing the non-Western humans from moving 
from the non-Western sphere into the Western sphere. Thus, seeing the risks 
and threats taken care of in foreign areas can be seen to have been the 
cathartic and anxiety relieving experience that was suggested by these 
images. This kind of addressing suggests that, when the Westerners 
themselves are safe from harm originating from the turbulent non-Western 
world, the right humanitarian order is restored.  
All in all, the analysis of the contemporary images proposes that the 
recognition of the humanitarianly defined global power of the West and its 
supporting, militarized operations, carried out in the name of Western 
civilizing, securitizing and life-saving endeavors, can be seen as the most 
popular way of achieving humanitarian catharsis today. The observably 
intended readings suggested by the images within the Western humanitarian 
frame, most commonly claim that supporting or consenting to 
humanitarianized Western military actions is the most effective way to ease 
the pain, or even prevent the suffering of the non-Western others. In other 
words, in the contemporary visual humanitarian tragedy theatre the images 
are often framed so that catharsis is presented as attainable by supporting 
the militarized Western moral world order and by maintaining the global 
hierarchy by confining threats to non-Western areas, as well as by trying to 
prevent the different strata of humanity from getting mixed.  
As the thesis has asserted, humanitarian visual communication is founded 
on the differentiation of the spectators, and the spectated, the safe (Western) 
on-lookers, and the (non-Western) suffering victims. From this juxtaposition 
of us and them, and from the overall hierarchical arrangement central to 
humanitarian order and communication, also stem the typical, historically 
formed responses to the suffering of others: development and civilizing 
efforts. From the same juxtaposition also rise the humanitarianly legitimated 
military operations aimed at changing and—at least on a rhetorical level—
enhancing the living conditions of the suffering others. Partly motivated by 
the framings of images of suffering and their emotional appeal, the Western 
world has for centuries tried to educate and develop the (non-Western) 
‘immature’ individuals of foreign areas prone to suffering by multiple means. 
The often unspoken intention behind these efforts has frequently been—and 
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largely still is—to ’civilize’ and bring up these global adolescents (the objects 
of the humanitarian action), in order for them to reach the higher standards 
of Western way of life (or ‘civilization’)—and, moreover, to contain the 
turmoil and instability from spreading from the non-Western crisis areas 
into the Western regime,986 in other words, to prevent the global adolescents 
from making the tragic mistake—from committing hamartia.  
Yet, in the visual theatrical humanitarian arrangement the suffering of the 
non-Western others—the corporeally displayed consequence of hamartia on 
the sufferers—is essential for its functioning. In spite of this essentiality, the 
traditional and historically prevalent mode of visually representing the 
suffering others in disaster-stricken bare life imagery and through spectacles 
of vulnerability and bodily weakness (underlining the non-Western 
hamartia) has from the 1980s onwards increasingly gathered criticism. 
Because of this criticism, humanitarian (organizational) imagery has been 
revamped by compiling codes of conduct on how to present images and to 
convey messages concerning the Third World and other objects of 
humanitarian actions. Due to this critique, humanitarian imagery has partly 
evolved and has come to include more positive arrangements, which attempt 
to address the spectators through ‘spectacles of self-determination and hope’. 
In other words, these representational arrangements have strived to dispel 
hamartia, that is to say, an essential feature of the theatrical arrangement, 
and thus they have attempted to bridge the distance and the moral gap 
between the spectators and the spectated. 987   
In line with these attempts, the contemporary imageries produced by 
Western governmental and military actors have partly leaned towards such 
more positive picturing, familiar from the humanitarian organizational 
settings, and molded their representational practices for their own strategic 
benefit. This tendency is perceivable, for example, in the images produced by 
the NATO-led ISAF operation in Afghanistan discussed in chapter 5. As the 
thesis describe, in these images pain and suffering are predominantly 
replaced by developmental themes, the distress caused by the war remains 
largely visually unaddressed, and the coexistence of foreign military troops 
and the locals is pictured in sceneries of mutual understanding, which dispel 
cultural difference and replace it with colonializing overtones.  
Nevertheless, this more positive (and less suffering-centered) mode of 
visual representation has not fully extended itself to the entirety of 
humanitarian imagery. Problems of visually representing the distress of 
others through positive imagery picturing the recipients of help as active, 
even happy characters—quite similar with the happy and safe remote 
(Western) spectators—has been seen to lead to a situation in which the need 
of help of the depicted individuals (and the groups they represent) has been 
undermined in the minds of the spectators. This representational practice 
can be criticized for creating false impressions of the reality of the objects of 
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the images by implying that they have the means to act in the world in ways 
that the average Westerner does. Moreover, the positive fashion of picturing 
those in need, sprouting from the organizational sphere, has not become 
widespread within the mainstream news media’s representational practices 
of mediating foreign crisis and distant non-Western suffering. This is despite 
the journalistic recommendations for picturing (foreign) suffering with more 
ethical consideration. Thus, in spite of the reconfiguration of organizational 
imagery, much of imagery of non-Western suffering circulated in the 
Western mainstream media still predominantly is presented through the 
imagery of bodily suffering, weakness and turmoil.  
Yet, concurrently the visual representations showing Western suffering in 
crude imagery of bodily pain are, overwhelmingly blocked and governed by 
cultural norms, media’s codes of taste and decency, as well as by direct 
political control/censorship. As the thesis argued, publishing visualizations 
of Western suffering is often seen as offending the individual space, 
personhood, honor and dignity of the sufferer depicted, and thus images of 
Western pain are rarely circulated in the West. These norms governing the 
representation of Western suffering do not apply to images presenting non-
Western suffering. As was discussed in chapter 4, this uneven 
representational mode results in humanity being divided into different 
strata, which are evaluated based on different norms and weighted on a 
different scale. This prevalent and strongly othering arrangement, located 
deep in the logic of humanitarian communication can, thus, be seen as a 
result of the hierarchical system of global humanitarianism and, ultimately, 
of the power structures of the dominant world order. Thus, the humanitarian 
hamartia—the tragic mistake leading to suffering and tragedy—of non-
Western individuals most often appears to be the grounded in the fact of not 
being a Westerner and not belonging to the protected, comprehensively 
insured988 global elite.  
I argue that the visually manifested suffering and hamartia of the non-
Westerners is an essential component of the hierarchical system of 
humanitarianism and necessary for the functionality of the plot of the 
humanitarian tragedy theater. Without the visually manifested corporal 
hamartia of non-Westerners the visual humanitarian communication (in the 
context of media representations in particular) does not seem to work. On 
the one hand, this can be seen to have been the case with the 2015 images 
picturing the refugees in Europe as like ‘us’, discussed in chapter 4: The cell-
phone using, well-clothed and able-bodied refugees were not seen as being 
entitled to help in Western (anti-multiculturalist/racist) political speech 
because of their appearance and material belongings resembling the Western 
style and level of well-being. Hamartia was missing, and, instead, the West 
saw hopeful and aspiring ‘economic refugees.’ On the other hand, it has been 
shown, when refugees are pictured in a state of bodily precariousness, weak 
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and exhibiting traits of cultural difference, it is then again habitually argued 
that they would not fit in (in Europe/West) and should not come to ‘our 
societies to cause trouble’; in other words, these (non-Western) humans 
attempting to cross the hierarchical global boundaries were not seen to 
belong to the same sphere of humanity with the Westerners.  
Just as the global humanitarian system thrives on hierarchy, difference 
and separation of the different strata of humanity, also visual humanitarian 
communication is founded on the tragic, global, culturally and politically 
hierarchical difference of the spectators and the spectated and on the 
necessity of hamartia. As the representational practices of human suffering 
(and their global, political, and regime-driven difference) follow the 
functions, practice and spirit of humanitarianism dominant in their era, 
efforts to change the visual narratives by a conscious and deliberate plan are 
unlikely to be efficient before the whole system of (humanitarian) global 
order is transformed. Changing the visual style will not change the political 
intentionality or the imperialistic, hierarchical logic and the power structures 
of the manifold (politicized) practices of contemporary global 
humanitarianism. Because of their muteness, visual representational modes 
simply trail the overall logic.  
Thus it may be concluded that, contemporarily, exhibiting the suffering of 
others through graphic images of bodily pain, to a large degree, is not about 
informing the (Western) spectators of distant tragic events of the suffering of 
others in order to arouse empathy and to provoke humanitarian actions, but 
rather the images of crisis and suffering seems to be increasingly about 
indicating the status of the sufferers within the global hierarchy of humanity. 
Today the humanitarian imagery is a central arena of communicating the 
world order and manifesting the globally conditional value of (human) life in 
its inconclusiveness and the limited universality of humanity. 
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